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ABSTRACT 
 
 
EXPLORING WOMEN COLUMNISTS’ “IN-BETWEEN” POSITIONALITY IN 
PUBLIC SPHERE: A STUDY INTO NARRATIVES ON FEMINIST IDENTITY 
IN CONTEMPORARY TURKEY 
 
 
Ünal Abaday, Didem 
 
Ph.D., Department of Political Science 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Saime Özçürümez 
 
 
June 2015 
 
This dissertation investigates women columnists’ narratives on feminist self-
identification with the aim to disclose the narrative lines along which feminist 
identity is negotiated in 2000’s Turkey. In the contemporary social and political 
milieu in which neoliberal, neo-conservative discourses undermine feminist demands 
and the poststructuralist critique makes it difficult to articulate stable identity claims, 
the issue of feminist self-identification comes to the forefront as a critical theme 
underlying the discussions on the future of feminism. These global debates also 
resonate at the local level with a unique tune that derives its peculiarity from the 
social and political context in question. Keeping this in mind, I trace the 
repercussions of the debates outlined above in the Turkish social and political 
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context. It has been widely argued that the current Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) rule in Turkey is heavily characterized by a neoliberal, neoconservative and 
antifeminist political stance. Given the antifeminist ethos of the current political 
landscape, public negotiations of feminist self identification in contemporary Turkey 
display multiple layers of complexity that are difficult to disentangle. This 
complexity begs the question of how feminist identity is negotiated and narrated in a 
discursive field in which antifeminist discourses are constantly reproduced through 
certain discursive opportunity structures. 
Against this background, this dissertation particularly focuses on the 
narratives of women columnists who are well-known public intellectual figures in 
contemporary Turkey. The study of media is especially important for a study that 
intends to examine the positionality of narratives on feminism in public deliberation. 
It is worthwhile to investigate the alternative media domains in the high circulation 
mass media and map out the zones of potential that can contribute to the counter 
hegemonic attempts challenging the contemporary conservative gender regime in 
Turkey. The study of women columnists’ narratives on feminism and feminist 
identity may provide us a fertile ground to delve into the discursive openings in the 
mainstream media through which profeminist discourses can acquire a considerable 
standing in public deliberation. It can provide us critical tools to nuance our reading 
of public sphere by disclosing the functioning mechanisms of publics that constantly 
shift between hegemonic and subaltern publics, which we could name as “publics in-
between”. Following the research goals described above, this study intends to delve 
into the prominent features of the positionality of women columnists in 
contemporary Turkey vis-a-vis the political struggles over the gender regime and 
shed light on the intricacies, the promising aspects and the limitations in women 
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columnists’ narratives on feminism and feminist identity. As a result, it aims to 
disclose how women columnists situate themselves vis-a-vis feminist subaltern 
publics in contemporary Turkey.    
Keywords: Public Sphere, Women Columnists, Feminist Identification, 
Narratives 
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                   ÖZET 
 
KADIN KÖŞE YAZARLARININ KAMUSAL ALANDAKİ “ARA” 
KONUMLARINI KEŞFETMEK: GÜNÜMÜZ TÜRKİYE’SİNDE FEMİNİST 
KİMLİK ÜZERİNE ANLATILARA BİR BAKIŞ 
 
Ünal Abaday, Didem 
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Saime Özçürümez 
 
Haziran 2015 
 
Bu çalışma, kadın köşe yazarlarının feminist kimlik üzerine kurdukları anlatıları 
inceleyerek 2000’ler Türkiyesi’nde kamusal alanda feminist kimlik üzerine kurulan 
anlatı çizgilerini ortaya koymayı amaçlar. Postmodern, postkolonyal eleştirilerin ve 
yükselişteki neoliberal, muhafazakâr söylemlerin etkisiyle feminist kimliğin 
sabitleyici unsurlarının uğradığı irtifa kaybını gözeterek, feminist aidiyetle ilgili 
tartışmaları ele alır. Bu çerçevede, feminist kimlikle ilgili tartışmaların, feminizmin 
geleceğini biçimlendirecek kritik sorular ortaya koyduğu fikrinden yola çıkar.  
Feminist literatürde kimlik ve aidiyet konularıyla ilgili güncel tartışmalar 
yerel bağlamda kendine has bir tonla belirmektedir. Bu çalışma, söz konusu 
tartışmaların Türkiye bağlamında nasıl biçimlendiğini inceler. Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi’nin (AKP) yön verdiği günümüz Türkiyesi’nde etkin olan muhafazakâr, 
antifeminist toplumsal cinsiyet söyleminin teşkil ettiği söylemsel sınırları tahlil eder 
ve bu çerçevede, kamusal alanda feminist kimlik üzerine kurulan anlatılarda öne 
vii 
 
çıkan yapıtaşlarına, anlatı çizgilerine ve karmaşık yapılara ışık tutmaya çalışır. 
Sosyal ve siyasi iklimin antifeminist bileşenleri karşısında, feminist kimliğin 
kamusal alanda çok katmanlı, çözümlemesi zor anlatılarla tezahür ettiği görüşünü 
savunur.   
Çalışmanın ana noktası yüksek tirajlı gazetelerde yazan ve kamusal 
tartışmalara yön veren kadın köşe yazarlarının feminist kimlik üzerine kurdukları 
anlatılardır. Medyayla ilgili çalışmalar, feminizm üzerine anlatıların kamusal 
alandaki konumunu değerlendirebilmek açısından kritik önem taşır. Bu çalışma da, 
muhafazakâr toplumsal cinsiyet söylemlerini karşı-hegemonik bir yaklaşımla 
eleştirebilen farklı medya alanlarını, bu alanların olanaklarını ve sınırlarını tayin 
eder. Bu analizin ışığında, medyadaki profeminist söylem alanlarının kuruluşuna ışık 
tutar ve kadın köşe yazarlarının kamusal alandaki konumlarını, kendilerini feminist 
karşı-kamuya göre nasıl/nerede konumlandırdıklarını irdeler. Kadın köşe yazarlarının 
kamusal alandaki girift konumlarını irdelemek, bize, hegemonik ve karşı kamular 
arasında gidip gelen, “ara-kamu” diye adlandırabileceğimiz bir söylem alanına 
tekabül eden özne konumlarının kuruluş ve çalışma mekanizmalarını anlamamızı 
sağlar.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kamusal Alan, Kadın Köşe Yazarları, Feminist Kimlik, 
Anlatı 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I owe debts of gratitude to many people. First and foremost, I am deeply indebted to 
Prof Dr. Dilek Cindoğlu for her fundamental role in my doctoral work. This 
dissertation would not have been possible without her guidance and encouragement. 
Throughout this work, she generously offered her intellectual and spiritual support as 
well as her expert guidance in every possible way.  
I would like to express my gratitude to Assist. Prof. Saime Özçürümez for her 
time and valuable feedback. My special thanks go to Prof. Dr. Simten Coşar who has 
always been very supportive throughout this Ph.D work. Carefully reading the drafts 
and offering her enlightening comments, she helped me see more clearly what I 
really aim for in this dissertation. I feel privileged to have her as a mentor. I also 
would like to thank Prof. Dr. Elisabeth Özdalga whose guidance greatly contributed 
to this study. She generously supported this research project and offered her kindest 
help. My thanks go to Prof. Dr. Alev Çınar who broadened my mind through her 
insightful suggestions and comments. I also thank Assist. Prof. Özlem Savaş for her 
valuable contributions.  
I thank TÜBİTAK for the financial support provided by the domestic doctoral 
fellowship and the international research fellowship programs that made the 
completion of this study possible.  
ix 
 
I am indebted to Assoc. Prof. Zakia Salime for helping me arrange affiliation 
at the Department of Women’s and Gender Studies of Rutgers University between 
June 2014 and April 2015. Dr. Anna Loutfi from the Department of Gender Studies 
of Central European University was also kind enough to offer me supervision in the 
fall semester of 2013.  
I wish to express my deepest gratitude to the women columnists who agreed 
to participate in this study. Without their contributions, this study would not have 
been possible.    
Last but not least, I am deeply grateful to my family for their endless support 
and encouragement throughout this entire journey. My hearfelt thanks especially to 
my dear mother Meral Ünal... 
And to Ali, for sharing the joy of life with me...   
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………….…………...iii 
ÖZET………………………………………………………………………………..vi 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………………………………………......viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………….x 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………..1 
CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW ON IDENTITY POLITICS……………..22 
2.1. A Brief Survey on The Rise of Identity Politics and Its Contemporary 
Dilemmas…………………………………………………………………....22  
2.2. Feminism and Identity Politics: ………………………………………..29 
 2.2.1. Butler’s Performative Theory and Critique of Identity…….......31 
 2.2.2. The Category of “Woman………………………………………33 
  2.2.2.1. End of Feminist Politics?..............................................34 
     2.2.3. An Attempt to Resolve the “End of Feminist Politics” Debate..37 
                 2.2.4.Postfeminisms…..……………………………………………….39 
                 2.2.5. Identity Politics and Feminism in Turkey in 2000’s…………...46  
 
CHAPTER III: INTERPRETIVE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK……………...53 
3.1. Mid-way Theories in Feminist Debates………………………………...53 
 3.1.1. Metaphors About “Subject in Process………………………….61 
    3.1.1.1. Mestiza…………….………………………….............62 
  3.1.1.2. Nomad…………………………………………….......64 
  3.1.1.3. Cyborg………………………………………………..67 
 
3.2. Attempts to Generate A New Terminology Instead of “Identity”……...70 
 3.2.1. Identity As “Ungrounded Ground……………………………...73 
   3.2.2. Identity As “Interpretive Horizon”…………………………….77 
         3.2.3. “Identification” Instead of Identity…………………………….84 
         3.2.4. Narrative Identity……………………………………………….89 
             3.2.5. Interrelational Identity…………………………………………..94 
 
    3.3. Useful Theoretical Tools………………………………………………100 
xi 
 
             3.3.1.Intersectionality……………….………………………………..100 
                     3.3.2. Strategic essentialism/ “Strategic” identities.…………………103 
         3.3.3. Coalition Politics.……………………………………………...105 
 
  3.4. Feminist Self-Identification and the post-Habermasian Feminist                   
Critique of Public Sphere………………………………………………..…..109 
            3. 4. 1. Feminist Critiques of the Habermasian Model………………112 
         3.4.2. Counter-publicity……………………………………………...116 
         3.4.3. Mass Media, Counter-publics and Women Columnists………123 
 
               CHAPTER IV: METHODOLOGY……………………………………………….127 
4.1. Semi-structured in-depth Interviews………………..………………....127 
4.2. Research Participants: Women Columnists…………………………...128   
4.3. About the Interviews and Interview Questions………………………..133 
            4.4.The Questions, Dilemmas and Important Points Regarding the            
            Operationalization of Feminist Self-Identification…………….…………..136 
4.5. The Dilemmas of Feminist Self-identification………………………..141 
            4.6. Narrative Analysis: Tracing Women Columnists’ Approach to Feminism     
                          in Narrative………………………………………………………………...147 
           4.6.1.The Narrative Turn in Social    Science………………………147 
           4.6.2. Doing Narrative Analysis...…………………………………..149 
           4.6.3. Identity and Narratives…...…………………………………..150 
 4.6.3.1. Characteristic Features of Narratives…………151 
 4.6.3.2 Narrative Structures, Themes and Context……154 
  
CHAPTER V: HEGEMONIC DISCOURSES ON FEMINISM IN TURKEY 
UNDER THE AKP YEARS……………………………………………………….156 
5.1. The AKP Rule, Gender Politics and the Field of Discursivity….…....156
  5.1.1 The Neoliberal-Conservative Alliance, the Authoritarian Political                     
         Culture under the AKP Rule and Politics of Gender...........................164 
         5.1.2. The Antifeminist Ethos of the Era…………………………….166 
                     5.1.3. The Operating Mechanisms of Discourse, Discursive Opportunity     
                     Structures and the AKP Rule………………………………………...176 
5.2. The Feminist Subaltern Publics in Contemporary Turkey……………183 
  5.2.1. Bodily Issues, Embodied Protests………………………….....188 
  5.2.2. Violence Against Women……………………………………..195 
         5.2.3. Veiling and Prospects for Collaborative Feminist Politics……200 
         5.2.4. Profeminist Intervention into Patriarchal Discourses…………202 
 
CHAPTER VI: WOMEN COLUMNISTS’ WRITINGS ABOUT GENDER 
ISSUES: PUBLIC SPHERE AND THE LIMITS OF DISCOURSE……………...209   
 
6.1. Critical Points and Prominent Themes in Women Columnists’      
Writings…………………………………………………………………….210 
         6.1.1.Violence Against Women……...………………………………210 
         6.1.2. Women in Politics…………………………..............................216 
         6.1.3.Abortion Debates…………………...………………………….219 
         6.1.4. The Issue of Headscarf ……..…………………………………223 
xii 
 
         6.1.5. Critique of Patriarchal Statements of Male Elite…..……….…230  
                     6.1.6. Challenging Sexist Discourses Targeting at Female Public               
                     Figures such as Aylin Nazlıaka, Güldal Mumcu and Nuray Mert..…231 
                     6.1.7. Other Patriarchal Public Declarations and Women Columnists’                     
                     Criticisms ……………………………………………………..…….232 
 
CHAPTER VII: NARRATIVES ON FEMINIST IDENTITY IN SECULAR 
WOMEN COLUMNISTS’ INTERVIEWS………………………………………..237 
  
7.1. Main Themes in Secular Women Columnists’ Narratives on Feminist   
                          Identity…………………………………………………………………….238 
 7.1.1. Gender Awareness in Profession……………………………...238 
         7.1.2. About Being a Woman Writer…………………………..........251 
7.2. Meanings of Feminism for Columnists……………………………….262 
         7.2.1. Relationship to Feminism and Feminist Identity……………..264  
7.3. Narratives on AKP’s Gender Politics…………………………………281 
7.4. Concluding Remarks…………………………………………………..284 
 
CHAPTER VIII: ISLAMIC FEMINISM AND PIOUS WOMEN COLUMNISTS IN 
CONTEMPORARY TURKEY……………………………………………………287  
 
8.1.Political Meanings Attached To Veiling: The Post-1980 Period………289   
            8.2. Veiled Women and Islamist Politics……..……………………………292 
8.3. Pious Women Writers As Influential Public Figures in Turkey………297  
8.4.Core Debates on Islamic Feminism……………………………………302  
 8.4.1.Accomodation of Islamic Feminism in Third Wave    
         Feminism……………………………………………………………..305 
8.5.Pious Women Columnists’ Narratives on Islam, Feminism and Islamic          
Feminism…………………………………………………………………...306  
  8.5.1. Attempts To Disclose Women’s History/Memory and Rewrite  
  Official History From the Viewpoint of Pious Women in Turkey …306 
8.5.2. Media, Gender and Being a Pious Woman Professional in Media: 
An Intersectional Approach………...……………………………….309 
  8.5.3. Pious Women Writers, Intellectual Legitimacy and the Literary        
                     Field………………………………………………………………….313 
 8.5.4. The Term “Woman Writer”…………...………………………320 
 8.5.5. Islam, Feminism and Islamic Feminism………………………325  
 8.5.6.Critique of Western Secular Feminisms...……………………..334  
  8.5.7.Critique of Secular Feminist Narratives and Feminist Movements  
  in Contemporary Turkey…………………………………………….339  
 8.5.8. The Label “Feminist”…………………………………………350  
  8.5.9.Narratives on the AKP’s Gender Policies and Veiled Women’s  
  Status in Contemporary Turkey……………………….…………….359 
 8.5.10. Concluding Remarks………………………………………...365 
 
CHAPTER IX: INTRICATE IDENTITIES/ VULNERABLE POSITIONALITIES: 
FINAL ANALYSIS ON WOMEN COLUMNISTS’ NEGOTIATION OF 
FEMINIST SELF-IDENTIFICATION……………………………………………370  
 
xiii 
 
9.1. Feminist Scholarship and Puzzling Identity Narratives……………....370 
9.2. The Idea of Narrative and Narrative Tools for Exploring Feminist  
Self-Identification….……………………………………………….……...379 
9.3. Profeminist Tones in Women Columnists’ Narratives………….……385 
9.4. Generic Existence: Profession Instead of 
Identity………………………………………...…………………………...392 
 9.4.1. Neoliberal Individualistic Logic and Women Columnists’  
 Narratives……………………………………………………………396 
 9.4.2 Women Columnists as Pioneer Women in the Public  
 Sphere………………………………………………………..………400  
9.5. Women Columnists’ Reflections on their Relationship with    
Feminism…………………………………………………………...………404  
 9.5.1 Islamic Feminism in Women Columnists’ Narratives…………409 
9.6. The Implications of the Public Context……………………………….412  
  9.6.1. AKP’s Patriarchal Gender Politics and Its Implications for  
  Feminist Identity…………………….……………………………….414  
 
CHAPTER X: CONCLUSION……………...…………………………………….421 
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………….436 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
An overarching neoliberal logic characterizing social, political and economic 
structures appears as the chief modality of governance in the contemporary era. 
(Harvey 2005, Brown 2006) Governing each and every domain of life, neoliberalism 
has become hegemonic in the current world order and led to significant repercussions 
with regard to formation of subjectivities. In the neoliberal era, the classical liberal 
notion of absolute freedom of capitalist markets is accompanied by the infiltration of 
the market rationality into social discourse. (Rose 1992) In this regard, neoliberalism 
provides a normative framework based on the premise that individuals are self-
interested actors with agency and absolute control over their lives. This 
individualized notion of the self with a strong stress on agency and self-interest 
results in the retreat of the “structural”. (Phipps, 2014: 134-135) Individual acts are 
abstracted from social structures that frame and constrain the acts in question. As the 
importance of the “structural” gradually diminishes, the neoliberal concepts such as 
agency, choice and self-interest predominate over the approach to social and political 
problems. This individualistic notion of the self and the retreat of the “structural”, in 
return, precludes the possibility of initiating a discussion on how to improve the 
social and political context in which individual choices are made.    
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The repercussions of the retreat of the “structural” is maybe most visible in 
the public presentation of identities and collective identity categories. Beck and 
Beck-Gernsheim (2002) argue that since contemporary social and political order is 
set upon individualized notions of self and society, collective categories such as 
gender, class and ethnicity are destabilized. This destabilization can be clearly 
observed in the changing character of the category of “woman”, gendered 
subjectivity and feminist identity.  
Feminist thought and activism have long been occupied with a self-reflexive 
endeavour to revise the essentialist conceptions of “woman”, “feminist”, “feminism”. 
The poststructural and postcolonial lines of thinking, which dismantled monolithic, 
unified categories and identities, have greatly contributed to this self-reflexive 
attempt. On the other hand, while the revisionist strands in feminist thought and 
activism updated feminist theoretical tools in line with the contemporary challenges, 
the neoliberal, neoconservative social and political order has given way to other 
complications that feminist activists and theorists have to deal with. Recent studies 
conducted in the Western context suggest that given the current stress on 
individualized notions of self, young women today increasingly tend to disassociate 
themselves from feminist goals and ideas, deeming feminism as passé. (Budgeon 
2001, Rich 2005, Scharff 2013) It has been noted that although young women 
negotiate their lives around gendered dynamics, they construct an identity narrative 
in which they regard feminism as a past phenomenon irrelevant to the contemporary 
social world. (Rich 2005, Budgeon 2001) Their individualist position appears as a 
key factor propelling them to disclaim feminist self-identification. 
It has been suggested that the neoliberal discourses of individualism and self-
liberation, which in return result in repudiation of the feminist struggle for gender 
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equality, are deeply embedded in political discourses and popular culture in the 
Western context today. (McRobbie 2004, 2007) The neoliberal repudiation of 
feminism goes hand in hand with a conservative backlash discourse that labels 
feminism as extreme, anti-family and anti-man. (Faludi 1991) As a consequence of 
the conservative discursive regimes, the backlash discourse holds feminists and the 
feminist struggle responsible for the dismantling of family as an institution, blames 
feminism for the disruption of the moral order and suggests an anti-feminist 
“antidote” to cure the existing social malfunctions.  
Considering the demise of feminist self-identification in contemporary 
neoliberal times marked by increased individualism and backlash discourses, one can 
safely suggest that the issue of public self-presentation and endorsement of identity 
claims are pressing issues for feminist thought and activism today. This necessitates 
a thorough analysis of the concept of identity with a special focus on its limits as 
well as its promising features. Scholars agree that identity is a troublesome concept 
to be revised and modified in accordance with the demands of the current social and 
political order. In this line of thought, static, frozen understandings of identity are 
abondoned, while dynamic, flexible approaches to identity, identification and subject 
formation are increasingly incorporated into scholarly analyses. As a result, a great 
portion of the recent feminist theory has come into being against the background of 
contemporary contestations over the concept of identity.  
The relentless attempts to revise and modify “identity” in line with the current 
social and political demands do not undermine the significance of identity for 
feminist scholarly analyses. The indispensible character of identity also prevails for 
feminist activism. Identity as an analytical concept is too crucial for feminist 
activism to be abondoned since the absolute abondoning of identity and the category 
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of women would result in a deadlock for feminist politics. Scholars point out that the 
poststructural dismissal of the category “woman” eliminates the possibility of 
making collective demands in the name of women, rendering feminist activism and 
politics futile. (Alcoff 2006, Bordo 1995) Thus, it has been extensively argued that 
identity categories can be revised and modified through antiessentialist lenses so as 
to make them in tune with flexible, dynamic social and political demands. (Lloyd 
2005, Alcoff 2006) This new reading of identity categories mitigating between the 
poststructural critique and the political need for identity claims, in return, generates a 
new modality of feminist politics informed by hybridity, flexibity and change.  
In the contemporary social and political milieu in which neoliberal, neo-
conservative discourses undermine feminist demands and the poststructuralist 
critique makes it difficult to articulate stable identity claims, the issue of feminist 
self-identification comes to the forefront as a critical theme underlying the 
discussions on the future of feminism. Given the excessive stress on choice, agency 
and self-control on the one hand and the disarticulation of feminist identification on 
the other, contemporary feminist studies, regardless of their contextual focus, cannot 
afford to ignore the debates on consequences of neoliberalism for feminism, the issue 
of identification and the future of feminism. These global debates also resonate at the 
local level with a unique tune that derives its peculiarity from the social and political 
context in question.  
In this frame, it is important to explore how the impasse in feminist theory 
regarding the articulation of identity positions is resolved. Going beyond the 
poststructuralist dismissal of identity and the essentialist fixation of subject positions, 
some feminist scholars search for novel ways in which they can argue for articulation 
of stable identity demands without falling into the trap of producing essentialist 
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narratives. By calling this particular cohort of feminist theories as “mid-way” 
theories, this dissertation appropriates a resolutionary, “mid-way” approach in order 
to deconstruct the coextistence of agency, intentionality and dynamic, unstable 
conceptions of identity. In this sense, women columnists’ narratives on feminist 
identity provide a useful ground to explore the potentialities and feasibility of “mid-
way” feminist theories on identity.  
This dissertation also engages in an attempt to explore the usefulness of the 
concept of narrative for disentangling the multiple layers and the intricate character 
of identity narratives. It investigates the constitutive elements of the narrative logic 
with the aim to disclose the close relationship between the idea of narrative and the 
articulation of identity positions. Since narratives serve as analytical tools to interpret 
the social, political and cultural contexts, narrative analysis of identity positions has 
the potential to uncover the complexities and dynamic aspects of subjects’ 
positionalities. Therefore, this study departs from the fact that the study of narrative 
can reveal both the peculiarities of the contextual setting shaping the constitution of 
identity narratives and the gist of subjective experiences that endows subjects with a 
particular interpretive horizon. In this regard, it aims to shed light on the applicability 
and relevance of the concept of narrative for studies on intricate identity positions.  
Furthermore, another key aspect in the dissertation is to complicate the 
conceptualization of public sphere so as to render it more fruitful in order to capture 
the heterogeneity of positionalities in the public sphere. Contrary to the Habermasian 
understanding that regards public sphere as an arena where all particularities are left 
out and inclusivity of all is ensured, the feminist critique argues that the ideal of 
inclusivity is a myth that cannot account for the power dimension involved in public 
deliberation. Feminist scholars contend that communicative procedures of reaching 
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an agreement in the Habermasian framework do not automatically lead to 
accessibility into public debates. In this vein, the idea of a single, overarching public 
sphere has been deeply questioned and the existence of competing publics has been 
stressed in feminist scholarship. The feminist critique points out that there is not one 
monolithic, unifying public but multiple publics with different agendas. Fraser 
(1990) calls these paralel discursive arenas “subaltern counter publics” where 
members of subordinated social groups can circulate counter-discourses. 
Accordingly, counterpublics reveal the differential power relations among diverse 
publics of a multiple public sphere and articulate alternatives to wider publics that 
exclude the interests of marginalized groups.  
The current feminist scholarship on the Habermasian public sphere mainly 
deals with the antagonistic relationship between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic 
publics and delves into the perpetual contestation over stabilization of meaning in 
public deliberation. Nevertheless, under certain circumstances this two-pillar 
conception of public sphere may not suffice to elucidate the transitivity 
characterizing hybrid, complex discourses that go back and forth between hegemonic 
and counter-hegemonic discursive fields. The complexity of such discourses arises 
from the fact that they are difficult to pin down in a stable location that can be clearly 
described as hegemonic or counter-hegemonic. In this sense, they can be defined as 
borderland discourses constantly in shift in accordance with the changing contextual 
setting, subjective experiences and/or strategic concerns. It is important to note that 
neither hegemonic nor counter hegemonic publics display monolithic, homogeneous 
traits. They may contain hybrid positionalities that exceed the limits of the discursive 
field characterizing the public in question. However, some positionalities are even 
more unstable and elusive, which propels us to situate them on the borderland. In this 
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study, I aim to complicate the conceptualization of public sphere by pointing out how 
borderland positionalities destabilize two-pillar accounts that rest on the contestation 
between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic publics.    
With these thoughts in mind, I decided to trace the repercussions of the 
debates outlined above in the Turkish social and political context. Women’s studies 
literature in the post-1980 period in Turkey has been quite prolific in its attempts to 
deconstruct the discourses configuring the gender regime in the late Ottoman period 
and in modern Turkey. Many significant studies have been conducted with the aim to 
provide a critical perspective to historical periods, political discourses and gender 
relations in modern Turkey. However, the issue of feminist self-identification in the 
Turkish context has not been investigated thoroughly so far. Keeping this in mind, I 
believe that the study of feminist identity and identification is more crucial today 
than ever because it can shed light on the contemporary gender discourses in the 
current social and political milieu in Turkey marked by pro-Islamism, conservatism 
and anti-feminism.  
It has been widely noted that the current Justice and Development Party 
(JDP) [AKP] rule is heavily characterized by a neoliberal, neoconservative and anti-
feminist political stance. Studies on AKP’s gender politics reveal that the party’s 
policies and political discourses implicitly reproduce traditional gender roles and 
confine women to familial roles. (Çitak and Tür 2008, Coşar and Yeğenoğlu 2011) 
Moreover, the patriarchal tones in AKP discourses are further reinforced through 
attempts to disassociate feminism and gender equality and marginalize feminism as 
an extreme ideology. Relying on streotypical understandings of feminism, 
conservative party discourses regard feminism as inherently prone to result in clash 
between sexes and thus replace it with the Islamic belief of complementarity between 
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sexes. Consequently, feminism becomes the “other” of the AKP’s gender politics. 
Keeping the current antifeminist gender regime in mind, it is significant to study the 
peculiarities of feminist self-identification in Turkey in this particular era marked by 
a striking proliferation of antifeminist political discourses. Given the antifeminist 
ethos of the era, public negotiations of feminist self identification in contemporary 
Turkey display multiple layers of complexity that are difficult to disentangle. This 
complexity begs the question of how feminist identity is negotiated and narrated in a 
discursive field in which antifeminist discourses are constantly reproduced through 
certain discursive opportunity structures. At a political moment in which politics for 
women and feminist identification do not overlap, the study of feminist identity and 
identification in the public sphere can be useful to point out the limitations, 
intricacies, hybridities as well as the promising aspects underlying the unique 
standing of feminism in public discourses today.   
To avoid ahistorical, static conceptualizations of “feminism” and “feminist”, 
this study puts at its very center the dynamic, historical and contextual character of 
the meanings attached to the concepts of “feminism” and “feminist”. In this sense, it 
derives its momentum from the fact that the word feminism has undergone striking 
transformation in meaning over the years. Introducing differences among women 
into scholarly analyses and challenging the association of feminism with Western, 
white, secular, middle class women, scholars in recent decades have attempted to 
incorporate the identities, demands and needs of women from different backgrounds 
and situations into feminist scholarship. In this research, I take the position that 
feminist scholarship has to be informed by this inclusivity and depart from the fact 
that the concept of feminism and feminist evolve in time, depending on geographies, 
contexts, subjects’ positionalities and the character of the discursive regime. 
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My interest in studying feminist self-identification in contemporary Turkey 
does not only stem from the particularities of the Turkish context, the contemporary 
debates on identity in feminist scholarship and the embeddedness of the meanings of 
feminism in the local context but it has also a personal root. I have been highly 
intrigued by the remarkable variety of rhetorical strategies that people use when they 
try to explain their relationship to feminism. It is striking to observe that identity 
claims are always meticulously formed because they are supposed to be the carrier of 
our uniqueness. They are compact and multi-layered; they may simultaneously entail 
affirmation and denial of certain identity claims. In this sense, conventional 
statements such as “I am not a feminist but…” or “I am a feminist but…” do not 
simply connote a slippery, evasive identity position but lean against sophisticated 
negotiations of feminisms and feminist identities. As such, identity claims are always 
incomplete, never enough to reveal one’s feelings about who one really is, though 
one is frequently expected to make herself known to others through stable identity 
claims. Thus, I believe that a study of feminist self-identification has the potential of 
bringing into the open this multi-layered, intricate nature of narratives on identity and 
identification.  
 
Dissertation Scope and Research Objectives 
This study investigates public narratives on feminist identity in the social and 
political context in contemporary Turkey and aims to understand the complexities of 
the negotiation of the feminist label, the social and political factors affecting it and 
the reasonings put forward to justify these negotiations. It particularly focuses on the 
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narratives of women columnists who are well-known public intellectual figures in 
contemporary Turkey and greatly contribute to the trajectory of public debates.  
The study of media is especially important for a study that intends to examine 
the positionality of narratives on feminism in public deliberation. Analyzing how 
narratives on feminism are situated in the media vis-a-vis conservative gender 
discourses may give us clues about the functioning mechanisms and governing rules 
of the current gender regime. In recent decades, feminist research on women and 
media have extensively studied the representation of women in media and 
communication, disclosing the overarching character of sexist approach to women in 
the media sphere. However, the study of women media professionals that focus on 
the prospects of profeminist activism in the media sphere, still constitutes a marginal 
research area in the wider body of women and media literature. (Byerly and Ross 
2006, Minic 2014) In this sense, studying women columnists in the media with the 
aim to identify their positionality vis-a-vis the feminist counter public is important as 
it may help us comprehend the unique character of the positionality of women 
columnists as prominent public intellectuals. Women intellectuals have always been 
marginal actors in the intellectual field. (Moi 1994) This marginality, in return, may 
result in certain idiosyncracies regarding the position that women columnists take up 
vis-a-vis hegemonic and counter hegemonic discourses. Moreover, the contextual 
specificities further contribute to the unique character of women columnists’ 
positionality.  
Scholars note that the media under the AKP rule has emerged as one of the 
critical domains where hegemonic struggles over meaning are fought vehemently. 
(Kaya and Çakmur 2010, Akser and Baybars-Hawks 2012) Particularly the last years 
under the AKP administration has been characterized by political pressure, 
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surveillance, legal restraints on news-reporting and accreditation discrimination. In 
this sense, deeply divided into two camps, namely the secularist and pro-Islamist, 
media in today’s Turkey is a principal locus of political contestations. Given the 
critical standing of media in the contemporary political landscape in Turkey, one can 
suggest that the media sphere has massive influence over the trajectory of public 
debates today. Ferree et al. (2002: 16) argue that in the contemporary world social 
actors evaluate the effectiveness of their own discourses by looking at the coverage 
in the mass media. One can suggest that coverage in the mass media is key for public 
discourses to display efficacy in public deliberation. Mass media as the major site of 
political contest in contemporary Turkey witnesses hegemonic power struggles over 
meaning and allows for discussion of norms of democratic deliberation on a variety 
of policy domains including gender. While certain media domains constantly 
reproduce hegemonic discourses on gender, there are also alternative media domains 
where counter hegemonic discourses can be articulated. In this sense, one should 
keep in mind that mass media does not represent a monolithic block but displays 
heterogenity.  
To point out the heterogeneity in the mass media, Dahlgren (1995: 155-159) 
elaborates on the differential status attributed to hegemonic and counter hegemonic 
discourses in the “common domain” and “advocacy domain” in the media. 
According to this differentiation, the common domain in the mass media is marked 
by an aspiration to appeal to a general public, which eventually contributes to the 
reproduction of hegemonic discourses. Contrary to this, the advocacy domain 
displays a multi-perspective approach that makes room for oppositional publics to 
articulate their group identities and political demands and enter into public 
deliberation. In this formulation, it is the advocacy domain in the media that 
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contributes to counter hegemonic projects and contests the boundaries of hegemonic 
publics.  
Drawing on this differentiation, it is worthwhile to investigate the alternative 
media domains in the high circulation mass media and map out the zones of potential 
that can contribute to the counter hegemonic attempts challenging the contemporary 
conservative gender regime in Turkey. In this regard, the study of women 
columnists’ narratives on feminism and feminist identity may provide us a fertile 
ground to delve into the discursive openings in the mainstream media through which 
profeminist discourses can acquire a considerable standing in public deliberation.  
Women columnists are crucial public figures in the public sphere in 
contemporary Turkey. With the proliferation of the mass media in the post-1980 
period, the number of intellectual women, who write columns about general public 
matters, has greatly increased. Considering that the media in Turkey, as everywhere 
else, is a male-dominated sphere, the presence of women columnists in the media 
sphere, especially of those who write through gendered lenses, can be regarded as a 
significant intervention into the male codes of public deliberation.  
It is possible to say that the writings of columnists under consideration in this 
study are by and large informed by gendered lenses. In this sense, their position in 
the media sphere is of critical importance for the ongoing discursive struggles on 
gender norms in contemporary Turkey. Having said this, one should note here that 
the high circulation of patriarchal discourses in contemporary public debates in 
Turkey does not mean that conservative, anti-feminist gender discourses exhaust all 
possibilities of meaning making. On the contrary, since meaning is never fixed in the 
discursive realm (Laclau and Mouffe 1985), attempts to reinforce conservative 
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gender norms are counterweighed by profeminist discourses striving to be more 
visible and influential. Fraser (1990) and Felski (1989) underscore that at times when 
the need to appeal to broader masses and intervene into the gender agenda is 
politically urgent, feminist subaltern discourses may assume a highly publicist 
character. At such moments, feminist subaltern politics may rely on strategic 
coalitions with profeminist discourses available in the public sphere. It is also true 
that profeminist public discourses acknowledging the need for mobilization may 
prefer to allign with the feminist subaltern public vis-a-vis the rising conservative 
gender regime. As a result, the boundaries of the feminist subaltern public may 
expand towards the hegemonic public so as to counterweigh the political attempts to 
fix meaning over gender norms. 
Taking into account the complexities underlying the interactions between the 
subaltern and hegemonic publics, this study aims to understand the positionality of 
women columnists in contemporary Turkey vis-a-vis the political struggles over the 
gender regime. As noted above, with each conservative, anti-feminist attempt to 
reinforce the meaning in a discursive field, other possibilities for meaning strive to 
be more influential. Thus, it is crucial to analyze the intricacies, the promising 
aspects and the limitations in women columnists’ narratives on feminism and 
feminist identity in order to shed light on how they situate themselves vis-a-vis the 
feminist subaltern public. In this frame, following the feminist critique of the 
Habermasian public sphere and Fraser’s idea of “subaltern counter publics”, this 
study examines whether women intellectuals under consideration here, generate an 
alternative domain in the media sphere that can challenge the proliferation of 
antifeminist tones in the current gender regime.   
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Given that the rise of the AKP has changed the structural and discursive 
characteristics of Turkish society and politics, this study also pays particular 
attention to the prominent traits of gender politics under the AKP rule. It examines 
the narrative lines in the current proliferation of discourse on women’s identities, 
bodies and sexualities and discloses the constitutive elements of the gender regime in 
contemporary Turkey. Investigating in detail the ways in which women columnists in 
question attempt to challenge the proliferation of anti-feminist discourses in 
contemporary public debates, it aims to unravel the repercussions of the current 
patriarchal discourses upon the public narratives on feminism and feminist identity. 
 
Research Questions 
The following research questions will constitute a guideline for this study as I 
examine women columnists’ positioning in the public sphere and their conception of 
the formation of public discourses and negotiation of marginalized identities.    
Can women columnists’ columns be considered as part of the “advocacy 
domain” in the mass media that collaborates with counter public discourses? If so, 
what kind of counter public issues stand out in their writings? How do they frame 
these issues? Can counterpublic discourses be effectively represented in their 
writings? Such questions will help us figure out where women columnists position 
themselves in the heterogenous mass media sphere. Along with these questions, it is 
also important to investigate how women columnists think of the formation of public 
discourses and the negotiation of marginalized identities in the public sphere. Do 
they acknowledge the heterogeneity and multiplicity in the public sphere? At what 
points do they question the hegemonic boundary drawing in dominant publics? Do 
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they acknowledge the flexible and always-in-process character of identities in 
counter public settings? What are the limits of their approach to counter hegemonic 
discourses and identities?  
It is also important to explore the characteristics of the identity narratives that 
women columnists construct while reflecting on their relationship with feminism. 
How do women columnists negotiate the label “feminist” in contemporary Turkey? 
How do they see the relationship between feminist identity and the feminist label? 
What kind of an identity position does the label “feminist” generate in their 
imagination? In what ways do their narratives reflect the multi-layered character of 
identity positions? How do they make use of the idea of narrative to deal with the 
challenges of reflecting on the feminist identity position?  
Finally, as this study pays particular attention to the relationship between the 
conservative gender regime in contemporary Turkey and women columnists’ self-
positioning vis-a-vis the rising patriarchal discourses, it is crucial to ask questions 
about the impacts of the contextual setting on identification with a feminist position. 
The following questions can provide a useful guideline in this regard: How do 
women columnists engage with contemporary public debates on pressing gender 
issues? What are the prospects and limits of their positioning vis-a-vis the current 
public discourses on gender? How is their unique positionality in the contemporary 
gender regime gets translated into their narratives on feminist identification?    
Hoping to find answers to the questions outlined above, this study relies on a 
three pillar analytical framework. First, it investigates the applicability of mid-way 
feminist theories on identity to women columnists’ unique positionality and their 
self-positioning vis-a-vis the feminist subaltern public. Second, it examines women 
columnists’ narratives in terms of their approach to the dynamic relationship between 
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identity and narrative, thereby bringing into the open the limits and promising sides 
of the narratives in question. Furthermore, it scrutinizes the concept of public sphere 
by testing its limits with regard to borderland discourses that constantly mitigate 
between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic publics. Third, it explores the 
implications of the contemporary gender regime in Turkey for feminist identity 
positions. It delves into whether the rise of patriarchal discourses in the public sphere 
has led profeminist subject positions to allign with the feminist subaltern public in 
more organic ways.  
 
Methodological Framework and Time Scope 
This study draws on twelve in-depth interviews conducted between September 2012 
and June 2013 with well-known women columnists in contemporary Turkey. 
Considering that qualitative interviewing is a useful method to listen to people’s 
subjective interpreting of the social and political world, it makes use of interviews to 
reveal how women columnists interpret feminism, feminist identity and the gender 
regime in Turkey. In addition to in-depth, semi-structured interviews, this study also 
analyzes women columnists’ newspaper articles regarding controversial public 
debates on gender issues in the last years.    
Women columnists under consideration in this study actively engage in 
public deliberation on the political agenda and write about contemporary gender 
issues. Apart from the up-to-date coverage of political debates and the gender 
sensitive approach in their columns, it is also important to note that they respresent a 
wide spectrum of ideological positions in contemporary Turkey. To ensure the 
diversity of ideological positions represented in this study, women columnists from 
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various mainstream newspapers, i.e. Hürriyet, Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, Vatan, Posta, 
Habertürk, Zaman, Star, Taraf, have been selected and incorporated into the study.  
Interview questions asked during interviews inquire about women 
columnists’ professional lives in the media sector and investigate to what extend they 
attribute priority to their gender identity in their professional lives. These questions 
aim to reveal how women columnists conceptualize feminism and feminist identity, 
what their main criticisms against feminism are and whether or not they call 
themselves feminist.  
While inquiring about women columnists’ narratives on their relationship 
with feminism, I intentionally avoid from providing a list of predictors for measuring 
feminist identity and defining what feminism is. The fixation of feminisms’ 
meanings and the ideological components of feminist identities through 
operationalizing a list of predictors would be contrary to the aims of this study. 
Rather than evaluating women columnists’ negotiation of feminist identity according 
to a fixed set of predictors, the aim here is to grasp how women columnists 
themselves operationalize feminist identity. In this regard, the complexity of the 
feminist identity claims, different shades of feminist positions (weak, strong, etc.) 
and different reasonings (strategic, ideological, practical, etc.) involved in the 
negotiation of feminist identity are taken into account here while exploring narratives 
on feminist identity.  
Narrative analysis will be used in this study to disentangle the intricacies of 
women columnists’ narratives on feminism and feminist identity. Following the 
increased interest in in subjectivity and in the meanings attached by individiuals to 
their actions, scholars from a wide spectrum of disciplines have incorporated 
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narrative analysis into the social science research. (Hinchman and Hinchman 1997, 
Sommers 1994, Plummer 1995) Narrative as a useful concept can be thought of as a 
means of exploring the ways in which social actors interpret the world and their 
place within it. Sommers (1992: 603) identifies four features of narrativity 
particularly relevant for social sciences: (I) relationality of parts; (2) causal 
emplotment; (3) selective appropriation; and (4) temporality, sequence, and place. 
Keeping these features in mind, I will outline the constitutive themes in women 
columnists’ responses by making a thematic analysis. I will also make a structural 
analysis and elaborate on the relationality of parts, casual emplotment, selective 
appropriation and temporality in columnists’ narratives. Furthermore, I will analyze 
the contextual factors that affect the formation of narratives in question. As a result, 
relying on both thematic, structural and contextual narrative analysis, I will try to 
locate women’s narratives on a web of power configurations vis-a-vis hegemonic 
public narratives in the public sphere in contemporary Turkey. 
 
Dissertation Outline 
The analytical framework described above is portrayed in nine chapters in this study. 
Chapter II maps out the contours of the literature on identity studies and feminist 
identity studies. It starts with a brief survey on the rise of identity politics in the last 
decades. Identifying the openings as well as the limitations of identity politics, it 
outlines the criticisms posed against identity politics and identifies the main narrative 
lines in the anti-identity trend in contemporary scholarship. In addition to the 
criticisms, it also points out the scholarly attempts to redefine identity in line with the 
contemporary social and political demands. Against this background, this chapter 
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tries to portray how the feminist theory positions itself vis-a-vis the recent challenge 
to identity. 
Chapter III provides a theoretical framework that will serve as a useful 
guideline for the purposes of this study. With its focus on feminist identity theories, 
it introduces new theoretical tools in feminist scholarship that attempt to mitigate 
between poststructural dismissal of identity and essentialist conceptions of identity 
politics. In the subsection on “midway feminist identity theories”, new terminology 
and conceptual openings in feminist scholarship such as identity metaphors (nomad, 
mestiza, cyborg), identification (Hall 1996, Brubaker and Cooper 2000, Weir 2008), 
identity as interpretive horizon (Alcoff 2006) and as ungrounded ground (Hekman 
2004), narrative identity (Benhabib 1999), interrelational identity (Weir 1996, 2008), 
intersectionality (McCall 2005, Ferree 2009, Davis 2011) and strategic essentialism 
(Spivak 1990) are introduced. As a result, this subsection maps out the contours of 
the contemporary conceptual terrain in which feminist identity studies are 
reconfigured. It explores the potentials as well as the limits of the concepts and 
theories that will constitute a major pillar in the theoretical framework of this study. 
The next subsection in this chapter explicates the relevance of the feminist 
critique of the Habermasian understanding of the public sphere for the purposes of 
this study. It explains the feminist revision to the idealistic character of the 
Habermasian public sphere and puts forward the promising aspects of the feminist 
conception of “subaltern public” for a thorough analysis of women columnists’ 
positionality in the public sphere in contemporary Turkey.  
Chapter IV puts forward the methodological frame of the study. It gives 
detailed information on the qualitative method of the study, research participants and 
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the scope of the questions asked during in-depth interviews. It also presents the 
challenges of the operationalization of feminist identity in contemporary studies. 
Next, the chapter introduces narrative analysis as a useful methodological tool to 
analyze women columnists’ narratives on feminist identity and self-identification. 
Here, it focuses on the key features of narrativity, thereby providing a roadmap for 
exploring the narrative structure, the content and the contextual elements in women 
columnists’ responses. 
Chapter V situates this study against the background of the contemporary 
gender regime in Turkey. It particularly focuses on the social and political 
conservatization under the AKP rule and its repercussions for gender relations in 
Turkey. In this way, this chapter prepares the ground for a discussion as to how 
women columnists position themselves vis-a-vis patriarchal gender discourses in 
contemporary Turkey.  
To decode the contextual aspects of women’s positionality in the public 
sphere, Chapter VI investigates the limits of what women columnists can say about 
contemporary gender debates. To this end, it engages into a detailed analysis of 
women columnists’ newspaper articles on pressing gender issues in Turkey. It 
attempts to put forward at what junctures in public debates women columnists raise 
their voice in their columns to oppose the patriarchal discourses in Turkey.  
Chapter VII discusses secular women columnists’ narratives on feminism and 
feminist identification. By closely reading their narratives, here I aim to disclose the 
narrative logic that secular women columnists utilize to make sense of feminist 
identity. A main aim in this chapter is to expose the peculiarities of the secular 
character of their positionality in the public sphere. Analyzing the prominent themes 
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in the narratives in question, this chapter lays the groundwork for a comparison 
between secular and pious women columnists’ positionalities.  
Chapter VIII unearths the conceptions of Islamic feminism and feminist self-
identification in pious women columnists’ narratives. Providing a contextual analysis 
of the symbolic meanings underlying veiling in modern Turkey, this chapter follows 
the trajectory of the rise of pious women writers in the public sphere and attempts to 
identify the intricacies and peculiarities of their positionality. Along these lines, it 
scrutinizes how pious women columnists interviewed in this study interpret feminism 
and feminist self-identification.  
Finally, chapter IX provides a concluding analysis, explicating the 
complexities of women columnists’ narratives in the light of the theoretical 
framework used in this study. In this frame, this study hopes to shed light on the 
multiplicities, contradictions, strategic elements, constantly shifting belongings and 
contextual positionings that characterize the configuration of identity narratives. It 
also aims to illuminate the multi-layered, intricate character of profeminist women 
intellectuals’ positionality in the public sphere in contemporary Turkey. Situating 
this analysis against the background of the social and political landscape in Turkey, 
this study investigates the repercussions of the current gender regime in Turkey on 
narratives on feminism and feminist identity. This three-pillar analytical structure 
enables the study to provide an insight into the positionality of feminist subaltern 
discourses in the public sphere in Turkey at a time when neoliberalism, 
neoconservatism, pro-Islamism and antifeminism converge, leading to dramatic 
shifts in the gender regime. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW ON IDENTITY POLITICS 
 
 
 2.1. A Brief Survey on The Rise of Identity Politics and Its Contemporary 
Dilemmas  
The concept of identity and difference has become a key concept in the political, 
social and cultural theory in the last decades. The impact of new social movements 
on society such as second-wave feminism, black liberation movements, gay 
liberation, peace and environmental movements and also the postmodern and 
poststructuralist critiques of traditional approaches to identity has been quite 
influential in this trend. (Weedon 1999) Challenging the oppressive conditions in 
society, identity politics signifies a particular way of making politics based on the 
assertion of distinctiveness and demand for recognition. The universal idea of 
citizenship, which is above differences such as gender, religion, race, etc., has been 
shattered through this emphasis on identity and difference.   
Identity politics emerged in the 1960s and 70s and politicized areas of life 
that have not been defined as political until then such as sexuality, environment and 
lifestyle. To understand the role of identity in these social movements, New Social 
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Movement Theory, the first theory to deal with the challenges of collective action in 
identity based social movements, distinguishes class-based movements from 
contemporary movements that prioritize concepts such as gender, peace, 
environment and youth. According to this theory, these new movements are 
organized on postmaterial values, rather than on an exclusive concern on economic 
survival and signify a shift to a post-industrial society. (Touraine 1981) In this frame, 
along with the rise of postmaterial values in the second half of the 20th century, 
identity politics has appeared as a mode of articulating unified claims to challenge 
oppression mechanisms that marginalize and discriminate against certain groups.  
The notion of “difference” is at the very core of identity politics. Former 
claims for recognition that demand equality on the basis of universally shared human 
attributes are turned into claims for recognition of differences and a language of 
authenticity. Kruks (2000: 85) explains this as follows: “The demand is not for 
inclusion within the fold of ‘universal humankind’ on the basis of shared human 
attributes; nor is it for respect ‘in spite of’ one's differences. Rather, what is 
demanded is respect for oneself as different.” To underscore the idea of difference, 
identity politics uses the language of authenticity, which points out the unique and 
politically laden character of subjects’ experience of oppression. 
On the one hand, the concepts of identity and difference have been in demand 
in scholarly debates in the last decades; on the other hand, a wide range of critiques 
of identity politics has come to the foreground. One can identify different axes of 
critique in the challenge posed against identity politics. Firstly, scholars criticize 
identity politics by claiming that it lacks any prospect for building coalitions and 
social change and thus leads to a chaotic, splitted society. They maintain that identity 
groups are organized around narrow categories and make particularistic claims, 
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which preclude a universal vision for social change and compertmantalize society 
into narrow identity visions. (Gitlin 1994) In this line of thought, since identities are 
governed by particularistic self-understandings and are dividing, they are seen as a 
political threat for any political agenda that seeks majority support. (Alcoff 2006: 5) 
Elshtain (1995) suggests that identities involve a set of interests, values, beliefs, 
which limits the sort of reasoning concerning the public ends. For her, to rationally 
think about public ends, we must be able to distance ourselves from identities before 
entering the arena of public debate. In a similar vein, Kaufman (1990) argues that 
since it lacks a vision to bring about institutional and structural change, identity 
politics is limited to personal expression and self-transformation and thus is 
apolitical. 
On the other hand, it is claimed that identity politics can be totalizing in that it 
does not take into account the internal differences within an identity-based 
community. Referring to the intragroup dynamics, Fraser (2000) underlines that 
because of the discouragement of the internal differences, identity politics may 
curtail the ability to creatively interpret one’s own identity and lead to conformism, 
intolerance and patriarchalism. Accordingly, since identity politics urges 
mobilization around a single axis, it may put pressure on participants to identify that 
particular axis as their defining feature, even when they do not want to define their 
selves so reductively. 
Apart from the criticisms above, scholars also point out the dilemmas in the 
emphasis put on victimhood. Regarding this, Brown (1995) argues that identity 
politics is very much prone to stabilization of identity through producing victimhood 
discourses. She alleges that the advocacy of rights based on marginalized identities 
will only result in the reification of discrimination. Therefore, from Brown’s 
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perspective, since identity politics involves fixing of identity in that of the injured 
victim, it cannot be liberatory. 
The other line of criticism in the anti-identity trend in current scholarship is 
based on the argument that while the stress on differences is helpful in pointing out 
the exclusionary properties of the universal notion of the subject, it creates another 
essentializing narrative. The emphasis put on the experience of the subject, especially 
his or her experience of oppression makes identity politics very prone to 
essentialism. According to this critique, identity politics rests on unifying claims 
about the experiences of subjects and in this way defines a fixed, essential essence 
for the constitution of identities. This criticism of identity politics mostly draws on 
the postmodern and poststructuralist accounts. In the postmodern critiques of the 
modern conceptions of subject, subjectivity is often theorized as an effect of the 
social and political context and the unified notion of the self is replaced with a 
fragmented, multiple, fluid self. (Foucault 1980, Butler 1990) In these approaches to 
identity, the stress is on the incompleteness, fragmentation and contradictions of 
identity. For example, in the Focauldian framework, there is no identity prior to 
politics. Rather than identity constituting the terms of politics, it is politics that 
defines identity. (Lloyd 2005) To explain this further, it is neccesary to briefly touch 
upon Foucault’s notions of knowledge, power and subject.  
By redefining the concept of discourse as a system of representation, Foucault 
gives discourse a different meaning. Rather than treating discourse simply as a 
linguistic concept, he studies the rules and practices that produce meaningful 
statements. (Hall, 2001: 73) For Foucault, discourse connotes a particular way of 
representing knowledge. In this understanding, discourse reveals the production of 
knowledge through language. Discursive structures shape the limits of who can 
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speak and what can be said. Statements in discourse define the limits of what can be 
known about the object of discourse. In other words, meaning is constructed within 
discourse. 
For Foucault, it is not the subject that produces knowledge but the rules of 
discourse govern what is sayable and thinkable by prescribing certain ways of 
talking. (Ibid, 79) Drawing on this, Foucault harshly criticizes the idea of the subject 
endowed with autonomous agency, consicousness and a core self. (Ibid) Subjects in 
the Foucauldian framework are not autonomous producers of knowledge and 
meaning but operate within the limits of the discursive formations; they are produced 
within discourse. By submitting to the rules of discursive formations, subjects 
construct certain subject positions and become bearers of certain knowledge. Hall 
(2001: 80) explains this as follows: “Individuals have different, ethnic, racial, 
gendered characteristics but they will not be able to take meaning until they have 
identified with those positions which the discourse constructs.” 
This particular conception of discourse and subject relies on the idea that 
identity is not a metaphysical but a deeply political notion formed within a certain 
power configuration. Since subjects are products of discursive formations, the 
identities that the subjects bear cannot be grounded on a fixed substance or a stable 
essence, but should be regarded as dynamic and historical. They are constituted 
through norms, rules and historically produced modes of behaviour. In this sense, 
there is no prediscursive subject and all subject positions as well as the metaphysical 
claims for essential core are effects of power. 
Foucauldian understanding of subjectivation, when appropriated by an anti-
identity approach, relies on the premise that identity as a stable construct imposed 
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from outside cannot capture the fluid, context-dependent and relational character of 
selfhood. On the other hand, this understanding may also make room for social 
constructionist accounts of selfhood that affirm identification and articulation of 
belonging as reflections of self-agency. In this sense, Tarver (2011: 806) notes that 
self is not given shape passively by power relations but it rather takes shape through 
active involvement in those relations. Challenging the assumption that what comes 
from the social world is necessarily constraining and pernicious, this latter account 
aims to redefine the subject’s relation to the other’s power to name as a dialectical 
process in which the self is not a passive construction but actively engages in 
interaction with the social. In this frame, Tarver (2011) reminds us that Foucault’s 
insistence that power is not a monocausal force, makes the attempt to seperate the 
active “what comes from the subject” from the passive “what shapes the subject from 
outside” futile. Accordingly, the dialectical processes of subjectivation may 
accomodate the idea that subjectivation can also be enabling to the extend that it 
involves the self’s active engagement with the social.  
Scholars who try to reinvigorate identity as a critical concept to make sense of 
social phenomena, adopt this latter approach in accounting for the dynamic processes 
of identification and formation of selfhood. Taking into account the recent criticisms 
posed against the concept of identity, Hall (1996) suggests that it is no more possible 
to think of identity in the old way but identity still matters as a critical concept 
without which key questions cannot be thought at all. Yet, he also notes that the 
concept of identity to be deployed is not an essentialist entity but a strategic and 
positional one. It does not assume a stable core self, unfolding from beginning to end 
without change. It accepts that identities are never unified, never singular, 
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increasingly fractured and multiply across different, intersecting and antagonistic 
discourses, practices, positions. 
In a similar vein, Alcoff (2006) interprets identity as an indispensible 
concept. She questions the contemporary suspicion on identity politics by arguing 
that differences in social identity do not necessarily lead to political relativism or 
fragmentation, but that, quite the reverse; it is the refusal to acknowledge the 
importance of differences in our identities that has led to miscommunication and 
disunity. She opposes the claim that identities are constraining, exclusive and 
imposed from outside. In her view, identity is not merely that which is given to an 
individual or group, but is also a way of interpreting and working through an 
objective social location. (Ibid, 42) In this account, it is possible to define identities 
as positioned or located lived experiences in which both individuals and groups work 
to construct meaning in relation to historical experience and historical narratives. 
Thus, Alcoff proposes to view identities as a site from which one must engage in the 
process of meaning-making. 
Brubaker and Cooper (2000) distinguish between strong and weak 
conceptions of identity. Accordingly, while the former tie identity to a core self and 
fixed interests, the latter define identity as multiple, fluid, fluctuating. Pointing out 
the openings of the weak conception of identity, Brubaker and Cooper (Ibid) aim to 
disassociate identity from reifying connotations while stressing the identification acts 
that are deeply embedded in modern life and help one locate oneself vis-a-vis others.  
It is plausible to suggest that in the recent literature on identity, soft 
conceptions of identity still matter whereas strong conceptions of identity have 
become mostly outmoded. How does feminist theory position itself vis-a-vis the 
recent challenge to identity? What are the challenges posed by feminist theory 
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against the concept of identity? Does the feminist thinking produce theories 
defending identity? These questions will help us build a theoretical framework to 
understand the dynamics of the feminist self-identification among women columnists 
in Turkey. 
 
2.2. Feminism and Identity Politics  
In response to the proliferating debates on identity and identity politics, feminism has 
engaged in a self-reflexive endeavour to revise its former assumptions. As a result, 
third wave feminism as a new current of feminism has come out. Postmodernist and 
poststructuralist feminist approaches and also feminist postcolonial theory have 
contributed to the emergence of third wave feminism. (Coleman 2009) Postmodern 
and poststructuralist feminists have critically questioned the notion of coherent 
identities and viewed freedom as resistance to categorization and identity. (Butler 
1990, Nicholson 1990) Feminist post-colonial theory, on the other hand, posed a 
great challenge to the idea of the common experience of being woman. Scholars like 
Mohanty (1991) pointed out the broad range of differences among women and the 
implausibility to talk about a universal idea of womanhood.  
Emphasizing the equality of men and women, first-wave feminism had 
addressed the problem of women’s political identity by attempting to fit women into 
the universal category of “citizen”. The solution offered by second-wave feminism 
was the emphasis on differences between men and women and a definition of 
feminist politics in terms of the universal category “woman”. However, this turned 
out to be equally flawed because the category of “woman” enshrined the hegemony 
of white, middle-class, heterosexual women, relegating other women to the margins 
of feminist politics. (Mohanty 1991) 
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Second wave feminism argued that the commonalities that women share in 
terms of nature and experience unify them and form the basis of feminist politics. 
Theory in the second wave was regarded as the search for one key factor that would 
account for sexism cross-culturally. (Alcoff, 2006: 252) The metanarrative 
conception of feminist theory obviously ignored historically and culturally situated 
elements in women’s experiences. For example, Firestone (1972) invoked biological 
differences between women and men to explain sexism and tried to locate roots of 
gender differences in biology. In her book Reproduction of Mothering, Chodorow 
(1978) argued that female mothering produces women whose sense of self is 
relational and men whose sense of self is not relational. In such accounts, the cause 
of prevailing gender relations are sought in ahistorical and cross-cultural terms. Since 
the claim that women can be unified on the basis of shared characteristics turned out 
to be divisive for women precisely because it does not reflect the experiences, 
demands and needs of all women, second wave feminism had to respond to various 
sources of dissension. In the Anglo-Saxon world, one of the first reactions posed 
against the epistemic privileges of white, middle class women was black feminists’ 
demands for inclusionary feminism. Some black women even rejected the term 
“feminism” and adopted “womanism” instead with the aim to point out the 
association of feminism with whiteness. (Walker 1984) This critique of the epistemic 
privilege embedded in the second wave feminism and the call for the inclusion of 
differences such as race, ethnicity, class in the feminist project compelled many 
feminists to rethink the category of “woman”.    
By collaborating with the poststructuralist arguments, the recent stage of 
feminist thought puts the “unified” category of woman under suspect. A main source 
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for contemporary feminist questioning of identity is Butler’s poststructuralist theory 
that has deeply affected the modality of feminist line of thinking.  
 
2.2.1.Butler’s Performative Theory and Critique of Identity 
 
At the center of Butler’s Gender Trouble (1990) is the replacement of the 
notion of a fixed, essential identity with that of an identity constituted by fluctuating 
and fluid discursive forces. The modernist subject that Butler rejects is rational, 
autonomous and disembodied. In the political realm this subject translates into the 
“universal citizen” who has no race, class, gender or culture. Butler proposes 
“performativity” as an alternative theory to the modernist subject. For her, there is no 
substance behind gender identity. This idea of identity as free-floating and not 
connected to an essence views gender as a reiterated acting. According to this view, 
the category of “woman” conceals the political, discursive origins of the fabricated 
core of gender identity. 
For Butler, gender is not something one is, it is something one does; it is a 
sequence of acts, a doing rather than a being. Gender only comes into being through 
these gendering acts such as wearing certain gender-coded clothing or walking and 
sitting in certain gender-coded ways. Genders are true and real only to the extent that 
they are performed. (Butler 1990, 278–9). They are instituted through a stylized 
repetition of habitual acts. No ontological status apart from the various gender coded 
acts constitutes the reality of genders. In this view, not only gender but also sex is 
socially constructed. Second wave feminist formulations of the sex/gender 
distinction claimed that while female biology corresponds to certain anatomical 
features, being a woman is an individual’s socially acquired role and sense of 
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identity. Opposing this gap between sex and gender, Butler argues that sex is as 
socially constructed as gender. This means that our sexed bodies are also 
performative; there is no pre-discursive sexed body. Sexed bodies become 
intelligible only through discursive construction. According to this, if the gendering 
activities would come to an end, then there will be no point in distinguishing physical 
bodies as man and woman. In this frame, Butler draws attention to the practices and 
speech acts that attribute sexed bodies their meaning. For her, although sexed bodies 
do not exist outside regulatory discursive mechanisms, they are constructed as if they 
provide foundational material sources for gendering activities. Her performative 
theory rejects the fixation of women as females with feminine traits and a 
heterosexual desire towards men and men as males with masculine traits and a 
heterosexual desire towards women. By making heterosexuality appear as natural 
and presenting homosexuality as deviant, these gender codes, for her, attempt to 
render gender identities unify through the binary logic of heteronormativity. (Butler 
1990, 42) To underscore that there is no substance to gender identity, she states that 
“a good ten percent of the population has chromosomal variations that do not fit 
neatly into the XX-female and XY-male set of categories.” (1990: 137).  
In sum, relying on the Foucauldian framework, Butler argues that sex and 
gender identities are never prior to social and linguistic influences but are effects of 
multiple discourses, practices and institutions. Moreover, for her these identities are 
constantly reproduced through regulative institutions such as heteronormativity and 
by enforcing particular gender performances. (Weir, 1996: 113) In this vision, 
identities are constructed in such a way that power/language configurations make 
them appear natural. Deconstructing the claim that identities are natural and 
descriptive, Butler discloses that subjectification and identity construction are always 
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normative and regulatory, forcing individuals fit into certain fixed identity 
categories. 
 
2.2.2.The Category of “Woman” 
Butler’s performative theory has some consequences for feminist identity politics. 
Since gender identities acquire their meaning only through certain gender coded 
ways of behavior, the gender identity of “woman” should be always in process, 
which in return leads to the conclusion that there cannot be any categorical definition 
of “woman”. The argument that subjects are overdetermined by a set of social 
discourses and are totally imprinted by history leads to the view that the category 
woman is a fiction without objective basis and that feminist efforts must be directed 
towards dismantling this fiction. In this view, essentialist formulations of 
womanhood tie the individual to her identity as a woman and thus cannot represent a 
solution to sexism. Therefore, this line of thinking suggests that politics of gender or 
sexual difference must be replaced with a plurality of difference where gender loses 
its position of significance. (Alcoff 2006: 133) Yet, according to this, it is not enough 
to recognize the multiplicity of cultural, social, and political intersections in the 
construction of women’s identities, rather it is necessary to totally abandon the 
attempts to define “woman” as a category. For Butler (1990: 9), since identity 
categories are always normative and exclusionary, any attempt to define woman 
would result in normative requirements and exclusions. The very subjects that the 
feminist movement struggle to liberate are products of power relations that are 
sustained through certain exclusionary practices and definitions of “ideal” identities 
such as heterosexual, white, etc. Therefore, in Butler’s thought, the main focus of 
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feminism should be limited to the revelation of the ways in which bodies are socially 
constructed as sexes and the performative acts constituting genders.  
In this line of thought, an effective feminism could only be a wholly negative 
feminism, deconstructing everything and refusing to construct anything. (Ibid., 141) 
This is also the position that Kristeva adopts. She claims the following: 
“A woman cannot be; it is something which does not even belong in the order 
of being... the problematic character of subjectivity does not mean, then, that 
there can be no political struggle, but that the struggle can have only a 
“negative function” rejecting “everything finite, definite, structured, loaded 
with meaning in the existing state of society”. (1981; 137, 166)  
 
It follows that feminist practice can only be negative, at odds with already what 
exists. Since any definition of the category “woman” would lead to normative 
prescription, Butler (1990: 9, 43) suggests that feminists should regard the identity of 
woman as open to intervention and resignification, abondon the category of woman 
as the foundation of feminist politics and disclose the power relations shaping gender 
identities.  
2.2.2.1. End of Feminist Politics? 
 
Postmodernism and postcolonialism have provided a new epistemological 
vision for feminisms to avoid the accounts that limit feminist imaginary to the 
experiences of white, middle class, western women. Alcoff (2006: 142) notes some 
of the attractions of the postmodern critique of the category “woman” for feminists 
as follows: First, it facilitates the idea of plurality of differences unhampered by any 
pre-determined gender identity as formulated either by patriarchy or cultural 
feminism. Second, it can explain the construction of female subjectivity, which 
cultural and liberal feminisms leave untouched. In this way, it can relate sexist 
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oppression to social discourses. Third, it also gives us an enhanced capacity to 
explain women who embrace patriarchy and to understand in general how ideology 
is reproduced. However, these advantages do not suffice for feminism and 
postmodernism to become allies. The postmodern dismantling of the stable self, 
objective knowledge and universal reason has left the theoretical terrain with 
questions about how to talk about gender, self and knowledge without reproducing 
teleological and binary ways of thinking. Nicholson (1990: 8) identifies the central 
question for feminism in the time of crisis as follows: “If postmodernism entails 
abondoning the use of cross-cultural categories, what happens then to the category of 
gender?”  
There is this concern that the modernist view from nowhere is replaced with 
the equally flawed postmodernist view from everywhere. Bordo critizices this view 
from everywhere by deeming it an impossible fantasy:  
 
“Gender is criticized for its fixed, binary structuring of reality and is replaced 
with a narrative ideal of ceaseless textual play. This remains animated by its 
own fantasies of attaining an epistemological perspective free of locatedness 
and limitations of embodied experience- a fantasy that I call “a dream of 
everywhere”. (In Nicholson, 1990: 136) 
 
For Bordo, humans are always invested with social, political and personal interests 
and thus cannot adopt endlessly shifting vantage points.  
The postmodern critique of the subject treats subjectivity purely as a 
linguistic effect, reduces the self to signification and leaves no room for agency and 
intentionality. Dismissing the category of woman as fiction, they define the self as 
undecidable and always in the process of becoming. According to Alcoff (2006: 
143), the claim that meaning is always undecidable cannot be a useful one for 
feminism because movements are never mobilized just as negations or rejections. In 
this view, the thesis of undecidability may reduce feminism to a deconstructive task. 
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Alcoff asks, if gender identity is simply a social construct, then what can we demand 
in the name of women if women do not exist; how can we speak against sexism if the 
category is a fiction. (Ibid) For her, the undecidability thesis leaves women 
unprotected with respect to oppressive gender relations. Young’s following statement 
echoes Alcoff’s concern: ‘Without some sense in which ‘‘woman’’ is the name of a 
social collective, there is nothing specific about feminist politics’. (1994: 714) In a 
similar vein, Benhabib asks whether it is really necessary to abondon the concepts of 
selfhood, agency and autonomy for the sake of critiquing certain prepositions of 
feminism and identity politics. Her answer is as follows:  
“Postmodernism can teach us about how the theoretical and political traps of 
utopias and foundational thinking can go wrong but it should not lead to a 
retreat from utopia altogether. For we, as women, have much to lose by 
giving up the utopian hope.” (1995: 30)  
 
Here, the main idea behind the criticism directed against the dismissal of the 
category of woman is that once the construction of a gender identity happens through 
performative acts, it may give way to situations in which the political necessity of 
speaking as a woman can hardly be ignored.  
Based on the positions presented above, one can say that the defense of the 
category of woman and the postmodern anti-categorical stance has emerged as one of 
the fundamental debates of contemporary feminist theory. Thus, one of the striking 
questions on the feminist agenda today is “whether or not feminism can claim to be 
postmodern if the actual conditions of modernity remain.” (Howie & Tauchert, 2004: 
44) In this vein, one can suggest that although postmodernism can provide crucial 
insights about how to avoid essentialism, it falls short when it comes to dealing with 
the reality of already formed gender identities.  
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2.2.3. An Attempt to Resolve the “End of Feminist Politics” Debate 
 
How would women make collective demands if the attempts to ground identity in a 
shared nature or experience are already outdated? What should feminism’s relation to 
identity be? These questions have occupied a great bulk of the recent feminist 
thought. Some feminist scholars have responded to feminists’ worries about the 
future of feminist politics by suggesting that the postmodern dismantling of the 
category of “woman” does not necessarily have to lead to the end of feminist politics. 
For example, Lloyd (2005) argues that acknowledging the flexible, dynamic 
character of subject formation does not entail the demise of feminist politics. She 
denies the binary opposition between the post-structural ideas about subjectivity and 
essential feminist claims. As explained above, poststructuralist scholars maintain that 
identity politics understood as the expression of authentic selves is always 
regulatory, normative and thus exclusionary. It operates through establishing the 
parameters of what counts as authentic behaviour and disciplining the subjects in 
accordance with these parameters. (Lloyd, 2005: 57) On the other hand, essentialist 
feminists argue that without the idea of stable subject, it is imposible to articulate 
feminist demands. To deconstruct the binary opposition between these two camps, 
Lloyd alleges that the relation inbetween is not oppositional but strategic. Drawing 
on Spivak’s idea of strategic essentialism, she argues that because politics is 
organized around interest representation, constituencies and parties, there are times 
when it is necessary to make demands on behalf of women. (2005: 66) She notes that 
the political realm gives legitimacy only to those who can speak on behalf of real 
needs and desires of specific people and thus strategic essentialism is inevitable for 
feminism. Yet, Lloyd also warns that her affirmation of strategic essentialism does 
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not entail acknowledgment of stable, fixed, unitary subject. On the contrary, the 
replacement of stable subject with the dynamic, flexible accounts of subjectivity is 
vital in her conception of feminism. She explains this as the following:  
“We have to understand that to invoke a stable subject as the active agent of 
politics is not to refer to a subject that precedes discourse or politics; it is to 
performatively enact that subject as the initiator of politics… Similarly to say 
that identity grounds politics is not to refer to identity undersood 
metaphysically but it is to performatively invoke that identity as 
organizational of politics.” (2005: 58) 
 
In this frame, Lloyd underscores that identities are not prior to politics but are effects 
of power. However, in order to deconstruct the binary thinking that presents 
poststructural and essential claims in oppositional terms, Lloyd (2005: 63) states that 
identities understood as essence also involve identity production. Similarly, 
performatively produced identities postulate truth claims about selves. She gives 
lesbian identity as an example and says that lesbian identity does not appear all of a 
sudden but one realizes that one is lesbian by participating in certain communities 
and discourses. Using these discourses within a certain historical moment, the self 
constructs a lesbian self. In this sense, lesbian subjectivity is the product of 
discourses and practices that name it, not an essence that exists prior to those 
discourses. Yet at the same time, the self makes certain truth claims about her 
authentic lesbian experiences. Thus, in Lloyd’s thinking the projection of a truth 
about oneself is itself a performative effect, it is an identity produced in its 
articulation. (2005: 43) In short, the claim that the essentialist identity itself is a 
performative construction helps Lloyd rethink the space between postructuralist and 
essentialist claims as a strategic space that can be deployed for making political 
demands. In this way, she provides a resolution to the “end of feminism” debate 
without giving up the postmodern project of dismantling the unitary, fixed subject. 
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This in return produces some implications for feminism. It challenges the feminist 
assumption that feminist politics requires a stable subject to ground its demands. 
Drawing on an understanding of subjectivity that is not prior to politics but is 
generated by politics itself, it reconciles liberatory politics of social movements with 
the complex, dynamic, multiple character of subject production. 
 
2.2.4.Postfeminisms 
 
The question of feminist self-identification has come to the forefront especially in the 
recent debates on postfeminism in the Anglo-Saxon context. In some of these 
debates, postfeminism is associated with the current conjuncture in which feminism 
is perceived as no longer relevant and necessary to women who have benefited from 
the gains of earlier feminist movements and have become powerful actors in their 
public and private lives. In this sense, postfeminism is perceived as a reaction against 
earlier feminisms so much so that the meaning of the prefix ‘post’ thus becomes 
equivalent to ‘anti’. (Braithwaite, 2002: 4) 
In fact, it is quite hard to say that there is consensus about the meanings of 
postfeminism. It is appropriated to refer to a variety of different discourses such as 
backlash feminism, third way feminism, Girl Power, power feminism and 
postmodern feminism. (Genz and Brabon 2009) The term “postfeminism” first 
became tangible in the 1980s in its alignment with the rise of conservative politics. In 
this contextual setting, it signified an antifeminist stance and was associated with the 
view that women no longer need feminism since they already have benefited from 
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earlier feminisms and achieved powerful positions in the public sphere.
1
 According 
to Henry (2004), postfeminism understood as such has a paradoxical implication 
because it connotes both to the failures and successes of feminism. On the one hand, 
the term originates from the decline of the women’s movement and the rejection of 
feminism; on the other hand, it signifies “the time after feminism” in which the 
accomplishments of feminism have already yielded to gender equality.  
This association of postfeminism with women who argue that feminism is 
passé, has occupied many critics in the 1990s. This particular interpretation of 
postfeminism as antifeminist has been developed in the Anglo-American scholarship 
by second wave feminist critics such as Faludi (1991) or French (1992) in relation to 
the best-selling writers such as Naomi Klein, Katie Roiphe, Rene Denfield or Laura 
Doyle, who identify themselves as feminist but reject the assumptions of earlier 
feminisms. In these critiques, the distinguishing aspects of the writings of the 
postfeminist generation are identified as follows: First, it is maintained that the 
young postfeminist writers refuse the second wave’s emphasis on “victim” feminism 
in favor of “power feminism”, “equity feminism” or “new feminism”. This definition 
of feminism as power feminism has been subject to heavy criticisms because it 
creates the impression as if gender equality is fully achieved. (Faludi 1991) Second, 
it is argued that postfeminists’ emphasis on the individual lifestyle choices and 
personal pleasures provided by consumer culture turns feminism into a matter of 
lifestyle and deprives it of its potential as a social movement for initiating large 
scaled social change for women. (Ibid) In short, in this understanding postfeminism 
                                                          
1 Henry (2004: 19) notes that the first text to apply the term “post-feminist” to the 1980’s and to the 
generation of women who came age during the late 1970s and early 1980s is Susan Bolotin’s “Views 
From The Postfeminist Generation” published in the New York Times Magazine in 1982. Bolotin 
noted that the women she interviewed who were born between 1957 and 1964 viewed feminism as 
no more necessary for their generation.  
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is seen as a patriarchal construction that designates a pre-feminist stage. Tania 
Modleski expresses this point as follows: “Texts... proclaiming... the advent of 
postfeminism are actually… underminig the goals of feminism, delivering us back 
into a prefeminist world”. (cited in Genz & Brabon, 2009: 16)  
Moreover, the popular press has also been held responsible for the 
proliferation of postfeminist discourses in the form of anti-feminism. Faludi (1991) 
sees media as the major perpetrator of backlash against feminism. Drawing on news 
stories, articles, TV shows and Hollywood movies, she tries to display how the 
media blames feminism for a series of illnesses such as infertility or mental health 
problems. In this line of thought, the backlash media is seen as the main site where 
streotypical images of feminists are constructed as humorless, angry women 
unconcerned about their appearance and fanatically obssessed with political 
correctness. (Bailey, 1997: 22) According to these criticisms, this media discourse 
envisions home and motherhood as the domain of female autonomy and the choice to 
remain childless as unhealthy.
2
 Scholars, both those who regard postfeminism as 
anti-feminism (Faludi 1991) and those who acknowledge the multifaceted character 
of postfeminism and regard it as a timely reponse to the changing conceptions of 
subjectivity and agency in the contemporary era (Genz and Brabon 2009), identify 
these backlash discourses in the media as retrograde and point out conservative 
politics as their source of origin.  
                                                          
2
Such a conception of the domestic sphere is obviously quite different from the way it was perceived 
under the second wave feminism, especially in Betty Friedan’s Feminine Mystique. Friedan describes 
the housewife as trapped in the daily routine, as the epitome of female non-identity. In opposition to 
this, some postfeminist discourses remove the idea of home from this association with confinement 
and link it to women’s autonomy and power.  
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As mentioned at the beginning, the meanings of postfeminism is not limited 
to anti-feminism. Other scholars such as Genz and Brabon (2009: 39) argue that 
postfeminism cannot be seen as a purely patriarchal creation. In this sense, they 
maintain that the attempt to fix postfeminism’s meaning is futile and even misguided. 
They remind us that feminism never had one universal definition but always has had 
a number of working definitions that are relative to particular contexts, specific 
issues and personal experiences. Likewise, Rupp and Taylor (1999: 363) note that 
history of feminism is full of different strands of feminisms and feminists who would 
hardly find a common ground such as “Nazi feminists and Jewish feminists, Catholic 
feminists and Islamic feminists, socialist feminists and utopian feminists, social 
feminists and equity feminists, imperial feminists and national feminists”. Relying on 
the multiplicity of the meanings of feminism, Genz and Brabon (2009:4) urge for the 
acknowledgement of the multifaceted character of postfeminism. Scholars like 
Budgeon (2001), Braithwaite (2002) and Siegel (1997) also criticize the freezing of 
postfeminism’s meaning as anti-feminist since for them, this antifeminist label 
reflects a problematic belief in the definitional stability of feminism as a term, which 
excludes multiple meanings that exemplify feminism today. Alternatively, it is 
suggested that feminism can be seen as a term with multiple histories and multiple 
meanings. In this sense, postfeminism implies the plurality of feminism, may acquire 
quite different meanings within different contexts and relies on the view that it is no 
more possible to assume a unanimous feminist realm. (Genz and Brabon, 2009: 29) 
In this alternative reading of postfeminism, postfeminism could be a way to talk 
about the changes in feminist thinking that took place in the last decades with the 
influences coming from postmodernist, poststructuralist and postcolonial theory. 
(Brooks 1997, Gamble 2000) 
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The changing meaning of feminism in the postfeminist times in the 
perception of young generations is clearly illustrated in the following remark:  
“Young women coming of age today wrestle with the term feminism because we 
have a different vantage point on the world than that of our foremothers... for many 
of us it seems that to be a feminist in the way that we have seen and understood 
feminism is to conform to an identity and way of living that doesn’t allow for 
individuality... we fear that the identity will dictate and regulate our lives... forcing 
us to choose inflexible and unchanging sides, female against male, black against 
white, opressed against opressor, good against bad” (Walker, 1995: xxxiii) 
Walker’s statement is indicative of the fact that the new generation of feminist 
women who have become visible in the public sphere beginning with the early 1990s 
argue for a new feminism which would be corrective to the rigidity of the second 
wave. In another remark, she defines the current stage of feminism as third wave 
feminism: “I am not postfeminism’s feminist; I am the Third Wave.” (Henry, 2004: 
25) Here, Walker first rejects any association with the antifeminist backlash. She 
does not want to be treated in the same camp with publicized figures such as Katie 
Roiphe, Rene Denfeld or Camille Paglia whose works caricaturize second wave 
feminism. In contrast to these figures, she and other third wave feminists do not 
reject second wave feminism altogether. (Synder, 2008: 3) Third wave’s espousal of 
second wave feminism holds true to a certain extend in their imagination. Having 
denied any linkage with antifeminist backlash, Walker, in her above-mentioned 
statement, emphasizes that although she labels herself as feminist, this feminist 
identification does not belong to the “old”, i.e., second wave feminist narrative but 
designates a new stage in feminism’s history. Following Walker’s articulation of the 
new wave feminism, many books appeared in the U.S context, consolidating the 
existence of the third wave: Barbara Findlen’s Listen Up: Voices From the Next 
Feminist Generation (1995), Leslie Heywood and Jenifer Drake’s Third Wave 
Agenda: Being Feminist, Doing Feminism (1997), Jenifer Baumgardner and Amy 
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Richards’ Manifesta: Young Women, Feminism and the Future (2000), Rory Dicker 
and Alison Piepmeier’s Catching a Wave: Reclaiming Feminism for the 21st Century 
(2003).  
Henry (2004: 34) suggests that the reference to generation and age underlies 
many of the third wave narratives. These narratives frequrently bring up the issue of 
changing needs and demands of young women, cast second wave as outmoded and 
imply the beginning of a new era. Henry (Ibid) also notes that third wave ideas 
heavily rely on the analytical tools provided by the postmodern and postcolonial 
thinking. Bearing these in mind, she proposes that third wave feminism could be 
envisioned as a response to the contemporary challenges regarding gender debates. 
In a similar way, Synder (2008: 14) maintains that third wave feminism can be 
viewed as a tactical response to postmodernity. Accordingly, relying on the 
postmodern critique of essentialism, third wave feminism dismisses the idea that 
women share a common experience of womanhood. In this vein, third wave feminist 
ideas about identity acknowledge contradiction, multiplicity and ambiguity in 
identity positions. They also embrace an intersectional and multiperspectival version 
of feminism. Third wave feminists argue that this new wave welcomes identities 
which used to be seen as clashing with feminism. Accordingly, it is possible to 
conform to the consumerism of beauty culture and at the same time identify with 
feminism. (Ibid., p.7) Third wave feminists claim that this new stage of feminism is 
different from the second wave feminism in terms of its welcoming of differences 
and inclusiveness. Drawing on third-wave texts and practices, Purvis (2004: 14) 
defines this new stage of feminism as an awareness of intricate workings of power 
and the complicated character of subject positions that do not fit into the ficticious 
category of “perfect” feminism. Affirming the third wave feminist position, she 
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alleges that since ideas about how to be a feminist are constantly under interrogation, 
it is impossible to set fixed boundaries for feminist positions.  
Considering the recent postfeminist or third wave feminist arguments that 
redefine feminisms through multiplicity, one can suggest that the implications of the 
feminist self-identification in the contemporary setting are more complicated than 
before. Scholars argue that in the contemporary era where anti-essentialist critiques 
destabilized old feminist assumptions about women’s shared characteristics, giving 
way to contradictions and ambivalence, feminisms are confronted with the rise of 
antifeminist discourses fed by the patriarchal ideology. Women, especially young 
women, are increasingly refraining from the feminist label by resorting to the 
statement “I’m not a feminist but…” (Burgeon 2001) One can argue that the 
refrainment from the label “feminist” is nothing new. In other words, the same 
statement “I’m not a feminist but…” is not unique to the current stage of feminism 
but was also articulated in earlier stages of the history of feminism. Women, who 
resort to this rhetorical strategy, want to avoid the social ostracism that usually 
accompanies the feminist label or they do not share most of the feminist ideas but 
think that supporting gender equality is politically correct. However, this refrainment 
from the feminist label or the negotiation of it has gained new dimensions today. It 
has gone beyond the feminist/anti-feminist dichotomy and has come to encompass 
the current debates about difference, identity and feminist identity politics. The 
statement “I am not a feminist but…” has multiplied through the emergence of other 
statements like “I am third wave” or “I am not a second wave feminist”. In this 
sense, all statements that imply a certain distancing from the statement “I am a 
feminist” engage in attempts to rethink certain feminist assumptions, ideas and 
approaches in the light of the recent of poststructuralist, postcolonial critiques 
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dismantling the unitary, fixed conceptions of identity. Therefore, in this research, 
while analzing women columnists’ narratives about their relationship with feminism, 
I will keep in mind the complex web of meanings embedded in the espousal or denial 
of the feminist label. For example, the negotiation of the feminist label may involve 
certain strategic tactics which provide the subject a protective shelter to avoid social 
ostracism or it may involve an oppositional stance vis-a-vis unifiying, exclusionary 
tendencies of orthodox feminist narratives that fail to capture the multiplicity of 
contemporary feminist subject positions. In this sense, the statament “I am not a 
feminist but…” can be read along multiple lines marked by different political and 
personal motivations. On the other hand, the statement “I am not a feminist but…” 
also entails an ideological component that positions subjects vis-a-vis feminism 
critically. Here, the negotiation of the feminist label gains further meanings if the 
meanings of feminism in the mind-set of the subject in question are informed or 
affected by the recent feminist debates on identity and difference. If so, then the 
statament “I am a feminist” or “I am not a feminist” may display not one single color 
but different shades of that color, reflecting the contradictions and ambivalences 
underlying feminism today.    
 
2.2.5. Identity Politics and Feminism in Turkey in 2000’s  
 
Women’s identity in modern Turkey has always been strategically addressed by 
major macro social and political projects. (Kadıoğlu 1998) Westernization, Islamism, 
nationalism, the Republican project of modernization and socialism have been grand 
discourses that in one way or another tried to incorporate women’s identity into their 
projects. They regarded women’s identity either as the facilitator of their ideals or as 
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the marker of their ideological boundaries. In modern Turkey, an autonomous 
flourishing of feminist ideas took place in the post-1980 period. The rise of the 
feminist movement and scholarship in the post-1980 period has challenged this 
discursive utilization of women’s status (Arat 2004). Since then, many critical 
studies have been conducted about the Republican emancipation of women, pointing 
out the strategic utilization of the image of modern woman by the modernization 
project. (Durakbaşa 1998, Kandiyoti 1988, Kadıoğlu 1994)  
This initial momentum of feminist critique, which was mainly limited to the 
gendered subjectivities of secular, middle class women, has gained a new dimension 
with the flourishing of the studies taking into account different subject positions and 
identity claims in Turkey. As a result of this recognition of differences among 
women, the category of “woman” as a unified block has come to be deconstructed in 
the new cohort of women’s studies in the post-1980s Turkey. The post-1980 period, 
which witnessed the rise of identity politics along with a plurality of discourses- 
namely, feminist, Islamist, Kurdish, has been a turning point that has redefined the 
social, cultural and political codes in Turkey. Following the openings of the era, 
scholars resorted to the concept of “difference” to understand the multiplicity of 
experiences of being a woman in Turkey. Göle (1991), Özdalga (1998) and 
Saktanber (2002) have conducted studies about the identity of Islamist woman and 
pointed out the inadequacies of the Kemalist paradigm to account for the 
complexities of the newly rising identities of urban, well-educated, veiled women. 
For example, employing personal interviews with university students who are part of 
the Islamic veiling movement in Turkey during the post 1983 period, Göle (1991) 
interrogates how educated Islamist women contest the cherished master narrative that 
traditions and religion will disappear with the advent of modernity and education. In 
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this way, she challenges the opposition between modernity and Islamic identity and 
explains how veiling in its contemporary form is different from traditional Muslim 
women’s use of headscarf. For her, the contemporary reappropriation of veiling from 
traditional to modern forms of life indicates the emergence of a new figure on the 
political scene, i.e., female Islamist intellectual who diffentiates herself from 
traditional, uneducated women through her claims on Islamic knowledge and 
politics. On the other hand, in her book Veiling Issue: Official Secularism and 
Popular Islam in Modern Turkey, Özdalga (1998) sheds light on personal and 
political aspirations of three women who have chosen to wear headscarf. In this way, 
she initiates a debate on the the choice to veil that goes beyond the limits of the 
official ideologies. As in Göle’s work, Özdalga’s book redefines veiling as women’s 
autonomous choice that is not necessarily a form of submission to the confines of 
traditions but may signify a new appropriation of veiling informed by women’s 
agency, aspirations, personal and political demands. In a similar vein, Saktanber 
(2002) brings to the forefront the experiences of women as crucial actors in Islamic 
revivalism in Turkey and how they conceive Islam as a living social practice. In 
short, these new cohort of studies have initiated a new turn for feminist knowledge 
production and history writing in Turkey in that they provided a significant ground 
for scholary debates where differences among women matter.   
Feminist studies have also delved into the diversification of the women’s 
movement in the post-1990 period. In this period, along with the rising demands of 
Kurdish and Islamic women, women’s organizations have multiplied, reflecting the 
enlargement of the discursive space where dissolvement of unitary conceptions of 
womanhood and multiplication of women’s demands and needs can be articulated. 
Aldıkaçtı-Marshall (2005), Coşar and Gençoğlu (2008), Diner and Toktaş (2010), 
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Fisher Onar and Paker (2012) point out the broadening of the scope of women’s 
activism that takes place in tandem with the rise of identity politics in the post-1980 
period. These studies put forward that the multiplication of women’s organizations is 
reflective of the heterogenous array of women’s demands and needs in Turkey.  
The focus on differences among women has broadened with studies 
investigating the dynamics of the Kurdish women’s movement. In her pioneering 
study, Çağlayan (2007) exposes the interaction between ethnic/nationalist processes 
and gender relations and discusses the repercussions of women’s presence in the 
Kurdish movement. In this frame, she discloses the unique characters of the 
movement and its potentials in terms of gender equality. For example, she argues that 
unlike other anti-colonial nation building processes in other geographies at the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century, the Kurdish movement did not impose on women the 
burden to protect the authentic national self. Rather than being confined to their 
symbolic tasks at home, women are seen as active participants of the movement. She 
also notes that in the late 1990s the idea of gender equality has become much more 
significant for the left-wing and secular strands of the Kurdish movement as 
women’s active participation in the movement has considerably increased. For her, 
this, in return, has affected the organizational structure of the Kurdish movement and 
its ideological composition. 
Another crucial attempt in feminist studies in Turkey that has rendered the 
ethnic differences among women visible, is Ekmekçioğlu and Bilal’s study (2006) on 
Armenian feminist writers in the late Ottoman period. Focusing on the works of 
Elbis Gesaratsyan, Sırpuhi Düsap, Zabel Asadur, Zabel Yesayan and Hayganuş 
Mark, Ekmekçioğlu and Bilal provide crucial insights into how these writers 
negotiate the interplay between their gender and Armenian identities and their 
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conceptions of equality and freedom for women. In this sense, this work makes a 
substantial contribution to the process of generating a new feminist historiography 
that takes into account religious and ethnic differences in women’s identities. 
Furthermore, differences among women in terms of class positions have also 
been incorporated into feminist research. (Özyeğin 2001, Bora 2005) For instance, 
Bora (2005) analyzed how different gendered positions enter into dialogue in the 
context of domestic labour and regenerate each other. Relying on the Bourdieusian 
framework, she focused on the regenerative effects of the encounter in question and 
the dilemmas, possibilities and inequalities embedded in it.    
The portrayal above reveals that the unified category of “woman” is no more 
the unit of analysis in feminist studies in Turkey. As a result of the critique of 
epistemic privilege in the feminist knowledge production that prioritizes the demands 
of the “elite” women while ignoring less powerful or marginal identity positions, 
gendered subjectivities that were once invisible have come to the foreground of 
scholarly debates. Yet, these recent attempts to render the “invisible” visible, do not 
thoroughly capture the entire spectrum of the contemporary feminist scholarship. 
What is also needed is to take into account the recent debates about the encounter 
between feminism and postmodernism, which problematizes the very idea of identity 
in feminism. As explained earlier, the postmodern critique questions the claim that 
identity is prior to politics; it argues that identities are effects of power and contests 
each and every identity claim on the basis of its fictionality and its regulatory and 
disciplinary character. The postmodern dismantling of the idea of subject has been 
quite problematic for feminist politics for a number of reasons explained before. Yet, 
the critique of essentialism that underscores the historically situated, dynamic and 
fictional character of gender identities has proved to be quite useful to grasp the 
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complex functionings of gender identities. Therefore, I believe that while reflecting 
on gendered subjectivities and questions about identity and identity politics in 
Turkey, one has to keep in mind that identities and identity formations are never 
monolithic, monocausal, unified and fixed. To grasp the operating mechanisms 
underlying different modalities of identity formations, it is necessary to be aware of 
the multiple, flexible and hybrid qualities of the statements regarding the self. 
Studies conducted on feminist identity politics in Turkey constitute another 
point of reference for this research. These studies usually focus on feminist activism, 
feminist publications, feminist NGOs and women’s organization. Some studies 
disclose the effects of women’s movements on the democratization processes in 
Turkey. (Arat 1994; Marshall 2009, 2011) Others provide insight into the political 
demands of feminist organizations. (Arat 1999, Bora 2002) There are some other 
studies that investigate the trajectory of the women’s movement in Turkey and 
unmask the transformation of demands. (Esim & Cindoğlu 1999, Özçürümez & 
Cengiz 2011) Moreover, some of the works focus on feminist publications and their 
contribution to the dissemination of feminist discourses in the public sphere. (Arat 
2004, Koçali 2002, Kırca 2001, Öztürkmen 1998). Finally, one can also find studies 
that compare and contrast different women’s organizations and feminist NGOs in the 
light of each other. (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall 2005, Coşar & Gençoğlu 2008) However, 
despite this broad range of focus on feminist identity politics, the issue of feminist 
self-identification has not been interrogated so far. How do women negotiate the 
label “feminist” in Turkey? How do they see the relationship between feminist 
identity and feminist label? What kind of an identity position does the label 
“feminist” generate in their imagination? All these questions regarding the dynamics 
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of feminist self-identification that await to be answered constitue a huge vacuum in 
feminist scholarship in Turkey.   
Considering these missing points in the trajectory of feminist studies in 
Turkey, this research will attempt to uncover feminist self-identification among 
women intellectuals by taking into account the recent feminist debates on identity 
and identity politics.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
INTERPRETIVE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
3.1. Mid-way Theories in Feminist Debates  
 
“Neat, clear distinctions distort the complexity 
of the issues raised by the problem of identity. 
Identity must be understood from within this 
complexity, not through a denial of it.” (Susan 
Hekman, Private Identities, 8) 
“We are voyagers, discovers / of the not-known, 
/the unrecorded; / we have no map”(H.D., 
Trilogy, 59)  
“You must live sin fronteras [without borders]/ 
be a crossroads.” (Anzaldua, 195) 
 
Feminist theory today is undergoing a profound identity crisis. The poststructuralist 
critique of essentialist accounts on identity has dismantled the category of “woman”, 
claiming that this category ignores the differences among women and inevitably 
leads to fixed, stable identity narratives. Rejecting the essential identity of the 
modernist tradition, the poststructuralist critique has replaced it with incoherent, 
unstable, performative selves. Accordingly, any attempt to define the category of 
“woman” is misguided. Criticizing the conception of modernist subject as a stable, 
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coherent unity, Butler argues that there is no substance embedded in subjectivity; a 
substansive unity is a ﬁctive construct. In this regard, she defines gender identity as a 
relentless reiteration of gendered acts:  
“There is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is 
performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its 
results. Thus, gender identity is its acts; without the acts there would be no 
gender. It follows that [g]ender ought not to be considered as a stable identity 
or locus of agency from which various acts follow; rather, gender is an 
identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through a 
stylized repetition of acts.” (1990, 25, 140)  
 
Interpreting the category of woman as ﬁction, Butler’s critique of the modernist 
subject proposes an alternative to the essentialist accounts of gender identity. This 
poststructuralist position in feminist theory mainly targets at “cultural feminism”, 
i.e., a form of feminism that aims to challenge the patriarchal definitions of woman’s 
nature by redefining woman’s nature in a way that is highly prone to essentialism. To 
reconstruct woman’s nature, cultural feminists replace woman’s passivity with her 
peacefulness and her sentimentality with her proclivity to nurture. Instead of 
challenging the very act of deﬁning “woman”, they redefine the deﬁnition given by 
men. (Alcoff, 2006: 134) Yet, this new definition is equally flawed in that it 
homogenizes women, erasing the differences among them. In the poststructuralist 
critique, the replacement of the passivity attributed to women with positive attributes 
is seen as nothing but the duplication of misogynist strategies. (Ibid) In this frame, 
the main poststructuralist criticism is that cultural feminism is based on the 
essentialist fixing of gender identity, which in return generates a hierarchy among 
women. Accordingly, gender politics has to be rethought in such a way that sexual 
difference loses its significance and is replaced with a multiplicity of differences that 
are acknowledged to be fictive and always in process.  
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In the poststructuralist account, not only the category “woman” but “identity” 
in general is a very problematic concept. Hekman (2004: 101) notes that identity is 
generally defined through sameness. It is defined as “the quality of being the same in 
substance” and “sameness of a person or thing at all times and in all circumstances”. 
(Ibid) This definition of identity as “sameness in substance under all 
cirmcumstances” makes it an alien concept to poststructuralist accounts. The 
poststructuralist critique concludes that sameness embedded in the concept of 
identity makes identity an oppresive tool that disciplines subjects by fixing their 
position into stable identity categories.  
The poststructuralist dismantling of identity in return has led to the question 
as to whether such a critical move signifies the end of feminist politics. If one cannot 
talk about the category of “woman”, how can one make political demands in the 
name of women? In recent years, there has been various attempts in the feminist 
scholarship to mitigate the impasse between the poststructuralist accounts on identity 
and claims for autonomy. The theoretical deadlock caused by the binary opposition 
between the modernist subject as a stable, coherent entity and the poststructural 
subject as fictive, flexible and incoherent turned out to be unproductive to deal with 
current problems regarding feminist politics, feminist identification and sexual 
difference. Therefore, what is currently needed in feminist theory is an alternative 
account that can provide a new perspective, going beyond the binary opposition 
between the arguments for stable and flexible self. With the aim to come up with an 
alternative account, scholars have attempted to develop mid-way theories that 
employ the postmodern critique on identities without discarding the idea of 
autonomy and agency. This alternative perspective is a hybrid way of dealing with 
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questions of identity today since it combines elements both from the modernist and 
the poststructuralist accounts of subject.  
Proponents of the concept of identity who argue for the third way point out 
the critical importance of “identity” to analyze the key aspects of the current social, 
cultural and political phenomena. Echoing the postmodern theories, they claim that 
identities are effects of power, never fixed but always in process. Critiquing the idea 
of a stable subject position, such accounts stress unstable, flexible formation of 
subject that may encapsulate multiple aspects of subjectivity. Here, the subject is 
positioned within several connected axes of identity, which are always open to 
rearticulation. Peeling these identity layers does not reveal a core, essential self. 
However, in such accounts the acknowledgement of power effects, flexibility and 
multiplicity in the constitution of identities does not eradicate the possibility of 
making truth claims at certain historical moments.  
As one of the proponents of the third way, Hekman (2004) strongly argues 
against the “either/or” choice in feminist theory today. The “either/or” choice that 
confronts scholars working on identities today is as follows: Either you accept the 
poststructuralist fictive subject or the only alternative is the stable, essentialist 
accounts of the modernist subject. Hekman (Ibid, 6) alleges that the ﬁctive subject of 
the poststructuralist theory is not the only alternative to the modernist subject. 
According to her, we do not reinvent ourselves every day as the poststructuralist 
theory says; nor are we wholly constructed by hegemonic discursive formations. 
Hekman stresses that the unique aspects of our identity equip ourselves with a 
coherent core which does not have to be necessarily an essentialist counterpart of the 
modernist subject. 
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In the same vein, Lloyd (2005) points out the possibility of reconciling truth 
claims with flexible understandings of subject. According to her, the fact that 
identities are dynamic, flexible and are produced as effects of power does not mean 
that it is impossible to talk about authentic experiences that subjects form around 
certain identity categories. She underscores that even though the claims about fixed, 
shared experiences of group identities have become already outdated as a result of 
postmodern criticisms, it is still possible to make collective demands. In this regard, 
she states the following:  
“Every identity is performatively produced and each performative production 
involves positing a constative claim. Each time feminists appeal to the idea of 
woman they performatively invoke her, but each performative invocation 
produces her anew and differently.” (2005: 56) 
 
Here, similar to Hekman, Lloyd suggests that even performative selves display a 
stable unity once they are performatively constituted. Before making this argument, 
she underlines that subject is an effect of politics; there is no subject prior to politics. 
Accordingly, politics does not express the demands of a pre-constituted identity; 
rather the demands of that constituency are constituted in politics. Yet, for Lloyd, 
this acknowledgement of the fact that identities are always saturated with power 
relations should not be regarded as a constraint for feminist politics. As noted above, 
in the poststructuralist account there is no authentic self of being a woman that is 
already there outside power relations. Lloyd notes that this does not signify the end 
of feminist political demands but rather it can be seen as regeneration of feminist 
politics and its adaptation to current accounts of identity. Even though identities are 
seen as flexible and always “in process”, it is possible to talk about experiences 
formed around such identities. These experiences, Lloyd argues, are not 
representations of pregiven identities but products of a certain time and place. As 
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such, politics of identity is not always entirely constraining, as poststructuralists 
claim. One can acknowledge the congingent, performative character of identities yet 
at the same time talk about truth claims related to such identities. In short, espousing 
that identities are performatively formed does not necesarily obscure the postulation 
of truth claims. Accordingly, Lloyd maintains that feminist scholars today should not 
see performativity and truth claims in binary opposition. Rather, what is needed is to 
acknowledge that they are in an agonistic relationship, feeding and transforming each 
other and always in interplay, not in opposition.     
It is clear that both Lloyd and Hekman try to reconcile the idea of a stable self 
with the poststructuralist account of incoherent, flexible selves. The main idea in 
their critique of the anti-identity stance is that most of the prevalent assumptions 
about identity and identity politics are based on a deficient picture of what identity is. 
In the anti-identity theories, identity is imagined as inevitably fixed, monolithic and 
oppressive. Scholars such as Hekman, Alcoff and Lloyd remind that identities in fact 
have the potential to problematize the relationship between identity and politics. In 
other words, politics of identity can accomodate the fact that identities are not prior 
to politics but they are effects of politics. As such, identities do not have to be 
imagined as inherently monolithic and oppressive. As discussed earlier, one of the 
main critiques against identity politics is that since identities involve a pre-defined 
set of values, interests and practices, they discipline those who identify with those 
identities and lead to conformism, fixation and suppression. Accordingly, in identity 
politics, identity operates as a site of closure. It assumes that the values and interests 
of identity groups are intrinsic to them and transcend history, culture and geography. 
As a result, firm boundaries set around “authentic” identity turn identities into 
ahistorical categories and produce an exclusionary logic by defining those who do 
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not commit to the ideals of that particular identity as absolute “others”. (Lloyd, 2005: 
37) As a result of the identitarian logic, those who fail to conform with the 
descriptive ideal of the identity group fall outside the boundaries that form the 
authentic identity. Opposing this stable, monolithic account about identities, Lloyd 
(2005) underlines that identities are to be redefined as flexible and unstable. 
Furthermore, she argues that when identity demands are articulated, they are not 
necessarily derived from an essential core but are provisional.   
On the other hand, Hekman (2004) explains the progressive potential in 
politics of identity through the differentiation between private and public identities. 
She states that identities are constituted by an array of different influences and 
experiences which make each person unique. Her argument is that public identity 
categories cannot be monolithic and stable; rather they are quite complex as they are 
not standard reproduction of already defined identity categories but contain the 
unique aspects of personal identity, which further complicates public identity 
categories. Here, Hekman (Ibid, 7) points out to the fact that when one enters the 
public arena espousing a particular public identity category, this does not mean that 
that public identity category can represent each and every aspect of the identity of the 
person in question. The main idea in Hekman’s reminder is that the complexities of 
identities exceed the representative character of public identification. In short, two 
points come forward in Hekman’s reminder: First, public identity categories are 
reinterpreted in line with unique aspects of personal identities. This means that 
different public identifications may overlap with each other but they do not have to 
be identical. For instance, the category “woman” may assume different meanings in 
different individual cases. Second, public identifications do not exhaust the multiple 
character of identities; identities are not fixed by a particular public identity category. 
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Since one cannot bring each and every aspect of her identity into the public 
identification in question, espousing a particular public identity category such as 
“woman” does not fix one’s identity as “woman”. This means that identifications and 
multiple aspects of identities do not have to be thought in binary opposition but can 
be perfectly compatible. 
In a similar vein to Hekman and Lloyd, Alcoff (2006) also challenges the 
deficient aspects in the fixation of identities as monolithic and oppressive units. For 
her, identities are not always imposed on people from outside. They involve peculiar 
meaning making processes as they are derived from one’s own daily reality, i.e, the 
materiality of experience which is unique. (Ibid, 42) Thus, Alcoff (Ibid, 43) asserts 
that identities are “interpretive horizon”s that help us interpret and work through our 
peculiar social location and group history. This hermeneutic aspect in identities in 
Alcoff’s account operates as a safety bell against the fixation of identities as stable, 
universal and oppressive categories. 
To sum up, feminist scholars today engage in various attempts to indicate that 
stable, monolithic and universal identities are already outdated. These attempts 
diverge from each other when it comes to proposing an alternative to the old 
accounts of identities. While poststructuralists always consider identities as 
oppressive and thus avoid the identitarian logic, some other scholars point out the 
deficient aspects in the anti-identity theories, claiming that these theories obscure the 
potential in identities to problematize the relationship between politics, political 
demands and subjects. The latter group proposes a third way as a remedy to the 
theoretical deadlock caused by the opposition between modernist and poststructural 
accounts of subject. As seen above, such attempts to overcome the binary opposition 
between the modernist and the poststructural subject have been abundant in recent 
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feminist theory. I believe that the third way reconciling modernist and 
poststructuralist accounts of identities is quite useful to gain a thorough insight into 
the challenges and complexities of feminist identification.
3
 While negotiating a 
particular identity category, one may produce a dynamic and fragmented narrative 
about that particular identity, which would be in line with the posttructuralist 
accounts. Yet, at the same time one may also produce a narrative that presupposes a 
core self with a certain set of experiences, political demands and values formed at a 
certain time and place. The theoretical framework presented below reflects these 
complexities of the concept of identity and outlines different theoretical approaches 
that criticize old, stable accounts on identity and make revisions in the 
conceptualization of identity in order to render it compatible with the current social 
and political demands and needs. 
 
3.1.1. Metaphors About “Subject in Process” 
As noted before, second wave feminism often assumed that all women share 
common demands and experiences. This in return was accepted as the unifying basis 
of feminist politics. Yet, in the last decades this unified category of woman has been 
                                                          
3 Different concepts and terminology that approach to the same phenomenon from different angles 
can always be useful to comprehend the complexitiy of the phenomenon in question. In this sense,  
the anthropological concept “liminality”,  coming from the Latin word limen, i.e., threshold, can be 
cited here as a useful analytical tool to further reflect on the dynamism of identities. In Turner’s 
anthropology of the ritual process, the liminal corresponds to a particular phase of a ritual process in 
which the subject redefines her identity in a setting that has  ‘‘few or none of the attributes of the 
past or coming state’’ (Turner 1969: 94) For Turner, this is ‘‘an instant of pure potentiality’’ (1979: 
41), which makes the transgression of norms and conventions possible. In this sense, the idea of 
liminality is in tune with mobile, dynamic selves in mid-way feminist theories. Thus, the term 
“liminal” would be also an explanatory adjective to express the terms in which nomadic, border 
identities are in a flux of change.   
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deeply interrogated on the basis that it mainly refers to white, middle class women. 
In line with the postmodern theory, this critique problematized the idea of stable 
subject and underlined that subject positions are never fixed but always open to 
tranformation. In this account subjects are mobile and do not contain an essential 
self. Ferguson puts it as follows: 
 
“Mobile subjects are ambigious, messy and multiple, unstable but 
persevering. They are ironic, attentive to the manyness of things... They are 
politically difficult in their refusal to stick consistently to one stable identity 
claim.” (Ferguson, 1993: 154)  
 
This account of subjects as units permanently open to rearticulation deconstructs 
fixed boundaries and prevents fixation of subject positions. Mobile selves in this 
account are ambigious, messy, multiple and unstable. Ferguson (Ibid) articulates that 
such selves are “politically difficult in their refusal to stick consistently to one stable 
identity claim.” Such complexities of identities can be sometimes best expressed 
through metaphors. To be able to indicate various axes embedded in the construction 
of identities and the continual state of flux in subject positions, some scholars use 
metaphors such as “cyborg”, “nomad” or “mestiza”. These metaphors indicate that 
subject formation processes are coalitional as various axes of identity are brought 
together in these processes. (Lloyd, 2005: 15) 
  
3.1.1.1.Mestiza 
As a Chicana residing in the United States and as the lesbian daughter of a Mexican 
mother and a white father, Anzaldua (1987) uses the metaphor “mestiza” to refer to a 
subject position that is tolerant of differences, ambiguities, contradictions and 
acknowledges the co-extistence of multiple differences in a subject position. To 
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emphasize the reflections of class, sexuality, hybridity and ghettoization on mestiza 
identity, Anzaldua writes the following: “As mestizas, we have different surfaces for 
each aspect of identity… We are written all over with sharp needles of experience”: 
(cited in Lloyd, 2005: 47) As an influential metaphor for multiple subjectivity, 
“mestiza” emblematizes the contradictions, the ambivalent character and plurality in 
marginal identities. According to Lloyd (2005: 48), the idea of borderland is pivotal 
to Anzaldua’s conception of mestiza identity. Borderland for Anzaldua does not only 
correspond to the geopraphical border between the U.S. and Mexico. Metaphorically, 
it signifies a space that is inhabited by those who transcend the confines of the 
“normal”. It is a site where the subject refuses all kinds of fixations. The idea of 
borderland confines the mestiza. Thus, she refuses to be contained by borders that 
define the mestiza as marginal. This strong denial of the binary thinking between the 
“normal” and the “marginal” renders the mestiza identity disorientating. (Lloyd, 
2005: 49) Regarding mestiza’s relation to borders, Anzaldua (1987: 195) says that to 
survive in the borderlands, one has to be a crossroads. As Lloyd notes, being a 
crossroads also means that one is open to be transformed by others as well as 
transforms others. This possibility for fruitful dialogue points out the interrelational 
aspects of multiple identities and their potential for building coalitions with different 
subject positions.   
In this frame, “mestiza” metaphorically resonates the poststructuralist idea 
that identity is always shifting and incomplete. This process of becoming is a 
creative but also a perplexing process. Lloyd (Ibid, 50) notes that the mestiza identity 
both signifies a desire for identity and the impossibility for it. In this way, it reveals 
the intricate and heterogenous nature of identity. The mestiza renders her identity 
formation a creative process in that she turns her volatile position between cultures 
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and races into a positive asset by stressing the mixed person’s ability to translate and 
negotiate the diversity of meanings, practices and forms of life. However, this 
positive meaning attributed to mestiza identity in Anzaldua’s account should not be 
seen as a romantic portrait. To point out the intricate aspects of mestiza identity, 
Andalzua writes the following:  
“The ambivalence from the clash of voices results in mental and emotional 
states of perplexity. Internal strife results in insecurity and indecisiveness. 
The mestiza’s dual or multiple personality is plagued by psychic 
restlessness…’’ (1987: 78). 
Anzaldua’s remark brings into the open that mestizas’ attempt to deconstruct the 
binary thinking between the “marginal” and the “normal” may result in mental 
disturbance and the indecisiveness of mestiza identity position, which, in return, 
demolishes the romantic portrait of being a mestiza.  
 
3.1.1.2.Nomad 
In Nomadic Subjects, Braidotti (1994) employs the metaphor of “nomadic 
subjectivity” to elaborate on the image of becoming. The term “nomadic 
subjectivity” is an attempt to explore how to live in a different way with multiple 
differences. Braidotti (Ibid, 66) posits that in order to make sense of the world, one 
requires an identity (sexual, national, social), yet not a fixed identity, valid for all 
time. In this regard, the nomadic subject develops an identity based on transitions, 
shifts and flexibility. In this sense, it is a multiple entity, a site for multiple forms of 
subjectivity, which cannot be reduced to a single, homogenous, monolithic form. 
Lloyd (2005: 16) states that nomad is a traveller who is always en route to 
somewhere else; she is never anywhere in particular. This refusal of the stableness of 
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fixed identity makes it a poignant metaphor for becoming other. Braidotti describes 
the nomad as follows:  
 
“The nomad is intensive, multiple identity, functioning in a net of 
interconnections. S/he cannot be reduced to a linear, teleological form of 
subjectivity but is rather the site of multiple conceptions. She is embodied 
and therefore cultural; she is a technological compound of human and 
posthuman. She is complex and endowed with multiple capacities for 
interconnectedness in the impersonal mode. She is a cyborg but quipped also 
with an unconscious.” (1994: 36) 
 
Braidotti’s employment of the metaphor “nomad” is a useful theoretical tool to grasp 
the transformation of bodies, identities and belongings in a culturally and ethnically 
heterogenous world. It entails multiple forms of belonging of subjects and reveals 
different ways in which a subject can have multiple belongings. It is possible to map 
out multiple ways of belonging that are subject to change depending on the particular 
location the subject occupies each time. Thus, nomadic subjectivity allows one to see 
alternative trajectories of subject formation and in this way dismantles the idea of 
unitary subject that belongs entirely to one location. As such, nomadic subjects are 
“subjects in transition” constituted by continuous shifts and changes. Nomadic 
subjects challenge hegemonic discourses and practices as they resist fixation of 
boundaries and being included in the pre-set, fixed identity categories and social 
structures. They attempt to blur all kinds of boundaries that discipline subjects into 
established social categories. In this sense, nomadic consciousness can be regarded 
as a form of political resistance to hegemonic views of subjectivity. Braidotti (1994: 
25) argues that like the Foucauldian notion of counter-memory, nomadic 
consciousness can enact “a rebellion of subjugated knowledges”. The potential for 
resistance in the nomadic subjectivity does not originate from the literal act of 
travelling; nomadic subject can subvert hegemonic discourses without necessarily 
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changing her habitat. The potential for political resistance is related to the nomadic 
processes of becoming. Thus, the potential in nomadism to subvert conventions 
renders it a creative act that makes room for otherwise unlikely encounters, 
belongings and interactions. (Ibid, 6) 
The fluidity in nomadism deterritorializes the self, thereby deconstructing 
identity categories. In its detachment from fixed identity categories, the nomadic self 
appreciates all kinds of differences such as race, class and gender without 
establishing a hierarchy among them. Braidotti (Ibid, 25) argues that this 
acknowledgement of the entangled relationships in the foundation of the self is “a 
form of resisting assimilation or homologation into dominant ways of representing 
the self.” As such, nomadic subjectivity provides a setting for interactions of axes of 
differentiation such as class, race, ethnicity, gender or age and reveals the multiple 
aspects of the self.  
Alcoff (2006: 276) points out the connections between the nomadic self and 
the postmodernist notion of the indeterminate self. She quotes Braidotti stating that 
“the nomad’s relationship to the earth is one of transitory attachment and cyclical 
frequentation.” (Ibid) Alcoff also notes Braidotti’s detachment from embodiment of 
the self. For her, in rejecting certainties and incorporating differences, this account 
employs a useful safety belt against dogmatism. Yet, Alcoff argues that Braidotti’s 
conception of identity categories as inherently prone to essentialism and her rejection 
of embodiment cannot grasp the true character of entangled relationships in the 
construction of the self. Alcoff maintains that entangled relationships do not uproot 
the self, rather they reveal its complexities. In this sense, in Alcoff’s interpretation 
Braidotti’s nomadic self resists commitments, obligation and avoids responsibility by 
having only ‘‘transitory’’ attachments. She explains her position as below: 
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“The nomad self is bounded to no community and in actuality represents an 
absence of identity rather than a multiply entangled and engaged identity… 
To be a free-ﬂoating unbound variable is not the same as being multiply 
categorized…” (2006: 276) 
Considering Alcoff’s point, one should ask the following the question: Is the 
nomadic subjectivity an attempt to uproot the self? Braidotti (1994: 31-33) clearly 
states that “being a nomad does not require one to sever all the ties that sustain 
identity, nor does it mean that one has no sense of identity.” For her, being a nomad 
means living in transition but this does not mean that one cannot create stable bases 
for identity that is necessary to function in a community. (Ibid, 33) Accordingly, the 
nomadic self makes the necessarily situated connections but this does not lead her to 
function within the limits of a fixed identity. 
As a result, one can state that the idea of nomadic subjectivity corresponds to 
a self that is always in transition and at the same time can create stable ties, make 
commitments, feel obligations or fulfill responsibilities. Braidotti’s account of 
nomadism exludes any idea of identity as a fixed, stable entity yet it may be 
reconciled with flexible, dynamic accounts of attachments and ties. Instead of 
identity, the term “identification”, which I will explain later in this chapter, can be 
compatible with nomadism.  
 
3.1.1.3.Cyborg 
Haraway, in her essay A Cyborg Manifesto, argues against the conventional 
understandings of feminism which place gender and identity politics at the center. 
She introduces the image of “cyborg” to point out the shift from the unified human 
subject of identity to the posthuman of technoscience. Cyborg promotes hybridism 
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defined by biopower and techno-science, which devalues the categorical purity of 
modernity. (Gonzalez 2008) Haraway (1991: 149, 254) states this as the following: 
“A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of 
social reality as well as a creature of fiction… We are all chimeras, theorized 
hybrids, and made of machine and organism; in one word, we are cyborgs”. The 
cyborg metaphor puts an end to the unity and substantive vision of the subject. It 
contributes to ruptures separating humans and animals; and distinguishing between 
animal-human organisms and machines. In this sense, it dismantles the binaries of 
physical-nonphysical, human, animal and machine and transgresses the binary 
opposition between nature and culture. Through its hybrid and mosaic character, it 
points out the possibility for open-ended subjectivity and its potential for relentless 
permutation. The “cyborg” metaphor problematizes the idea of boundaries and blurs 
them by rendering them obselete. It blurs the boundaries between organic and 
mechanical, artificial and natural, real and fictional. Accordingly, what makes us 
human is neither wholly natural nor artificial. This posthuman person is both organic 
and mechanical, artifical and natural, real and fictional in Haraway’s account.  
Targeting at binary oppositions between nature and culture, mind and body, 
cyborg as a postmodernist strategy signifies the post-gender world where the 
differentiation between female and male bodies loses its meaning. Identity politics 
based on essential unity of particular identities is totally eliminated from the cyborg 
narrative. In this frame, Haraway (1991: 297) calls for a cyborg feminism. For her, 
other conventional forms of feminisms generate taxonomies that define what the 
official woman’s experience will be and therefore are based on a matrix of women’s 
domination of each other. In Haraway’s account, cyborg feminism argues against any 
kind of belief in essential unity and confronts dominations of unified categories such 
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as race, gender, sexuality, class. Identity in cyborg feminism is replaced with affinity. 
(Ibid, 296) If diffuse political coalitions are to be united, this unification can only be 
realized along the lines of affinity. Affinity in this account turns out to be a strategic 
term that has nothing to do with natural identification but signifies only a 
momentary, strategic coalition formed to render a particular subject position visible. 
Haraway (Ibid) gives the situation of U.S. black women as an example. Oppressive 
mechanisms embedded in the category of gender and race may not allow them to 
speak under these categories but they can conciously construct a space for 
themselves to speak as women of colour. However, this coalitional space based on an 
affinity of interests is never a unified category since those who affirm their identity 
as a U.S. woman of colour, diverge from each other because of many differences 
they have.  
To conclude, the metaphors described above are all attempts to bring to light 
the complexities and multiplicities of the self. The idea of becoming, hybridity, 
borderlands and the act of transgressing fixed boundaries are pivotal to these 
metaphors. In place of identity as a fixed, stable entity, they introduce the idea of 
“subject in process”. This dynamic form of subject resists fixation, categorization 
and blurs fixed boundaries that attempt to categorize the subject as marginal. In this 
sense, it can enact a rebellion of subjugated knowledges. The metaphors explained 
above are not just linguistic forms but they are important instruments with a capacity 
to shed light on contemporary questions regarding identity. One of the challenges 
that confronts feminist theory today is to find new images that can help us gain an 
insight of the changing conditions of the subject. The metaphors explained above 
serve this purpose. The fluidity, hybridity and flexibility in their character 
distinguishes them from essentialist, fixed conceptions of identity. Gonzalez (2008: 
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24) employs the metaphor of an “island” to depict the modernist, fixed conceptions 
of identity. The image of an island is surrounded by stable borders. In this sense, this 
image clearly depicts the modernist conception of identity as a natural and fixed 
entity. In opposition to the fixity of the image of island, mestiza, nomad and cyborg 
stress the journey of becoming and point out to a subject position where binary 
oppositions are exchanged with hybrid forms of being.  
Keeping in mind these useful theoretical tools, one should also ask whether 
these dynamic metaphors undervalue commitments, responsibilities and narratives of 
belonging altogether, as Alcoff argues. With this concern in mind, it is necessary to 
conceptualize these metaphors in such a way that they do not uproot the self but 
rather render it both flexible and situated at the same time.  
 
3.2. Attempts to Generate A New Terminology Instead of “Identity” 
Critics of identity point out that identities are contextual as they change depending on 
the character of the historical time and place in question. Moreover, they underline 
that identity categories are neither stable nor homogenous. Postmodern scholars such 
as Butler interpret identity categories as fictive by unmasking their discursive 
formation and distmantling the idea of essence. Accordingly, authentic or exemplary 
women’s experience does not exist because women’s experiences are different from 
each other, which makes it impossible to unify different women under the signiﬁer 
“woman”. As a result, any account of “authentic women’s experience” is prone to 
naturalize a particular group of women’s experiences while marginalizing others. 
The attempt to identify authentic women’s experience obscures the power relations 
involved in the production and maintenance of the identity category in question.  
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Challenging the attempts to mystify identities as natural, this critique has 
greatly enhanced the approach to identities in the contemporary era. However, 
scholars today are quite divided on whether identity is still a useful concept to 
comprehend the social and political phenomena. Some poststructuralist theorists 
argue for the abondonment of the category of identity altogether since any argument 
based on identity categories, they suggest, is doomed to operate through a myriad of 
exclusions. On the other hand, pro-identity theorists oppose this proposal for 
abondoning identity as they maintain that identity is a crucial marker for history, 
social location, and positionality and therefore a key concept to analyze how the self 
is positioned in the social and political world. What they suggest instead is a new 
way of thinking about identity. Going beyond the dichotomy between “essentialist” 
and “postmodernist” theories of identity, they contend that an adequate theory of 
identity should allow a social theorist to analyze the possibilities and limits of 
different identities. For them, neither identity nor politics of identity is inherently 
constraining. In this account, it is alleged that identities can also be enabling and 
enriching forms of attachment and feeling. Accordingly, acknowledging that 
identities are signiﬁcant modes by which people ex- perience, understand, and know 
the world, does not necessarily lead one to adopt an essentialist approach. The pro-
identity approach explained here defends the category of identity without relying on 
a mystified or reified essence. Rather, it sees identities as context-specific, socially 
embodied narratives about ourselves. Avoiding from defining identities as natural 
facts of who we are, it reconfigures the idea of identity as the locus by which social 
locations are hierarchically organized and power relations are reinforced as well as 
challenged. Contrary to the postmodern thinking which evaluates identities as 
discursive enforcements and disciplinary categories imposed on subjects, the pro-
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identity approach regards the idea of identity as a positive and meaningful entity that 
provides room for individual interpretation of one’s social location.  
 In short, contemporary social world is no longer a field that operates through 
fixed, static categories. It is relentlessly reshaped along with the changing categories 
used to account for our position in the midst of this transformation. The postmodern 
move that aims to deessentialize identities in line with the changing conditions of 
contemporary world does not necessarily require the abondonment of identities. 
(Nicholson and Seidman, 1995: 25) Rather, what is needed here is finding out new 
ways to think about identities while avoiding essentialism. This deconstruction of 
essential identities presupposes a new form of politics which is not based on unified 
identity categories but is organized around specific issues, struggles, goals that bring 
different parties together and generate coalitions. (Ibid, 28) This new understanding 
of politics does not automatically lead to the abondonment of the concept of 
“woman” or signify the beginning of a post-gender world. Mouffe (2005: 87) argues 
that “partial fixations can take place and precarious forms of identification can be 
established around the category ‘women’ that provide the basis for a feminist identity 
and a feminist struggle”. It is also necessary to note that such identifications will be 
complex formations that are not exclusively centered on gender but also interlock 
with class, sexuality, race, nationality, and so on. If the deconstruction of essential 
identities is possible without disawoving the posibility of forming political 
mobilization and making political demands, the task of the social theorist is to 
generate a new language that would express this new reconfiguration of identities. To 
this aim, scholars have employed different terms to reflect on the contemporary 
challenges regarding the issue of identity. Their main effort is to point out the 
73 
 
centrality of the concept of identity by avoiding essentialist approaches. Below is a 
review of the theoretical openings generated by such efforts.   
 
3.2.1. Identity As “Ungrounded Ground” 
To develop a new approach to identity that trancends the impasse characterizing 
current debates on identity, in her book Private Selves, Public Identities, Hekman 
(2004) identifies the misconceptions that are embedded in the prevalent 
conceptualizations of identity. For her, the ﬁctive subject in the postmodern theory is 
not the only alternative to the modernist subject. She argues that the notion of a 
coherent identity in the postmodern thinking is often falsely condemned as being 
repressive. In Hekman’s account, we are not wholly formed by hegemonic 
discourses, as posmodernist theorists argue. Rather, individuals are endowed with 
unique attributes that distinguish them from standardized identity categories, which 
grants them the ability to interpret the discourses around them through their own 
perspective and take a position accordingly. In this sense, for Hekman, everyone 
possesses a core self that allows one to operate in public life.  This core self is 
constituted both by public forces such as hegemonic discourses affecting the limits of 
what one can say and personal forces such as character or family. (Ibid, 7) Through 
making a distinction between private and public selves, Hekman aims to overcome 
the claim that identities inherently lead to conformism, uniformity and thus ignore 
multiplicities and diversities. She underlines that public identity categories are 
redefined in each individual case in line with the unique attributes that the core self 
has. In this sense, she defines political action as a site of interface between public and 
personal identity. For example, espousing the identity “woman” in the public arena 
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does not make one identical with others who make the same identification. Nor does 
it mean that this identification subsumes all the unique aspects of personal identity 
under the category “woman”. This point reminds us that personal selves do not have 
to be fixed by public identity categories. As Hekman ( Ibid, 7) argues, “we are all 
embedded in social structures but our embeddedness occurs at different locations.”  
In this frame, Hekman identifies two precautions against the fixation of 
identities. First, she states that those who espouse a particular public identity 
category may share similar interests or positions with each other. Yet, they are by no 
means identical since the unique aspects of their personal identities lead them to 
reinterpret the public identity category in question in line with their own needs and 
demands. Second, Hekman underlines that identifying with a public identity category 
does not mean to be subsumed entirely under that category since the complex 
character of personal identities far exceeds the scope of that category in question. 
Relying on this point, one can claim that identification with a particular public 
identity category does not constitute an obstacle to the multiple aspects of the self. 
Hekman acknowledges that there is no clear-cut distinction between public 
and personal selves as they mutually constitute each other. Without ignoring this 
point, she draws attention to the differences between public and private selves, which 
allows her to indicate that identities are not necessarily oppresive and unifying. For 
her, the core self that everyone posseses is formed by a complex array of forces that 
are both public and personal. By relying on object relations theory, she maintains that 
the core self that is formed in relation to signiﬁcant others in the early years of life 
persists over time. (Ibid, 102 ) It is this core self that constitutes the key aspect of 
Hekman’s critique against postmodern understandings of identity. According to her, 
the postmodern approach fails to acknowledge the differences among different 
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identity positions. The claim that we are all determined by social forces can explain 
the complexities of our identities only to a certain extend. For Hekman, an adequate 
theory of identity must be able to account for the unique, individual aspects of 
identities and their effects on our social position:   
“An adequate theory of identity must have an explanation for how hegemonic 
concepts such as “woman” are ﬁltered through the lens of individual 
situations. It must explain how race, class, and ethnicity as well as the 
peculiarities of particular families shape identities not as identical but as 
different. It must be able to explain the intersection of public identities such 
as “woman,” “middle class,” “black,” “Italian,” and so on with the particulars 
of individual families and social situations and how these combine to 
construct a personal identity.” (2004: 16) 
In Hekman’s reading, Butler’s postmodern approach envisions identity as an entity 
wholly produced by the surrounding discourses, thereby reducing identity to a void. 
Hekman argues that this approach eliminates the idea of agency and the ability to act 
since it reduces subjects to discursive formations. For Butler (1993: 115), what is 
needed against the perils of the modernist subject is the political resistance of 
incoherent identities. Accordingly, since fixed, coherent identities are always 
cohersive, all the attributes of the modernist subject must be rejected. Yet, this 
argument leaves Butler’s account in a difficult position since it undermines the 
ability of the fictive subject to act. For Butler, identity politics fixes the essence of 
each identity category through hegemonic discourses. In relation to feminist politics, 
she argues that “the category of woman, the subject of feminism, is produced and 
restrained by the very structures of power through which emancipation is sought”. 
(1990: 2). In Butler’s account, organizing feminist politics around the category of 
woman conceals the discursive origins of the fabricated core of gender identity. What 
she proposes instead is to deconstruct identity politics in order to reveal the very 
terms through which identity is articulated (1990:148). In this frame, the only way to 
resist hegemonic fabrication of essential core of gender identities is to resort to 
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pastiche. Since gender identity in Butler’s theory is produced through repeated 
performative acts, the resistance strategy requires the undoing of these entrenched 
performative gender acts. In this sense, Butler suggest that the strategy of pastiche 
entails the mocking of the notion of an original. It allows one to subvert essential 
gender identities and not to perform gender as it is supposed to be performed. 
However, the idea of resistance is quite problematic in Butler’s theory because there 
is always the danger of promoting the power that one is struggling against. Butler 
(1993: 241) herself asks the following: “How is it possible to tell the difference 
between the power we promote and the power we oppose?” For example, she argues 
that a lesbian who opposes heterosexuality absolutely may be more in its power than 
a straight woman since she establishes her opposition as opposed to the norms of 
heterosexuality and therefore cannot transcend the discursive boundaries established 
by the power that she opposes. (Ibid, 116–17). Since there is no exact formula to 
know the difference between the power we promote and the power we oppose, the 
scope of action for Butler’s fictive subject is quite fragile. Hekman (2004: 15) alleges 
that it is unclear how the ﬁctive, performative subjects can act, what actions they 
might perform and what power they might subvert. Thus, she concludes that there is 
no conceivable political strategy that emerges from Butler’s strategy of pastiche. 
(Ibid) 
In short, Hekman distances herself from Butler’s theory on the basis of two 
problematic points explained above: First, she opposes the rigid social 
constructionism in Butler’s account and instead suggests that subjects are not social 
dupes that are wholly constructed by discourses in an identical way. To oppose this 
point, she underscores the fact that public identity categories are reinterpreted though 
unique aspects of personal identity. Second, she critizes Butler’s idea of fictive self 
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on the basis that its ability to act has serious limitations. As a result, she develops a 
third way by arguing that it is possible to theorize a stable core of identity without 
abandoning social construction or presupposing an essential subject. The core self 
that Hekman proposes is socially constructed in the early years of childhood. This 
“ungrounded ground” provides a secure base to act without abondoning the idea of 
social construction. 
 
3.2.2. Identity As “Interpretive Horizon” 
In Visible Identities, Alcoff (2006) challenges the argument that identity claims lead 
to distrust, miscommunication, and disunity. To make identities more visible and 
point out their central character in social and political analysis, she deconstructs the 
anti-identity trend in scholarship by challenging the main political arguments behind 
the contemporary critique of identity, which she outlines as below: (Ibid, 38) 
(1) Identities inevitably lead to conﬂicting loyalties within a larger grouping, 
such as a nation. (Schlessinger 1992)  
(2) By encouraging the reiﬁcation of group identities, identity politics results in 
conformism, intolerance, and patriarchalism. (Fraser, 2000, 112–13). 
(3) Since rational reﬂection requires a certain distance from identities, strongly 
felt identities pose major problems for rational deliberation.  
For Alcoff, these critiques are either based on a misconception of identity as 
necessarily oppressive and unifying or they rely on the liberal conception of generic 
human which erases the particularities of identities for the sake of objective 
reasoning. Alcoff (2006: 6) states that it is the refusal to acknowledge the 
particularities of identities that paves the way to miscommunication and disunity: 
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“When I refuse to listen to how you are different from me, I am refusing to 
know who you are. But without understanding fully who you are, I will never 
be able to appreciate precisely how we are more alike than I might have 
originally supposed.”  
 
For Alcoff, it is not possible to identify a vantage point that is above particularities 
since everyone speaks from a particular location, experience and context. Setting 
aside particularities signifies the impossibility of communication, given that 
individuals make judgements as subjects who are embedded in a particular frame of 
reference. In this perspective, there can be no reasoning without sight, without some 
background. An environmentalist, for example, cannot engage in a debate about the 
use of energy resources without relying on her perspective on environmental issues. 
To stress the situatedness of judgements and perceptions, Alcoff argues the 
following:  
“To say that we have identities, histories, social locations, experiences, 
cultures, and so on is simply to say that we exist. Identities are best 
understood as ways in which we and others around us represent our material 
ties to historical events and social structures.” (Ibid, 287) 
 
Accordingly, identities matter especially for those whose experiences are marginally 
positioned vis-a-vis others. To clearly designate the salience of identities on the 
representation of selves, Alcoff elaborates on “visible” identities such as gender and 
race whose marks on the body cannot be erased. For her, age can be masked, 
homosexuality or class can be hidden but markers such as gender and race are 
inevitably visible and thus have to be incorporated into social and political analyses 
in order to uncover the mechanisms by which they are enacted and reproduced. (Ibid, 
6) In this frame, Alcoff engages in an attempt to reconstruct identity as a counter 
model of the abstract individual citizen who has no gender, race, or cultural 
background. Yet, Alcoff’s reconstruction does not mean going back to essentialist 
accounts. She opposes essentialist approaches by underlining the dynamic and 
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socially constructed character of identities. In Alcoff’s account, identities are not 
simply “there” prior to the politics of interpretation; rather, they are produced as a 
result of complex processes of interpreting and working through an objective social 
location and group history. (Ibid, 9) As entities deeply grounded in social locations, 
identities resonate with the lived experience of subjecthood. In this sense, the 
materiality of lived experience is quite central to Alcoff’s conception of identities. 
Accordingly, identities provide meaning in line with the subject’s daily reality. 
Moreover, they are constituted in particular contextual conditions and at particular 
historical periods. Individuals and groups attempt to give meaning to their located 
lived experiences in relation to historical narratives. Thus, Alcoff suggests that the 
particularities of identities are best understood through speciﬁc context-based 
analyses. (Ibid)  
To point out the situatedness of the self, Alcoff relies on the concept of 
“horizon” used by Charles Taylor (1989). In Sources of the Self, Taylor provides an 
alternative account of selfhood, which challenges the disengaged self of modernity. 
In the accounts on the modern subject, self-mastery is defined in such a way that it is 
only achieved through objectifying the surrounding world, i.e., disengaged 
reasoning. (Mason, 2010) Opposing this picture of the self, Taylor argues the 
following:  
“My identity is defined by the commitments and identification which provide 
the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case 
what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or 
oppose” (1989: 27)  
 
Drawing on Taylor’s views, Alcoff defines identity as “interpretive horizon”, i.e., as 
a site where one engages in meaning making processes. This horizon of intelligibility 
corresponds to a “perspectival location from which the interpreter looks out at the 
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world”. (2006: 95) According to this, identities as interpretive locations enable 
individuals to make judgments about their selves and the social world in which they 
live. By making use of the hermeneutic approach, Alcoff argues that the self is 
always culturally located, which in return endows it with a horizon as a specific 
location. This hermeneutic insight makes it possible to construct a dynamic account 
of identity, given that meanings are always made and remade in relation to the 
changing contextual conditions. The meanings of a particular identity are constructed 
in different ways since differently located embodied subjects interpret the meanings 
of their identities in line with the peculiarities of their social location. In other words, 
identities do not operate on the basis of a stable set of interests, but rather function as 
an interpretive site in relation to a specific horizon, rendering the self open to change. 
(Ibid, 43) In this account, identity does not lead to a deterministic interpretation of 
social locations and historical narratives; as an interpretive horizon, it helps us bring 
out certain expriences and condition into the open. The interpretive horizon 
embedded in identities provides one a certain vantage point in line with the historical 
situatedness and lived experiences, which, in return, is helpful in illuminating the 
political implications of identities. This vantage point may facilitate to access to 
certain historical conditions that were invisible before. For instance, after they 
perceive gender discrimination, women, who used to believe that downplaying their 
identity as women in public life will ensure their fair treatment, may become 
feminists. (Ibid, 147) 
So far, it is clear that in Alcoff’s account, identities do not determine one’s 
interpretation of the social world but only provide horizons which help one disclose 
certain experiences, historical narratives or contextual conditions. In this account of 
identity as interpretive horizon that allows individuals to make sense of the world, 
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contextual conditions as well as the materiality of lived experience provide the 
setting for making judgements about the self and the world. The social world and the 
self is always apprehended from within the historical location. Therefore, the primary 
point here is to disclose different perspectival locations and different meanings 
derived through them. 
As noted above, materiality of lived experience is especially crucial for 
Alcoff’s account. For Alcoff (Ibid, 113) the situatedness of horizons is not simply 
perspectival but also material and embodied. In this sense, she alleges that 
interpretive horizon does not only operate in the form of presuppositions and 
perceptual orientations but it also has a tacit presence in the body in the form of 
gender or race. The materiality of lived experience helps Alcoff challenge the liberal 
picture of the separate, autonomous and disembodied self. In this way, she argues for 
an embodied subjectivity and attempts to build up a concept of identity closer to 
reality. 
Another crucial aspect of Alcoff’s account on identities is its relational 
character. Alcoff points out that the other is internal to the self’s substantive content. 
For Alcoff (Ibid, 45), this is not a relation of dependence but a mutually constitutive 
relationship in which the other is a part of one’s identity, i.e, a part of one’s horizon. 
Alcoff (Ibid, 79) argues that in both modern and postmodern accounts what comes to 
the individual from the social- whether it is named as discourse, disciplinary 
mechanisms or cultural traditions- is seen as necessarily constraining. She opposes 
this claim by arguing that the self cannot make any judgements outside the speciﬁc 
horizon constituted by Others since the self operates in a situated plane. (Ibid, 82) 
Given the hermeneutic insight that the self is always culturally located, the mutually 
constitutive relationship that the self constitutes with Others provides the backbone 
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of the perspectival location of the self. Therefore, Alcoff underlines that self-other 
relations are fundamental to the concept of identity, rationality and autonomy. This 
view on the self-other relationships also contributes to the idea that rather than 
leading to disunity, identities in fact facilitate communication as they are formed in 
close relation to others.  
In Alcoff’s model, critical rationality and moral agency develop and operate 
within specific social contexts. The act of discerning meaning is always performed in 
a particular place and time. To underline the particularities of interpretations of the 
social world, Alcoff employs the term “situated reasoning”. (Ibid, 94) Accordingly, 
meanings can change depending on the historical situations in which they are 
formed. In this view, reasoning is regarded as “an interpretive process involving the 
social location of the knower”. (Ibid, 95) Like the idea of interpretive horizon, 
situated reasoning captures the experiences of the individual and the context in which 
the act of interpretation takes place. Both the concept of horizon and situated 
reasoning point out the mediated nature of experience and the ﬂuid character of 
identity. In this sense, the concept of interpretive horizon as a perspectival location 
affecting one’s perceptions and interpretations is essential to explain situated 
reasoning. (Ibid,102)  
“Positionality”, which signifies a continuous engagement of the self into 
social reality, is in tune with Alcoff’s views on identities. To challenge the gender-
neutral aspects of modern notions of subjectivity and the post-gender orientation in 
postmodern theory, “subject as positionality” links the idea of social construct with 
human agency. De Lauretis (1984: 159) argues that the self is produced by one’s 
subjective engagement with the social world. The idea of subjectivity formed as a 
result of the interaction with the world implies that agency is not simply produced by 
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external structures of meaning. Individuals can enact their agency within the frames 
of particular discursive formations. Accordingly, gendered subjectivity is set both by 
the social location and by individual judgements and choices made from within the 
social location in question. The gendered self is part of the historicized narrative and 
at the same time actively contributes to the context in which she is positioned. This 
conception of the subject as positionality, as non-essentialized and emergent from 
historical experience and yet located in social structures, challenges the essential, 
universally same and ahistorical accounts of gendered subjectivity. Accordingly, the 
self is reconstructed anew each time when the horizon of meanings available in a 
culture changes. Alcoff (2006: 147) notes that if identity politics is reinterpreted 
through the lenses provided by the idea of subject as positionality, it can gain a new 
meaning that does not presuppose a stable set of judgements, perceptions and 
demands. In this way, it can incorporate identity into political analysis as an 
enabling, perspectival location. For Alcoff, this view allows one to avoid essentialist 
deﬁnitions that define women’s identity through ahistorical, universal categories 
such as peacefullness or disposition to nurture. Moreover, it helps one overcome the 
mere politics of negation in postmodern thinking that opposes all identity claims and 
identity-based interpellations and definitions. Alcoff (Ibid, 152) argues that it is 
possible to do better than to say, ‘‘I will make demands in the name of women even 
though I don’t accept the category of ‘women.’’ For her, since women exist in 
particular locations, we should make demands that reﬂect women’s needs on the 
condition that we don’t universalize their needs or the content of their political goals.  
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3.2.3. “Identification” Instead of Identity 
Another example of the pro-identity stand which tries to find a mid-way between 
essentialism and the postmodern dismantling of identity, is the replacement of the 
term identity with “identification”. Brubaker and Cooper (2000) suggest that the 
heavily burdened, deeply ambiguous character of the term “identity” today makes it 
necessary to come up with a new terminology that can capture the contemporary 
problems related to the subject’s position in the social world. They label the 
essentialist accounts as “strong” conceptions of identity and those which stress 
fludity and flexibity as “weak” conceptions. Accordingly, while “strong” conceptions 
of identity signify sameness, group boundedness and homogeneity, “weak” 
conceptions persistently insist that identities are multiple, malleable and fluid. For 
Brubaker and Cooper, the former account is too “strong” to deal with elastic aspects 
of identity issues, whereas the latter is so infinitely elastic that it cannot comprehend 
the particular aspects of identity that remain same and identical over time. To 
compensate for the limitations of each approach, Brubaker and Cooper suggest the 
employment of the term “identification” in order to overcome the problems and 
ambiguities in strong and weak conceptions of identity.  
On the other hand, Hall (1996: 2) argues that in the contemporary theoretical 
world, in which postmodern thinking puts key concepts under erasure, identity 
cannot be dealt with by employing old analytical methods. Yet, it cannot be totally 
eliminated either since it is a central concept in social and political analysis without 
which certain key questions cannot be thought at all. Questions of agency and 
politics are deeply related to identity issues. To transcend the impasse generated by 
the binary opposition between essentialist and postmodern thinking, Hall, like 
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Brubaker and Cooper, proposes the concept of “identification” as a new framework 
that can help us tackle with the key questions regarding self and agency.     
Hall agrees with the poststructuralist critique, namely with Foucault by 
claiming that the focus should be put on the discursive practices rather than on the 
knowing subject. Identities, in Hall’s account, are deeply embedded in history, 
language and culture; they designate the process of “becoming” rather than “being”. 
They are constituted by questions about the representation of the self: How we have 
been represented and how we might represent ourselves. (Ibid, 4) As such, identities 
are socially constructed entities that come into being only within representation. Hall 
claims that its socially constructed character or its fictional nature that arises from the 
the narrativization of the self does not undermine the political effectivity of identity. 
Therefore, to understand identities, one has to acknowledge that they are produced 
within discursive formations and practices through specific modalities of power.  
 In this frame, Hall (Ibid, 6) argues that identities are points of temporary 
attachment to the subject positions which discursive practices construct. The term 
“identification” helps Hall avoid the reifying connotations of identity and capture the 
idea of identity as constituted within representation. Identification, for Hall (Ibid, 3) 
is a process of articulation that entails discursive work and marking of symbolic 
boundaries. It does not assume a stable core-self, unfolding from beginning to end 
without change. Self as such is never unified, increasingly fractured, never singular 
but multiplies across different, intersecting and antagonistic discourses, practices, 
positions. Thus, this process of articulation can never be completed; but it is always 
conditional, contingent and always in flux. 
However, for Hall, this discursive character of identification does not imply 
the abolition or abondonment of agency. He states that the focus on discursive 
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practice in the analysis of subjects and identity positions can not reach its goal 
without taking into account the practices of subjective self-constitution. (Ibid, 13) In 
this sense, for Hall, the Foucaldian discursive approach to identity has to be 
complemented with a theory that can investigate the mechanisms by which 
individuals identify (or do not identify) with subject positions available to them, how 
they interpret, negotiate and perform these positions. In short, Hall calls for a theory 
that can account for the relations that subjects form with discursive practices. In a 
similar way to this, Hekman claims that the poststructural thinking does not provide 
useful tools to explain the individual negotiations of subject positions and the 
differences in identities that arise from these negotiations:   
“If, as Butler claims, we are all products of the discourses that constitute us, 
how can we explain the differences between us, particularly between women 
who are, on her account, constituted by the hegemonic concept “woman”? 
Speciﬁcally, how do we explain the fact that some women resist and others 
conform?” (2004: 16) 
 
In Brubaker and Cooper’s conception of identification, there is a similar stress on 
individual agents who do the act of identifying. Brubaker and Cooper argue that 
identification is intrinsic to social life. Modern life may necessitate many 
identification acts through which one locates oneself vis-a-vis others, in a narrative 
or in a public category. These identification acts are contextual in the sense that they 
may vary depending on the context in which they take place. Power relations and 
discursive practices deeply affect how one identifies oneself and how one is 
identified by others. Yet, Brubaker and Cooper’s conception of identification does 
not treat individuals as social dupes who have no power to interpret the social world. 
By complementing “identification” with the term “self-understanding”, they 
emphasize agency and situated subjectivity. To point out the peculiarities of 
subjective reasoning, they incorporate into the analysis the factors which affect one's 
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own understanding of oneself. Being an African-American, a Kurd or a lesbian 
generate effects on how one negotiates subjects positions constituted in a particular 
discursive formation.   
The stress put on intentionality, reflexivity and agency along with the 
acknowledgement that identities are dynamic, can also be found in Weir’s account. 
Weir (2008) suggests that the complexity of identity questions cannot be reduced to 
questions of category which ignore the individuality embedded in negotiations of 
identity. Instead of categorization, Weir (2008: 115) proposes to employ 
“identification-with”: “identification with others, identification with values and 
ideals, identification with ourselves”. For her, through such an approach it is possible 
to replace the so-called categorical “objectivity” with the subjectivity of 
identifications. Weir (Ibid, 116) states that this approach involves “a shift from a 
metaphysical to an ethical and political model of identity; from a static to a relational 
model; from a model of identity as sameness to a model of identity that focuses on 
what matters, what is meaningful for us”. In this model, questions of identity are 
dealt with through the lenses of one’s attachments and commitments, i.e, one’s 
identifications. In this frame, Weir redefines identity politics as politics of 
identification. She specifies three kinds of identifications: First, we identify with 
certain values and ideals that we are committed to. For example, if we identify with 
feminist ideals, we develop a certain critique of male oppression yet this does not 
mean that we develop the same kind of critique with others and identify with the 
same values and ideals. Moreover, in Weir’s model our values and ideals are not 
static but change depending on time and context. The key idea here is that these 
identifications that we develop inform our practices. Second, we identify as a “we”, 
which translates into solidarity and collective action. Third, we also form 
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identifications with others. In Weir’s conception, identifications with ideals, with 
“we’s” and with each other render us historically situated. Even though at one point 
one may come up with an “objective” categorical identity, it is necessary to 
acknowledge that it interacts with a “subjective, interest-driven, identification-based, 
relational identity.” (Ibid, 116) From here, it is clear that for Weir, identities should 
be dealt with as interpretations and affective commitments. This non-categorical 
conception of identity excludes identity as sameness; it puts the emphasis on 
relationships with other people and on identifications with what is significant to us. 
In this way, it argues for an ethical-relational and political model of identity. To 
stress the need to take into account the subjective aspects of identifications, Weir 
quotes Taylor’s following statement:  
“The question “Who am I?” can’t necessarily be answered by giving name 
and genealogy. What does answer this question for us is an understanding of 
what is of crucial importance to us. My identity is defined by the 
commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within 
which I can try to determine from case to case what is good or valuable, or 
what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose. In other words, it is the 
horizon within which I am capable of taking a stand.” (cited in Weir, 2008: 
117) 
 
Accordingly, questions about identity cannot be answered in terms of categories and 
fixed labels; they can only be tackled with by asking what matters to oneself: “What 
is the meaning and significance of my life? In other words, to what and to whom am 
I attached? With what and with whom do I identify?” (Ibid) In short, this subjective, 
interest-driven, strategic conception of identity helps one reconfigure identities as 
identifications that are defined through one’s relations with oneself, others and the 
social world. In this way, it takes into account the multiplicity of identity 
negotiations generated by subjective interpretations. In a similar vein, bell hooks 
(2000) states that to acknowledge differences between feminisms, one has to avoid 
categorical identities but formulate commitments and ideals in terms of 
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identifications. Instead of the phrase “I am a feminist”, she proposes the statement “I 
advocate feminism”. For her, the former statement plugs one into streotypical, 
heavily loaded conceptions of feminist identity, while the latter provides room for 
differences in conceptions of feminism. (2000: 29) This model of identification 
replaces identity politics as a firmly set belonging to fixed identity categories with an 
understanding of identity formed through relations, identifications and narratives in a 
constant meaning making process.  
 
3.2.4. Narrative Identity 
The idea of narrative provides a fresh ground to deal with questions about agency 
and intentionality which are concepts usually regarded as passé in the current 
postmodern era. Some feminist scholars such as Benhabib (1999), McNay (1999) 
and Lara (1998) resort to the idea of narrative with the aim to define a more active 
conception of the self. They maintain that the poststructuralist paradigm neglects the 
hermeneutic dimension of experience by reducing subjects to discursive effects, 
which deprives social analysts of any tools to investigate the question as to how 
social actors interpret the world.    
Narratives represent storied ways of communicating. (Hinchman and 
Hinchman, 1997) They help individuals construct storied accounts of themselves and 
their relation to the social world. As such, narratives are a significant mode of 
communication through which people attribute meaning to the past and present and 
connect together self and other. The idea of narrative corresponds to the act of 
connecting episodes and events in life with the help of temporality. (Ricoeur 1984) 
The question as to what has happened over time and how can one make sense of it by 
connecting it to other events, is fundamental to the idea of narrative.  
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In this frame, the narrative account of identity brings together the postmodern 
emphasis on social constructedness with the idea of a coherent self. The narrative 
account is anti-essentialist in that it opposes the idea that meaning is inherent to 
action. Rather, meaning in this account is produced as a result of interpretive 
strategies. Accordingly, narratives are interpretive devices produced in a specific 
context by specific people who are not passive carriers of experience but give 
meaning to the social world through their interpretive ability. (Lawler, 2003: 242) In 
addition to this, this account incorporates the idea of constant change into the 
analysis of self and identity and in this way, replaces the fixity of essentialist 
accounts with a dynamic account. Since the idea of narrative attempts to understand 
human experience in time, this inherent temporality of experience in the idea of 
narrative prevents closure of identities. The flux of events accomodate the emergence 
of new possibilities and new meaning making processes. Therefore, in line with the 
postmodern accounts, narrative conception of identity espouses that identity is 
always dynamic and incorporates the flux of experience. However, this does not 
mean that identity is free-floating. In the narrative account, the self is endowed with 
an active concept of agency and strong notions of self-expression and reflexivity. 
According to this account, by viewing the coherent and unified subject as a 
discursive imposition, the post-sructuralist view neglects the continuity of the self 
over time. (McNay, 1999: 89–94) Therefore, one can say that one of the main goals 
of the narrative account is to replace the free floating subject in the postmodern 
thinking with a situated subject who can connect events in the social world in order 
to make sense of it. This account moves from a negative paradigm of subject 
formation, which regards identities as inherently repressive and limits the scope of 
action to the subversion of the discursively imposed identities, to a generative 
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paradigm endowing subjects with intentionality and acknowledging their creative 
ability to interpret the available historical narratives. (Ibid)  
Benhabib (1999) argues that the narrative account defines identities in time 
not in terms of strong, fixed evaluative commitments but in terms of an ability to 
make sense. Accordingly, one’s commitments and attachments may shift in time but 
the need to attribute meaning to one’s experiences in a social world always persists. 
Benhabib (Ibid, 14) also notes that this need to make sense does not necessarily refer 
to an Aristotelian or Victorian narrative with a clear beginning and ending. She states 
that the need to make sense does not always produce one single narrative but many 
since narration processes contain constant attempts to retell, remember and 
reconfigure. In addition, Benhabib acknowledges that the drive to narrative unity 
does not exhaust the contradictory dimensions of subjectivity that do not perfectly fit 
into the narrative in question. Therefore, for her, the need to narrate should not be 
seen as an imposition but as an interpretive lens through which the relations between 
the self and the social world are rendered meaningful, whenever possible. In this 
frame, the main argument in the narrative account is that not each and every 
conception of identity suggests a stable, frozen subject and that it is possible to 
reconcile dynamism and coherence of the self.  
Relying on the discussions so far, one can suggest that Alcoff’s conception of 
identity as “interpretive horizon” bears resemblance to the narrative account of 
identity in the sense that they both point out the hermeneutic aspect of experience. In 
both of these accounts, the interpretive strategies that the self employs play a key 
function in the production of meaning. The narrative account also shares similarities 
with Hekman’s view of identity as “ungrounded ground” in its stress on the coherent 
aspects of the self. Both Hekman’s approach and the narrative approach attempt to 
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come up with a new theoretical frame which points out that the coherence of the self 
and its dynamism may coexist.  
Another crucial characteristics of the narrative account is its stress on the 
interrelational aspects of identity. Replacing the postmodern theory of performativity 
with the narrative approach to the self, Benhabib provides an elaborate discussion on 
the interrelational aspects of narrative identity. In her approach, she aims to propose 
a more developed account of communicative-pragmatic abilities of everyday life to 
explain creativity underlying individuals’ negotiations of subject positions available 
in the social world. To underscore the inventiveness that subjects can employ to 
resist norms of subordination and create new ways of being, Benhabib revises the 
Habermasian theoretical framework by taking into account contextuality and situated 
subjectivity. The Habermasian dialogic model of moral deliberation argues for an 
ideal of unrestricted rational discussion of public matters, which is open and 
accessible to all. The “communicative rationality” in the Habermasian model 
assumes that through a non-coercive, unifying consensus-building force of discourse, 
participants in a public debate can overcome their subjective views and reach a 
rationally motivated agreement. (Habermas 1987: 294, 315) For some feminist 
scholars, the Habermasian commitment to formalism, impartiality and universalism, 
which I will discuss in more detail in the next part, cannot capture the mechanisms 
through which power relations operate in the public sphere. Trying to incorporate 
points of view that each participant will introduce to the procedures of deliberation, 
Benhabib argues for a situated self. For her, the idea of narrative may be employed as 
a remedy for the formalism and universalism of the Habermasian communicative 
theory since it encompasses more nuanced notions of intersubjectivity and agency 
and attributes greater sensitivity to difference. (McNay, 1999: 6) Benhabib’s 
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conception of narrative identity attempts to overcome formalism and universalism of 
the Habermasian communicative ethics as well as the problem of fixity in the static 
accounts of the modern subject, by locating the self in an interrelational web. 
Benhabib (1999: 345) argues that to be a self is to act from within “webs of 
interlocution”, which range from micro narratives such as family to macro narratives 
of gender or nation. The interweaving of these multiple, historically and culturally 
specific narratives constitute an individual’s sense of the self. In this sense, 
individuals choose particular narratives from within a reportoire of public narratives.  
To link the individual and the collective through narrative, Sommers and 
Gibson (1994: 62) refer to the concept of “public narratives”, which they define as 
narratives that are attached to social and institutional formations rather than the 
single individual. This idea of public narrative suggest that there is a limit to what 
kind of narratives can be told and what can be said in these narratives. Individuals do 
not produce narratives in isolation but they choose from a repertoire of already 
emplotted stories. In short, narratives are not freely fabricated but largely depend on 
public narratives and how individuals are positioned vis-a-vis them.    
However, as Benhabib (1999: 345) argues, the fact that narrative codes are 
never freely chosen does not mean that they exclude inventiveness or the capacity to 
“initiate new actions and new sentences in conversation”. The hermeneutic aspect 
involved in the narrative allows one to retell public narratives in a myriad of different 
ways. A person's temporal and spatial location in the repertoire of available 
representations and stories in the social world provides a unique perspective for the 
narration processes and makes it possible to revise or reconstruct public narratives. 
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To be inserted into webs of interlocution also involves a conversation with 
others. Narratives are subject to change and always in process also because others’ 
narratives prevent closure of one’s own narratives. Benhabib (1999: 348) point out 
that others are not just the subject matter of one’s own narrative; rather, in telling 
their own stories they unsettle one’s self-understanding. Thus, since there always will 
be aspects of others’ narratives, narratives can never have a precise closure, which 
renders the narrative account of identity alert about the dangers of fixity.  
 
3.2.5. Interrelational Identity 
As a response to the need for new models of individuation, agency, and autonomy, 
Weir reformulates the self in such a way that it can include difference and 
heterogenity. She argues that an adequate theory of identity should be able to 
acknowledge that individuals are embedded, localized, constituted, fragmented and 
also subject to systems of power, oppression and exploitation. (1996: 184) With 
these concerns in mind, she attempts to find a third way that can reconcile the 
relational feminist theories on subject formation with the postmodern accounts of the 
self. Weir’s reformulation adresses some of the main concerns of both relational 
feminist theories which imagine the self only in its relations with others and 
postmodern theories that limit the construction of the self to discursive effects. Weir 
maintains that the construction of identity takes place as a result of complex 
processes which entail the embodiment and multiplicity of selves as well as the 
power of language and discourse.  
For Weir, although it is crucial to acknowledge the constructive effects of the 
relations that the self forms with others, the relational feminist accounts such as 
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Chodorow’s theory misrepresent identity formation as the direct effect of relations 
with others. In Reproduction of Mothering, Chodorow (1978) argues that the identity 
of the child is formed in his/her relation to the figure of mother. In this frame, she 
elaborates on the origins of the seperate male self marked by a denial of connection 
to the mother and the connection between the daughter and the mother that fixes the 
identity of the daughter as relational and caring. Accordingly, identifying with the 
father figure and developing a possesive interest in the mother, the male child easily 
develops an independent male agency, while the female child is bound with her 
intense ties with the mother, which in return renders her more bound with 
relationships. Weir acknowledges the significant effects of relationships on the self 
formation. Yet, she also notes that any theory that deals with the self outside the 
context and fails to take into account the effects of power relations in that context 
cannot provide an adequate picture of the self formation.  
As for the postmodern theories about the self, she states that these theories 
view identity as produced by exclusions of difference in systems of power. (1996: 
17) In this sense, they regard any attempt to articulate a particular identity position as 
an imposition of unity. With the aim to point out the limitations of postmodern 
accounts, Weir elaborates on Butler’s critique of the violence of identity in great 
detail. As discussed earlier, in Butler’s thought, regulative institutions maintain and 
reproduce specific power relations by enforcing particular performances of gender. 
By stressing the discursively and culturally constituted character of sex and gender 
identities, Butler develops a metatheory of identity and suggests that any identity is 
produced as a result of the power relations embedded in discourses and practices, 
which constantly reproduce binary oppositions. Arguing that language imposes false 
identities that foreclose the emergence of different voices, Butler calls into question 
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any claim to women’s identity. Identities in her account are portrayed as inherently 
repressive in that they fix multiplicity into a fictional unity. (Weir, 1996: 118) In 
short, Butler regards the identitarian logic as violence since it excludes possible 
experiences for the sake of rendering identities intelligible.  
Weir criticizes Butler’s theory on the basis that it fails to differentiate 
between repressive and non-repressive, exclusive and inclusive, metaphysical and 
socially constructed forms of identities. She states that “gender identity, women’s 
identity, lesbian identity, feminist identity, identity as uniqueness and sameness are 
all understood to be expressions of a single sacrificial logic of identity”. (Ibid) 
Moreover, for Weir, Butler’s interpretation of identity as violence makes it 
impossible to acknowledge the empowering effects of political identities upon 
participants of marginalized social groups such as feminists, gays and lesbians or 
ethnic minorities. Instead of Butler’s association of identity claims as acts oriented 
towards reification and transcendental essence, Weir (Ibid, 129) suggests that 
identity or more specifically, the category of “woman”, can be seen as a socially 
constructed form of identity that is open to change.  
As seen from above, in Weir’s thinking both relational feminist accounts and 
postmodern accounts have serious limitations in their approach to issues of identity. 
While the former account interprets identities as locked in relations with others and 
ignores power relations and the idea of mediation in language, postmodern theories 
limit the analysis to discursive effects and leave out the dynamism and change 
generated by intersubjectivity. Acknowledging the effects of relations on subject 
formation on the one hand and the power of discursive effects on the other, Weir 
develops an alternative account that goes beyond the assumption that all identity 
claims operate according to the exclusionary, repressive and unifying logic of 
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identity. Weir (1996: 18) defines identity formation as “a socially and a symbolically 
mediated process of negotiating and interpreting socially given and socially 
redeemed meanings”. In line with the Habermasian account, she emphasizes the 
intersubjective constitution of individual identity through communication. According 
to this account, one’s identity is constituted through taking up communicative 
positions and negotiating claims. It is achieved through the ability to negotiate 
differences discursively. Participation in communities, institutions, systems of 
meanings and intersubjective interactions render the self intelligible. In this relational 
account, the capacity to experience oneself as an active participant in a social world 
invests the self with meaning. This capacity for interaction with others introduces 
reflexivity and intersubjectivity into the formation of the self. Throughout this 
complex process in which self is constituted through intersubjective interactions, 
identities become subject to constant change as others’ existence prevent their 
closure. This relational model of identity formed in interaction with others is political 
in that it takes into account the power dimensions underlying the negotiations of 
meanings and values. It is also historical since it deals with processes of creating 
meaning through interactions over time.  
Weir notes that this relational conception of identity as a political, historical 
process of creating meaning over time through interrelations and practices of 
identification operates in tune with the narrative understanding of identity. Just like 
the narrative account, it rejects ahistorical, frozen conception of identities and 
proposes a dynamic conception that incorporates into the analysis the time dimension 
as well as the effects of others’ stories on the self. This conception of identity as a 
meaning making process over time through interrelations entails a capacity to 
identify with a life that matters. Weir states that this capacity to articulate a life worth 
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living allows one to hold oneself together through connections and identifications 
with oneself, one’s values and other people. She denotes that this kind of identity 
formation based on interconnections and identifications requires the ability to 
identify with another, to recognize her experiences and meanings and to see oneself 
in the other. This cognitive and affective aspect is an essential component in the 
conceptualization of relational identity as it allows one to recognize one’s 
interdependence.   
In Weir’s thought, this relational account of identities constitutes a 
“transformative identity politics” which recognizes the other as a figure who 
destabilizes our identitiy narratives and makes us acknowledge our interdependence. 
Weir states that this recognition of interdependence does not imply sameness or 
sharing the same experiences. Rather, it transforms identity formation into a constant 
process of remaking meaning through interrelations.    
 
“Traveling to the other’s world, seeing oneself in another, requires an active 
process of getting to know the other, through an imaginative and empathic 
engagement that goes beyond recognizing how we are the same, and beyond 
“putting oneself in the other’s place,” without change to the self. This 
engagement with the other requires learning about her world, learning to take 
her perspective, and thus forever changing my own.” (Weir, 2008: 125) 
 
According to Weir, each time when one connects with the other, identities are 
destabilized and constituted anew through travelling to each other’s world and 
expanding the selves to include the relation with each other. This communication 
entails knowing, listening to and witnessing others’ experiences. Opening the self to 
learning about differences results in a transformation that goes both ways: the 
transformation of the self and the other. However, this intersubjective relation and 
the transformation of the self does not take place outside the web of power relations. 
In other words, there is no isolated process of transforming the other and being 
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transformed by the other outside the mediations generated by power relations. 
Therefore, Weir combines the relational account with the idea of self-reflexivity. 
Self-reflexivity in her account is the awareness of the subject that she is the one who 
invests her existence with meaning. In this meaning making process one must try to 
be alert about one’s position in the web of power relations. Therefore, the capacity to 
relate to others is bound with the capacity to reflect on one’s privileged positions of 
power. Moreover, one should also recognize repressed parts of one’s self to 
acknowledge the oppressive aspects of the social world that may be commonly 
shared with others. (Ibid, 126) In sum, what Weir suggests is that relations of 
identification in the intersubjective account of identities should be combined with the 
recognition of our positions in relations of power.   
In addition, one should note that the idea of difference is a crucial aspect of 
Weir’s interrelational account of identities. Arguing for the openness of the self to 
transformation, this account regards differences not as something to be resolved but 
espouses them as a product of our interdependence. Weir (1996:186) states that the 
identitarian logic and differences are usually thought of as mutually exclusive. In 
postmodern accounts, any attempt to identity is seen as an act of violence since the 
constitution of an identity is imagined as repression of other possible expressions of 
experience. According to this, every subject position is regarded as a play of various 
differences that cannot be resolved because attempts to resolve them or put them 
within fixed boundaries would be an act of domination. To maintain a model of the 
self as an open process of change, one should leave contradictions unresolved. 
Challenging this view, Weir claims that one should not be afraid of making use of 
the identitarian logic if identity is reformulated through a relational account. Given 
that the self is constituted through relations with others and thus entails others’ 
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differences in its composition, resolving contradictions or making identity claims 
will not result in fixation of identities. Therefore, Weir (Ibid, 187) suggests that  “the 
struggle to resolve conflicts through an openness to difference is essential to the 
practice of change.” In this sense, with its stress on interdependence, Weir’s 
alternative account of identity makes it possible to reconcile the idea of identity and 
difference. Criticizing non-identity and arguing for resolution of contradictory 
aspects of identities, this account does not attempt to deny the multiplicity of selves; 
on the contrary, the idea of multiplicity is central to it. Weir (Ibid, 18) contends that a 
key feature of modern self-identity is the capacity to reconcile “conflictual multiple 
identities”. Yet, her attempt to reconcile differences does not result in the erasure of 
these differences; her recognition of the intersubjective character of identity 
formation allows her to incorporate differences into the formation of identities. 
Opposing the postmodern view that contradictions should be left unresolved, Weir 
alleges that the capacity for self-knowledge is essential for the definition of one’s 
identity; it is this capacity that allows one to engage in self-critique.  
 
3.3. Useful Theoretical Tools 
3.3.1. Intersectionality 
As discussed earlier, in the last decades non-white and non-western feminists who 
criticize the limited focus of the Anglo-Saxon feminist theory have claimed that for 
those women who do not come from a privileged background, “womanhood” on its 
own is not the only axis of oppression; there are other axis of oppresion which 
intersect with “being a woman”.  (hooks 1984, Mohanty 1991) Based on this 
criticism, the intersectionality theory underlines women’s different positions in 
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power relations and suggests that the experience of womanhood is subject to change 
depending on whether one is black, white, rich, poor, heterosexual, homosexual, etc. 
Unless the intersections of these multiple facets of identities are taken into account, it 
will not be possible to make some women’s experiences visible. One can state that 
the gist of the intersectional approach is about ‘decentring’ the ‘normative subject’ of 
feminism. (Brahd and Phoenix 2004) While the category of woman signifies all 
women as a homogeneous group across classes and cultures, the intersectional line of 
thinking outcasts this category or enriches it with multiplicity. According to the 
intersectionalist position, all the attempts to define the category of woman as a 
unified, homogenous group are illusory and totalizing. (Haraway 1991: 173). 
Drawing on this new line of thinking, feminist theory has attempted to combine the 
postmodern reconfiguration of subject and agency with the social-critical power of 
feminism.  
In this frame, intersectionality can be seen as another response to the claim 
that identity politics ignores multiple aspects of identities, privileges some aspects of 
identity over others, fails to acknowledge diversity within groups and imposes a 
uniform identity. To challenge the static conception of identity, the feminist literature 
on intersectionality reconceptualizes identity politics as an attempt to articulate 
knowledge derived from the material conditions, lived experience and social location 
of participants. In this way, it challenges ahistorical, frozen accounts on identities. 
Yuval Davis (2006: 200) defines the intersectionalist analysis as an effort to 
comprehend how specific positionings and identities interrelate and affect each other 
in particular contexts. It is widely acknowledged that differential positionings in 
terms of class, race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, ability, stage in the life cycle and 
other social divisions deeply affect access to economic, political and cultural 
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resources. The intersectionalist approach allows one to study how such axes of 
difference are intermeshed together. The idea of “tripple oppression” clearly 
exemplifies this notion of intermeshed, mutually constitutive differences. It puts 
forward that black women suffer from three different axes of oppression, i.e., race, 
class and gender. Being a woman, being black and a member of the working class are 
all identity aspects demarcating black women’s position in western societies. It is not 
random that the majority of Black people in contemporary western countries are 
from the lower socio-economic classes and women would tend to occupy even a 
lower position in this strata. This points out that certain identity categories that cross-
cut each other cannot be dealt with in isolation from each other. (Ibid) The 
intersections of race, gender and class constitute particular subject positions which 
cannot be reduced to neither of these constituent identity vectors.  
However, the intersectionalist approach should not imlpy a fixed 
understanding of social divisions. To stress the dynamic construction of categories, 
Lloyd (2005: 48) notes the following:  
“The metaphor of the intersection works only insofar as we see it not as a 
static space where paths diverge or get jammed, but as a fluid and 
multidimensional space of travel that facilitates the mobility of disparate 
individuals and groups.”  
 
Instead of pinning down points of intersection and fixing them, this constructivist 
approach to intersectionality treats inequalities as dynamic. Accordingly, the 
formation of these categories and their mutually constitutive relationships are part of 
an ongoing historical process from which neither structure nor agency can be erased. 
This dynamic, constructivist view of intersectionality closely collaborates with the 
postmodern deconstructionism that points out the artificiality of social categories. 
Since the certainties of fixed singular locations ignore the multiplicity of voices, to 
unreveal the workings of power and the social inequalties, one should listen to the 
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interplay of different, multiple voices within groups. To comprehend the interplay of 
different locations, it is necessary to espouse that the crossing points of differences 
are not static as differences themselves are subject to constant change.  
Scholars who follow a constructionist approach to intersectionality such as 
Davis (2008), McCall (2005), Ferree (2009) treat social divisions as historical 
processes, not as possessive properties of individuals or a static list of structural 
locations. According to this, social divisions such as gender, race or ethnicity take on 
multiple meanings each time when they crosscut each other in different social 
locations. In this constructivist approach, social inequalities take on their operational 
meaning in the complexity of the dynamic interplay between themselves. As 
inequalities themselves gain different meanings in different social locations, points of 
intersection constantly change each time when these social inequalities crosscut each 
other. The notion of narratives of location and positionality are central to this 
constructivist view of intersectionality. To comprehend the complexity of the 
interplay of flexible social categories, one has to take into account the narratives that 
individuals produce about their social location in society as well as the effects of the 
context that affect their positionings. It is obvious that this understanding goes hand 
in hand with the stress put on flexible, dynamic aspects of identities and 
identifications.  
 
3.3.2. Strategic Essentialism/ “Strategic” Identities 
As seen in the discussions so far, a great deal of scholars argue that one 
cannot avoid deploying at least a minimal understanding of a stable identity in social 
and political analysis.  Since politics is organized around interest representation, the 
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only way to enhance rights and freedoms of individuals in marginalized social 
groups is to make demands on behalf of them. Therefore, one of the crucial problems 
in contemporary feminist thought is to reconcile the temptation to make political 
demands based on stable parts of identities with the idea of social constructionism 
and anti-essentialism. In this vein, neither can essentialist approaches provide a valid 
analytical framework today to investigate identity questions; nor can one totally rely 
on the postmodern accounts and relinquish the idea of agency altogether. Admitting 
the limitations of both essentialist and strictly deconstructivist approaches to identity 
and identity politics, a number of scholars have recently advocated the strategic use 
of identity. This strategic project has been proposed as a remedy for the threats of the 
anti-essentialist attack on the category of women and the dismissal of a shared 
identity as a distinct social group.  
In this frame, in her seminal book The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, 
Strategies, Dialogues, Spivak (1990) proposes to make use of the idea of 
essentialism without making an overall commitment to it. According to this, we 
should act as if a common identity shared by the members of a specific group can be 
articulated.  As such, the idea of strategic essentialism draws on the anti-essentialist 
critique that there is no essential identity outside the web of power relations; yet, it 
puts forward that to be able to achieve political goals, one may need to act as if there 
were essential identities. To argue for certain social justice demands, one can 
constitute a politics based on a strategically constructed positionality as commonly 
shared by group members. In this sense, the category of “woman” may be 
temporarily used as a stable category in order to mobilize political action. This 
approach differentiates between essentialisms. While a total commitment to 
essentialism detaches identities from history and context and regards them as frozen 
105 
 
unities, strategic essentialism uses essentialist claims not as permanently fixed truths 
but as a part of a strategically formed argumentative position that is thought to be 
neccesary for political purposes. In this sense, those who deploy strategic 
essentialism expect that this temporary commitment to “essences” will yield political 
achievements in terms of rights and freedoms. The essentialist framing defines the 
needs and actions necessary for a particular group of people. It produces truth claims, 
depending on the positionality of the group members. Given the hegemonic 
representation of this particular group at a particular time, in a particular context, the 
strategic essentialist framing counterposes the marginalized, oppressed aspects of the 
“essential” group identity by developing a politically viable approach. In this sense, 
unlike essentialism which means bracketing of the context, idea of strategic 
essentialism entails a critical reading of the context. The question as to what kind of 
essentialist claims are articulated as a part of a political strategy helps one 
comprehend the power configuration underlying the historical moment in which 
these claims are produced. 
 
3.3.3. Coalition Politics   
Another concept that mitigates the opposition between social constructivism 
and essentialism is “coalition politics” which is a way of forming political alliances 
among different groups of individuals with different political demands. Challenging 
the idea of essentialist identity politics that draws fixed boundaries by strictly 
defining what is to be left outside the identity category in question, coalition politics 
replaces the exclusive nature of essentialist conceptions of identities with flexible, 
dynamic account of identities and renders the formation of coalitions possible. 
Phelan (1994) refers to queer politics as an example of coalition politics that 
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accomodates dynamic boundaries to identity positions. She criticizes identity politics 
in general and lesbian identity politics in particular on the basis that they tend to 
essentialize identities, silencing those voices that do not fit into this unitary 
conception. For Phelan, queer politics, as a broad term that describes a sexual 
orientation challenging the norm of heteronormative society, can meet the demands 
of inessential coalitional politics by accomodating the demands of lesbians, gays, 
bisexuals or transgender individuals. In this sense, queer politics reframes the 
discourse around sexual orientation and challenges the fixed categories of identity 
that had previously motivated activism. Reappropriating the word "queer" as a term 
that contradicts dominant cultural norms, queer activists have attempted to form a 
multiracial, multigendered movement with diverse sexualities. (Seidman 1993) In 
this sense, it can be understood as a successful, coalitional strategy that deconstructs 
categories.  
Ferguson (1993: 186) states that coalition politics does not replace identity 
politics but displaces it. Accordingly, identity positions constituting coalition politics 
are unstable categories that can engage in dialogue, transform each other and 
discover common grounds. In this sense, coalition politics does not turn away 
entirely from the idea of identity; rather, it reconfigures it as mobile and dynamic. As 
Pheelan (1997: 138) argues, it acknowledges that “some social signiﬁers embody 
relations of oppression”. Thus, coalition politics acknowledges that individuals can 
have similar experiences, which in return allows them to use the ﬁrst-person plural 
pronoun. However, it does not attempt to define strict boundaries designating who 
and what kind of experiences exactly constitute this “we”. One can suggest that 
coalition politics is another way of indicating that it is possible to come up with an 
understanding of identity politics that does not erase differences. Regarding this, 
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Hekman (2004: 144) states that it retains differences while accomplishing 
commonality. 
In this frame, coalition politics sets out to destabilize singularity, challenges 
dominant models of knowledge formation through singular subjectivity and aims to 
eliminate systems of domination-subordination arising from historically and socially 
constructed differences of power and privilige. It takes into account relations of 
oppression at play and explores limits to and possibilities for collaborative action, 
thereby enacting a dialogue about how differences can be incorporated into feminist 
conversations without necessarily leading to agreement or requiring commonality 
between different identity positions and groups.  
Mohanty (1995) notes that the emphasis on shared experiences and 
commonality presumes unity and homogeneity, which leads to downplaying of 
important differences among women. Echoing Mohanty’s idea, coalition politics as 
an attempt to turn differences and power imbalances into meaningful dialogue, does 
not rely on an already available consciousness that needs to be reinvigorated. Rather, 
it connotes a way of seeing that has to be constructed anew along the lines of lived 
experiences. (Keating 2005, Fowlkes 1997)  
As such, coalition politics can be seen as a resolution to the pitfalls of the 
essentialist tendencies of identity politics. It displaces the exclusionary character of 
feminist identity politics without necessarily resorting to a post-identity approach. 
Acknowledging that identity as an analytical concept is indispensible for making 
feminist political demands, theorists such as Anzaldua (2002), Weir (2008) and 
Mohanty (2003) reclaim the notion of identity by theorizing about coalitional 
feminist politics. Since a post-identity approach cannot give an account of how 
108 
 
women experience their embodied identities and what these identities and 
experiences mean for them subjectively, these theorists aim to read political 
coalitions through the lenses of a dynamic view of identity. Mohanty (2003: 104) 
contends that feminist solidarity never relies on fixed identity positions and common 
demands ready at hand, but always comes into being as a result of processes in which 
one creates meaning in line with one’s historically and spatially located identities and 
experiences. Anzaldua (2002) points out the potential for transformation underlying 
coalitional politics and opposes the widespread critique of coalitions that attributes 
fixity and uniformity to coalitional political activities. Stating that coalitions cannot 
be based on common grounds or permanent agreements, she refers to transformative, 
relational character of coalitions. By employing the concept “bridge”, Anzaldua 
indicates that coalitions bridge differences without detaching subjects from their 
individuality; they connote the work of opening the gate to others and the efforts to 
transform the self through moving to an unfamiliar territory.   
On the other hand, Weir (2008, 113-116) redefines coalitional feminist 
politics by reconstructing identity politics for feminism through the concept of 
“identification-with”. According to her, feminist identification first connotes 
identification with feminist values and ideas which are never fixed and constantly 
change over time. Second form of identification that Weir outlines is identification 
with feminists as “we”, while third form of identification is identification with 
particular others. For Weir, the result of this three-stage identification is collective 
action culminating in feminist solidarity. One should note that while on the one hand, 
identifications as such generate collective identities; on the other, they incite 
considerable change in these identities. Since identification with each other precludes 
the fixation of the self and the other through constant shaping and reconstituting 
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feminist collective identity, coalitional feminist politics enables one to travel to the 
world of the other and be open to change as one sees oneself through the perspective 
of others. It is this relational character of feminist coalition politics that makes it 
possible to transform static accounts of identites into dynamic, transformative 
feminist identity politics.  
In sum, as can be seen from above, intersectionality, strategic deployment of 
essentialist identity claims and coalition politics constitute a crucial part of today’s 
scholarly debates on feminist politics of identity. The need for such strategies 
indicate that it is not possible to erase the concept of identity altogether. 
Acknowledging this, some scholars such as Alcoff (2006) and Hekman (2004) argue 
for an approach that espouses stable aspects of identities, while others such as Spivak 
(1990) propose temporary stabilization of identities as a political strategy. Both of 
these approaches suggest that the negation of the idea of identity in the postmodern 
thought fails to deal with the political implications of already formed identities. As a 
result, they attempt to come up with a mid-way approach to respond to such 
challenges. 
 
3.4. Feminist Self-Identification and the post-Habermasian Feminist Critique of 
Public Sphere 
 
The liberal conception of public sphere, as famously developed by Habermas, rests 
on the idea that with the growing need for arenas where news and matters of 
common concern could be freely exchanged and discussed, a separate domain from 
ruling authorities started to evolve in the modern Western world. (Habermas 1991) 
For Habermas, the discursive arenas making up the public sphere are organized 
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around common concerns and are marked by inclusivity regardless of social status. 
Thus, the public sphere in this sense connotes an ideal of unrestricted rational 
discussion of public matters, which is open and accessible to all. The main focus in 
the Habermasian model of deliberation is on intersubjective communication. His 
theory of “communicative action”, in this sense, refers to the communicative 
processes of reaching understanding. Habermas uses the concept of “communicative 
rationality” to refer to a non-coercive, unifying consensus-building force of 
discourse. In such discourse, participants are assumed to have overcome their 
subjective views and developed a commitment to reaching a rationally motivated 
agreement. (Habermas 1987: 294, 315) According to Habermas, consensus-bringing 
force of argumentative speech is a “central experience” in the life of a human being. 
(Habermas 1983: 10) Thus, since it is unavoidable, it may be presumed to be 
universal.  
In the Habermasian model, each and every one in principle takes part freely 
and equally in public debate. The only “force” which is active in the ideal speech 
situation and in communicative rationality is the “force of the better argument”. 
Flyvbjerg (1998:213) identifies the key processual requirements of the Habermasian 
discourse ethics as the following:  
“1. No party affected by what is being discussed should be excluded from the 
discourse (the requirement of generality); 2. all participants should have equal 
possibility to present and criticize validity claims in the process of discourse 
(autonomy); 3. participants must be willing and able to empathize with each other's 
validity claims (ideal role taking); 4. existing power differences between participants 
must be neutralized such that these differences have no effect on the creation of 
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consensus (power neutrality); and 5. participants must openly explain their goals and 
intentions and in this connection desist from strategic action (transparence)”  
In this model as described above, communicative rationality requires ideal 
role taking and power neutrality. Unlike strategic pursuits and rational-choice 
models, Habermas’ discourse ethics requires detached participation that is 
disassociated from private interests and inclined towards reaching the best argument. 
It is widely argued that his model of communicative rationality is idealistic and thus 
far from being able to account for the actual functioning of power relations. 
Flyvbjerg (1998: 216) alleges that the Habermasian model is about distinguishing 
rationality and power from each other in communication and regards rationality in 
isolation from power. According to Flyvbjerg (1998: 219), Enlightenment 
rationalism, which obliterates all differences among subjects, has little to offer in 
understanding the operating mechanism of power in the social and political world. 
The recent feminist scholarship raises a similar point, pointing out the power 
dimension in the communicative processes that arise from differential positions of 
subjects in the configuration of power in society. It argues for a revised 
understanding of public sphere that would take into account different needs and 
demands of marginalized groups.  
The feminist critique argues that the problem with the Habermasian model is 
not limited to its normative character and the discrepancy between this model and the 
empirical reality but it arises to a great extend from the limited scope of the basic 
conceptions in this model such as communicative rationality, public deliberation and 
public sphere. (Benhabib, 2002) While pointing out the limitations of the normative 
character of the Habermasian framework to reveal the power differentials in society, 
the feminist critique also puts forward the serious drawbacks characterizing the 
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Habermasian model with regard to interlocutors’ participation into public 
deliberation. The main critisms posed against the Habermasian model by feminist 
scholars are summarized below. 
  
3.4. 1. Feminist Critiques of the Habermasian model 
In the last decades, the feminist critique has pointed out that the ideal of inclusivity, 
which is central to the Habermasian public sphere, has never been realized in terms 
of gender identities. In this vein, Fraser (1990: 13) questions the rhetoric of publicity 
and accessibility and alleges that the modern conception of public sphere rests on a 
number of significant exclusions, among which gender constitutes a main axis. 
Firstly, Fraser attacks the idea of a single, overarching public sphere, claiming that 
an all encompassing public sphere overlooks the complexity of individuals’ 
differential social positions and is inimical to the notion of difference. Undoing the 
idea of an overarching public sphere, she points out the existence of competing 
publics, which she calls “subaltern counter-publics”. For Fraser, these counter-
publics are parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups 
invent and circulate counter-discourses in order to articulate their identities, interests, 
and needs. In Fraser’s reconfiguration, the Habermasian single, overarching public 
where all differences are bracketed to ensure rational deliberation, is undone in 
favour of plurality of competing publics. She clearly unmasks that bracketing of 
status differentials is a utopian ideal which cannot capture the actual working of 
power mechanisms. 
In a similar vein, Ryan (1992) documents the variety of ways in which 19th 
century North American women of various classes and ethnicities constructed access 
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routes to public political life, even despite their exclusion from the official public 
sphere. Ryan's study shows that, even in the absence of formal political incorporation 
through suffrage, there were a variety of ways of accessing public life and a 
multiplicity of public arenas. In this way, Ryan demonstrates that the bourgeois 
public was never the public. Relying on Ryan’s study, it is possible to suggest that 
counterpublics have always contested the exclusionary norms of the bourgeois public 
yet bourgeois publics, in turn, prevented these publics from elaborating alternative 
norms of public speech.  
In addition to the idea of a single, overarching public, feminist critics also 
question the idea of “common good” deeply embedded in the Habermasian 
conception of public sphere. The question as to whose interests and needs are 
represented in the idea of “common good” and whose are left out constitutes the core 
of this critique. Another main concern here is the line drawn between public issues 
and issues that are deemed to be private and thus excluded from public deliberation. 
Feminist scholars contend that in the Habermasian model, the common good is 
produced as a result of the strict seperation of public and private matters. It has been 
argued that the public sphere based on such a differentiation is ill-equipped to 
consider the political dimension of relations in the intimate sphere. (Landes, 1998: 
142) In this line of thought, the feminist critique exposes that the categories of public 
and private are not naturally given categories but come into being in political 
discourse to delegitimate some interests and valorize others. In this sense, feminist 
scholars defy the rigid seperation between the public and private and underline that 
this seperation only serves to the interests of the powerful groups while restricting 
marginal groups’ needs and demands to the private sphere. In this vein, Benhabib 
(1992: 100) maintains that the boundaries applying to the “public” and “private” 
114 
 
have always been discursively created, and thus constitute a major site of power 
struggle in the contemporary era. She argues the following:  
 
“All struggles against oppression in the modern world begin by redefining 
what had previously been considered ‘private,’ non-public and non-political 
issues as matters of public concern, as issues of justice, as sites of power 
which need discursive legitimation.” 
 
To point out that the question as to where to put the line between public and private 
issues is a matter of power struggle for women, Fraser (1990) refers to how the 
second wave feminist movement as a counter-public turned the issue of violence 
against women, i.e., an issue that was deemed to be an entirely private matter, into a 
public concern.  
On the other hand, Young opposes the idea of common good in the 
Habermasian model by pointing out the drawbacks of its universalistic tones. 
According to her, to be useful to the realities of plural societies, a political theory 
should be able to encompass difference. Critiquing the idea that difference is 
something to be transcended because it is partial and divisive, Young (2000: 43) 
maintains that conflict and disagreement are the usual state of affairs even in a well-
structured deliberative democratic setting. In this understanding, since participants in 
political discussion cannot transcend their particularity, the claims about bracketing 
differences and adopting a point from nowhere is not realistic. Young (2000: 118) 
suggests that if they aim to solve their collective problems, then they must listen 
across their differences to understand how proposals and policies affect others who 
are differently situated. 
To comprehend how the bracketing of differences in the Habermasian model 
would lead to the domination of the powerful, one can refer to Bourdieu’s 
understanding of symbolic power. For Habermas, the agreements achieved in public 
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discussions on a rational basis rests on each parties’ convictions, meaning that 
nobody can force the argument to a third party, but rather everyone is convinced that 
the communicatively achieved argument is the best argument. Sanlı (2011) points out 
that it is precisely this conviction that presents the symbolic power at work as natural 
and arbitrary. In Bourdieu’s thinking, the powerful possessors of symbolic capital, 
i.e, prestige, honour, attention, are endowed with the right to speak, recognition and 
legitimacy. Thus, the question as to where one stands in the power configuration in 
society affects what one can or cannot say in a certain situation. Permeating deep into 
the power relations arising from the distribution of different kinds of capital, 
symbolic power presents itself as natural. Thus, without problematizing the 
hierarchies which appear as natural, normal and inevitable, it is not possible to 
understand the working mechanisms of public discussion. This means that common 
convictions reached as a result of a public discussion in the Habermasian sense are 
never devoid of power relations. Accordingly, some individuals are always granted 
with greater right to speak, depending on the symbolic power they have.  
Considering the points explained above, the feminist critique asks for 
reconsideration of the following assumptions of the Habermasian model of the public 
sphere and public debate:  
“1. the assumption that it is possible for interlocutors in a public sphere to bracket 
status differentials and to deliberate "as if" they were social equals. 
2. the assumption that a single, comprehensive public sphere is always preferable to a 
nexus of multiple publics 
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3. the assumption that discourse in public spheres should be restricted to deliberation 
about the common good, and that the appearance of "private interests" and "private 
issues" is always undesirable 
4. the assumption that a functioning democratic public sphere requires a sharp 
separation between civil society and the state.” (Mclaughlin, 1995:8) 
 
3.4.2. Counter-publicity 
One can safely suggest that the feminist critique has been quite helpful to 
compensate for the idealistic character of the Habermasian model. This revised 
understanding of public sphere acknowledges the existence of multiple publics and 
opposes the idea that public sphere is a monolithic bloc, where power flows in a uni-
directional way. Especially Fraser’s (1990) and Felski’s (1989) incorporation of the 
concept of “counter-public” into academic debates has greatly expanded the scope of 
the Habermasian idea of single, overarching public sphere. According to their 
explication, counterpublics reveal the differential power relations among diverse 
publics of a multiple public sphere and articulate alternatives to wider publics that 
exclude the interests of marginalized groups. In this sense, they signify an expanded 
communicative flow as a result of which discursive exclusions become cyrstallized.  
Fraser argues that counterpublics can be regarded as a response to the 
bracketing of differences in the public debate and as an attempt to correct the 
exclusionary character of the formation of public opinion. In this view, differences 
should be unbracketed in public discourse and thematized as topics of deliberation. 
The subjective particularities that interlocutors incorporate into public deliberation 
reinforce the notion of difference in the deliberative model and work as a precaution 
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against the drawbacks of the idea of common good. This expanded conception of 
public sphere, which includes not only reason and speech but also subjective 
viewpoints and acknowledgement of differential status of individuals in society 
regards contestation between publics as legitimate in the multiple public sphere. 
Differences incorporated into public deliberation in this model may turn into sites of 
contestation, where different publics aim to influence wider publics and shape public 
discourses. However, one should also note that contestation in this revised model 
does not connote a binary opposition that situates counterpublics and wider publics 
as complete opposites. 
Although Fraser defines subaltern counter publics in opposition to the 
unifying, universalist tendencies in the hegemonic public sphere, in her conception, 
counter publics as parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social 
groups invent and circulate counter discourses should not be thought of in isolation 
from wider publics. According to Fraser, rather than defining them through a binary 
opposition, one should try to understand the dialectical relationship between the 
wider publics and the publicist character of counter publics. To explain this point 
further, Fraser (1990: 68) notes that counterpublics develop a dual character with the 
aim to expand their discursive space:  
 
“On the one hand, they function as spaces of withdrawal and regroupment; on 
the other hand, they function as bases and training grounds for agitational 
activities directed toward wider publics.”  
 
Accordingly, at certain points counterpublics may manifest a publicist orientation 
and aspire to wider circulation of counter-discourses. Fraser (1990: 14) states that it 
is precisely this publicist orientation that allows counterpublics to achieve their 
emancipatory potential. The counter-discursive contestation of hegemonic 
boundaries through engagement in dialogue with hegemonic discourses indicates that 
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counterpublics are not monolithic entities but are composed of multiple forms of 
alliances and relationalities. While at some points they may be geared towards 
enclaving themselves by putting the emphasis on group identity and solidarity, at 
other points they may follow a publicist, counter-discursive strategy in wider publics 
to generate transformative effects on hegemonic public discourses.  
Felski acknowledges this dual character of counterpublics as well by pointing 
out its transformative potential. Referring to the feminist counterpublic sphere, Felski 
(1989: 167-168) explains this potential as the following:  
“The experience of discrimination, oppression and cultural dislocation 
provides an impetus for the development of a self consciously oppositional 
identity. Yet insofar as it [feminist counterpublic sphere] is a public sphere, 
its arguments are also directed outward, toward a dissemination of feminist 
ideas and values throughout society as a whole… Internally, the feminist 
counterpublic generates a gender-specific identity grounded in a 
consciousness of community and solidarity among women; externally, it 
seeks to convince society as a whole of the validity of feminist claims.”  
 
Having differentiated between the internal and external functions of the feminist 
sphere, Felski focuses on how the external function is carried out through 
institutional mechanisms and sites which, in return, serve for the dissemination of 
feminist goals. She underscores that the outward extension of counter public 
discourses functions as a catalyst of social and cultural change. (Ibid, 167) 
Similar to Fraser (1990) and Felski (1989), Downey and Fenton (2003) 
maintain that counter-publics are not constituted in a singular, foundational manner 
but rather should be considered in terms of relationality, conjunctural shifts and 
alliances, making connections with other publics. In order to acquire visibility in the 
dominant public, counter-public discourses may intermingle with dominant public 
discourses in a deliberative setting. Downey and Fenton (2003) allege that the 
existence of counter publics among multiple publics is always dialogic in that to 
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challenge the universalist discourse that the dominant public uses to appeal to a 
general public, counterpublics need to enter into deliberation with dominant publics. 
This outward extension of counter publics is especially important because it 
gives us useful clues as to what “counter” in counterpublic really means. The 
acknowledgement of the publicist character of counterpublics helps feminist scholars 
refrain from thinking of counterpublics solely as enclaved clusters and allows them 
to gain insight of the multiple character of counter hegemonic discourses. The 
conjunctural alliances that counterpublics may form with hegemonic discourses in a 
deliberative setting denote that the “counter” in counterpublics does not consist of a 
singular constellation of counter discourses but should always be thought of through 
multiplicity. In this sense, Downey and Fenton (2003: 15) argue that counter-
publicity is neither based on abstract ideals of universality nor on essentialist notions 
of community. Accordingly, it is best understood by inquiring complex relationalities 
between wider publics and counter-publics and their situatedness in local as well as 
global contexts.     
The complexity of counter publics cannot be understood only by employing a 
nuanced understanding of the relationship between counterpublics and the dominant 
public. One should also take into account the internal politics as well as the 
organizational and ideological formations underlying counter publics. When defined 
as a homogenous entity, the label “subaltern public” does not capture the complex 
character of the heterogenity of marginalized groups. Underlining the heterogenous 
character of the multiple public sphere, Squires (2002) proposes an alternative 
vocabulary to capture the sophisticated character of the internal politics of counter 
publics. To distinguish between subaltern public spheres, she uses the following 
terminology: enclave publics, counter public and satellite publics. Accordingly, a 
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public can enclave itself, avoiding close contact with the dominant public. It may 
also assume a publicist character and engage in lively debate with broader publics. 
Finally, a public can act as a satellite public sphere, differentiating itself from other 
publics.  
In making this differentiation, Squires stresses that the use of vocabulary is a 
key tool in capturing the multiple meanings that the term “counter” in a subaltern 
counter public can assume. It enables comparisons across counter publics and offers 
a nuanced understanding of the variations in a certain public sphere. According to 
Squires (2002: 447), the vocabulary has to be flexible enough so as to capture what 
really constitutes the “counter” in the counter public. Differentiating counter publics 
from the dominant public on the basis of stable, fixed and homogenous identity 
markers cannot account for the complex constituents of these publics. What Squires 
suggests instead is a flexible, multi-layered conceptualization of identity markers that 
also takes into account the heterogeneity of counter publics.  
The idea of multiplicity in counter hegemonic discourses is in line with the 
attempt of counter publics to defy universal validity claims. As oppositional 
discursive arenas criticizing the homogenizing and universalizing logic of the 
Habermasian model, counter publics articulate particularities based on gender, race, 
ethnicity, religion, sexuality and other axes of difference. On the one hand, it is this 
partial particularity that enables a common identity among participants in a counter 
public sphere. As for the feminist subaltern counter-public, Felski (1989: 166) notes 
that the shared experience of gender-based oppression facilitates to unite all 
participants beyond their specific differences. Yet, it is important to note that counter 
publics do not claim to provide a representative universality through this common 
identity. Rather, they offer a critique of cultural values from the standpoint of the 
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marginalized group in question. (Felski, 1989: 167) In this sense, the issue of 
common identity in a counter public setting can be best comprehended by taking into 
account the multiple, dialectical and always in process character of the “counter” in 
counter publics. Regarding this, Fraser (1990: 14) alleges that public spheres are not 
arenas where already formed propositional contents are articulated; rather they are 
discursive sites that enable the dynamic formation and enactment of social identities. 
This standpoint radically challenges the orthodox liberal narrative assuming that 
individuals enter into the public sphere to debate their already constituted needs and 
desires. Accordingly, individuals never participate into public deliberation with 
already formed needs and desires. On the contrary, the public sphere itself shapes 
and constitutes subjects who seek recognition in public deliberation. (Dillon, 2007: 
6) 
In this frame, it would be simplistic to reduce a particular counterpublic to a 
monolithic, singular reading of identities of participants in that counter public setting. 
To avoid this simplistic reading, one should always keep in mind that the 
interrelation between agonistic and consensual moments stands at the core of the 
dialectical mediation in counter and hegemonic publics. Mediating between group 
identities and universalistic moral claims, emancipatory counter narratives cast doubt 
on the exlusionary scope of public deliberation and provide new frameworks in the 
public sphere to revise prevailing public discourses. (Lara, 1998: 3) In the course of 
this transformation, the consensual act of reaching an agreement about the content of 
recognition is constantly deconstructed through the agonistic moments where 
hegemonic and counter public discourses contest each other. As counterpublics 
engage in dialectical relationship with wider publics and influence hegemonic public 
discourses in one way or another and get influenced in return, the “counter” in 
122 
 
counter discourses is constantly renegotiated in response to the dialectical change 
both in the hegemonic public sphere and the counter public. Therefore, one can never 
talk about a fixed, stable common identity among individuals in a counter public 
setting. The conception of common identity that brings individuals together in the 
counter public sphere is relentlessly subject to dialectical transformation in 
hegemonic and counter public discourses.  
As counterpublics struggle against universal validity claims, they designate 
that heterogeneity is constitutive of each and every public sphere. The constantly 
dialectical relationship between hegemonic and counter hegemonic discourses in 
public debates provide a setting where public discourse is always open to change and 
rearticulation. The dialectial relationship between consensual and agonistic moments 
in public discourses point out the impossibility of discursive closure in public 
discourses since any closure would connote stabilization of democratic norms and 
exclusion of agonistic democratic contestation. (Mouffe 2005) Thus, consensual 
moments where a rationally founded agreement is achieved through democratic 
norms is destabilized by agonistic moments, ensuring the dialectical movement of 
counterpublics amid the multiple publics of the public sphere.  
In short, since the dialectical movement of counterpublics entails a striking 
fluidity of the conception of “counter”, it is not possible to reduce the meanings of 
the “counter” in counter public discourses to a fixed conception of people’s identities 
in the counter public setting in question. (Asen, 2000: 429) As Fraser (1990: 15) and 
Dahlgren (2005: 159) argue, identities in public sphere are never ready at hand but 
develop in relation to discursive configuration in public spheres. Yet, this cautious 
approach to the perils of identity-based conceptions of counter-publics does not mean 
that identity is totally irrelevant in counter public settings. A flexible, dynamic as 
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well as embedded conception of identity can be very helpful to make sense of the 
discursive struggle of counter publics with wider publics. The theoretical framework 
explicated in the previous section complements this critical approach to counter 
publics based on the dialectical movement of counterpublics between consensual and 
agonistic moments. 
 
3.4. 3. Mass Media, Counter Publics and Women Columnists 
 
Public discourse is carried out in various forums such as parliaments, courts, social 
movements, universities, streets and mass media. Ferree et al. (2002: 16) argue that 
in contemporary world mass media appears as the major site of political contest 
because participants in other forums also use mass media and acknowledge its 
pervasive influence. Social actors evaluate the effectiveness of their own dicourses 
by looking at the coverage in mass media. Moreover, mass media is not only a site 
where public contestation occurs between different discourses but it also produces 
public discourses by setting the agenda. As a result, coverage in the mass media is 
key for public discourses to display efficacy in public deliberation.  
Ferree et al. (2002) employ various terms to evaluate how successful public 
discourses are in the mass media. First, in order to reflect on to what extend 
discourses are given voice, they use the term “standing”. Standing, for them, does not 
mean any kind of coverage in the media. Rather, it connotes being treated in the 
media as an influential actor with voice who is directly quoted and considered as 
capable of shaping the public agenda. Second, Ferree et al. (Ibid) also use the term 
“framing” to express the importance of the representation of a social actor in the 
media in a preferred frame. For them, success in the media is achieved if a public 
124 
 
discourse is covered as authentically expressed, not through another frame. In this 
sense, standing and framing in the mass media corresponds to a social actor’s power 
to incorporate her differential position in society into public discourse as a theme of 
deliberation.  
Mass media as the major site of political contest in contemporary world is 
located at the center of hegemonic power struggles over meaning and norms of 
democratic deliberation.   Pointing out heterogeneity in mass media, Dahlgren (1996: 
155-159) differentiates between “common domain” and “advocacy domain” and the 
differential status attributed to hegemonic and counter discourses in each of these 
domains. Accordingly, while the common domain in the mass media implies the 
arena that strives for universalism by reproducing hegemonic discourses and 
appealing to a general public, advocacy domain refers to a multiperspective 
journalism that allows oppositional publics to articulate their group identities. In 
Dahlgren’s formulation, it is the advocacy domain where plurality of perspectives is 
ensured. As such, advocacy domain allows for a certain type of media that 
contributes to counter hegemonic projects and contests the boundaries of hegemonic 
publics. This type of media closely collaborates with counter publics to enable 
marginalized viewpoints to enter into public deliberation.   
At this point, it is necessary to reflect more on the roles that mass media plays 
amidst hegemonic power struggles in the public sphere. As discussed so far, norms 
of public deliberation always implicate relations of power. The post-Habermasian 
feminist critique has indicated that norms regulating discourse in a particular public 
sphere advantage some participants while disadvantaging others. In this regard, at 
certain points participatory norms may operate as powerful silencers regulating how 
topics enter and circulate in public sphere. The idea of counter public in the post-
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Habermasian feminist critique clearly discloses that the Habermasian public sphere is 
a space necessarily constituted by exclusionary power mechanisms. Questioning the 
boundaries of “legitimate” public spheres and incorporating the idea of contestation 
and power relations into public deliberation, counterpublics reveal the impossibility 
of final closure of discourse in public deliberation and in this sense closely 
colloborate with discourse theory. (Dahlberg, 2011: 45) Acknowledging that public 
discourses are formed through hegemonic struggles, necessarily involving 
hierarchies of power and relations of inclusion and exclusion, the idea of 
counterpublic opens a space for thinking and doing otherwise. (Ibid, p.43) This 
critique that is geared towards unmasking hegemonic relations is based on the 
contention that discourse is always political and radically contingent; there is no 
discourse prior to the political. Bringing to light how hegemonic boundary drawing 
in public sphere is realized, counterpublics, similar to discourse theory, stress that 
any hegemonic consensus is radically contingent and point out the possibility of 
counter hegemonic contestation.  
Noting that mass media is one of the public arenas where hegemonic 
struggles for public deliberation take place, one should ask the following question: 
What kind of media politics can support the contestation of hegemonic public sphere 
boundaries? It is obvious that only a type of media, which allows counter hegemonic 
projects to articulate marginalized needs and demands, can support an effective 
contestation of hegemonic public boundaries. In this sense, it is the advocacy domain 
in mass media, as Dahlgren formulates it, that can collaborate with countepublics in 
introducing the excluded elements into hegemonic public discourses. The advocacy 
domain points out the heterogeneity and multiplicity in mass media as it operates 
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alongside with the hegemonic common domain controlled by the mainstream mass 
media.         
Here, the crucial point for the purposes of this study is to figure out where 
women columnists position themselves in the heterogenous mass media sphere. Can 
their columns be considered as part of the advocacy domain in mass media that 
colloborates with counter public discourses? If so, what kind of counter public issues 
stand out in their writings? How do they frame these issues? In terms of their 
standing and framing, can counterpublic discourses be effectively represented in their 
writings? Along with these questions, it is also important to investigate how women 
columnists think of the formation of public discourses and the negotiation of 
marginalized identities in public sphere. Do they acknowledge the heterogeneity and 
multiplicity of public spheres? At what points do they question the hegemonic 
boundary drawing in dominant publics? Do they acknowledge the flexible and 
always-in-process character of identities in counter public settings? What are the 
limits of their approach to counter hegemonic discourses and identities? These 
questions will consitute a guideline for this study as I scrutinize women columnists’ 
positioning in mass media sphere and their conception of the formation of public 
discourses and negotiation of marginalized identities.    
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CHAPTER IV 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
4.1. Semi-structured in-depth Interviews 
For a study that investigates the feminist self-identification among women 
intellectuals in Turkey, it is obviously a must to make in-depth interviews with the 
women intellectuals in question and ask them what they think about feminist identity. 
Therefore, as the methodological framework I will utilize in depth semi-structured 
interviews to realize the goals of this study. Ramazanoglu and Holland (2002: 155) 
suggest that qualitative methods, such as face-to-face interviews, are especially 
crucial for feminist studies because they provide a ground for the researchers to 
prioritize women’s personal experiences and analyze nuances of meaning. According 
to Rubin and Rubin (1995:1), qualitative interviewing is a way of finding out how 
others interpret the world. Interviewing allows researchers to listen to people’s 
subjective interpreting of the world and enables the research participants to tell their 
own story. The spontaneous exchange within an interview allows for flexibility and 
freedom. Thanks to repeated questioning, the researcher can gain a comprehensive 
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understanding of what the interviewees think at a specific moment in time (Rubin 
and Rubin, 1995: 19). In sum, as Patton (2002: 341) says, “the purpose of 
interviewing is to enter into other person’s perspective”. In this sense, one can say 
that the use of qualitative in-depth interviews in feminist studies is a quite crucial 
way to uncover women’s subjective experiences and how they interpret the world.  
 
4.2. Research Participants: Women Columnists   
In the post-1990s and especially in 2000’s, with the proliferation of mass media and 
growing demand for public intellectual figures such as commentators or columnists, 
the number of intellectual women who are writing for a large audience about general 
public matters has greatly increased in contemporary Turkey. Women columnists are 
crucial actors who prolifically contribute to the public debates and shape the public 
opinion in the Turkish context. For this study, I have talked to 12 women columnists 
who are quite influencial figures in the media field. Moreover, apart from writing 
articles in newspapers some of them are well-known novelists. The list of the women 
columnists who generously contributed to this study is as below: 
 
  
Born in Education  Newspaper Books 
 
        
Ferai Tınç 1949 
(left the Lit. Dept. of 
Robert College) Hürriyet - 
        
Gila Benmayor 1960 
BA in English 
Literature Hürriyet - 
        Hidayet Şefkatli 
Tuksal 1963 Ph.D in Theology 
 
Star, Taraf - 
 
        Mehveş Evin 1970 BA in Psychology Milliyet - 
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      Mine Kırıkkanat        1951           BA in Sociology 
 
 Cumhuriyet      Novels 
 
 
 
Müge İplikçi 1966 
MA in Gender 
Studies 
 
Vatan Novels, Essays 
        Nihal Bengisu 
Karaca 1972 BA in Law Habertürk - 
        Ruhat Mengi     - BA in Engineering Vatan - 
        
Sibel Eraslan 1967 BA in Law Star 
Novels, 
Essays 
 
        Yazgülü Aldoğan 1958 PhD in Sociology 
 
Posta Novels 
 
        
Yıldız 
Ramazanoğlu 1972 
BA in 
Pharmaceutics 
 
Zaman 
(commentary 
page)  
Novels, 
Essays          
 
        Zeynep Göğüş 
 
BA in I.R. 
 
Hürriyet Essays 
 
         
Ferai Tınç wrote for many years for Hürriyet, one of the most widely read, 
mainstream newspapers in Turkey known for its liberal stance. She began her 
journalistic career as a reporter in the foreign news department and has also worked 
as a foreign correspondent, editor and editor in chief in this department. Since the 
beginning of 1990s till 2011 when she resigned from the newspaper because of the 
rising governmental control on the media in Turkey, she has regularly written 
columns on the foreign news page. Tınç states that she has always performed her 
profession by prioritizing women’s point of view.  
Gila Benmayor has been working for Hürriyet for over 30 years. She has a 
master’s degree in journalism from Istanbul University and a certificate in 
archeology. Since 1981, she has worked in different positions in the foreign news 
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department in Hürriyet. Currently she contributes to the newspaper through her 
columns. 
Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal graduated from the Faculty of Theology of Ankara 
University. She has earned her doctoral degree in 1998 with a dissertation titled 
Kadın Karşıtı Söylemin İslam Geleneğindeki İzdüşümü (The Trajectory of the 
Misogynist Discourse in the Islamic Tradition), which investigates the foundations of 
the Islamic tradition by questioning the real gist of Islamic premises in terms of 
gender equality. Tuksal has written columns for Star and Taraf newspapers between 
2009-2012 and 2012-2013. In addition, she has been quite active in the Islamist 
women’s movement and taken up a leading role in the foundation of Başkent Kadın 
Platformu (Capital Women’s Platform), a women’s organization led by Islamist 
women. She has been frequently cited as an Islamic feminist in public debates. 
Mehveş Evin is a columnist in Milliyet. She has been working as a journalist 
since 1993. Before Milliyet she has worked as an executive in different media 
platforms such as Akşam newspaper and Aktüel, i.e. a weekly journal. She began 
writing columns in 2006. 
Mine Kırıkkanat has written columns for Cumhuriyet, Radikal, Vatan and 
Milliyet newspapers since mid-1980s.  She was also a Paris correspondent for many 
years. In addition, she has published many novels and collections of essay.   
Müge İplikçi is an author and a columnist in Vatan newspaper. She has 
studied English literature in her undergraduate study and has a Master’s degree in the 
same field. She worked as a teacher and journalist in the 1990s. She has written 
many novels, short story books and collections of essay. 
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Nihal Bengisu Karaca graduated from the Law Faculty of Istanbul University. 
She began her journalistic career in 1994 at the journal Aksiyon, where she later 
became an editor for the arts page. She also worked for Kanal 7 as a copywriter and 
program director. She wrote columns for Zaman newspaper, the weekly journal Yeni 
Aktüel and currently for the daily Habertürk. 
Ruhat Mengi has a degree in engineering. Before she was made to quit her 
job by the newspaper administration because of her critical position vis-a-vis the 
AKP government, she wrote for Vatan newspaper. Before Vatan, she worked for 
Sabah newspaper for a long time. She also makes news programs for TV. 
Sibel Eraslan has begun writing in national newspapers and journals in 1989 
when she was a senior university student at the Law Faculty of Istanbul University. 
Since then, she has written in mainstream national newspapers with a pro-Islamic 
stance, such as Yeni Şafak, Vakit and Star. In addition to her journalistic career, she 
has also published novels, collections of short stories, essays and research books.  
Yazgülü Aldoğan has a Ph.D in Sociology. After teaching in academia for 
some time, she has started her journalistic career and has worked for various media 
institutions such as Nokta journal, Hürriyet and Sabah newspapers. Currently she 
writes for Posta; a mainstream newspaper with a high circulation. She has also 
published two novels.   
Yıldız Ramazanoğlu graduated from the Pharmacy Faculty of Hacettepe 
University. Since 1996, she has published ten books, including novels, collections of 
short stories and research books. Moreover, she has also contributed to national 
newspapers and journals and has participated in international women’s summits as 
representatives of human rights and women’s organizations. Her literary works deal 
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with themes such as womanhood, religiosity, otherness, while her research books 
cover a broad array of issues ranging from colonial feminism in Iraq and Afghanistan 
to Turkish politics. 
Zeynep Göğüş has written for Cumhuriyet, Milliyet, Hürriyet and Sabah 
newspapers. She specialized in foreign news and has published a book on EU-Turkey 
relations. She states that she is one of the first women columnists in 1980’s Turkey 
who have written regularly on a wide range of social and political topics.   
I have chosen to talk to these women columnists for a number of reasons. 
First, for a study that investigates women intellectuals’ negotiation of feminist 
identity by focusing on their position in the public sphere, it is significant that 
research participant women intellectuals are prolific contributors to current public 
debates and display a certain profeminist stance with regard to gender issues. Women 
columnists in the list provided above are all established columnists/writers, who 
actively engage in the recent political discussions and write about gender issues. 
Apart from the up-to-date coverage of political debates and gender conscious stance 
in the columns, it is also important that research participants reflect the wide 
spectrum of ideological positions in contemporary Turkey. Therefore, women 
columnists from various mainstream newspapers, i.e. Hürriyet, Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, 
Vatan, Posta, Habertürk, Zaman, Star, Taraf, has been selected and incorporated into 
the study.  
As a result, the most striking differentiation among the selected group of 
intellectual women has come forward with respect to the religious affiliations. While 
some women intellectuals under consideration here are secular, unveiled women, 
others have a stronger religious affiliation. However, such labels, by no means, 
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should imply that these two groups, i.e, secular and Muslim, constitute two isolated 
categories. This research acknowledges that it is possible to detect both differences 
and similarities between Muslim and secular women intellectuals in terms of their 
approach to feminist identification. The dialogue between these two groups as well 
as their unique characteristics will be investigated in next chapters.   
 
4.3. About the Interviews and Interview Questions 
All women columnists were quite cooperative and wanted to contribute to the aims 
of the study. It is clear that women columnists who accepted to participate in the 
study have a certain degree of interest in gender issues in Turkey. Their interest in 
this realm can also be detected in their writings. Some interviews took place in 
women columnists’ offices in newspaper buildings, some others are conducted in 
public places such as cafés. The interview duration was approximately one hour, 
which was enough to ask the questions that I intended to ask. 
I have divided the interview questions into two parts. The first part inquires 
about women columnists’ professional lives in the media sector. Here, my main 
motivation is to investigate to what extend women in question attribute priority to 
their gender identity in their professional lives. The second part aims to reveal how 
the women columnists conceptualize feminism and feminist identity, what their main 
criticism against feminism is and whether or not they call themselves feminist. One 
of the most helpful aspects of doing interviews is asking interviewees the same 
questions because in this way the researcher can compare and contrast different 
responses. However, sometimes it may also be necesssary to take into account the 
differences among participants and adjust the questions accordingly before each 
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interview. Considering this point, I have updated the interview design before each 
interview by adding new questions, where necessary, in order to capture the political 
stance that the writer in question has and the implications of this stance for her 
approach to feminisms and feminist identity. Yet, the main questions remained the 
same throughout the interviews.  
Firstly, I asked women columnists about the trajectory of their professional 
lives in the media sector. Here, I mainly aim to uncover the context in which their 
writing has developed. The question basically inquires about the difficulties that 
women columnists have encountered throughout their professional lives or the 
support they have got from their families or colleagues. It is critical whether they 
elaborate on their experiences in a general manner or from a gender perspective. In 
addition to this, I have asked women columnists to compare women’s position in the 
media sector with that of male colleagues. The main idea here is to see whether they 
would touch upon the power differentials stemming from gendered positions. I have 
also asked about women columnists’ attitudes towards the term “woman writer” or 
“woman columnist”. This particular labeling or the refrainment from it can be seen in 
similar terms with the choice to call oneself “feminist”. These labelings reveal the 
subject’s negotiation of gender roles in the construction of her identity. One can 
suggest that the acknowledgement of the decisiveness of gender roles and the choice 
to define oneself as a “woman writer” or “woman journalist” may raise the prospects 
of calling oneself feminist. In addition to these aspects, I also examined how women 
columnists position themselves in the media and whether they differentiate 
themselves on the basis of their gender-conscious or profeminist stance. To 
understand women columnists’ peculiar position in the public sphere, it is inevitable 
to take into account how they themlselves define their positioning.    
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In the second part designed to disclose women columnists’ ideas about 
identity politics and feminist identity, I have tried to find out how they define their 
relationship to feminism. Here, it is critical whether or not they would label 
themselves as feminist. Here, it is also important to scrutinize how they position 
feminist self-identifcation in the public sphere. Moreover, criticisms that women 
columnists pose against feminism are investigated in detail in order to obtain hints to 
comprehend their thoughts on how feminism should (not) be. I also ask women 
columnists to elaborate on the trajectory of their relationship with feminism. Through 
this question, I would like to incorporate the time dimension into the interview. In 
return, I hope to be able to discern whether or not women columnists see identity as a 
static/dynamic construction. In addition, I have tried to understand women 
columnists’ support for the women’s movement in Turkey. Myakovsky and Wittig 
(1997); Cowan, Mestlin and Masek (1992) argue that there are certain indicators that 
could help us predict the feminist identity; namely, positive perception of feminists 
and feminist movement, exposure to feminism, agreement with profeminist attitudes 
towards gender roles and belief in the significance of collective action. Following 
this point, I have investigated whether a correlation can be detected between women 
columnists’ support for women’s movement and their attitudes towards feminist self-
identification. Furthermore, I have scrutinized what women columnists would say if 
someone would situate them in or close to a counter public fed by feminist ideas. I 
also try to disclose how women columnists see the position of feminist discourses 
within power configurations in the public sphere in Turkey. It is crucial to 
comprehend how they place feminists and feminist discourses vis-a-vis the dominant 
public discourses because this could give us clues about their choice to refrain from 
or affirm the feminist label.  
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4.4. The Questions, Dilemmas and Important Points Regarding the 
Operationalization of Feminist Self-Identification 
Feminist self-identification has been studied widely in the literature from different 
angles. Cowan et. al (1992) and Zucker (2004) studied the predictors of feminist 
identity; Aronson (2003), Williams and Wittig (1997) and Misciagno (1997) 
investigated the multiple dimensions of feminist identity; Peltola et. al (2004) 
analyzed the role of generation in feminist identification and McCabe (2005) focused 
on the discrepancy between feminist attitudes and feminist self-labeling. Although 
the literature on feminist identification is so rich, most of the studies operate in the 
field of social psychology and treat feminist self-identification solely as a form of 
social identity which is espoused as a result of the individual judgement of a 
particular group membership. The treatment of feminist identification exclusively as 
a matter of individual jugdement ignores the power mechanism involved in the 
process. One does not negotiate feminist identity in a vacuum; rather the negotiation 
takes place within a social and political context that is closely bounded with 
discourses operating on feminism. In this sense, the endorsement of the feminist 
label is, before all, a public statement and thus needs to be carefully investigated with 
respect to the public discourses about feminist identification and the subject’s 
position in the public sphere.  
Some researchers, who conduct research in the field of social psychology, 
agree with the fact that espousing feminist identity is a public statement. Wittig and 
Williams (1997:4) argue the following:  
“Considering oneself a feminist privately and calling oneself a feminist in 
social discourse are two such assertions of group membership: the former is a 
private self-label, while the latter connotes a more public assertion.” 
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Moreover, they proposed that private feminist self-labeling versus public 
identification as a feminist may reflect different levels of belief in the social 
acceptability of the term as well as differential commitment to collective action. 
However, despite this acknowledgement, their analyses mainly focus on the 
individual dimension of feminist identification and do not engage into a thorough 
study of the public aspects of the matter. Williams and Wittig (1997) investigated the 
nature of the discrepancy between college students who self-identify as feminists and 
those who support feminist goals, but don't call themselves feminists. Four variables 
that might differentiate between the first and second group were tested in their study: 
recognition of discrimination, positive evaluation of feminists, previous exposure to 
feminism and belief in collective action. Their main goals are to identify which 
variables may be predictive of pro-feminist orientation versus those which may be 
predictive of feminist social identity. This kind of analysis, which treats feminist 
identity as a social identity, focuses on the individual motivation for group 
membership and leaves out the study of public discourses working on the feminist 
label, cannot account for why espousal of the feminist label is before all a public 
statement.  
The social identity theory, in this sense, has significant limitations to reflect 
on the negotiation of the feminist label. Unlike personal identity which consists of 
traits people use to describe themselves as unique individuals, social identity 
emphasizes the characteristics people share with others who are members of a 
particular group based on categories such as gender, ethnicity and so on. Tajifel 
(1978: 63) claims that social identity deals with “an individual’s self-concept which 
derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group together with the 
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value and emotional significance attached to that membership”. Similarly, Thoits and 
Virshup (1997: 106) define social identities as “socially constructed and socially 
meaningful categories that are accepted by individuals as descriptive of themselves 
or their group”. This implies that social identity does not emerge until it is personally 
acknowledged as self-defining in some respect. Thus, research utilizing social 
identity as a conceptual framework puts the emphasis on individual’s self concept. 
Referring to this point, Huddy (2001) maintains that social identity theorists’ 
disinclination to examine the sources of social identity in a real world complicated by 
history and culture generates serious limitations about the explanatory power of the 
concept. Huddy criticizes the social identity theory on the basis that it does not 
elaborate enough on the element of choice in identity development. For her, in social 
identity theory individuals are assigned to certain identity groups and how they 
acquired those identities remains an enigma. She states that to compensate for the 
limitations of social identity theory, it is necessary to neatly elaborate on the 
individual negotiations of identities. Moreover, she argues that rather than treating a 
particular identity as a monolithic pattern, different shades of identities, i.e, weak and 
strong versions of identities, have to be taken into account. (Ibid, 24) Huddy further 
suggests that to illuminate the power mechanisms involved in the identity 
development, it is also necessary to explore the meaning of group identity and the 
connotations of group membership for group identifiers, potential identifiers, and 
outsiders. Otherwise, group identity appears as a fixed category that is homogenous 
across the group.  
Considering these criticisms posed against social identity theory, it is possible 
to suggest that the inclination in this theory towards assigning individuals to cerrtain 
identity categories without questioning the acquisition or negotiation of those 
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identities and its focusing on the individual motivation without placing the individual 
in a setting limits the theory’s explanatory capacity to reflect on the social and 
political context. As Hall (1996) argues, precisely because identities are constructed 
within discourse, it is necessary to treat them as produced in specific historical and 
institutional sites within specific discursive formations and practices. Similarly, 
Lloyd (2005: 14) challenges the idea that identity is prior to politics and stresses that 
identities are political effects generated on the field of power. For her, production of 
identities also entails their naturalization in order to make them appear to preexist 
politics.  
Considering the points mentioned above, the concept of social identity cannot 
provide a useful ground to account for feminist identification among women 
intellectuals under consideration here. Rather than being a personal matter negotiated 
merely at the individual level, women intellectuals’ negotiation with feminist identity 
can be better understood when situated in a social and political context. Thus, in this 
research I depart from the understanding that feminist identification is before all a 
“public statement”.   
Furthermore, the emphasis in this study will not be put on feminist identity as 
“collective identity” either. Taylor and Whittier (1992) define collective identity as 
the shared definition of a group that derives from members’ common interests, 
experiences, and solidarity. Defining collective identity as a characteristic that is 
constructed, activated, and sustained through interaction in social movement 
communities, Taylor and Whittier identify three processes involved in the formation 
of politicized identities: “The creation of boundaries that mark off a group; the 
development of a consciousness of the group's distinct and shared disadvantages; and 
the politicization of everyday life, embodied in symbols and actions that connect the 
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members of the group and link their everyday experiences to larger social injustices.” 
(cited in Taylor and Rupp, 1999: 365) From here, it is clear that collective identity is 
defined within the context of a particular social movement and thus is associated 
with mobilization and activism. 
Even though some of the women columnists declare that they ardently 
support the women’s movement in Turkey, they are not directly involved in it. 
Therefore, feminist identification in this case connotes a broader realm than that 
implied by the concept of collective identity.
4
 Women may develop feminist identity 
and espouse the feminist label yet they may not be particularly part of the activism 
and mobilization carried out by the women’s movement. Some scholars suggest that 
assertion of a particular group identity is to be accompanied by political activism. 
For them, identity politics cannot be merely limited to the individual life choices but 
is inevitably intertwined with the political attempts to enhance the social and political 
rights of the social group in question. For example, Kaufman (1990: 30) argues that 
“identity politics’ emphasis on self-transformation as a prelude to political change 
has frequently been replaced by a vision of self-transformation as political change.” 
She critically maintains that “the tendency to claim political content for changes in 
the lifestyle encourages the view that politics does not necessarily involve 
engagement with external structures of power.” (Ibid, 31) 
                                                          
4 It is very telling that most of the women columnists regard feminist identity as a collective identity 
that supresses different aspects of one’s identity and imposes a fixed, restrictive set of norms and 
values, which in return requires absolute compliance. The theoretical framework described in the 
earlier chapter puts forward that collective identities do not necessarily connote a fixed group 
identity discarding difference and individuality. Narratives reducing feminist collective identity to 
exclusionary and essentialist forms of identity politics ignore the alternative understanding of 
political collectives as derivatives deeply located in individuals’ social positions, experiences and 
meaning making processes. Women columnists’ reduction of feminist collective identity to fixed, 
restrictive set of norms and values will be later analyzed in detail. 
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Although I agree with this claim to a certain extend, in the case of women 
columnists the atomistic individualism does not hold true. It has to be acknowledged 
that the statements that these women intellectuals make in public reach broad masses 
and thus are capable of generating wide ranging political effects. Relying on a 
conceptualization of politics as an activity that goes beyond the political institutions 
and structures, encompassing each and every realm of life as well as the complex 
processes of becoming a subject, this study assumes that feminist self-labeling or the 
reservation to do so is inherently political and is capable of generating political 
consequences for women’s status in society and the public recognition of feminists. 
Feminist self-identification as a public statement, first of all, has to be 
situated against the background of the concept of public sphere because to 
understand the power mechanisms involved in the feminist self-identification 
process, one has to be able to delienate the characteristics of the public debate and 
the formation of the public opinion, all of which in return affect the self-labeling. To 
do this, I will rely on the theoretical framework regarding the idea of public sphere, 
which I introduced earlier.   
   
4.5. The Dilemmas of Feminist Self-identification 
  
Current research on feminist self-identification in the field of social psychology has 
widely elaborated on women who embrace some feminist principles, but do not 
identify themselves as feminist. (Cowan, Mestlin & Masek 1992; Williams & Wittig, 
1997) The question as to why these women, usually labelled as “egalitarians” or 
“non-labelers”, refrain from the feminist label, even though they are committed to 
feminist ideals, has puzzled the recent research agenda on the feminist identification. 
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Considering the fact that attitudes held by feminists and nonfeminists may be quite 
alike with respect to gender inequalities, McCabe (2005) asks the following question: 
“What's in a label?” To tackle with this question, reseachers have attempted to 
understand the differences between the feminists and egalitarians in terms of their 
approach to feminism. Along with McCabe (2005), many other scholars claimed that 
nonlabelers are similar to feminists in their support for gender equality (Liss et al., 
2001; Roy, Weibust, &Miller, 2007). On the other hand, Bay-Cheng and Zucker 
(2007) found that nonlabelers tended to endorse individualistic values more so than 
feminists. 
First of all, it should be noted that refrainment from the feminist label despite 
the support for feminist goals may have something to do with social ostracism. The 
label “feminist” is not a value-neutral term. In the public imagination, it is usually 
associated with such epithets as "feminazi", “militant”, "man hating", "lesbian". 
Tyler (2007:176) contends that from the very beginning of the women’s movement, 
the anti-feminist campaign has distorted the meaning of feminism so much so that 
feminism is mostly represented as a selfish and anti-family ideology. The way that 
the anti-feminist discourse discredits feminist ideas and goals by representing them 
as selfish, immoral and anti-family is clearly revealed in the following quote:   
“Feminists... promote a highly personalized sexual politics that is 
simultaneously depoliticizing, individualistic and potentially pernicious in its 
implications. Feminism... renders politics hollow, first, by finding politics 
everywhere; second, by reducing politics to crude relations of force or 
domination, and third, by stripping politics of its centrality to a shared social 
identity. It erodes private life by construing it as a power-riddled 
battleground, thus encouraging a crudely politicized approach toward coitus, 
marriage, child-rearing, even one’s relationship to one’s own body.” (Elshtain 
quoted in Tyler 2007:177)  
 
Talking about the U.S. context, Tyler (Ibid, 173, 177) suggests that because of the 
distorted image of what feminism means and who a feminist is, the label “feminist” 
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has been widely rejected even among women who have pro-feminist attittudes to 
gender issues. In this sense, it is very difficult to reverse the cultural definitions of a 
typical feminist deeply entrenched in the public mind. As a result, such culturally 
established group prototypes create a powerful source of identity stability. 
It is obvious that social ostracism regarding the feminist identity stems from 
this negative discursive construction of the term “feminist” in the public imagination. 
Emprical studies suggest that both feminists and non-feminists believe that a typical 
feminist is far more extreme than they themselves are. (Liss et al., 2000:5) Both 
feminist and nonfeminist women believe that a typical feminist has stronger radical, 
socialist, and cultural beliefs than they themselves have.  
Scholars also point out the vagueness surrounding the term “feminist” as 
another possible cause for the refrainment from feminist self-labeling. (Budgeon 
2001; Liss, Hoffner, and Crawford 2000; Misciagno 1997) In this frame, hooks 
(1984: 17) suggests that the feminist discourse has never been able to arrive at a 
consensus of opinion about what feminism is or accept definitions that could serve as 
points of unification. Moreover, she argues that the “anything goes” approach to the 
definition has rendered the term meaningless. (Ibid, 23) To designate the contentious 
nature of the term, theorists and historians have argued that the word "feminism" is 
similar to "liberalism" in the range of understandings and distortions it encompasses. 
(Cott 1987) Noting the fact that the ambiguity surrounding the term “feminist” 
induces would-be supporters to disclaim the label of feminism even when they 
support feminist goals, some scholars attempted to reexamine and reconceptualize 
the public understanding of the word “feminism” and “feminist”. To this end, Offen 
(1988) traces the trajectory of the development of feminist ideas back to the early 
phases of the women’s movement in the 20th century and tries to reveal different 
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modes of feminist thinking specific to time and place. Here, she identifies two 
conflicting modes of thinking, i.e, relational and individualist. Offen (Ibid, 142) 
clearly notes how the history of feminism is inextricable from the time-honored 
concerns of historiography: politics and power. Furthermore, she points out that one 
of the reasons why so many women today disclaim the label feminist even when they 
support feminist goals may have something to do with the fact that they associate 
feminism with the individualist conceptualization of feminism and thus regard it anti-
family and selfish. According to Offen, relational feminism, if appropriated in favour 
of women, could offer an exit for the disidentification between espousal of feminist 
ideals and feminist self-identification. She notes that in contrast to the individualistic 
view which posits the individual as the basic unit and is thought to cause competition 
between the sexes, relational feminism proposes a gender-based but egalitarian 
vision of social organization and features the primacy of a companionate, non-
hierarchical, male-female couple as the basic unit of society.
5
 (Ibid, 135) In this way, 
she evidently points out the historically situated and differing meanings of 
feminisms. 
Part of the attempt to understand the discursive construction of the term 
“feminist” in the public imagination is to acknowledge the differentiation between 
private and public aspects of identification. According to Williams and Wittig 
(1997), at the private level, avoidance might be due in part to personal ("cognitive") 
dissonance, for example, between one's positive self-concept and a personal negative 
evaluation of feminists. At the public level, one potentially risks more -e.g., social 
ostracism. This differentiation between private and public aspects of feminist 
                                                          
5 Yet, she also notes that relational feminism may be easily appropriated by patriarchal politics as 
well and may turn into something that works against women as women's special nature, 
physiological and psychological distinctiveness and the centrality of motherhood have been so far 
frequently coopted by patriarchal actors.  
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identification is quite useful for this study. Following this distinction, we will be 
dealing with feminist self-labeling as a public statement. 
Another important point regarding the study of feminist identity is to take into 
account different shades of identity. In order to understand different levels of 
commitment to feminist identity, Duncan (2010:4) differentiates between strong 
feminists, weak feminists, and nonfeminists. In a similar way, to tone down the 
strong associations attributed to feminist identity, hooks (2000) suggests that with the 
aim to “emphasize that engagement with feminist struggle as political commitment 
we could avoid using the phrase “I am a feminist”. Instead, she suggest to use the 
statement “I advocate feminism”:  
“Because there has been undue emphasis placed on feminism as an identity or 
lifestyle, people usually resort to streotyped perspectives on feminism. Saying 
“I am a feminist” means I am plugged into pre-conceived notions of identity, 
role or behavior. When I say “I advocate feminism, the response is “what is 
feminism? the pharase ı adovate does not imply the kind of absolutism that is 
attached to “ı am”. It does not engage us in a dualistic thinking... When asked 
are you a feminist, it appears that an affirmative answer is translated to mean 
that one is concerned with no political issues other than feminism.” (2000: 
29) 
 
This complex nature of identities makes it impossible to stabilize feminist identity 
claims. (Budgeon, 2001: 18) The problem of difference within the category ‘woman’ 
has revealed that there are as many ways of becoming a feminist as there are of 
becoming a woman. Fragmentation has provided many different ways for women to 
be feminist. In a similar vein, motivations for the denial of the feminist identity could 
be as varied as the espousal of this identity. This denial could be strategic, 
ideological or practical. Griffin (1989) suggests that when a woman says, “I’m not a 
feminist but…”, this connotes a way of speaking about feminism without making an 
identification with it. Non-identification may display a refusal to be fixed into place 
as a feminist, but it may also be a way of avoding social ostracism or a sign of the 
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inability to position oneself as feminist because of the confusing and contradictory 
messages about what feminism really is. 
The complexity of the feminist identity claims, different shades of feminist 
positions (weak, strong, etc.) and different reasonings (strategic, ideological, 
practical, etc.) involved in the negotiation of feminist identity are to be taken into 
account while accounting for feminist identity. Recent research has acknowledged 
this complex nature of feminist identity claims by putting its multidimensonal 
character at the center. For example, McCabe (2005) argues that feminist identity is a 
multidimensional concept that encompasses feminist self- identification, feminist 
consciousness, and gender-role attitudes. Rhodebeck (1996) suggested that feminist 
identity and feminist opinions are distinct, differentiating between “support of 
feminist positions” and “support of feminism”. On the other hand, Misciagno (1997) 
draws attention to the fact that traditional accounts of feminist consciousness 
excluded “de facto” feminists, i.e. women who hold feminist beliefs but do not take 
on the feminist identity. This line of thinking enables us to avoid reducing the 
negotiation of the feminist identity to the espousal of the label. It points out the 
hybrid character that the relationship with the feminist label can display.  
Last but not least, I would like to note that in this research, I intentionally 
avoid from providing a list of predictors for measuring feminist identity and defining 
what feminism is. The fixation of feminisms’ meanings and the ideological 
components of feminist identities though operationalizing a list of predictors, would 
be contrary to the aims of this study. Rather than evaulating women columnists’ 
negotiation of feminist identity according to a fixed set of predictors, the aim here is 
to grasp how women columnists themselves operationalize feminist identity.         
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4.6.Narrative Analysis: Tracing Women Columnists’ Approach to Feminism in 
Narrative 
 
4.6.1.The Narrative Turn in Social Science 
Traditionally, the concept of narrative has been a concern for literary and 
linguistic studies. Sommers and Gibson (1994:37) note that for a very long time, 
narrative has been cast as the "epistemological other" of the social sciences and there 
has been a sharp contrast between the particularistic characteristics of narrative and 
the social science methodologies. However, in recent decades, scholars from a wide 
spectrum of disciplines have incorporated this concept into the social science 
research. This can be attributed to the increased interest in subjectivity and in the 
meanings attached by individiuals to their actions. (Hinchman and Hinchman 1997, 
Sommers 1994, Plummer 1995) The postmodern subvertion of grand, universal, 
totalizing theories through reference to knowledge that is local and specific, can 
closely collaborate with narrative models of knowing.  
In recent years, scholars from various disciplines have come to suggest that 
we live in a story-shaped world (Bruner, 1986; Polkinghorne, 1988; Sommers, 1994; 
Taylor, 1989). They argue that humans make sense of the world only through 
narratives; our lives are storied and identities are narratively constructed. Relying on 
such premises, Fisher (1984) claims that human communication is largely a story 
telling process and regards humans as homo narrans, i.e, storytelling animals. For 
Bruner (1986), too, humans are, as a species, homo narrans, with an inborn tendency 
to tell stories. 
The narrative turn offfers creative possibilities for adopting interdisciplinary 
approaches, which go beyond the literary study of narrative, psychology or rhetorics 
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and encompass various disciplines such as political science and sociology. Sommers 
(1992, 1994) incorporates the concept of narrative into sociology, while Patterson 
and Monroe (1998) use it for political science research. With the greater acceptance 
of postmodern research methods, narrative is now seen as a valid means of 
knowledge production and has become increasingly legitimized. (Riessman, 2008; 
Skeggs, 2002). 
As a result, it has been widely accepted that narratives play a critical role in 
organizing our perceptions of reality into a coherent and meaningful pattern. Thanks 
to the social scientists’ incorporating the idea of narrative into their work, it has 
become apparent that the explanatory powers of narratives are by no means limited 
to personal lives. Humans also need stories to find out how the world progresses and 
how one fits into it. In this sense, narratives play a critical role in the construction of 
political behavior as they shape our perceptions of political reality and affect our 
actions in response to political events. Sommers and Gibson (1994) state that social 
life is storied and narrative is an ontological condition of social life. According to 
them, people make sense of the world by integrating the events around them within 
one or more narratives, which are derived from a repertoire of available social, 
public, and cultural narratives. As such, narratives also serve as analytical tools to 
interpret the social, political and cultural contexts.   
One of the merits of narrative analysis is that by entering into dialogue with 
marginalized groups, narrative interviewers may unearth hidden or subordinated 
ideas. Bringing to light the ideas that are excluded from or neglected within 
dominant political structures and processes, narratives may be used to contest 
dominant social practices. (Franzosi, 1998; Plummer, 1995. Andrews, 2002) 
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Therefore, narratives of members of excluded groups are capable of showing how 
hegemonic accounts are inadequate to account for some experiences.   
 Another merit of narrative analysis is that narratives enable us to conduct 
research on multiple levels. (Squire, 2008) First, it helps you to bring structures of 
language into focus. Second, it puts great emphasis on the content of texts, ranging 
from individual phrases to larger bodies of texts. Third, narrative analysis also pays 
attention to the context of storytelling. In this study, we will apply narrative analysis 
by taking into account both the structure and the content of the narratives in question 
as well as the context in which the narratives are produced. 
 
4.6.2. Doing Narrative Analysis 
Narrative is usually defined as a story “with a clear sequencial order that connects 
events in a meaningful way for a definite audience and thus offers insights about the 
world and people’s experiences of it.” (Hinchman and Hincman 1997: xvi) Yet, in 
more broader terms, it may also refer to the ways in which we weave disperate facts 
together in order to make sense of our reality. (Patterson 1998) In this sense, the 
concept of narrative can be thought of as a means of exploring the ways in which 
social actors interpret the world and their place within it. Regarding this point, 
Bamberg and McCabe (1998: iii) state the following:  
 
“With narrative, people strive to configure space and time, deploy cohesive 
devices, reveal identity of actors and relatedness of actions across scenes. 
They create themes, plots, and drama. In so doing, narrators make sense of 
themselves, social situations, and history.”  
 
Therefore, for studies attempting to reveal the dynamics involved in negotiations of a 
particular identity, the concept of identity serves as a fundamental analytical tool.   
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4.6.3. Identity and narratives 
 
Narratives can provide detailed accounts regarding actors’ interpretations and 
provide a useful ground to closely reflect on the negotiation processes and 
constitutive parts of identities. Rosenwald and Ochberg (1992:1) state that “personal 
stories are not merely a way of telling someone (or oneself) about one’s life; they are 
the means by which identities are fashioned”. Similarly, Ricoeur (1984) says that it is 
through narrativity that we come to know, understand and make sense of the social 
world. Since the self comes to know itself only through the symbolic mediations in 
narrative and identities are constructed through narrativity, the study of narrative can 
be thought of as an attempt to come to terms with how identities are constructed.  
Here, it is important to note that in narrative account, identity is not 
something foundational and essential but something produced through narratives that 
are constantly reconstituted. Narratives involve reconstruction of stories across times 
and places as it is not possible to repeat the same story exactly the way it was told 
before. (Squire 2008) Thus, each and every act of narration involves a different story 
line. Therefore, narratives tell about experience through reconstituting it, resulting in 
multiple and changeable storylines. (Ibid, 23) In this sense, narratives would require 
a constant work on narration of identities. They involve uncertainties of 
representation and may never reach closure. Thus, narrative analyses must accept 
that there can be multiple valid interpretations that prevent the hermeneutic circle 
from closure. (Freeman 2004, Squire 2008) The process of telling stories that 
constitute the basis of personal identity, is an uncertain and ongoing process. This 
dynamic nature of identities and the impossibility of closure in identity construction, 
leads to the fact between the lines, narratives may involve different, even 
contradicting story lines about identities and selves.  
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Finally, one should also note that the narrative approach is in line with the 
mid-way theories that attempt to negotiate between postmodern accounts dismantling 
the idea of identity and essentially oriented identity politics. One the one hand, 
narrative analysis requires agency; it depicts human action that entails agency. 
(Patterson and Monroe, 1998: 315) On the other hand, as argued above, the 
conception of agency that narrative relies on is quite dynamic and open to change.   
 
4.6.3.1. Characteristic Features of Narratives 
Narrative helps us organize our ideas and experiences in terms of their historicity, 
temporality and relationality. As such, narrators can create plots from disordered 
experience, by giving reality a unity. (Riessmann 2008) Regarding this point, Mink 
states the following: 
 
“Life has no beginnings, middles or ends. Thus, if life has any narrative 
structure, it is one we have put there after the fact.” (cited in Kerby, 1991: 41) 
 
In this frame, narrators organize their tales temporally, spatially, thematically and 
episodically. By utilizing particular linguistic devices, they make sense of their own 
identities and the historical, social and political context.  
In the field of narratology, scholars identify certain qualities to define and 
study the concept of narrative. One of the foundational elements of the theory of 
narrative is the differentiation between “story” and “plot”. According to this 
differentiation, story connotes what is depicted in narrative, while plot corresponds to 
the structure of the series of events and the relationship that connects one event to the 
other. As E. M. Forster put it, “the king died and then the queen died” is a story, but 
“the king died and then the queen died of grief” is a plot. (cited in Martin, 1986: 81) 
Stories are the raw material of events, whereas plots, as constructed out of stories, are 
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the basic means that bring specific events into one meaningful whole. (Polkinghorne, 
1987) In this sense, it is thanks to the nature of a plot that narrative parts are 
synthesized into a meaningful temporal whole where the meaning of each and every 
part is dependent on the framing of the story. In addition to the “story-plot” 
differentiation, there are many other narrative qualities that contribute to the 
formation of a meaningul whole. For example, temporality (the time dimension in 
narrative), sequencing (the episodic ordering of narrative), causal emplotment (causal 
ties weaving events together), narrative perspective (narrator’s point of view) and 
narrative rythm are some of them. (Bal, 1985)  
Sommers (1992: 603) identifies four features of narrativity particularly 
relevant for social sciences: (I) relationality of parts; (2) causal emplotment; (3) 
selective appropriation; and (4) temporality, sequence, and place. Before all, 
narratives are constellations of connected parts embedded in time and space. This 
relationality of parts or emplotment is quite crucial for narrativity since it is through 
emplotment that events or thought are brought together and life is given coherence. 
Sommers underlines that in narrativity we discern the meaning of each and every 
single event only in temporal and spatial relationship to other events; she argues that 
the relationality of parts is the chief characteristic of narrative. It is possible to say 
that the narrative assumes a meaning thanks to the causal emplotment. When 
independent parts are located in a sequential plot, then their relationship to other 
parts becomes clear and in this way we can construct a configuration of relationships. 
The episodes which make up the plot, serve a purpose; their particular configuration, 
when read as a coherent whole, points out the meaning of the narrative. (Lawler, 
2003: 242)  
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In Sommers’ scale, another crucial element of narrativity is its evaluative 
criteria. According to this, the evaluative capacity of emplotment demands selective 
appropriation in constructing narratives. In other words, a plot must be thematic:  
 
“We do not narrate all the details of any circumstance; what we choose to 
narrate is generally noteworthy because it stands out by posing a problem or 
exception.” (Patterson and Moore, 1998:7)  
 
The primacy of the narrative theme or competing themes determines how events are 
processed and what criteria will be used to prioritize events and render them 
meaningful. Lastly, temporality and sequence also play an important role in the 
construction of narrative. We mentioned that the connected parts in narrative are 
brought together in such a way that the narrative as a whole has a coherent meaning. 
Here, it is important to observe in what sequence the parts are brought together. 
Following the sequence can give us clues about the meanings of narrative.    
Having mentioned the components that form a narrative, for the purposes of 
this research it is quite crucial to distinguish between personal or ontological 
narratives and public narratives. Sommers (1994) suggest that the idea of narrative 
links the individual and the collective in two ways: 1. Narratives of individual lives 
must always contain other life narratives 2. Narratives are not only produced by 
individuals but also circulate socially. Sommers calls the second form of narratives 
as  “public narratives., i.e., narratives which are attached to social and political 
formations rather than the single individual. According to this account, 
personal/ontological narratives are produced only within the limits of the repertoire 
of public narratives. This means that the question as to what kind of narratives will 
socially predominate depends at large on the distribution of power.  Sommers alleges 
that ontological narratives never occur in vacuums but are interpersonal. Thus, agents 
may adjust narratives to fit them into their own identities and in return they may also 
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adjust their identities to fit into the narratives. Accordingly, people construct their 
identities by locating themselves within a repertoire of emplotted public narratives; 
they make sense of their identities in line with the multiplicity of available social, 
public and cultural narratives. Narratives’ dependence on a stock of plots or on a 
canon reveals that each and every narrative is a product of the relationship between 
the hegemonic and subversive features of the public sphere. Therefore, narrative 
analysis enables us to investigate, not just the ways in which stories are structured, 
but also the power mechanisms embedded in the social and political context that 
allow for the production of certain kind of stories while silencing others.  
In line with Sommers’ differentiation between ontological and public 
narratives, in this research the term “narrative” does not simply correspond to a story 
that simply carries a set of facts or events. Rather, it is operationalized as a social 
product produced by people within specific social, historical and political context. In 
this vein, it is important to take into account that narratives do not originate with the 
individual; rather, individuals produce narratives within the context of public 
narratives which limit what can be said, what stories can be told and what will count 
as meaningful. 
 
4.6.3.2. Narrative Structures, Themes and Context  
The concept of narrative is an elaborate means to thoroughly reflect on the 
constitutive parts of women columnists’ responses. As explained above, the main 
idea in narrativity is the causal emplotment of different parts into a coherent whole in 
such a way that the end product has a tangible meaning in itself. Keeping this in 
mind, I will try to analyze how women columnists bring different ideas together to 
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produce a coherent narrative on feminist identity. Moreover, I will also investigate 
the role that the idea of narrative plays in identity formation processes and the 
possibilities it offers for the negotiation of identities.   
One can suggest three different axis along which narrative analysis can be 
made. Accordingly, the interpretive schemes in narrative analysis can focus on 
narrative structures, narrative content or the context in which the narrative is 
produced. (Squire, 2008: 9) As Barthes (1975) says, one cannot reduce narratives to 
the sum of sentences in the text. It is the unique narrative structure, i.e, the order of 
events, temporal distortions, flashbacks and flashforwards or the narrative rythm, that 
carries the narrative beyond the story or the sum of sentences in the text. Drawing on 
this, in order the analyze the meanings underlying the narrative, one can focus on the 
narrative structure. In addition to this, one can also study the narrative content, i.e. 
“what is said in the narrative”. Thirdly, the context in which the narrative is produced 
constitutes another research axis that allows on to trace the power mechanisms 
surrounding the formation and telling of narratives.   
In this research, I will try to follow all three of these research paths and try to 
explore the narrative structure, the content and the contextual elements in women 
columnists’ responses. I will outline the constitutive themes in women columnists’ 
responses by making a thematic analysis. On the other hand, I will make a structural 
analysis and elaborate on the relationality of parts, casual emplotment, selective 
appropriation and temporality in columnists’ narratives. I will also analyze the 
contextual factors that affect the formation of narratives in question. As a result, 
relying on both thematic, structural and contextual narrative analysis, I will try to 
locate women’s narratives on a web of power configurations vis-a-vis hegemonic 
public narratives in the public sphere in contemporary Turkey.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
HEGEMONIC DISCOURSES ON FEMINISM IN TURKEY UNDER AKP 
YEARS 
 
 
5.1. The AKP Rule, Gender Politics and the Field of Discursivity 
 
Since this study focuses on women columnists’ narratives in the post-2000’s, i.e., a 
time period that witnessed a considerable increase in the number of women 
columnists contributing to the mass circulation newspapers, it is necessary to portray 
the social and political context in which these narratives are produced. In the last 
decade, the main characteristics of Turkish politics has been subject to a radical 
change as a result of the rise of the pro-Islamic Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi [Justice 
and Development Party] (AKP). For the first time in Turkish politics, a pro-Islamic 
party could get the majority of the votes in three successive elections, i.e, in 2002, 
2007 and 2011 and rules the country with a new Islamist thinking marked by 
pragmatism rather than religious principles. (Çavdar, 2006) This remarkable rise of 
the AKP and Islamist politics was unprecedented because of the sui generis 
characteristics of Turkish modernization. The mentality of the Turkish experience of 
modernity was set in line with the Enlightenment tenets of materialism and 
positivism, which necessitated secularization and rationalization. Thus, the place of 
Islam in the new, modern country was revised and a very peculiar relationship was 
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established between the state and Islam in Turkey following the Kemalist revolution. 
(Toprak 1981) In this new period, religion was conceived as the chief obstacle 
blocking the way towards a modern society. Henceforth, the Republican elite, by 
adopting a teleological secularism, endeavored to prompt a radical rupture with the 
Islamic past. However, with the emergence of the pro-Islamic AKP on the political 
scene, the old premises of the Turkish experience of modernity had to be revisited 
and definitions of Islam as the “other” of the modern Turkey have become passé.  
On the other hand, as a part of this Islamic resurgence, conservatisation in 
socio-cultural and political matters has come to the foreground. (Çarkoğlu & Toprak 
2006; Toprak 2009) Party’s approach to women’s issues can be seen as a litmus 
paper though which this conservatisation crystallizes. In the AKP's conservative 
politics, being a woman is first and foremost defined within the familial sphere 
through traditional gender codes. In the party program, it is clearly stated that the 
party prioritizes family centered policies and is determined to protect family unity.
6
 
For PM Erdoğan, family constitutes the backbone of a powerful nation. He states the 
following: “If the family unit in a nation dissolves, that nation is doomed to dissolve, 
too.”7  Relying on this pro-family politics, AKP government aims to reinforce a 
strong commitment among citizens to the moral and political importance of family 
ideal and attempts to implement policies to consolidate this ideal as a regulative 
principle in the social and moral imagination. The idea of family in the AKP 
discourse is not only utilized as a regulative principle but also used as a strong 
political metaphor that applies the paternalistic familial logic to the political realm. 
Accordingly, citizens are seen as family members and politicians as heads of 
household, which paves the way to the reproduction of the patriarchal character of 
                                                          
6 See  http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-programi#bolum_ 
7
 See http://www.aile.gov.tr/tr/24264/Aile-Olmak-Projesinin-tanitimi-yapildi. 
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the household in the political realm. On different occasions, PM Erdoğan utilized this 
metaphor of family to make a reference to the solidarity and common fate of the 
nation. For example, in a public speech he stated:  
“East is ours, so is West. Turk is ours, so is Kurd... As 76 million people, we 
are together. Together we are a big family. We are Turkey.”8 
  
While introducing the AKP candidates before 2011 elections, he had used the same 
expression with the aim to appease those who could not enter into the candidate list 
and to stress the solidarity and the ‘familial’ ties within the AKP:  
 
“We are a big family. Those friends who do not see political activities as 
restricted to being an MP, will continue to be active in different positions.”9  
 
In line with the central role attributed to the notion of family in the social and 
political imagination, various policy attempts have been made by the AKP to take 
measures to prevent the disintegration of the family. Recently, the Ministry of 
Family and Social Policies initiated a project called “Being a Family”, which 
provides certain advantages to families in various policy areas ranging from health 
and housing to postal services.
10
 If one aim of this policy attempt is to give families 
advantages in certain policy areas, the other aim is to encourage young people to get 
married and urge them to have children. In this sense, pronatalist policies constitute 
another main pillar of AKP’s pro-family politics. Stressing the need for a young 
population, PM Erdoğan advises to married couples to have at least three children in 
many of his speeches. This pronatalist vision frequently articulated by Erdoğan is 
based on religious, nationalistic, patriotic and economic motifs. To back this vision 
up, Erdoğan makes religious references to the prophet’s advice to get married, 
                                                          
8
“Erdoğan: Bedelini ağır öderler”, Star Gazete, http://haber.stargazete.com/politika/erdogan-
bedelini-agir-oderler/haber-813477#ixzz2oV8XkQwc.  
9
www.zaman.com.tr/politika_basbakan-erdogan-mevcut-167-milletvekili-listede-
bulunmuyor_1120234.html. 
10
 http://www.aile.gov.tr/tr/24264/Aile-Olmak-Projesinin-tanitimi-yapildi. 
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adresses the nationalist sentiments or frames the issue of pronatalism as a matter of 
patriotism.
11
 Yet, one can suggest that the ultimate motif in his pronatalist argument 
is the economic success of the country. For him, the future population of the country 
will definitely affect the competitiveness of the country on the economic market. 
Regarding this point, he makes the following statement: 
“One or two children mean bankruptcy. Three children mean we are not 
improving but not receding either. At least three children are necessary in 
each family, because our population risks aging.”12  
 
In this frame, pronatalist AKP discourses urging couples to have at least three 
children, are prevalent discourses in contemporary public debates in Turkey, which 
are frequently quoted in newspapers, appear in parliamentary discussions and 
underpin certain policy initiatives.  For Akşit (2010), this call for three children, 
which operates through the utilization of women's bodies for pronatalist political 
projects, points out the beginning of a new period for demographic policies in 
Turkey. In this new pronatalist period, women’s bodies are seen as subservient to 
political aims. Regarding the utilization of women’s bodies, Delaney (1991) claims 
that with respect to the cultural meanings of reproduction in Turkey, women's bodies 
are always perceived as “the soil” and men's sperm as “the seed”, i.e., the essential 
element in reproduction. Accordingly, one can safely argue that pronatalist political 
projects in the contemporary era in Turkey regard women's bodies as “the carrier of 
                                                          
11
 For example, he quotes the prophet’s following remark: “Get married and have children. I will 
praise your crowd”. See his speech on http://www.aile.gov.tr/tr/24264/Aile-Olmak-Projesinin-
tanitimi-yapildi. In the same speech, he also identifies the importance attributed to family as a 
constitutive element of the national identity and frames the stress put on family as a patriotic 
sentiment.   
12
“Turkish PM Reiterates His Call for Three Children”, Hürriyet Daily News, January 3, 2013, 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-erdogan-reiterates-his-call-for 
threechildren.aspx?pageID=238&nid=38235. 
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the seed”, make it vulnerable to societal control and render women’s womb subject 
to regulation by the modern administrative power.  
In addition to the recent pronatalist discourses defining the ideal number of 
children, the recent anti-abortion policy initiative could be identified as another 
reflection of this pronatalist vision. Upon Erdoğan remarks in a public meeting in 
2012, stating that abortion is murder
13
, a policy initiative appeared on the political 
agenda, which is designed to considerably reduce the time limit defined in law for 
the use of the right to abortion. Moreover, following this policy initiative, certain 
legal arrangements has been made, introducing limitations on c-sections and 
rendering this birth method restricted to medical emergencies. The government’s 
recent attempt to limit the terms of the right to abortion and the recent legal 
arrangements rendering the c-sections only possible under certain medical conditions 
are policy steps that contribute to AKP’s pronatalist aims and lead to the biopolitical 
control of population. As argued above, through regulating women’s reproductive 
capacities and their rights on their bodies, such discourses and policy initiatives see 
women’s womb as a policy area that can be easily be utilized for political purposes.14 
These patriarchal discourses attempt not only to regulate reproductive capacities but 
they also produce regulatory discourses on sexualities, especially on women’s 
sexualities in the name of protecting the unity of family. Discourses controlling 
women’s bodies and sexualities have always been prevalent in the social, cultural 
and political fields in Turkey. However, what is alerting in the contemporary era is to 
witness political steps that strive to transform these discourses into law through 
                                                          
13
“Başbakan: Her Kürtaj bir Uluderedir” [PM: Every Abortion is an Uludere], Radikal, May 27, 2012, 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalEklerDeta3&ArticleID=1089235&CategoryID=
77. 
14
 For further discussion on recent abortion debates in Turkey, see Unal and Cindoğlu (2013).    
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certain legal arrangements. Calling these attempts as “masculinist restoration”, 
Kandiyoti (2010: 175) argues that such attempts are geared towards restoring the 
priviliged status men enjoyed under Sharia legislation in the pre-Republican era, not 
only de facto but also de jure. Following this argument, one could suggest that the 
differentiating trait of the patriarchal gender regime under the AKP era lies in the 
political attempts to codify male domination over women’s lives through certain 
legal arrangements.  
Another example indicating the patriarchal motifs in the legal arrangements 
proposed by the AKP with regard to the realm of sexuality is the law proposal in 
2004 that is designed to render adultery subject to punishment. It has been suggested 
by the party that this proposal is intended to be put into force in response to the 
demands of Anatolian women who want adulterous husbands to be punished. (Onar 
and Müftüler-Baç, 2011) Since polygamy is an acceptable practice in Islam, some 
men may tend to use religious ceremonies to justify their infidelities, while most of 
the time it is women who suffer most from these polygamous relationships both as 
wives and as “second wives”. Yet, as women’s groups have poignantly articulated 
during the public debates on adultery, the legal punishment of adultery as a remedy 
to the problem of polygamous marriages, can be very prone to turn into a potential 
infringement of women’s rights and private life. It can serve as a tool to scrutinize 
women’s private lives and regulate their sexualities. In the end, thanks to the protests 
of women’s groups and the reactions from the European Union, the government did 
not attempt to put this proposal into force.  
As seen from above, the disintegration of the family and factors damaging the 
institution of family including infidelity are perceived by the AKP government as the 
most threatening aspects of the modern era. Thus, in recent years various measures 
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have been taken or proposed to protect family as a fundamental value in the social 
and political imaginary. In this conservative political model, the relentless stress put 
on the familial unity constitutes a discursive ground where traditional gender roles 
are reproduced over and over again. As a result, women are rendered subservient to 
the unity of family through the traditional familial roles assigned to them as mothers 
and wives.  
In fact, despite this ongoing conservatization in social, cultural and political 
fields and the reproduction of traditional gender roles, one should also acknowledge 
that during the initial stages of its rule the AKP has passed important legislative 
reforms that have improved women’s public and private status. For example, In 
2003, superiority of international legislation was accepted by making an addition to 
Article 90 of the Constitution, which made the CEDAW (The Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women), signed in 1985 in 
Turkey, operational in law. With repect to the labour law, it was explicitly stated that 
there is no place for discrimination on gender in the relationship between employee 
and employer. Moreover, the duration of paid leave for working women after giving 
birth was extended to 18 weeks. In 2004 an additional statement was incorporated 
into the 10th clause of the Constitution, which renders the state the guarantor of 
gender equality. Another change was made in the new Penal Code stating that 
marriage would not nullify criminal responsibility in the cases of rape. Also, sexual 
offences such as harassment in the workplace were criminalized. In the regulation of 
sexual crimes the discrimination between virgins and non-virgins was abolished. In 
addition to these, for all municipalities that have more than 50,000 residents it was 
made mandatory to establish shelter houses for women and children.  
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At first glance, one may find it contradictory to reconcile these limited but 
promising legal enhancements regarding women’s status in society and the 
conservative and at times overtly anti-feminist tones in the party discourse. Coşar 
and Yeğenoğlu (2011) suggest that these seemingly contradictory facets of the 
conservative AKP politics feed each other in the sense that while women are 
expected to be active participants of the economic market in the neoliberal order 
envisioned by the party, the reproduction of the patriarchal familial roles assigned to 
women in the conservative party politics puts serious limitations on their choices to 
get involved in the public sphere. In other words, although the AKP signed 
significant legal amendments during its administration, the party's reluctance to 
challenge the traditional gender roles in the familial sphere precludes the possibility 
of establishing a new gender regime that would comprehensively improve women's 
status in public and private spheres. 
In this frame, Coşar and Yeğenoğlu (2011: 561) define AKP's gender politics 
as a peculiar form of neoliberal–conservative patriarchy, borrowing from Islamic 
patriarchy as well as establishing an intricate alliance between neoliberal and 
conservative frameworks, which asks women to adapt to global market conditions, 
yet at the same time to perform normative wife and motherhood roles. They define 
AKP’s gender discourse as “partial improvement at the legal level but gradual retreat 
of women from the economic sphere, mainstreaming of conservative discourse on 
women’s rights and a distaste towards feminist demands”. (Ibid) Accordingly, this 
new mode of patriarchy may approve of women’s participation in economy but at the 
same time, through the stress on traditional gender roles at home it burdens women 
with a double set of responsibilities. In this model, the subordination of women in the 
neoliberal economic frame does not necessarily originate from their exclusion from 
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the labor market but the terms of employment make them vulnerable to the 
exploitation in the job market. When this is added to the conservative emphasis on 
women’s roles as mothers and wives, the result is that the familial roles assigned to 
them in the private sphere turn out to be the decisive element for women’s life 
choices. 
Majority of women in Turkey at working age are either economically inactive 
or engage in informal market activities such as domestic service work, unpaid family 
work or traditional handicraft activities. (Dedeoğlu 2013) Their absence or 
marginalized presence in the employment sector makes them dependent on male 
family members’ income and fixes their position in the family as care providers. 
Dedeoğlu (2013) and Buğra (2012) argue that the limited scope of the social security 
system in Turkey marked by a synthesis of neoliberalism, Islamic notions of 
solidarity and a strong emphasis on familialism identifies the household as the main 
provider of social security and positions women as primary figures who are supposed 
to provide care for the household and ensure the continuity of the “familial security 
system”. It is obvious that the lack of child care facilities and the discursive 
reproduction of women’s roles as wives and mothers, when added to the low female 
employment and the gendered inequalities underlying the current social security 
system, render women even more vulnerable vis-a-vis the public and private 
patriarchy in Turkey.  
 
5.1.1. The Neoliberal-Conservative Alliance, the Authoritarian Political Culture 
under the AKP Rule and Politics of Gender  
The convergence of neoliberal and conservative approaches in contemporary 
Turkey and its implications in the realm of gender relations connote a particular 
political minset in which women’s bodies and sexualities appear as a discursive tool 
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whereby the hegemony of the current political rule is further reinforced. As such, this 
intricate patchwork operates hand in hand with a biopolitics that relies on a peculiar 
relationship between the neoliberal-neoconservative agenda and regulation of 
women’s embodiment. The neoliberal-conservative governmentality governs 
women’s bodies through a ubiquotous concern with their health, sexuality and 
reproduction. As a result, it shapes the contours and the substance of women’s 
pyshical bodies and embodiment. What follows this agenda is the proliferation of 
schemes of surveillance of women’s bodies and sexualities.  
Considering that traditional gender roles in the familial realm put the greatest 
burden on women’s shoulders, it would not be far-fetched to note that the neoliberal 
character of the era and the neoliberal restructuring of the social security system in 
last years has further increased women’s familial responsibilities such as elderly care 
or child care. The limited scope of the social security system in Turkey marked by a 
synthesis of neoliberalism, Islamic notions of solidarity and a strong emphasis on 
familialism identifies the household as the main provider of social security. (Dedoğlu 
2013, Buğra 2012, Coşar and Yeğenoğlu 2009, 2012) Moreover, it positions women 
as primary figures who are supposed to provide care for the household and ensure the 
continuity of the “familial security system”. It is obvious that the gendered 
inequalities underlying the current social security system, together with the 
discursive reproduction of women’s roles as wives and mothers, render women even 
more vulnerable vis-a-vis the public and private faces of patriarchy in Turkey. 
In this sense, the strong stress on family operates not only as an ideological 
tool to perpetuate the conservative values of Islamic life styles in contemporary 
Turkey but it also plays an important role in alleviating the destructive effects of the 
neoliberal restructuring of the economy. Regarding this, Yazıcı (2012) maintains that 
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AKP’s ideological promotion of the slogan “strong family, strong society” mainly 
operates as a ground for concealing government’s attempts to shift social care from 
state to familial sources.     
As suggested by various scholars, the hegemony of the AKP rule relies on an 
intricate patchwork politics composed of various elements such as populism, pro-
Islamism, nationalism and neoliberalism. (Bozkurt 2013, Coşar 2004, Hale and 
Ozbudun 2010) The neoliberal-conservative alliances in the AKP politics plays a 
highly critical role in contributing to the perpetuation of the hegemonic character of 
the AKP rule. It constitutes one of the main narrative lines in the AKP’s hegemonic 
rule. As the hegemonic character of the AKP rule becomes more entrenched, the 
party takes a drift towards an authoritarian stance which in return leads to a more 
assertive discourse promoting the neoliberal and conservative values. This vicious 
cycle constantly reproduces the traditional gender roles in contemporary Turkey, 
defining women’s position in society over familial roles. Consequently, along with 
the perpetuation of the hegemony of the AKP rule over the years, the patriarchal 
discourse on women’s bodies and sexualities proliferates in the social and political 
realm in an unprecendented way.   
 
5.1.2. The Antifeminist Ethos of the Era 
In this new form of patriarchy in the AKP era, the other major component is the 
rejection of feminist ideas and the reframing of women’s rights advocacy as 
“equality of opportunity”. The contradiction between the commitment to make legal 
improvements regarding women’s status, which we witnessed in the first period of 
AKP, and the constant reproduction of patriarchal gender discourses in party 
officials’ speeches or policy proposals, characterize AKP’s stance vis-a-vis women’s 
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organizations. Attempts have been made by the government officials to foster the 
dialogue between the government and women’s organizations. Yet, these attempts in 
the end turned into articulation of distaste for feminist ideas and resulted in 
disappointment for feminists.  
For example, in 2010, as a part of the ongoing democratization process 
initiated to deal with the Kurdish issue, PM Erdoğan organized a series of mettings 
with different segments of society to listen to their opinions about the ongoing 
democratization steps. One of these meetings was organized at the Dolmabahçe 
Palace to bring the PM and women organizations together in a platform where they 
can enter into a dialogue on the subject topic. However, despite the initial openness 
to dialogue, during the course of the meeting PM’s position shifted towards a 
patriarchal language so much so that in the end he even rejected the idea of gender 
equality. Upon the question as to why he always frames the position of women 
within the confines of motherhood, PM Erdoğan took the initiative to elaborate on 
his views on gender equality and made the following statement:  
“After all, I don’t believe in the equality of men and women. Therefore, I 
prefer to say equality of opportunity. Women and men are different, they 
are complementary [mütemmim] to each other.”15 
 
This remark has attracted various criticisms both from the secular and Islamist circles 
and continues to be a reference point for the criticisms questioning AKP’s approach 
to gender issues. Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal, a pious scholar and columnist, argued that 
PM’s subject statement belongs to the canon of narratives utilized by men to stress 
their dominance while talking to women.
16
 For Tuksal, this statement is a clear 
reflection of the hegemonic codes of manhood in Turkey, which always situates men 
in a superior position and thus inhibits any possibility of dialogue. On the other hand, 
                                                          
15 http://haber.gazetevatan.com/kadinla-erkek-esit-olamaz/318006/9/siyaset. 
16
 “Kadın Erkek Eşit Değil mi?” [Are Women and Men Not Equal], Star, 21 October 2010. 
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Fatma Bostan Ünsal, a founder member of the AKP, very recently pointed out the 
importance of reading AKP’s approach to gender issues through a retrospective and 
reminded the public of Erdoğan’s public denial of gender equality. While criticizing 
AKP’s recent attempt in October, 2013 to take measures against the cohabitation of 
male and female university students, Ünsal also stated that the public should have 
more seriously questioned Erdoğan’s denial of gender equality in 2010:  
“When the PM said that men and women are not equal, this has affected 
society so deeply that after such a statement there is no use of talking about 
gendered inequalities that women suffer from at home or in politics. When he 
made that statement, we should have asked the PM what exactly he meant… 
Because those words still have a powerful effect on the mindset of people in 
the rural area. When he said ‘men and women are not equal’ everybody 
should have opposed to this.”17  
 
Ünsal’s analysis is quite significant in the sense that she sees discursive or legal 
attempts marked by patriarchal values in a continuum. In this sense, she suggests that 
each patriarchal statement that is not truly criticized in the public debates contributes 
to the patriarchal discursive regime in the country and prepares the ground for future 
attempts to make such statements. This point makes even more sense when the 
proliferation of misogynist discourses in public debates in contemporary era in 
Turkey are taken into account. Since patriarchal speech acts of the AKP politicians 
constitute critical nodal points in the anti-feminist tone of gender politics in 
contemporary Turkey, one should not treat such statements in isolation or as 
expressions of individual opinion. Rather, it is necessary to situate them within the 
existing discursive regime, identify their relation with statements having similar 
tones and evaluate their effects on the public debates. 
As a matter of fact, the contention that each uncontested patriarchal speech 
act prepares the ground for further discursive attempts reinforcing the patriarchal 
                                                          
17
 See http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/avrupa/25062899.asp. 
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mindset, proves to be true when Erdoğan’s remarks regarding gender equality are 
taken into account. Recently, Erdoğan’s antifeminist claim that “women and men 
cannot be equal” entered the public agenda once again as Erdoğan reiterated this 
claim in another public occasion. He stated the following:  
“Sometimes, here they say ‘men and women are equal’. But ‘equality among 
women’ and ‘equality among men’ is more correct. However, what is 
particularly essential is women’s equality before justice… Equality is turning 
the victim into an oppressor by force or vice versa. What women need is to be 
able to be equivalent, rather than equal… You cannot bring women and men 
into equal positions; that is against nature because their nature is different… 
For example, in work life, you cannot impose the same conditions on a 
pregnant woman as a man…”18 
 
Considering the persistent character of Erdoğan’s denial of gender equality, one can 
safely suggest that the cultivation of the anti-feminist discourse through distancing of 
feminism from gender debates is one of the main constitutive pillars in AKP’s 
political project aiming for a civilizational turn in Turkey. In this sense, antifeminist 
discourses frequently come forward in various speech acts of AKP politicians and 
serve to AKP’s appeal to authenticity in its claim for spiritual uniqueness of norms 
and values in Turkish society and their distinctiveness from the Western civilization.  
In 2008 in a meeting organized by the party’s women’s branches, Dengir Mir 
Fırat, the then-Vice President of the AKP, stated that women from AKP cannot be 
slaves to feminism: 
 
“Our view as AKP on women is very different from other parties and other 
segments of society. We do not support the clash between men and women as 
envisioned in the philosophical ideas in feminist thought. Women from AKP 
have never been slaves to feminism and never will be. Because we believe 
that men and women are inseperable and they compliment each other.”19      
                                                          
18
 Turkish President Erdoğan Says Gender Equality Against Nature”, Hurriyet Daily News, 24 
November, 2014,  http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-president-erdogan-says-womens-
equality-with-men-against-nature.aspx?pageID=238&nID=74726&NewsCatID=338. 
19
 See http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=254895. 
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Similar to Erdoğan’s statement that “men and women are not equal”, Fırat’s remark 
departs from the idea of complimentarity between genders as envisaged in Islam. 
Defining feminism as a discourse promoting the clash between genders, he justifies 
the distinctiveness of AKP’s gender discourse through resorting to the idea of 
complimentarity between genders.  
As Erdoğan’s and Fırat’s remarks exemplify, gender equality in the 
conservative AKP discourse is interpreted as an alien concept to the Islamic values 
and principles in society. The replacement of the idea of gender equality with 
“equality of opportunity” is a consequence of this approach to gender issues in which 
not the rights language but the religious concept “fıtrat” overweighs. The idea of 
“fıtrat” [disposition] suggests that each and every being has its peculiar existence and 
is equipped with unique capabilities. Accordingly, women’s fıtrat is believed to be 
different from men’s in that women are usually associated with motherhood, care 
providing and compassion. This concept of fıtrat in Islamic thought results in the 
replacement of the idea of equality with “equity” that is based on an understanding of 
equality of genders as humanbeings. (Bardan, 2009) Accordingly, the statement that 
men and women are equal is seen as contradictory to the Islamic understanding of 
fıtrat and equity. As a result, rather than talking about the equality of men and 
women, the stress in the Islamic thought is put on the complementarity of genders, 
which intrinsically differentiates between male and female dispositions by seeing 
them as a part of the whole. In this model, the idea of equity and the order of social 
justice can only be realized on the condition that men and women perform their roles 
in line with their dispositions.  
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As seen from above, the replacement of the idea of gender equality with 
complimentarity between genders derives its momentum from the claim that the 
Islamic civilization and feminism are incompatible with each other. Erdoğan’s recent 
statement is clearly reflective of this understanding. While talking about the brutal 
rape and murder of a young woman, Özgecan Aslan20, he stated the following:  
“I say that women are consigned by God to men and those feminists… they 
say, ‘what do you mean women are consigned, this is an insult.’ You 
[feminists] have no link to our religion and our civilization. We look to the 
address of the ever-loved one. He says ‘Women are consigned by God to 
men; endorse [protect] that which is consigned.’ He says ‘Don’t hurt her.”21 
 
In another public speech, Erdoğan made a similar discursive manouvre stressing the 
alleged distance between feminism and Islam by reducing womanhood to the 
orthodox Islamic conception of motherhood and framing feminism as an ideology 
that categorically opposes motherhood: 
“Our religion [Islam] has defined a position for women [in society]: 
Motherhood. Some people can understand this, while others can’t. You 
cannot explain this to feminists because they don’t accept the concept of 
motherhood…”22  
 
It is interesting to note that president Erdoğan’s rhetorical moves replacing the idea 
of gender equality with complementarity between genders and the support for this 
political position in the conservative community clearly reveal how antifeminism in a 
pro-Islamist, conservative context and postfeminist discourses fed by patriarchy and 
conservatism reproduce each other in a cyclical way. Stating that “men and women 
are not equal”, President Erdoğan aims to eradicate the feminist gist of the idea of 
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 See http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/20-year-old-turkish-woman-brutally-murdered-body-
burned.aspx?PageID=238&NID=78354&NewsCatID=509. 
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 Barçın Yinanç, “Erdoğan Targets Feminists To Prevent The Unity of Conservative and Liberal 
Women”, Hürriyet Daily News, February 19, 2015, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-
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November, 2014,  http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-president-erdogan-says-womens-
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gender equality and introduces a new terminology with pro-Islamist, conservative 
motives that displaces the feminist interpretive framework through an emphasis on 
concepts such as “complementarity” and “equity”. Some pro-Islamist women’s 
organizations have attempted to justify this political attempt by appropriating 
postfeminist arguments. For instance, the public statement of the head of the pro-
Islamist women’s organization KADEM (Kadın ve Demokrasi Derneği) [The 
Association of Women and Democracy], Sare Aydın Yılmaz, is quite telling in that it 
clearly discloses the convergence of conservative gender discourses and postfeminist 
claims. Aydın Yılmaz states the following:  
“Recently, a new approach has been developed known as postfeminism or 
third wave women’s movement which relies on the idea of difference. This 
new approach has clearly challenged the idea of equality because the 
principle of equality takes the male norms and values as the ideal model and 
attempts to define women accordingly. In this regard, postfeminism replaces 
the idea of equality that connotes sameness with the idea of justice informed 
by differences.”23  
Yılmaz appropriates the idea of postfeminism in order to replace the idea of equality 
with the idea of “fıtrat”, i.e., disposition, which enables her to stress that women have 
a different disposition by nature as envisaged in Islam. The same interpretation has 
also resonated in the media sphere through the newspaper articles of some 
columnists.
24
 This appropriation of postfeminism as “the time after equality” and 
replacement of the idea of equality with “justice” and “difference” can be regarded as 
a rhetorical move to disqualify feminist frames of reference from being a major line 
of narrative in dealing with gender issues. It modifies the postfeminist moment as a 
linear narrative of progress that connotes a new stage in the history of gender 
struggles where the idea of equality is no longer in tune with contemporary 
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 See http://kadem.org.tr/star-gazetesi-acik-goruste-yayinlanan-esitlik-ustu-adalet-baslikli-yazi/ 
24
 See Gülay Göktürk, “The Issue of Fıtrat” [The Question of Disposition], Akşam, November 29, 2014,  
http://www.aksam.com.tr/yazarlar/gulay-gokturk/fitrat-meselesi/haber-358492. 
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challenges. The traps of this interpretation of postfeminism are quite alarming in that 
the casting of the idea of equality as passé is a form of concept-stretching that 
appropriates contemporary feminist debates in such a way as to utilize them for pro-
Islamist, conservative goals. The concepts of equality and difference in this 
interpretation are cast as mutually exclusive as if equality means sameness and the 
idea of difference does not encapsulate the idea of equal rights. Hence, one should be 
wary of the possible forms of collaboration between conservative discourses and the 
contemporary postfeminist moment since the postfeminist revision of feminism may 
easily be appropriated by conservative discourses as a justificatory mechanism for 
arguments displacing some basic feminist ideas.  
 The antifeminist tones in AKP’s gender politics are further fortified through 
the reproduction of the streotypical understandings of feminism. As in other 
prevalent streotypical accounts, feminism in AKP’s discourses is closely associated 
with man-hating, extremism or clash between men and women. The former vice 
president Mengi states that feminist ideas foster the opposition between sexes. On the 
other hand, PM Erdoğan labels women activists protesting against the draft bill 
regarding the punishment of adultery as “marginal women who cannot represent the 
ideal Turkish women”25. When her opinion about feminism is asked in an interview, 
the former Minister of Family Affairs, Fatma Şahin states that she could support 
feminism as long as it is not about imagining sexes in opposition: 
“Imagining sexes in opposition results in clash… I may say that I am a 
feminist to the extend that it is about protecting women’s rights but if it is the 
name of turning it into a conflict, then I am not a feminist.”26  
                                                          
25
 “Türk Kadınını, Marjinal Bir Kesim Temsil Edemez” [A marginal group cannot represent the Turkish 
woman]. Zaman, September 25, 2003. 
26
http://taraf.com.tr/haber/feministim-ama-erkek-dusmani-asla.htm  
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This belief that feminism is inherently prone to result in clash between sexes is 
cultivated so much so that feminism becomes the “other” of the Islamic belief of 
comlementarity of men and women and is distanced from the party ideology 
altogether. 
In addition to the replacement of gender equality with complimentarity 
between genders, the disassociation of feminism and Islam and the streotypical 
conception of feminism, the recent debates on the quota system in Turkey point out 
another prominent aspect of AKP’s peculiar interpretation of gender equality. These 
debates disclose the interlocking of antifeminist and neoliberal discourses in the 
AKP’s gender discourses. In this mindset, it is alleged that gender mainstreaming is 
contrary to the gist of the merit based society where competitiveness is defined as a 
key value.  
When constitutional changes appeared on the agenda in 2004 as a part of the 
accession negotiations with the European Union, various women’s groups and the 
CHP as the main opposition party proposed the inclusion of a clause in the 10th 
article of the Constitution to make it possible to provide a legal ground for the 
employment of the quota system. However, majority of the AKP parliamentarians 
voted ‘no’ for this clause and only agreed to add the revised clause that “men and 
women are equal. The state has the duty to ensure the implementation of these 
rights.” It is obvious that one of the main reason for this rejection of the quota system 
is related to the reinterpretation of gender equality as equality of opportunity in the 
party ideology. As explained before, by relying on the Islamic framework, PM 
Erdoğan prefers to frame gender equality as a matter of access to resources, not in 
terms of inequalities in the existing gender regime. Therefore, in this mindset, the 
quota system is regarded as preferential treatment, which harms merit-based 
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competition and inherently discriminates against men. In 2008, as a response to a 
women’s rights activist who defends the quota system, Erdoğan stated the following: 
“I don’t see the quota system as equality. Equal participation already exists in 
Turkey. Go, run for the elections and win. If you cannot win on your own, 
this means that you are taking shelter in men’s charity…”27   
It is quite clear that gender quotas are seen here as violation of liberal principles. The 
same interpretation is also quite prevalent in the public debates in Islamist circles. 
For example, during the quota debates in 2004 the pro-Islamist newspapers Zaman 
and Yenişafak covered the quota proposal within the frame of “preferential 
treatment”, reduced this issue to the clash between the AKP and CHP and largely 
ignored the demands of women’s organizations. (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2010) 
The proponents of the quota system usually point out that quotas aim at 
“equality of result, rather than equality of opportunity” (Bacchi 2006: 33) However, 
the neoliberal logic in the AKP’s patriarchal discourse ignores this idea of equality of 
electoral results, argues for a gender blind political recruitment and limits the focus 
only the to merit-based entry into electoral competition. Equality of opportunity is a 
concept that has already become passé in today’s feminist thought because it fails to 
capture the invisible forms of patriarchy such as glass ceiling that prevents women 
from climbing the career ladder up. Hence, one can safely argue that AKP’s gender 
discourse with its limited focus on equality of opportunity excludes any possibility of 
gender mainstreaming and looking through gendered lenses. The fact that even the 
parliamentary commission working on gender equality is named as “Commission for 
Equality of Opportunity” clearly reveals the dominance of the gender-blind 
neoliberal logic in the party ideology. 
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 http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=234565. 
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In short, one could allege that the rise of this anti-feminist discourse in 
government officials’ speeches and the attempts to solidify it de jure through legal 
arrangements expands the boundaries of this discourse in many other realms of the 
public sphere in contemporary Turkey. Relying on this expansion of the 
conservative, anti-feminist discourse, columnists writing in pro-Islamic newspapers, 
Islamist scholars or prayer leaders find an opening to articulate their patriarchal 
standpoints more aloud and make their points heard in public debates.  
 
5.1.3. The Operating Mechanisms of Discourse, Discursive Opportunity 
Structures and the AKP Rule 
The Foucauldian concept of discourse suggests that rules and practices that produce 
meaningful statements govern the ways in which a particular topic can be talked 
about at a certain time in a certain context. Reflecting on the Foucauldian concept of 
discourse, Hall (2001: 73) states that discourse never consists of one statement, one 
text or one action; the same discourse appears across a range of texts. Accordingly, it 
is possible to say that discursive statements that share similar motifs, style and 
narrative are products of the same discursive regime. They are not single speech acts 
but belong to the same set of governing rules and draw on a similar set of discursive 
opportunity structures. Ferree (2002, 2003) defines discursive opportunity structures 
as ways of thinking that provide political acceptability of specific ideas. They explain 
the interactive relationship between the discursive context and the speaker’s strategic 
choice to formulate certain discourses. In this sense, certain discourses that used to 
remain hidden or unnoticed, may become highly visible in another discursive regime. 
Drawing on the opportunity structures provided by this change in the governing rules 
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of discourse, certain speakers can articulate certain ideas more boldly or effectively. 
The proliferation of the discourses that are in line with the hegemonic discursive 
regime can be also clearly noticed in the enhancement of their “standing” in public 
debates. Ferree et al. (2002) define the idea of “standing” as a criteria to measure the 
effect of certain discourses particularly in the public debates in the mass media 
forum, a major site of political contest with pervasive influence over other forums of 
public debate. For them, “standing” points out to the fact that certain discourses are 
extensively covered in the mass media forum and are recognized as relevant and 
significant in shaping the trajectory of public debates.   
In this frame, in the contemporary era, in which an anti-feminist, conservative 
gender discourse is in rise in government officials’ discourses in Turkey, the 
discursive opportunity structures allow certain actors to articulate their patriarchal 
standpoint in a more overt manner. As a result, what we see in the mass media forum 
is that such discourses are extensively featured, have gained a widespread circulation 
in public debates and thus are quite influential in shaping the trajectory of public 
debates on gender issues. On the other hand, one should acknowledge that the 
extensive coverage of such discourses in the mass media forum is also related to the 
contemporary political atmosphere shaped by the secular-Islamist cleavage in 
Turkey. In other words, although these conservative, patriarchal discourses have a 
high standing in the mass media forum and in other arenas of public debates on 
gender issues today, their framing, i.e., the interpretive framework attributed to them 
changes depending on the character of the arena in which they are dealt with. While 
in pro-Islamist arenas, they could encounter less criticism and enjoy more support, it 
is more likely that in secular arenas they are covered through a negative frame. For 
example, during the quota debates in 2004 the pro-Islamic public debates mainly 
178 
 
interpreted the quota system as preferential treatment and ardently supported the 
government’s rejection of the pro-quota proposals. (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2010) On the 
other hand, the debates in secular arenas criticized the anti-quota approach and 
presented it as another indicator of the Islamic upsurge in the country. (Ibid) 
Similarly, when a well-known Islamist scholar recently stated that pregnant women 
should not wander around in tight clothing because it is immoral, the pro-Islamic 
public debates chose to cover this debate within the frame of freedom of expression 
and refrained from making news about the scholar’s first controversial statement but 
only featured his defence.
28
 The secular mass media forums covered his remarks in a 
critical frame.  
In short, even though the conservative, patriarchal discourses are widely 
covered in the mass media forum today and shape the political agenda, their framing 
shifts depending on whether the forum in question is pro-Islamic or secular. 
However, despite this variability in their interpretation, it is obvious that patriarchal 
statements have a critical standing in public debates in the current era. As a result, 
the discursive regime has become increasingly conservative and anti-feminist, which 
can be easily felt in recent public debates.  
In July 2013, a reputable Islamist scholar told in a TV show that pregnant 
women should not wander around in tight cloths because it is contrary to aesthetic 
standards.
29
 In August 2013, a provincial education director stated that he is very 
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concerned about girls using the same stairs with boys.
30
 The same position about 
gender segregation was once again articulated by an AKP parliamentarian and 
entered into public discussion in November 2013. Sadık Yakut, MP from AKP and 
debuty parliamentary speaker stated the following:  
“Having girls and boys educated at the same schools in the name of a pro-
West approach is unfortunately a mistake that has been continually made 
from the past up until now”.31  
Another influential emblematic example revealing the patriarchal tone of today’s 
discursive regime could be found in the remarks of President of the Directorate 
General for Religious Affairs, Mehmet Görmez, who declares that the United 
Nations should care about crimes against humanity before violence against women.
32
 
Here, Görmez overtly trivializes the problem of violence against women in Turkey in 
order to criticize UN’s ignorance vis-a-vis the civil war in Syria. Moreover, quite 
recently an important Islamist intellectual made several misogynist declarations 
openly opposing women’s participation into workforce. In a series of columns he 
argued that women’s employment harms the unity of family, results in male 
unemployment and thus is a deviation from women’s original disposition. 33 
Although he was severely criticized by many pious women writers, as a reputable 
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intellectual in Islamist circles his remarks have obviously contributed to the 
reproduction of the patriarchal discursive regime in the country.  
The above examples may help us gain an insight of the high circulation of 
patriarchal discourses in public debates nowadays. As stated earlier, such discourses 
have always been prevalent in the social, cultural and polical imagination. However, 
it is possible to say that the recent disursive opportunity structures have made it 
possible for social and political actors to articulate these discourses in a more overt 
manner. On the other hand, the mass media forum grants high levels of “standing” to 
these discourses in a variety of ways. While secular media platforms cover such 
discourses in a negative frame and present them as nodal points in the 
Islamist/secular conflict, the pro-Islamic platforms employ a reverse logic by 
defending these disourses on the basis of freedom of expression or blaming the 
secular circles for distorting the discourses in question for political aims. 
Consequently, this proliferation of patriarchal discourses largely shape today’s public 
debates about gender issues in Turkey. 
 Having noted this, one should ask the following questions: How does this 
conservative, anti-feminist discursive regime affect feminist discourses in the public 
sphere? Do feminist discourses lose ground vis-a-vis AKP’s conservative politics? 
Or is it vice versa? Does the current conservative regime make feminist discourses 
even more alert and cautious about patriarchal politics? If so, what kind of discursive 
opportunity structures come into being as a result of this effect? How do the women 
columnists integrate into the changing discursive structures with regard to 
articulating feminist discourses? 
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In the next chapters, I will discuss women columnists’ approach to gender 
issues in Turkey, drawing on their articles in newspapers and their responses in the 
interviews that I have conducted with them. Before making this analysis, at this point 
I should note that all women columnists who participated in this study engage in 
gender debates actively. For them, gender issues in contemporary Turkey constitute a 
critical field in the public sphere. Even though they employ quite different tools and 
perspectives to account for these patriarchal structures, in one way or another they 
unanimously react against them. Their writings on gender debates are usually in the 
form of a critique against the overt articulations of patriarchal discourses in the 
public sphere. In this sense, it is possible to argue that their writings constitute a 
unique discursive space in the mass media sphere, which is characterized by a pro-
feminist tone and collaborates with the feminist subaltern publics on certain issues. 
Taking into account this unique discursive space, one can allege that there are 
multiple platforms today in Turkey where actors produce a counter discourse that is 
highly critical of the contemporary patriarchal discursive regime.   
Drawing largely on the Foucaldian understandings of power, subject and 
discourse, Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 111) suggest that society is impossible; it does 
not exist. By this statement, they mean that society is never a completed or total 
entity in which parts have a stable position. For them, only a partial structuring is 
possible. At certain moments some discourses may seem to be relatively uncontested 
but the possibilities for the new ascriptions of meaning and new articulations always 
prevent the closure of meaning making. (Jorgensen and Philips, 2002: 47) Discourse, 
in their thought, is only a temporary and partial fixation of meaning and thus can 
easily be undermined by new meaning making processes. Since meaning can never 
be ultimately fixed, the discursive terrain is characterized by constant social 
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struggles. For Laclau and Mouffe, discourse, i.e., the temporary fixation of meaning, 
takes place by excluding all other possible meanings that signs in a discourse can 
take in relation to each other. In other words, the unified system of meaning in a 
discourse is generated through a set of exclusions. In Laclau and Mouffe’s theory, 
the surplus meaning generated by meanings excluded from discourse consitutes the 
field of discursivity. Accordingly, the polysemy of meanings in the field of 
discursivity make it possible that temporal discursive fixation at a certain historical 
moment can be challenged from the outside surplus of meanings and in this way 
meaning can be rearranged. (Ibid, p.27) In this frame, the discursive field is marked 
by constant struggles among antagonistic discourses that strive for hegemonic 
fixation of meaning. In Laclau and Mouffe’s analysis, although hegemonic 
interventions fix the meaning at a certain historical moment by excluding and 
suppressing all other possible discourses, their contingency makes them prone to be 
challenged by outside discourses.  
In addition to the impossibility of permanent fixation of meaning and the 
constant struggle for meaning making, one should also take into account the 
multiplicity of discourses underlying the undecidability of the discursive terrain. In 
her critique of the Habermasian public sphere, Fraser (1990) argues that the public 
sphere is not a single, overarching entity but encompasses multiple discursive arenas. 
She poins out the existence of parallel discursive arenas where members of 
subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter-discourses in order to 
articulate their identities, interests, and needs. Keeping in mind Fraser’s critique, it is 
possible to note that even a hegemonic discourse attempts to suppress all other 
discourses and possibilities of meaning, there are other spheres where subjugated 
forms of discourse can be articulated. In this frame, it would be too simplistic to 
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suggest that AKP’s conservative, anti-feminist gender discourse exhaust all 
possibilities of meaning making about gender issues in the contemporary public 
debates in Turkey. Although the current conservative government engages in a 
hegemonic struggle to fix the meaning in the realm of gender relations, this 
hegemonic attempt makes the existing conservative discursive regime subject to 
outside attempts to restructure meaning. With each conservative, anti-feminist 
attempt to reinforce the meaning in the discursive field, other possibilities for 
meaning strive to be more visible and influential. Hence, I think that women 
columnists’ narratives that are discussed in this study can be better understood when 
read in terms of their position in these struggles characterizing the discursive terrain. 
Their writings constitute a critical position that challenges the anti-feminist attempts 
to fix the meaning with regard to gender issues. In this sense, their position entails a 
possibility to closely collaborate with the feminist subaltern public. In the next 
chapters, I will try to investigate in detail how women columnists in question attempt 
to challenge the proliferation of anti-feminist discourses in contemporary public 
debates. 
 
5.2. The Feminist Subaltern Publics in Contemporary Turkey 
In order to analyze how women columnists situate themselves vis-a-vis the 
feminist subaltern public, one should also delve into counter-hegemonic discourses 
making up the feminist subaltern public in contemporary Turkey. It is important to 
note that the feminist subaltern public does not represent a monolithic entity but is 
composed of various discourses, groups and identity claims that do not necessarily 
overlap. (Fraser 1990, Felski 1989) In this sense, any attempt to study counter 
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publics should take into consideration the multiplicities underlying them. It is also 
useful to keep in mind that each counter public may encompass further differences in 
itself, depending on its reformist and orthodox tendencies. (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 
2005) Counter publics with reformist tendencies may be open for dialogue, 
cooperation and change, whereas those with an orthodox character may rely on a 
relatively more rigid set of identity claims and demands. Moreover, a subaltern 
public may adopt a publicist or an enclave tendency in relation to its goals in the 
public sphere. (Fraser, 1990: 14) While at some points it may enclave itself by 
putting the emphasis on group identity and solidarity, at other points it may follow a 
publicist strategy in wider publics to generate transformative effects on hegemonic 
public discourses.  
In Turkey, profeminist counter publics are composed of various groups that 
may share commonalities on some issues as well as radically differ from each other 
with regard to certain concerns and demands. The secular/pro-Islamist divide appears 
as one of the main fault lines that diffentiates profeminist concerns, demands and 
ideas. Yet, one should note that this differentation does not operate as a binary 
opposition, precluding collaboration and transitivity among secular and pro-Islamist 
groups’ demands and concerns.  
The 1990s in Turkey witnessed the emergence of new cleavages in feminism 
that have come forward as a result of the rise in Islamist, Kurdish and LGBT 
movements. (Diner and Toktaş, 2010) This diversification of demands in the field of 
gender relations, in return, has led to a considerable dismantling of the exclusionary 
tones in the secular feminist definition of the subject of feminist activism as secular, 
Turkish, middle class and urban. The transformation of the women’s movement in 
the post-1990s along with the rising poststructural and postcolonial critique, has 
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rendered the secular feminist counter publics more open to the demands of Islamist 
women and gave way to close collaboration between secular feminists and Islamist 
publics. Cooperation, dialogue and mutual empathy between secular feminists and 
pious women came to flourish in different profeminist environments such as feminist 
publications and collaborative attempts to enforce women’s activism. Arat (2004) 
identifies Pazartesi, a feminist monthly published between 1995 and 2002, as a 
precursor example that is emblematic of the changing character of the relationship 
between secular feminists and Islamist women and known for its reformist approach 
to veiling and its coverage of Islamist women’ demands. Other feminist publications 
such as Amargi, a quarterly feminist journal published since 2006, followed an 
approach similar to that of Pazartesi, opposing headscarf bans and extensively 
covering the headscarf issue beginning with the very first issue. (Çaha, 2011: 11)  
Moreover, collaborative activist platforms such as CEDAW meetings, the 
Woman Platform for Perpetual Peace, a platform committed to oppose war and 
reinforce peace in Turkey as well as in broader Middle Eastern geography; We Are 
Looking After Each Other initiative, an attempt to bring together women from 
secular and Islamist backgrounds, and the Turkish Penalty Code Women’s Platform, 
were other examples revealing the multiplication of sites in women’s movement 
where dialogue and mutual understanding can be enhanced. (Fisher Onar and Paker 
2012: 387) 
In the post-1990 period, the Islamist women’s organizations have also 
achieved a dialogic moment marked by a dialectical, collaborative will to foster 
cooperation. Even though the majority of these organizations have reservations about 
adopting an explicitly feminist position, it is possible to suggest that profeminist 
values play a significant role in the reasonings of the organizations that display a 
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reformist stance. Aldıkaçtı-Marshall (2005) notes that even when these organizations 
disassociate themselves from an explicitly feminist position, they explain their 
standpoint through profeminist principles.
34
 Especially the women’s groups that tend 
to negotiate gender issues through an Islamic feminist perspective display a 
promising potential for reconciling Islam and feminism.
35
 
In a nutshell, both secular and pious women’s commitment to dialogue and 
mutual recognition and their participation in collaborative profeminist platforms 
makes it possible for them to relate to different womanhood positionalities without 
necessarily subsuming differences under forced agreements and unified categories. 
Thus, it is clear that despite the differences inbetween, both secular and pro-Islamist 
publics bear a certain potential to collaborate on certain issues in order to achieve 
political demands.  
In addition to the political urgency of certain gender issues, Turkey’s 
participation in the international human rights regimes in the post-1980 period and 
the cultivation of feminist language in gender discourses has also generated a 
positive impact on collaborative attempts initiated by women with different 
convictions.
36
 In return, this prospect of cultivating women’s status in society 
through a reference to the universal human rights discourse has nurtured 
                                                          
34 According to Aldıkaçtı-Marshall (2005), some Islamist women active in women’s organizations 
deny the conception of veiling as covering womanhood; rather they see it as a way of underlining 
womanhood. Drawing on this, she argues that this attempt to underline womanhood instead of 
hiding it, connotes a useful ground where feminist arguments can be reinterpreted from within 
Islamist ideology.   
35 Capital Women’s Platform [Başkent Kadın Platformu] can be cited here as an example of Islamic 
women’s organizations that adopt a reformist approach. Founded in 1995, it has adopted a critical 
approach to the patriarchal readings of Islam and utilized a women’s rights discourse in dealing with 
contemporary gender issues. For a more detailed account of the narratives of members of the CWP, 
see Aldıkaçtı-Marshall (2005), Aldıkaçtı-Marshall and Shablok (2009), Coşar and Gençoğlu (2008).       
36
In 1985 Turkey signed CEDAW (The Convention on the Eliminatiın of All Types of Discrimination 
Against Women); in 1987 it applied for the European Union membership; in 1992 it signed the 
Helsinki Summit Declaration on Human Rights and in 1999 became a candidate country to the EU. 
(Arat and Altınay, 2015: 13)  
187 
 
collaborative platforms that enabled women to cooperate beyond divergences, clash 
of interest and differences in persuasions and commitments. (Arat and Altınay 2015, 
Aldıkaçtı-Marshall 2009) Initiating various collaborative platforms, women came to 
mobilize over issues such as violence against women, education, employment and 
empowerment by leaving “thick” identities behind and relying on “thin” universal 
values. (Nora Fisher and Paker 2012) The cultivation of universal human rights 
discourse in gender politics, in return, has contributed to the flourishing of 
transformative encounters between different womenhood experiences. (Ibid)  
Turkish Penalty Code (TPC) Women’s Platform, founded in 2003 with the 
aim to urge the government to enhance gender equality in new legal arrangements, is 
one of these collaborative platforms that has actively worked during the negotiations 
on the legal changes concerning the Penalty Code. Another striking example in this 
regard is the Platform We Stand By One Another, (Birbirimize Sahip Çıkıyoruz 
Platformu), founded in 2008 with the aim to bring together both veiled and unveiled 
women around the common cause of protesting against headscarf bans. The members 
of this platform declare that they “stand by one another” irrespective of their 
differences as believers and non-believers, veiled and non-veiled women.
37
 Rejecting 
the state control over women’s bodies in the name of modernism, secularism, 
religion, tradition, morality or honor, they ask for an all-inclusive public sphere that 
is not characterized by oppression and explotation of women. As it can be seen from 
here, such platforms signify the potential for coalitional feminist politics in women’s 
movement in contemporary Turkey.  
Having noted this, below, I will outline the prominent themes, concerns and 
demands in profeminist subaltern discourses in contemporary Turkey. In doing so, I 
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 See http://birbirimizesahipcikiyoruz.blogspot.com/ 
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will try to disclose the main narrative lines in contemporary feminist struggles in 
Turkey. Moreover, I will point out the fields of struggle where feminist coalitional 
politics can flourish. I will also touch upon the differences between secular feminist 
and Islamic subaltern publics that are difficult to reconcile and preclude close 
cooperation.   
Here, it is useful to outline some of the main themes in contemporary 
profeminist struggles in Turkey as the following: 
1.) Bodily Issues, Embodied Protests: Abortion, c-section and women’s morality 
2.) Violence Against Women 
3.) Veiling 
4.) Resistance Against the Rise of Patriarchal Discourses and Sustained Feminist 
Pressure on Government 
 
5.2.1. Bodily Issues, Embodied Protests 
The AKP rule marked by increasing authoritarianism and conservatization has 
witnessed significant political contestations over women’s bodies and sexualities in 
Turkey. Through various policy initiatives and public statements, it has attempted to 
regulate women’s bodies and sexualities, reinforced schemes of self-regulation and 
in return, shaped the contours of women’s bodies. (Unal and Cindoglu 2013, Acar 
and Altunok 2013) AKP’s preoccupation with women’s bodies crystallizes most 
visibly in its anti- abortion stance, pronatalist policies, urge for marriage at an early 
age and constant reproduction of conservative codes on women’s sexualities. Given 
that AKP’s biopolitics shape the materiality of women’s bodies in a performative 
sense and urge women to adopt certain forms of embodiment and self surveillance 
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techniques, “woman’s body” as a narrative theme and a field of protest stands at the 
very center of contemporary feminist struggles in Turkey. In this sense, one can 
argue that subaltern profeminist publics today are characterized by embodied protests 
so much so that women’s bodies have become a main locus of profeminist 
opposition.  
The fact that bodies are powerful sites of resistance (Butler 1990), implies 
that subaltern publics seeking change through bodies have to confront the challenge 
of how to locate the body in profeminist struggles. Women’s bodies do not represent 
identical physicalities and are further differentiated along ethnic, socio-economic 
and/or religious factors. In this sense, bodily differences have a considerable effect 
on how women can be involved in embodied protests. (O’Keefe, 2014:3) The 
challenge of how to include bodily differences in embodied protests points out the 
intricacies underlying the use of body in feminist activism.  
There are various ways through which bodies can be involved in protests. 
First, activists can make protests possible through utilizing their bodies as political 
arguments. (Sutton, 2007: 140-141) They can performatively present their bodies as 
a site of protest and as symbols that convey political meaning. (Ibid) Second, to 
articulate their demands and claims, activists may also make use of the material 
characteristics, needs or vulnerabilities of their bodies. (Ibid) Defining bodily needs 
and risks as part of activist practices, they may situate the materiality of the body, the 
needs and vulnerabilities arising from it at the very center of the protest. The recent 
protests in Turkey organized by pregnant women as a reaction to the misogynist 
remarks of Tuğrul İnançer, a well-known religious scholar, who stated that 
pregnancy should not be displayed in public, provide a clear example of the 
utilization of bodily vulnerabilities for activist practices. 
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Women activists protesting against the rise in patriarchal discourses in 
contemporary Turkey regard their bodies as a site of resistance. They convey their 
demands and arguments through their bodies by presenting their bodies as “text” or 
political argument”. They also make use of their bodily vulnerabilities in order to 
underline that women’s embodiment is a main locus for profeminist activism. Below 
are some examples from recent profeminist protests which clearly disclose that 
women’s embodiment is central to contemporary feminist struggles in Turkey.   
In 2013, in a TV program, Tuğrul İnançer, a religious intellectual, well-
known in conservative circles stated that pregnant women should not wander around 
in tight clothing because it is immoral. For him, presence of pregnant women in 
public is disgraceful: 
“Announcing pregnancy with a flourish of trumpets is against our civility. 
[They] should not wander on the streets with such bellies. First of all, it is not 
aesthetic…  After seven or eight months of pregnancy, future mothers go out 
their husbands by car to get some fresh air. And they go out in the evening 
hours. But now, they are all on television. It’s disgraceful. It is not realism, it 
is immorality.” 
 
Upon this statement, pregnant women gathered in Istanbul in Taksim Square and in 
Kadıköy to protest İnançer’s misogynist mindset suggesting seggragation. They 
defied İnançer’s remarks by chanting slogans such as “our bodies are ours”. Their 
husbands and boyfriends also supported the demonstration by wearing pillows under 
their t-shirts.  
A similar example of embodied protest had taken place earlier in 2013, when 
the AKP proposed an anti-abortion initiative that attempted to introduce a new law 
restricting the right to abortion. Following this, thousands of women marched to the 
streets with colorful banners and flags protesting the AKP’s anti abortion stance. The 
protesters chanted slogans such as: “Keep your hands off women’s bodies”; “it is my 
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body, so who are you?”; “abortion is my choice, murder is men’s method”.38 The 
abortion debate also sparked an online photo campaign initiated by bianet, a feminist 
news portal, which invited users to submit a photo of themselves protesting 
government officials’ anti-abortion stance. 39  The campaign rapidly became a 
widespread protest movement with the motto “my body, my decision”.  
Another embodied profeminist protest took place as a reaction to the deputy 
PM Bülent Arınç’s remarks criticizing women’s laughter in public. During an Eid El-
Fitr meeting on July 28, 2014, he complained about moral corruption in Turkey and 
suggested that women’s trespassing norms is a concerning component of the current 
moral decline. In his speech, he clearly situated men’s and women’s sexual selves 
hierarchically vis-a-vis each other, identified women as the party “culpable” for the 
current “moral decline” and highlighted them as a target. His provocative statement 
in question is as below: 
“Chastity is so important… It is an ornament for both women and men. [She] 
will have chasteness. Man will have it, too... He will be bound to his wife. He 
will love his children. [The woman] will know what is haram and not haram. 
She will not laugh in public. She will not be inviting in her attitudes and will 
protect her chasteness…  Where are our girls, who slightly blush, lower their 
heads and turn their eyes away when we look at their face, becoming the 
symbol of chastity?”40 
Arınç’s remarks gave way to a social media protest with thousands of women posting 
smiling selfies under the Turkish hashtag “kahkaha” (laugh) and “diren kahkaha” 
(resist laugh). This protest rapidly became widespread, urging concerned women to 
voice their reactions against misogynist discourses via their bodies. 
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 See http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-women-protest-abortion-ban-with-music-and-
dance-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=22308&NewsCatID=339. 
39
 “Abortion debate sparks online visual protest campaign”, June 1, 2012, Hurriyet Daily News, 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/abortion-debate-sparks-online-visual-protest-campaign-
.aspx?pageID=238&nID=22142&NewsCatID=339. 
40
“Women should not laugh in public, Turkish deputy PM says”, Hürriyet Daily News, 29 July 2014, 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/women-should-not-laugh-in-public-turkish-deputy-pm-says 
.aspx?pageID=238&nID=69732&NewsCatID=338. 
192 
 
As seen in the examples above, misogynist gender dicourses in contemporary 
Turkey that subject women’s bodies to ubiquitous surveillance and control 
mechanisms, are heavily criticized in embodied protests organized by profeminist 
counter publics. Given the discursive utilization of women’s bodies in the 
contemporary political regime, the issue of embodiment and embodied protests come 
to the forefront as the keystone of today’s profeminist struggles. In this frame, the 
use of body in profeminist struggles as the site and medium of resistance leads to the 
question as to how bodily differences would be accomodated in embodied protests 
today.  
One can suggest that in the Turkish context, this challenge crystallizes most 
visibly in different conceptualizations of embodiment by secular and Islamic selves. 
The anti-abortion initiative in 2012 and the profeminist struggles against it have 
disclosed that although secular and Islamic profeminist women collaborate against 
the prohibitionist stance on abortion, their approach to embodied protests in this 
regard differ radically from each other. The majority of recent profeminist protests 
against the anti-abortion political discourses in contemporary Turkey have been 
organized around mottos such as “it is my body, so who are you?”, “my body, my 
decision”. These slogans clearly put the emphasis on women’s bodily autonomy and 
suggest to diccuss the issue of abortion as a fundamental women’s right. While this 
stress on women’s bodily autonomy is crucial to protest against patriarchal 
discourses on a feminist basis, irrrespective of other narrative lines that may tone 
down the feminist cause, such as “abortion as an economic imperative” or as a 
“health issue”, it may also hamper the emergence of a profeminist coalition politics 
at a time when it is needed most.  
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The Islamic profeminist actors agree with secular feminists on the idea that 
the prohibitionist stance on abortion would serve nothing but put women’s lives in 
danger. In this sense, it is important to note that a leading pro-Islamist women’s 
NGO, the Capital Women’s Platform was part of public declarations signed by 
different women’s organizations in order to oppose the AKP’s anti-abortion 
initiative. Commenting on the ongoing public debates, Berrin Sönmez, the head of 
the Capital Women’s Platform, stated the following: 
“To abolish abortion would be wrong in many aspects. A possible prohibition 
would endanger women’s health. Moreover, prohibiting abortion would mean 
that it is not dealt with as a women’s issue, which is a great mistake.”41 
On the other hand, Sönmez underlined the pro-Islamic motives in her critique of the 
prohibitionist stance on abortion by referring to the religious interpretation of 
abortion:   
“Even though it is not born yet, the fetus is a living entity with rights. It is 
necessary to take into account the rights of the fetus but the religious, social 
repercussions of this issue have to be always framed as a woman’s issue. As a 
Muslim, I believe that God entrusts the fetus to the woman. Thus, the woman 
has responsibility here. Responsibility is given because she has a will. Of 
course, abortion should not be encouraged; it can only be the last resort when 
the circumstances render it neccessary. Yet, I find it quite harmful that future 
legal arrangements may deny women this last resort…”42 
Here, it is clear that Sönmez’s approach to the issue of abortion relies on an Islamic 
conception of body that refrains from acknowledging the subject’s bodily autonomy 
and stresses the divine authority upon the body. Although this conception per se does 
not preclude the profeminist opposition against the prohibitionist stance on abortion, 
it clashes with the idea of an embodied protest relying on such a slogan as “my body, 
my decision”. The slogan in question derives its momentum from women’s bodily 
                                                          
41 See http://arsiv.taraf.com.tr/haber-allah-cenini-kadina-emanet-etti-94707/ 
42 See http://arsiv.taraf.com.tr/haber-allah-cenini-kadina-emanet-etti-94707/ 
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autonomy, which makes it difficult at some points to reconcile it with the Islamic 
feminist framework.  
Regarding this point, Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal, columnist and member of the 
Capital Women’s Platform, states that it is not easy for religious circles to accept the 
slogan “my body, my decision” since it connotes an ownership over the body.43 
Tuksal stresses that in Islamist thinking, body is not a property of individuals; only 
bodily capacities belong to them. (Ibid) Therefore, she suggests that in order to 
ensure the broadest feminist coalition against the patriarchal policies utilizing 
women’s bodies for political purposes, profeminist publics should refrain from elitist 
discourses and try to encompass multiplicities in women’s demands and 
positionalities.   
Against this background, one can conclude that the hegemonic codes of the 
gender politics in Turkey attempt to reinforce the patriarchal gender regime through 
pervasive control over women’s bodies, which in return, renders embodied protests 
highly vital for profeminist publics. The pervasive character of the patriarchal 
discourses on women’s bodies also enhances the possibility for feminist coalitional 
politics. Yet, the scope of this coalitional politics depends on the question as to how 
women’s bodies will be incorporated into feminist protests as a site of resistance. As 
seen above, acknowledgement of differences in the conceptualization of embodiment 
could ensure a broader scope for future embodied feminist protests.      
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 See http://www.ucansupurge.org/turkce/index2.php?Hbr=899. 
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5.2.2. Violence Against Women  
Violence against women as a symptom of a society in which women are excluded 
from social, economic and political life, is a pressing issue in contemporary Turkey. 
According to recent nationwide survey studies, thirty five percent of women declare 
that they have been subject to violence by their male partners at least once. (Altınay 
and Arat 2009) Another striking point in recent studies is women’s solititude when 
faced with violence. Survey results suggest that most of the women in Turkey who 
had been subject to violence had never shared this experience with anyone before 
sharing it during interviews. (Ibid) Given women’s solititude when faced with 
violence, it is of great importance that violence against women is vocalized in public 
debates in a gender conscious tone.  
The prevalence of violence against women is the utmost indicator of how 
men exert power over women’s lives, sexism is maintained and women’s subordinate 
position is ensured in contemporary Turkey. It has been reported that the rate of 
violence cases has increased by fourteen-fold in recent years.
44
 Moreover, Altınay 
and Arat’s nationwide survey (2009) drawing on 9000 interviews reveals that 
violence against women in Turkey as everywhere else crosscuts social class, 
geographical region or ethnicity. Accordingly, not only women in the rural East who 
are economically dependent on their families but also women enjoying economic 
independence in the urban West declare that they have been physically abused by 
their male partners.  
The entrenched character of violence against women in Turkey crystallizes in 
the patriarchal codes of women’s sexuality and in the oppression that women 
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 See http://bianet.org/bianet/kadin/132742.  
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experience in the form of legal discrimination or economic/ social inequality. A 
ubiquitous discourse calling for extensive control over women’s sexuality lies at the 
heart of gender relations in Turkey, which in return perpetuates male violence. In this 
frame, it is obvious that the efficacy of counter-hegemonic profeminist discourses in 
public debates needs to be enhanced in order to contest the pervasive character of the 
patriarchal gender regime leading to violence against women.  
Since the 1980s, when it first emerged as an autonomous organization, the 
women’s movement in Turkey has been quite active in struggling against violence 
against women. (Sirman 1989, İlkkaracan and Berktay 2002, Kardam 2005, 
Aldıkaçtı-Marshall 2009, Diner and Toktaş, 2010) Given the increasing rates of male 
violence in contemporary Turkey, women’s organizations that receive their 
momentum from the legacy of decades-long struggle against male violence, attribute 
top priority to profeminist activism against the murdering of women. Utilizing 
pressure politics such as lobbying and advocacy through media and internet, 
organizing demonstrations, protests, meetings and offering services such as 
telephone lines or consciousness raising/ skill training workshops, women’s 
movements engage in disruptive feminist acts that challenge the hegemonic gender 
codes in society and aim to end male violence.  
It would not be far-fetched to suggest that despite the differences in their 
agendas, women’s movements regard violence against women as a unifying theme 
for collaborative profeminist politics. Yet, one should also note that their conception 
of violence against women and its causes may radically differ from each other, 
depending on their political positioning. While some organizations may underline its 
structural repercussions deeply entrenched in the patriarchal social norms and values, 
others may prefer to refer to its ties with the violence culture that crystallizes in the 
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ethnic terror that the Turkish state imposes on Kurds in Turkey. (Diner and Toktaş, 
2010: 53) Moreover, an Islamic standpoint could also be decisive in the 
conceptualization of violence against women as it may tend to refrain from 
acknowledging that “family” as the utmost social institution in the Islamist mindset 
is in fact the main locus of violence.
45
  
Overall, despite the differences in women NGO’s political positionings, 
violence against women as a social endemic in contemporary Turkey has given way 
to collaborative profeminist struggles under various organizational roofs. For 
instance, Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu (The Platform for Stopping 
the Murder of Women) and Şiddete Son Platformu (The Platform for Stopping 
Violence) are collaborative initiatives that bring women from different organizations 
together with the common aim to combat against male violence. These platforms can 
be regarded as dipruptive public acts that organize protests, utilize media for 
publicist purposes and put sustained pressure on government authorities. They were 
quite active in 2012, during the public negotiations of the new legal changes in the 
law no. 4320 regarding the prevention of violence against women. Moreover, they 
closely follow the judicial cases against men who murdered women, intervene in the 
media representations of these cases and inform the public of the trajectory of the 
judicial processes.
46
  
Not only secular feminist organizations but also Islamist profeminist 
women’s NGO’s have engaged in collaborative initiatives to struggle against 
violence against women in contemporary Turkey. For instance, the Capital Women’s 
Platform can be cited here as an active pro-Islamist women’s NGO that has taken 
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 See Sibel Eraslan, 2013, Fatma Şahin BM’de: İstanbul Sözleşmesi”, Star, 6 Mart, 
http://haber.stargazete.com/yazar/fatma-sahin-birlesmis-milletlerde/yazi-733308. 
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 See http://kadincinayetlerinidurduracagiz.net  
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part in various meetings organized to bring women’s NGO’s and the government 
together to take action againt male violence. It has closely monitored the inclusion of 
women’s organizations in the policy making processes regarding the prevention of 
violence against women.
47
 It has also engaged in collaborative acitivities with other 
civil societal organizations to incite change in the patriarchal codes giving way to 
male violence.
48
   
Putting sustained pressure on the government authorities has been one of the 
most effective activist tools that the women’s movement utilized in recent years in its 
struggles against violence against women. In fact, this activist strategy has been 
productively used by women’s NGO’s since the beginning of 2000s to initiate 
positive change in women’s rights and freedoms. Lobbying and advocacy efforts of 
profeminist groups and their intervention into the legal changes in the Civil and 
Penal Codes at the beginning of 2000s have been highly effective in keeping feminist 
demands on the public agenda. When the draft Civil Code came to parliament in 
2001, feminist groups came together to push for the amendment of the Civil Code, 
urging the parliamentarians for the enforcement of the equal division of the property 
obtained during marriage by man and woman after divorce. (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 
2009) In a similar vein, thanks to their sustained efforts in 2004, feminist groups 
have also been quite effective in pushing for the amendment of the Penal Code that 
would ensure that violence against women is treated as a crime against the individual 
rather than society; virginity exams of girls are restricted to court order, the deﬁnition 
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 The Capital Women’s Platform closely followed the inclusion of women’s organizations as 
watchdog in the implemention of the the Istanbul Convention ratified by Turkey in 2011. It has 
swiftly reacted to the recent bureaucratic attempts in December, 2014 to exclude the majority of 
well-established and experienced women’s organizations from the control mechanisms available to 
ensure the proper implemention of the Convention. See 
http://www.baskentkadin.org/tr/?page_id=784.   
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of rape is extended so as to include rape in marriage and the penalty for honor 
killings is increased. Reaching out the supranational bodies such as the European 
Union or the United Nations, meeting the MPs in the parliament, preparing draft 
laws, issuing press statements and organizing street protests to ensure publicity in the 
media, women’s groups have exerted a considerable public force on the government 
authorities, urging them to recognize their demands. Along with Turkey’s drift to 
authoritarianism and its divergence from international human rights regimes in the 
second decade of 2000’s, feminists have also utilized different social media tools 
such as twitter and facebook to appeal to international actors such as the EU, 
mobilize women over contemporary gender issues and reach out broader masses. 
(Eslen-Ziya 2013) New terrains of political struggle generated by social media have 
in return expanded the efficacy of activist tools in women’s movement in 
contemporary Turkey.      
A publicist, highly effective strategy marked by various activist tools has 
been utilized by the women’s movement in its efforts to combat against the 
increasing violence against women in contemporary Turkey. For instance, in 2011 
when the prospect of legal change that would enhance the struggle against male 
violence, appeared on the political agenda, women’s organizations engaged in close 
collaboration with state authorities to articulate their demands regarding the 
prevention of violence against women. The Platform for Stopping Violence prepared 
a draft law that points out the critical importance of framing the law on the basis of 
protecting women, not the family, i.e., the main locus of male violence.
49
 When their 
demands were not met, women’s organizations aimed for media publicity to voice 
their cause. Releasing press statements, addressing profeminist women columnists to 
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get their support and organizing street protests, women’s organizations attempted to 
exert sustained pressure on goverment authorities to ensure that the law be framed on 
the basis of women’s rights and liberties. Eventually, contrary to what feminists 
suggested, the law was passed under the name “Law for the Protection of Family and 
Prevention of Violence Against Women”. Yet, despite this shortcoming, it has 
brought about significant acquisitions such as the extension of the scope of the law 
so as to include all women irrespective of their marrital status.
50
  
In a nutshell, one can suggest that women’s organizations’ sustained efforts to 
exert pressure on the government and their attempts to generate media publicity 
constitute significant axes in contemporary feminist struggles against male violence, 
which greatly enhances the visibility of feminist demands in the public sphere. 
 
5.2.3. Veiling and Prospects for Collaborative Feminist Politics 
As noted above, following its emergence in the 1980s, the autonomous women’s 
movement in Turkey has for a very long time relied on a monolithic conception of 
womanhood, limiting its scope to the concerns and demands of urban, secular, 
middle class women. Yet, this exclusionary stance has turned out to be futile in 
dealing with the rising demands of veiled women in society. As a result, the 
reformist components of the secular women’s movement have gradually adopted an 
intersectionalist approach that is inclusive of religious, ethnic and socio-economic 
differences among women.  
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Having noted that the secular feminist subaltern public’s positioning vis-a-vis 
veiling cannot be subsumed under a unified and monolithic category, one should 
differentiate between reformist and orthodox camps of the secular feminist public to 
unearth its multiplicities. Drawing on in-depth interviews with women activists from 
different women’s NGO’s, Aldıkaçtı-Marshall (2005) notes that orthodox secular 
women activists unanimously reproduce the conception of headscarf as a symbol of 
women’s exploitation, backwardness and threat to gender equality, positioning it in 
binary opposition with feminism. As for reformist secular feminists, Aldıkaçtı-
Marshall (Ibid) indicates that even though they do not approve of veiling per se, they 
acknowledge pious women’s will to veil and oppose the legal and discursive 
marginalization of veiling. This differentiation between orthodox and reformist 
camps also resonates in pious women’s narratives on feminism. Accordingly, while 
women activists with an orthodox Islamist standpoint refrain from utilizing a 
feminist perspective, reformist women are more open to reconcile feminism and 
Islam in that they interpret key gender issues through the dialectical relationship 
between feminism and Islam. (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall 2005, Coşar and Gençoğlu 2008)    
Yet, one should note that the reformist components of women’s groups, 
marked by unstable, shifting characteristics, may not be sufficient for generating an 
alternative feminist politics. At times, these grey areas may shift towards a stable, 
orthodox positioning, toning down the dialectical, reformist elements. Coşar and 
Gençoğlu (2008: 340) argue that the reformist character of women’s groups may 
pave the way to contingent, issue-based coalitions that does not necessarily 
correpond to an all-inclusive, anti-essentialist feminist politics. In this sense, 
strategic, issue-based cooperation that does not evolve into an all-inclusive, anti-
essentialist feminist political disposition may easily become prone to shift towards an 
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orthodox standpoint, precluding dialogue, cooperation and prospects for feminist 
politics. On the other hand, it is this issue-based, contingent cooperation that serves 
as the first step for a feminist platform that bears the possibility of bringing women 
in coalitional feminist politics. 
In short, veiling and the relationship between Islam and feminism as 
significant themes on the feminist politicial agenda in contemporary Turkey serve as 
a litmus test that exposes the multiplicity in women’s organizations and profeminist 
activism. They also point out a promising zone of collaboration that can lead the way 
to coalitional feminist politics on the condition that strategic, issue-based cooperation 
can evolve into a feminist political disposition beyond ideological cleavages.  
 
5.2.4. Profeminist Intervention into Patriarchal Discourses 
The Foucauldian idea of discourse clearly puts forward that the patriarchal gender 
regime is not only secured through misogynist legal arrangements but is further 
reinforced through patriarchal public discourses that achieve widespread efficacy in 
the public sphere. In this sense, the high circulation of patriarchal discourses generate 
“political opportunities” for women’s movements to contest the patriarchal tones in 
public debates. (McAdam et. al, 1996) One can safely argue that the contemporary 
AKP rule marked by increasing circulation of patriarchal gender discourses render 
women’s movements’ activism critical in Turkey. It is possible to suggest that by 
utilizing a diverse repertoire of action, women’s movements today raise their voice to 
keep profeminist ideas in circulation so as to counterweigh the ubiquitous effects of 
patriarchal discourses. Thus, their intervention into patriarchal public discourses 
constitute a critical field of resistance today. Below are some recent examples that 
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clearly identify discourse as a main area of contestation where controversies in the 
gender regime in contemporary Turkey between hegemonic and counter hegemonic 
discourses come to the forefront.  
During a visit to the first baby born in 2015, Health Minister Mehmet 
Müezzinoğlu stated that mothers’ only career should be motherhood: 
“Mothers have the career of motherhood, which cannot be possessed by 
anyone else in the world. Mothers should not put another career other than 
motherhood at the center of their lives. They should put raising good 
generations at the center of their attention…”51 
Upon this remark, women’s organizations have fiercely criticized Müezzinoğlu for 
his openly patriarchal gender discourse. Gönül Karahanoğlu, head of the Association 
of Women Candidates (KADER) underlined that “government cannot assign 
motherhood to women as a directive”, while Gülden Türktan, head of the Women 
Enterpreneurs Association of Turkey (KAGİDER) denoted that intervention into 
women’s choices regarding motherhood is against human rights:    
“Motherhood is a situation. Women and men jointly make a decision on 
women’s motherhood situation and work situation. For a minister to make 
such a decision is against human rights.”52 
 
In a similar vein, Platform for Stopping the Murder of Women declared that 
Müezzinoğlu’s intervention into women’s life choices further perpetuates male 
violence that targets women when they attempt to make free choices as they wish.
53
 
Women’s organizations’ fierce opposition to Müezzinoğlu’s misogynist discourse 
through various press statements and their attempts to make space for profeminist 
ideas in the public deliberation, clearly point out that struggle for enhancing the 
efficacy of feminist ideas is a main area of contestation for feminist activism today.  
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 See http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/mothers-only-career-should-be-motherhood-turkish-
health-minister-says.aspx?PageID=238&NID=76360&NewsCatID=341. 
52
 Ibid. 
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 See http://kadincinayetlerinidurduracagiz.net/haber/1894/kadin-mucadelesine-golge-etmeyin-
baska-ihsan-istemez. 
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A similar case of contestation can be detected in public debates regarding the 
Minister for Family and Social Policies, Ayşenur İslam’s recent statements on 
violence against women. In a public speech, Islam claimed that no women were 
killed under state protection, implying that all necessary precautions have been taken 
by the state to prevent male violence. Upon this statement, the profeminist news 
portal, Bianet refuted İslam’s claim by publishing a list of women who were killed in 
2014 despite the state protection.
54
 Bianet’s opposition to İslam’s statement can be 
seen as a corrective intervention into public debates, opening a space for a 
profeminist perspective. Similarly, the press conference organized in the parliament 
together with profeminist women MPs and women’s organizations including the 
Platform for Stopping the Murder of Women, Flying Broom and KADER, was 
another intervention into İslam’s misleading account of violence againt women. In 
this conference, women’s organizations and women MPs informed the public of the 
recent statistics regarding the murdering of women and heavily criticized the 
Minister İslam’s negligent approach to violence cases.55  
In addition to the examples above, President Erdoğan’s recent statement on 
gender equality can be identified as another case where the contestation between 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses come to the forefront. In a speech at 
an international gathering in November, 2014, on women’s rights and freedoms, 
Erdoğan made the following statement:  
“Sometimes, they say ‘men and women are equal’. But ‘equality among 
women’ and ‘equality among men’ is more correct. However, what is 
particularly essential is women’s equality before justice... Equality is turning 
the victim into an oppressor by force or vice versa. What women need is to be 
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able to be equivalent, rather than equal... You cannot bring women and men 
into equal positions; that is against nature because their nature is different… 
Our religion [Islam] has defined a position for women [in society]: 
Motherhood. Some people can understand this, while others can’t. You 
cannot explain this to feminists because they don’t accept the concept of 
motherhood.”56  
 
The president’s statements underlining the unique character of women’s disposition 
has led to fury among women’s organizations, generating another line of discursive 
struggle. Upon this, Istanbul Feminist Collective made a public statement, declaring 
that they do not consent to traditional gender roles imposed on women.
57
 Another 
public statement was declared by 59 women’s and LGBT organizations, which 
boldly underlines that gender equality is not a matter of bargain, but a universal 
human right: 
 
“President Erdoğan’s remarks are in conflict with the principle of gender 
equality in various international agreements ratified by Turkey… The 10th 
article of the constitution clearly states that men and women have equal 
rights… Thus, Erdoğan’s remarks also violates the Constitution… Erdoğan’s 
remarks aim to annul the achievements of the women’s movement that has 
been struggling for gender equality in Turkey for decades… We declare that 
we will never make a concession at the sacrifice of gender equality and 
remind the public that equality is not a matter of bargain but a universal 
human right…”58 
 
The examples above do not portray the whole terrain of discursivity where 
contestation between hegemonic and counter hegemonic discourses takes place. 
Rather, they provide us a useful glimpse to notice the critical importance of 
discursivity as a main area of struggle for feminist activism today.  
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Having portrayed the main repertoires of action, the areas of struggle, the 
promising aspects as well as the limitations of the profeminist struggle in 
contemporary Turkey, it is possible to reach the following conclusions: First, in an 
age marked by increasing conservatization and high circulation of patriarchal 
discourses, feminist activism needs to ensure the broadest collaboration possible in 
order to contest the hegemonic attempts to stabilize meaning in the field of gender 
relations. When analyzed in detail, one can detect promising components in the 
feminist subaltern public that can give way to an all-inclusive, anti-essentialist 
feminist coalition politics. Despite differences inbetween on issues such as 
embodiment or veiling, some women’s groups and feminist organizations can 
incorporate an intersectionalist approach into their reasoning that makes room for 
extensive collaboration. Furthermore, the political urgency of certain issues such as 
violence against women further facilitates the emergence of collaborative initiatives.  
However, one should not ignore that this promising potential for 
collaboration has serious limitations with respect to ensuring a sustained feminist 
coalition politics. The fixation of others’ identity positions through essentialist 
conceptualizations hinders transformative qualities of feminist coalitional politics. As 
seen above, at some points secular feminist activism may speak from a point where 
differences between women are regarded as fixed identity positions precluding 
collaborative action or they are simply not taken into account while forming activist 
strategies. In a similar vein, Islamist women’s approach to secular feminist activism 
may sometimes be prone to stress the irreconcilable character of differences 
inbetween, rather than opting for a dialogic reconciliation of differences to enhance 
feminist activism.  
207 
 
According to theorists like Anzaldua (2002) and Weir (2008), the idea of 
coalition politics derives its momentum from the transformative, relational character 
of coalitions. In this perspective, coalitions bridge differences without detaching 
subjects from their individuality; they transform the self through the encounter with 
others. (Anzaldua, 2002: 3) In this sense, adopting a truly relational, transformative 
conception of coalitional feminist politics makes it possible for profeminist subjects 
to move to a new territory where they can always revise their standpoint as they see 
themselves through the perspective of others. This relational form of coalitional 
feminist politics goes far beyond the strategic, issue-based cooperation and has the 
potential to evolve into sustained feminist activism. Having said this, one can argue 
that although feminist activism in contemporary Turkey displays a striking potential 
for collaborative action, it needs to develop a relational, transfomative conception of 
coalition that will ensure a broader alliance between different voices of the 
profeminist counter public.  
Second, the need for collaboration in profeminist activism today does not 
only connote collaborative initiatives in the profeminist counter public, but reaches 
far beyond it, requiring extensive publicity to keep feminist ideas on the agenda. In 
this sense, it is necessary to investigate how publicist aims of the profeminist counter 
public can be best realized and the efficacy of feminist ideas in public deliberation 
can be enhanced. As seen above, in its struggle against patriarchal discourses, the 
profeminist counter public frequently addresses the media through press statements. 
In this sense, one can suggest that unearthing the potential in the media for enhancing 
the publicist goals of collaborative feminist politics is key for women’s and feminist 
organizations’ activism today. It is obvious that profeminist women columnists’ 
newspaper articles, which I am going to analyze in detail in the next chapter, 
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constitute a unique domain in the media that can substantially contribute to publicist 
aims of the profeminist counter public in contemporary Turkey.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
WOMEN COLUMNISTS’ WRITINGS ABOUT GENDER ISSUES: PUBLIC 
SPHERE AND THE LIMITS OF DISCOURSE 
 
 
The Habermasian idea that the public sphere is an arena where everybody can enter 
into debate without any limitation has already become outdated thanks to the recent 
feminist, postcolonial and postmodern readings. Power differentials position subjects 
in the public sphere in such a way that the limits of what they can say heavily depend 
on this positioning. Since this study investigates the position of women columnists in 
the public sphere in contemporary Turkey, not only the interviews conducted with 
them but also their writings in newspapers could give us useful clues about the limits 
of what they can say about prominent gender issues. Their columns can be thought of 
as a stage from which they address the general public and share their standpoint on a 
particular subject which they regard as relevant to contemporary public debates in 
Turkey. It is not difficult to guess that women columnists are not the most powerful 
figures in the media sector. Media, as in many other places all around the world, is a 
sphere that is highly dominated by patriarchal values in Turkey. Therefore, to 
analyze women columnists’ writings, one has to ask the following questions: What 
kind of consequences does the power configuration in the media generate in terms of 
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the discursive limits of women columnists’s writings? How do women columnists 
prefer to challenge the patriarchal discourses when they themselves are in a 
vulnerable position? What are the main aims, motives and the limits of their critique? 
Since the place of a woman writer has always been a marginal place in the 
intellectual history, women writers generally tend to refrain from underlining their 
authentic voice as a woman. One of the most well-known examples in this regard is 
Simone de Beauvoir, who presented her work in an ungendered form and claimed 
that she wrote only as a human being. (Moi 1994) To display an overt consciousness 
about gender identity renders the persona of the woman intellectual even more 
vulnerable. It is obvious that feminist position has been usually loaded with negative 
connotations in public debates. (Schaffer 1998, Sheridan et al, 2006) Thus, the 
vulnerability of the feminist position inevitably makes it difficult for some women to 
talk about gender issues in a feminist tone. In this frame, it is important to observe at 
what juncture in public debates women columnists raise their voice in their columns 
to oppose the patriarchal discourses in Turkey. Below are some observations on 
women columnists’ articles about recent gender debates in Turkey. 
 
6.1. Some Critical Points and Prominent Themes in Women Columnists’ 
Writings 
6.1.1. Violence against women 
From the late 1980s until today, feminists have relentlessly struggled to end violence 
against women in Turkey. Recently positive legal steps have been taken to prevent 
male violence yet still this is one of the most acute problems in contemporary Turkey 
with respect to gender relations. It has been reported that the rate of violence cases 
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has increased by fourteen-fold in recent years.
59
 Altınay and Arat’s study (2009) 
drawing on 9000 interviews revealed that one out of every three women in Turkey is 
subject to physical violence and violence against women crosscuts across different 
classes. As the rate of violence against women has reached such extreme levels, the 
media coverage of this violence has also increased. However, this does not mean that 
the representation of cases of violence against women in the media always involve a 
feminist tone that clearly condemns male violence. Rather, a great proportion of the 
news coverage in this regard may in fact legitimize violence against women, 
suggesting that by violating social norms, women may have triggered male anger. 
(Alat 2006) Keeping this in mind, one can note that the feminist tones in women 
columnists’ critique of violence against women constitute an alternative domain in 
the patriarchal media context. This indicates that women columnists can collaborate 
with feminists as potential allies to combat against violence against women in 
contemporary Turkey. 
Women columnists frequently write about women who have been exposed to 
physical violence, closely follow the judicial processes in this regard and urge the 
judicial authorities not to give the perpetrators reduced sentences. There have been 
some rape cases recently that have turned out to be quite emblematic of the 
patriarchal mindset of judges and have caused fury and despair among feminists. For 
example, in the recent rape case in Mardin, 26 men including government officials 
raped a 13-year-old girl but the court reduced the sentences of the perpetrators, 
concluding that the child victim was willing.
60
 In the Sakarya case, 34 men raped a 
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 “N.Ç. Davası Utançla Bitti” [The N.Ç. Case Ended With Shame],  
http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25300196/, 25 October 2011.  
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14-year old girl but were released immediately after being taken into custody.
61
 
Women columnists’ articles about these cases and many others clearly condemn the 
male violence and the misogynist court decisions. They explicity target at the 
patriarchal norms and values underlying the judicial system and problematize the 
tendency to reduce the perpetrators’ sentece based on the idea of the “will” of the 
victim.
62
 In this sense, it would not be far-fetched to say that women columnists have 
played a key role in generating public awareness about violence against women in 
recent years.  
Apart from this, women columnists have also urged the government 
authorities by directly addressing them to take immediate action to end violence 
against women. For example, Mengü titled one of her columns as “the Minister for 
Women’s Affairs Should Report This Prosecutor”63, while Mehveş Evin has written 
an article titled “Ms. Minister, Keep Your Word”64 in order to make Fatma Şahin, 
i.e., the minister for family and social policies, hear her ciriticism of the new law on 
violence against women in 2012, which puts the emphasis on family, rather than on 
women as individuals. On the other hand, İplikçi urged Fatma Şahin to call the 
parliament to convene exceptionally in order to pass the necessary laws to protect 
women from male violence.
65
 In a similar vein, Tuksal called the officials of the 
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Ministry of National Education to investigate a case of sexual abuse in one of the 
primary schols, about which she has been informed by one of her readers.
66
 From 
here, one can suggest that women columnists utilize their columns to convince 
government authorities to attribute top priority to violence against women and take 
action in this regard.    
Moreover, women columnists frequently refer to the declarations of feminist 
groups and women’s organizations both with regard to violence against women and 
other gender debates. It is possible to say that by introducing the ideas and criticisms 
of the “feminist subaltern public” into the public debates, they act as mediators 
between the hegemonic public and feminists. The feminist groups that can be 
identified in women columnists’ articles are as follows: Kadın Cinayetlerini 
Durduracağız Platformu (The Platform for Stopping the Murder of Women), Haklı 
Kadın Platformu (Right Women’s Platform), Istanbul Feminist Kolektifi (Istanbul 
Feminist Collective), KA-DER (The Association for the Support and Training of 
Women Candidates), KAGİDER (The Association of Women Enterpreneurs), 
Şiddete Son Platformu (The Platform for Stopping Violence). Concerning violence 
against women, they announce the protests organized by these groups.
67
 They also 
announce their declarations both by quoting them or by interviewing the members of 
these organizations.
68
 Besides this, they refer to the declarations of the feminist 
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groups as a reliable source and reference point to form their arguments on gender 
debates.
69
     
Another critical point to note here is women columnists’ awareness about the 
use of language. While talking about violence against women, they choose a 
terminology that refrains from victimizing women and shifts the focus to the 
perpetrator’s culpability.70 In addition to this, they are highly concerned about the 
patriarchal language used in the media and see the deconstruction of this language as 
complementary to the struggle against violence against women.
71
  
Finally, women columnists also try to explain in their columns why male 
violence has increased in recent years in such extreme proportions. This attempt to 
account for the underlying causes of male violence in fact reveals the entrenched 
bifurcations in their approach to gender debates. Secular writers who represent a 
Kemalist standpoint relate violence against women to the increasing conservatization 
in society. For example, Kırıkkanat argues that male violence is intrinsic to Islam and 
violence against women is going to increase in near future because of the ongoing 
conservatization in contemporary Turkey.
72
 As for the pious writers, one can note 
that there are different shades of emphasis in their writings with respect to violence 
against women. One the one hand, they struggle against the patriarchal male figures 
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in the Islamist community, who associate male violence with women’s excessive 
empowerment and regard women’s economic freedom as a threat to family unity. For 
example, Karaca argues that it is not women’s employment but the male violence 
that constitutes the utmost threat to the unity of the family.
73
 In this sense, she 
reverses the patriarchal logic by clearly stressing the perpetrator’s culpability. Yet, 
on the other hand, since the idea of family is quite crucial for pious women writers, 
they are also concerned about the attempts to question the family itself on accounts 
of domestice violence. Regarding this point, Eraslan writes the following: “Of course 
we are fiercely opposing violence yet family cannot be held accountable for this 
violence.”74  
To conclude, drawing on the analysis provided above, one can allege that 
women writers unanimously condemn violence against women, try to generate public 
support to put pressure on government officials and end male violence and also 
collaborate with feminist groups in this regard. They constitute an “advocacy 
domain” in the media sphere, where the standing and efficacy of the feminist 
struggle against male violence in public debates can be enhanced. In this sense, 
violence against women appears as a unifying theme in secular and pious women 
columnists’ narratives and constitutes a useful ground for cultivating feminist 
coalitional politics.    
Coalition politics is a way of forming political alliances among different 
groups of individuals with different political demands. It allows individuals to use 
the ﬁrst-person plural pronoun without defining strict boundaries designating who 
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and what kind of experiences exactly constitutes this “we”. (Ferguson 1993: 186, 
Hekman 2004: 144) Considering this anti-essentialist, dynamic character of coalition 
politics, one can suggest that the issue of violence against women as one of the most 
pressing gender problems in contemporary Turkey has the potential of reconciling 
different viewpoints in order to generate an effective, broad-scale struggle against 
male violence. As seen above, women columnists’ writings are a testament to this 
potential.  
Yet, despite the priority that women columnists unanimously attribute to the 
struggle against male violence, it is not possible to treat them all under the unified 
category of “women columnists who oppose male violence”. The positioning vis-a-
vis Islam appears to be the main factor that diffentiates their approach to violence 
against women. While some secular-Kemalist writers identify religion as the main 
cause of male violence, Islamist writers adopt a cautious stance in order not to 
depreciate the idea of family in their critique of male violence. In this sense, 
essentialist tendencies and discursive limits in women columnists’ profeminist 
alliance with the feminist subaltern public constitute a major obstacle to the 
prospects for forming an all inclusive coalition with regard to the combat against 
male violence. 
  
6.1.2. Women in Politics 
The political realm in Turkey, which is mainly reserved for men, is dominated by 
patriarchal norms and values. Since the enfranchisement of women in 1934, 
women’s presence in politics has always been marginal and quite symbolic so much 
so that the highest rate of women MPs in the parliament so far (based on the election 
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results in 2011) was fourteen percent. Women columnists unanimously challenge this 
marginal position of women parliamentarians in Turkey by introducing them to the 
public, stressing their presence in politics, criticizing the patriarchal norms and 
regulations in party politics and announcing women’s organizations’ attempts to 
increase the number of women in politics.  
For example, in her article written on the eve of 2007 elections, Göğüş quotes 
the spokeswoman of Uçan Süpürge (Flying Broom), one of the main women’s 
organization in Turkey, and argues that the party administrations only let women 
participate in politics when they do not attempt to bring about their own agenda and 
are highly submissive to the party and the party leader.
75
 She identifies this 
patriarchal tendency in party politics as a major obstacle, which hampers the election 
of women who could challenge patriarchal politics by introducing a gender conscious 
way of doing politics. A similar emphasis on the difference that women could 
generate in politics is stressed by Karaca in an article where she suggests that women 
are capable of changing the way that politics is done. She formulates her argument 
not on an essentialist basis but on women’s peculiar experiences as mothers and their 
accumulations about such values as empathy and conscience.
76
 Another similar 
account could be detected in İplikçi’s articles where she addresses women 
parliamentarians, reminding them that they are capable of changing the way that 
politics is done in the male-dominated parliament.
77
 This stress on women’s presence 
in politics is combined with a particular attention paid to the activities, projects and 
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plans of women politicians.
78
 Women columnists interview women MPs or inform 
the public about their accomplishments. In addition to the articles written before 
elections, women columnists have also written about the election results and made 
evaluations through gendered lenses. Usually this cohort of articles points out the 
missed opportunity with regard to increasing the number of women MPs in the 
parliament.
79
   
Yet, despite this unanimous emphasis on women’s presence in politics, 
women columnists differ from each other when it comes to the question of “which 
women” they would like to see in the parliament. Most of the secular writers 
formulate their arguments in quite broad terms without referring to the differences 
among women. In this regard, the violation of veiled women’s rights to be elected to 
the parliament remains as a debate restricted to the columns of pious women writers.  
The recent decision of four women parliamentarians from the AKP to start 
veiling in the parliament
80
 has been met with great optimism by veiled women 
columnists, while some Kemalist secular women writers have harshly criticized it. 
For example, Eraslan and Karaca celebrated this step as a turning point with respect 
to veiled women’s rights and the democratic regime in the country, while Kemalist 
secular women writers such as Mengi argued that veiling in the parliament has 
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nothing to do with rights and liberties because it signifies the project of Islamization 
and thus may be accompanied by further attempts to eradicate the secular regime. On 
the other hand, some other writers in the secular camp such as Evin evaluated the 
veil in the parliament as a positive step towards enhancing religious freedoms in 
Turkey. According to her, the fact that veiled women MP’s entry into the parliament 
has not led to turmoil among opposition parties is a sign of the maturation of 
democratic perspectives in the country. Yet, she is also concerned that the presence 
of veiled MPs in the parliament may be utilized by their parties for political 
purposes. Thus, she declares that she expects the veiled MPs, who have not been 
active in the public debates until then, to be more concerned about the rights and 
liberties of those groups other than their own and show that they are not just 
symbolic pawns of Islamist politics but influential actors promoting a wide array of 
rights and liberties for all groups.  
In sum, even though the secular-Islamist divide seems to be as the main 
bifurcation line among women columnists with respect to their attitude towards 
women in politics, these two groups are not monolithic and unified but rather display 
a wide array of different standpoints on the subject matter. 
 
6.1.3. Abortion Debates 
Another prominent theme in women columnists’ writings is the abortion debate that 
has emerged on the political agenda in 2012 as a result of PM Erdoğan’s remarks on 
women’s reproductive rights, abortion and c-section. On May 25, 2012, in his speech 
at the Fifth International Parliamentarians’ Conference on the Implementation of the 
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ICPD (International Conference on Population and Development) Programme of 
Action organized in Istanbul, Erdoğan stated the following:  
“I see abortion as murder… There is no difference between killing the child 
in mother’s womb and killing her after the birth.”81 
 
This statement has been followed by a pronatalist policy initiative that put on the 
agenda the possibility of limiting the terms of abortion. This initiative has triggered 
severe criticisms from different segments of society and in the end the terms of 
abortion has not been restricted yet another law has been codified recently, 
stipulating that c-sections would only be possible if there is a serious medical 
obstacle for vaginal birth. Against this background, an intense public debate has 
emerged in the country between the “anti-abortion” camp represented by the 
patriarchal political cadres and the feminist pro-abortion camps. Women columnists 
have taken part in these discussions quite actively. All of them opposed the 
restrictions that the government planned to impose on the terms of abortion and 
women’s reproductive capacities, even though they had different reasons for this 
critique.  
First of all, some of the women columnists strongly stressed women’s 
autonomy on their bodies and clearly stated that the ultimate authority as to whether 
maintain the pregnancy is the woman herself, not the state. They also underlined that 
the authority to decide about the birth method should be vested in medical experts 
and women themselves and that state regulation would only endanger women’s lives 
and annul their authority in this respect. In this regard, for example Mengi strongly 
argued for women’s autonomy and deemed the current attempts to control women’s 
reproductive capacities as unacceptable:  
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“If a woman thinks that she cannot endure the vaginal birth and it would be 
easier for her to have a c-section, this decision is ultimately to be made by the 
woman herself and nobody else has the right to intervene into this.”82  
In a similar vein, Evin regarded abortion as a topic to be prevented from any kind of 
male intervention and evaluated the recent public debate on abortion as another 
direct form of male domination to control women’s bodies.83 On the other hand, 
İplikçi articulated the very same idea by quoting at length the critique of feminist 
groups in her column.
84
 In another article, she clearly articulated the feminist slogans 
used in feminist circles to oppose this recent anti-abortion initiative: “Our body 
belongs to us, not to the state.”85  
This emphasis on women’s bodily autonomy was peculiar to secular writers 
and did not emerge as a main argumentation line in pious women writers’ articles. 
One can suggest that the recent abortion debate has clearly pointed out the 
peculiarities of dealing with gender issues through an Islamic feminist framework. 
Pious women writers’ views on abortion have turned out to be very emblematic of 
their understanding of Islamic feminism. Since the body in the Islamic thought is just 
a transitory reflection in this worldly life that will eventually evade, the Islamic 
belief does not easily endorse the liberal view of the bodily autonomy. Moreover, in 
the Islamic belief system, the right of the fetus to live begins at the moment of 
conception for it is granted by God. Committed to these precepts, pious women 
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writers explicitly stated that in principle they are against abortion. However, they 
also stressed that the government’s recent policy initiative to restrict the terms of 
abortion and c-sections is unacceptable. Their critique is not based on the idea of 
women’s bodily autonomy. Rather, they oppose the restriction of abortion by 
referring to factors that would jeopardize women’s lives such as sexual violence. In 
this sense, for them, women’s bodily autonomy enters into the picture only when 
women’s lives are under serious threat. Their stance in this regard has been quite 
different from that of the feminist groups that protested against anti-abortion 
initiative by shouting slogans such as “it’s my body, it’s my decision”. They 
themselves touch upon this difference and differentiate their critique from feminist 
pro-abortion protests. For example, Tuksal wrote the following:  
“Unfortunately, I did not approve of the cliche slogans that feminist friends 
used in their protests. They would like to engage in feminist politics and 
challenge the government. Okey, but they use such a discourse which makes 
it impossible in Turkey to move forward. Conservative women in Turkey also 
have concerns about abortion and birth control.”86  
 
In short, although women columnists could agree on the critique of the anti-abortion 
initiative that the government put on the agenda, their argumenttion lines and 
motivation for this critique have been quite different from each other. Secular writers 
exclusively formulated their arguments on the basis of women’s autonomy. Since the 
Islamic feminist framework is not in line with the idea of prioritizing women’s 
bodily autonomy vis a vis the fetus, pious women writers opposed the possible 
abortion restrictions by limiting the right to abortion mainly to the case of sexual 
violence. 
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6.1.4. The Issue of Headscarf  
All women writers underline that rather than being a subject matter in the 
“secularism versus Islam” debate, the headscarf issue is first and foremost a matter of 
women’s liberation. Yet, the terms of women’s liberation in their imagination differ 
greatly, depending on their position vis-a-vis the Republican understanding of 
women’s rights and liberties. In this sense, writers with the Republican conviction 
that veiling is nothing but submission to Islamic patriarchy, formulate headscarf as 
the most overt form of patriarchal imposition and as totally antithetical to women’s 
liberation. In other words, they do not acknowledge the free will involved in the 
decision to veil. For instance, Göğüş argues that veiling is not a matter of choice, but 
a patriarchal imperative for women that they have to submit to in order to be able to 
go out of the confines of the private sphere.
87
 In a similar vein, Kırıkkanat writes the 
following: 
“I would like my veiled readers to think for a moment why Islam requires 
veiling not for men but only for women. The answer to this is the supremacy 
of men and the humiliation of women. Veiling in fact is not about to veil but 
it means “being veiled”. Once the mechanism starts to function, the woman 
becomes someone who endorses inequality and even humiliation, i.e, a victim 
who feels attachment to the torturer. This is no different from the Stockholm 
Syndrome. This is how young girls veil ‘on their own will’. What is beneath 
the veil is not only the body but also the mind.”88 
 
Aldoğan’s views on veiling is not different from the position above. She maintains 
that veiling is the most obvious embodiment of gender inequality in Islam.
89
 Taking 
this argumentation line into account, one could allege that the Kemalist-secular 
women columnists oppose veiling in the name of gender equality. They themselves 
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explicitly express this: “At the last instance, what I am opposing is not the veiled 
women themselves, but the men who use every means to make those women veil.”90 
Here, the opposition against veiling is justified through a discourse that defines a 
universal model for women’s liberation and ignores all other possibilities for 
becoming a “liberated” woman. The emancipatory rhetoric, which has been 
emblematic of the Republican project, functions here as a mechanism that attempts to 
incorporate different needs, demands and desires of different women into a 
monolithic whole.    
The other interesting point is that the explanatory categories that women 
columnists use to reflect on the headscarf debate have changed as the AKP rule has 
become more and more entrenched in Turkish politics. For example, in the first 
period of the AKP rule, some of the writers perceived headscarf as a problem of 
economic and cultural underdevelopment and maintained that as soon as the per 
capita income reaches a certain level, gender relations in Turkey would undergo a 
huge transformation and women will not need to veil any more. The 
conceptualization of headscarf as imposition and imperative, rather than as a matter 
of choice and free will, is also the underlying idea here. Moreover, headscarf in this 
account is regarded as a practice that is peculiar to rural, uneducated and traditional 
masses. This kind of an analysis obviously fails to grasp the complexity of the 
headscarf issue as an urban phenomenon and ignores the existence of urban, 
educated and veiled women. Yet, in the second term of the AKP rule (2007-2011), 
we can see the acknowledgement of the urban character of the headscarf 
phenomenon. In some of her articles written in this period, Göğüş touches upon the 
fashion styles adopted by urban veiled women and how their fashion choices reflect 
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their will to appear as modern. However, Göğüş’s analysis is not accompanied by a 
change in her conception of headscarf as submission to Islamic patriarchy. 
The proliferation of discourse on headscarf in the second period of the AKP 
rule, especially the debates on the freedom to wear headscarf at universities and 
AKP’s first failed attempt to change the constitution to guarantee veiled women’s 
right to university education in 2008 and then the abolishment of the ban in practice 
in 2010, has caused a further resistance among Kemalist women columnists towards 
the expansion of veiled women’s rights and triggered concerns about the freedoms of 
secular, uncovered women. During the hot public debates on headscarf in 2008, 
which were initiated by AKP’s attempts to let the headscarf into universities, Göğüş 
defined the ongoing discussion on headscarf as quite discomforting in that it leads to 
deep controversies in the country and causes disorder and chaos.
91
 Around the same 
time when the debate was going on, Mengi expessed her concerns about the 
freedoms of unveiled women in the country and wrote that the secular regime is the 
only guarantee that one can hold on to in order to ensure that unveiled women will 
not be forced to veil.
92
 In a similar vein, after the new legal changes in 2013 that 
legalized headscarf for public officials, Aldoğan remarked that the expansion of 
headscarf in public life makes her worry about the oppression that unveiled women 
may be subject to.
93
 Apart from this, in an earlier debate in 2010, she had stated that 
veiled women protest and complain without grounds because they are the powerful 
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now and unveiled women represent a vulnerable position.
94
 In short, one can say that 
Kemalist women columnists have approached to the public debates on the expansion 
of veiled women’s rights and liberties with deep concerns about the secular regime 
and ignored or underestimated the violations regarding the right to veil.  
A second group of secular writers have refrained from framing the issue of 
headscarf exclusively in terms of submission to patriarchy but rather tried to deal 
with it by problematizing male politicians’ approach towards it. For instance, Tınç 
questions the instrumentalization of headscarf by the male political elite for further 
goals. In this sense, she criticizes the AKP for not being sincere about its political 
moves with regard to headscarf.
95
 Yet, one can say that even though Tınç does not 
associate veiling diretly with submission and humiliation, her framing of veiling 
solely as an instrument utilized by the male elite reminds one of the approach that 
discards women’s will to veil.  
On the other hand, her remarks about encouraging dialogue and cooperation 
between veiled and unveiled women are quite promising: 
“In the past, we used to talk more about rights and equality with veiled women... In 
the aftermath of the AKP rule, they (Islamist women) have become silent. In our 
talks, we realized that women have experienced similar treatment both in the Islamist 
and leftist movements. As it is the case everywhere else, women were assigned 
secondary roles in these movements. At the time when we were about to develop our 
dialogue by focusing on women’s condition, the AKP rule and the political 
calculations ruined our sincerity.”96   
 
Tınç’s narrative is quite ambivalent; she herself puts this ambivalent position into 
words as follows: “On the one hand, I am quite concerned about the discrimination 
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against veiled women but on the other hand, I am also very much alert about the 
rising conservatization.” 97  Her position resonates between an ardent support for 
establishing dialogue with veiled women and suspicions about women’s veiling and 
conservatization of society. Her critique of the instrumentalization of the headscarf 
by the male political elite serves as a useful ground to challenge the patriarchal 
character of Islamist politics but it may also mask her reluctance to regard veiling as 
women’s personal choice.  
There are also other secular writers such as İplikçi, who put the emphasis on 
the discrimination against veiled women in society and refrain from engaging in the 
controversial debate on whether veiling is submission to patriarchy. In this sense, 
İplikçi clearly states that veiled women in Turkey have never been able to enjoy the 
same opportunities that unveiled women had.
98
 She also points out the limitations of 
the categorization of women as “veiled” and “unveiled”. Instead of this fixed coding, 
she proposes dialogue among women and underlines that patriarchal politics should 
never attempt to unveil women or veil them.  
The recent patriarchal discourses of some conservative politicians who 
attempted to interfere in non-conservative clothing styles of secular women, has 
further cyristalized these writers’ approach in this regard.99 For example, in response 
to the recent patriarchal discourses, İplikçi interpreted the right to veil and the right 
to wear decolté dresses as two sides of a whole in which one cannot be realized 
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without the other.
100
 Drawing on the idea of women’s autonomy, she opposes against 
all patriarchal interventions into women’s bodies by stating that “women are not 
beings who can be veiled or unveiled by those in power.” Similarly, Evin warned 
against the limits of the freedom of clothing in the mindsets of Islamist politicians in 
Turkey who limit this freedom to the freedom to veil.
101
 From here, it is clear that 
while talking about the positioning of veiled and unveiled women vis-a-vis each 
other, these writers, in one way or another, try to underscore the complementarity of 
rights and liberties of each group, rather than presenting the relation inbetween as 
opposition.  
On the other hand, pious women writers’ articles on headscarf are mainly 
shaped by feelings of resentment, stories of victimhood, discrimination, critique of 
Islamist politicians’ inertia with regard to the bans on the right to veil and celebration 
of recent reforms concerning the right to veil. For instance, Eraslan frequently writes 
about the individual stories of veiled lawyers who could not perform their profession 
due to the bans and the discrimination they faced in their profession. As a law faculty 
graduate, she also talks about her own experiences and blames the undemocratic 
regime for violating her basic rights and liberties. When the right to veil in public 
service was guaranteed in laws through a democratization package announced on 30 
September 2013, Eraslan wrote about her deep resentment for her wasted 25 years 
that she lived after she decided to veil as a senior law faculty student and expressed 
her deep gratitude for the PM and the government for abolishing the bans. She 
interpreted this recent legal arrangement not only as restoration of basic rights but 
also as a turning point in the democratization process in the country. In this sense, 
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she touched upon the complementarity between the rights of veiled and unveiled 
women: 
“I do not think that this issue only concerns veiled women… Because the 
society lives this punishment, alienation and distancing all together over the 
mothers and daughters...”102  
 
In response to the criticisms that the AKP allowed this move to be made with the 
expectation to achieve electoral gains, Eraslan stressed that this is not a strategic, 
utilitarian move but a sincere step that originates from a long history of right 
violations. 
In a similar vein, Karaca regards the recent developments about the right to 
veil as the beginning of a new period. Like Eraslan, she puts great emphasis on the 
idea of complementarity. In this regard, she writes the following: 
“From now on there will be a better future not only for veiled women but also 
unveiled women… In a country where a certain group is subject to such an 
evident form of discrimination, how can the other group be equal… The idea 
of women’s rights has become a common value, as the gap between the rights 
of veiled and unveiled women has narrowed.”103 
Karaca is quite critical of the claims that women MPs in the AKP are symbolic 
pawns utilized for the party for political goals. On the other hand, Tuksal also 
articulates the same critique by stating that you cannot question somebody’s decision 
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to veil and accuse her of being a pawn in politics.
104
 However, Tuksal’s stance on the 
recent developments regarding the right to veil is a bit different from the optimism 
portrayed above. She reminds that veiled women have been asking for the right to be 
elected for so long. For her, the fact that the government party has ignored all these 
public demands so far is also quite reflective of its desire to control the timing of the 
change process and turn it into electoral gains.
105
 Moreover, she is also critical of the 
recent enhancement of veiled women’s rights in public service. She criticizes the 
prohibition of the right to veil from certain professions such as military, police and 
judicial professions because, for her, this logic still regards headscarf as a political 
symbol, rather than a freely chosen religious attire and imperils the normalization 
process it can undergo.
106
  
 
6.1.5. Critique of Patriarchal Statements of Male Elite  
As stated earlier, women columnists have written many articles criticizing patriarchal 
norms, values, practices and legal arrangements. It is quite interesting that they 
usually engage in these gender debates as a response to the rise of patriarchal 
discourses in the public sphere. This means that their “pro-feminist” position in the 
media becomes evident when they sense a threat perception. Before, we have 
mentioned that the position of women columnists in the public sphere is quite 
peculiar in the sense that they take a position inbetween the hegemonic patriarchal 
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public sphere and the subaltern feminist public like mediatory figures informing the 
public of the arguments of the feminist public. At certain junctures in public debates, 
they feel the need to stress their alliance with the feminist subaltern public. In this 
sense, the formation of this alliance is quite contextual; it comes into being as a 
response to the rising sexist discourses. Below are some examples of the patriarchal 
discourses that women columnists challenged in their columns. 
 
6.1.6. Critique of Sexist Discourses Targeting at Female Public Figures such as 
Aylin Nazlıaka, Güldal Mumcu and Nuray Mert 
In recent years, some male politicians have reproduced the misogynist thinking in 
their personal statements by openly attacking well-known female public figures on 
accounts of their moral values. For example, targeting MP Aylin Nazlıaka, who 
harshly criticized the recent anti-abortion initiative by stating that “PM ought to stop 
standing guard over women’s vaginas”, Bülent Arınç, the spokesperson for the 
government, made the following statement: “How can a married lady with a child 
can talk about her sexual organ so comfortably?” He also accused Nazlıaka of being 
flirtatious in the parliament: “I am a shy person. I may feel embarrassed if a nice lady 
constantly looks at me.” Upon this, Karaca wrote an article titled “The Lost Honor of 
Aylin Nazlıaka”, where she states that she does not agree with Nazlıaka’s critique of 
the anti-abortion initiative yet she finds Arınç’s sexist statement as unacceptable: 
“It is not possible to accept this kind of political stance which utilizes 
woman’s marriage, motherhood and honor for political purposes.”     
 
In a similar vein, Evin criticizes another patriarchal statement of Arınç, where he 
tries to solve a debate that he had with Güldal Mumcu, MP from the CHP, by 
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uttering that “she is a nice lady… she is entrusted us”107. As a reponse to this, Evin 
stated that this protective patriarchal attitude annuls a woman MP’s free agency.108   
Another criticism comes from İplikçi in an article titled “Hussy”, where she 
deeply criticizes the general manager of the state television TRT who labeled a well-
known Kurkish singer, as “aşüfte” [hussy] in a meeting.109 Upon this, in her article, 
İplikçi questions how sexist discourses can become so entrenched in the top 
bureaucratic positions in state.   
Ferai Tınç wrote an article titled “You Are Supposed to be a Lady…”, where 
she criticizes PM Erdoğan for his remarks about Nuray Mert, a well-known 
columnist and academician.
110
 In a speech, implying Nuray Mert, Erdoğan stated the 
following: “You are supposed to be a lady… Why do you give such an ardent 
support to the BDP and the PKK?” In her article, Tınç points out the problematic 
character of Erdoğan’s addressing to Mert as a “lady”. She argues that without 
acknowledging the problems underlying such political moves that strategically utilize 
women’s gender identities, other problems concerning the democratic regime in 
Turkey cannot be solved.       
6.1.7. Other Patriarchal Public Declarations and Women Columnists’ 
Criticisms  
So far, with respect to the debates about women’s reproductive capacities or the right 
to abortion, we have seen that some articles of women columnists echoe the ideas of 
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the feminist subaltern public. In fact, there are many other debates generated by 
patriarchal discourses to which women columnists reacted by affirming their alliance 
with the feminist subaltern public. Below is a brief summary of these examples in 
chronological order. 
PM Erdoğan’s remarks about a feminist protest organized in 2004 as a 
reaction to the draft bill criminalizing adultery has been severely criticized in the 
columns of some women columnists. To protest this bill, feminist women marched to 
the Grand Assembly with the slogan, “our body and our sexuality is ours”. Erdoğan 
denounced the slogans and the protest by stating that these “marginal” women, who 
do not comply with the traditional values of society, cannot represent the ideal 
Turkish woman.
111
 Upon these statements, Tınç wrote that it is not possible to label 
these feminist women as “marginal” because women from all over the country and 
from 80 women’s organiztion participated in this protest, which points out the 
representative character of the protest.
112
 Moreover, she also reminded that it is 
thanks to the feminist movement in Turkey that many promising developments have 
been achieved in terms of women’s rights.  
PM Erdoğan’s highly provocative statement that “men and women are not 
equal” 113  has also caused fury among women columnists. In response to this 
statement, Tuksal openly wrote that it is a political contradiction to struggle for 
Turkey’s EU accession and declare support for human rights on the one hand and 
dispute with feminist activists on gender equality on the other.
114
 For her, PM’s 
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remarks in question are an attempt to restrain women and bring them into line, which 
is in fact deeply embedded in the patriarcal codes of manhood in Turkey.  
The recent remark of a well-known religious intellectual criticizing the public 
presence of pregnant women and implying segregation for them
115
, has come to the 
forefront as another salient example that made explicit the profeminist tones in 
women columnists’ line of thinking. Opposing this misogynist statement in a 
sarcastic tone, Mengi stated that this Islamic intellectual suggests pregnant women to 
play hide-and-seek.
116
 She underlines that not such patriarchal discourses but 
awareness for violence against women should dominate the agenda. Similarly, 
Karaca wrote that it is totally incomprehensible that such an intellectual figure 
having significant knowledge on Islam can make such misogynist statements.
117
 Yet, 
one should also note that she distances herself from some feminist demonstrations 
that argue against the misogynist remarks in question by prioritizing pregnant 
women’s agencies on their bodies.  
To sum up, as clearly seen from above, women columnists’ writings cannot 
be subsumed under a unified category but display multiplicity, which renders fixed 
categorizations and labels impossible. In addition to the divide between secular and 
Islamist writers, which appears as a major fault line characterizing the multiplicity in 
women columnists’ writings, both secular and Islamist writers are further divided 
into reformist and orthodox sub-clusters, depending on their receptivity to others’ 
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differences and openness to change through dialogue. Yet, despite the lack of an all-
inclusive, anti-essentialist, dialogic approach to public gender debates in some 
women columnists’ writings, one can suggest that their allignment and collaboration 
with the feminist subaltern public, however limited in scope, makes a significant 
contribution to the publicist aims of the feminist subaltern public. In this sense, 
women columnists’ positionality in the public sphere is quite unique in terms of their 
relation to the feminist subaltern public. While they may act in cohort with the 
feminist counter public to a certain extend, their position may shift towards a 
hegemonic standpoint when the orthodox tones in their position overweigh. This 
constantly shifting narrative in their approach to current gender debates positions 
women columnists somewhere between the hegemonic public and the feminist 
subaltern public.  
Another important point to take into account here is that women columnists’ 
contribution to the publicist aims of the feminist counter public points out the 
significance of forming a broad collaboration vis-a-vis the rise of patriarchal 
discourses in contemporary Turkey. For such a collaboration to take place, a 
dialogic, self-reflexive, transformative communicative action is needed so that 
common aims can be achieved without disregarding differences. Yet, one should 
always bear in mind that while evaluating the implications of profeminist women 
columnists’ collaboration with the feminist counter public, it is always necessary to 
closely look into the gist of the profeminist ideas at stake. In other words, 
collaboration with the feminist subaltern public per se does not ensure transformative 
coalitional politics since neither the feminist counter public nor profeminist women 
columnists have fully adopted the relational, anti-essentialist qualities of 
transformative coalition politics. Thus, one should always acknowledge the 
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multiplicity in both profeminist women columnists’ writings and the profeminist 
counter public and ask which components of this multiplicity can contribute to 
transformative coalition politics. This nuanced analysis can help us detect the 
promising aspects of both profeminist women columnists’ writings and the feminist 
subaltern public for the enhancement of an all-inclusive, anti-essentialist feminist 
activism in contemporary Turkey. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
NARRATIVES ON FEMINIST IDENTITIES IN SECULAR WOMEN 
COLUMNISTS’ INTERVIEWS 
 
 
Interviews in feminist methodology provide a useful ground for researchers to reveal 
women’s experiences and narratives as well as their positionings vis-a-vis public 
narratives. In-depth interviewing allows one to enter into other people’s perspectives 
and comprehend how they interpret the social world through their unique lenses. In 
this sense, the in-depth interviews that I have conducted with twelve well-known 
women columnists in Turkey were very useful to gain a thorough insight into how 
intellectual women in contemporary Turkey narrate their positions vis-a-vis feminist 
identity.  
With the recent rise in narrative studies in scholarship, it has been widely 
acknowledged that identities are formed in and through narratives. (Sommers 1994, 
Ricoeur 1984) Individuals negotiate identity categories by constructing narratives 
about them and positioning themselves vis-a-vis public narratives as well as others’ 
narratives. In this sense, identities and identifications are narrations that one tells 
about about oneself, others and the prevalent norms and values encoded in public 
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narratives. Following this narrative approach, below I will demonstrate what kind of 
claims women columnists bring forward to make sense of feminist identity. 
In the previous chapter, it has come into the open that one of the most striking 
differentiations among women columnists in this study is the secular/religious divide 
and their views on the compatibility of Islam and feminism. Considering this point, 
for practical reasons, women columnists’ narratives are grouped here according to 
their promixity to secular and Islamic feminisms. While the analysis below deals 
with the narratives of secular writers, the next chapter will cover pious women 
writers’ narratives on feminism and feminist identity. Yet, it is important to note that 
this grouping in this study does not mean that the boundaries between these two 
groups are impermeable. In other words, one should acknowledge that there may be 
many commonalities between these groups. It is also possible to find out that a writer 
presented as a secular columnist may share more commonalities with a pious 
columnist than she has with secular writers.  
 
7.1. Main Themes in Secular Women Columnists’ Narratives on Feminist 
Identity 
7.1.1. Gender Awareness in Profession 
To learn about the trajectory of their professional career and figure out their gender 
awareness, I asked women columnists the following questions: “How did you start 
writing columns? ; What would you say about being a woman in the media sector? ; 
What do you think about the discrimination against women in the media?” All 
women columnists stated that being a woman in a male-dominated media sector 
means facing many difficulties. In general, they pointed out that women journalists 
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are gettoized to certain issues and are not promoted to executive positions. Although 
all women columnists produced a gendered analysis of women’s position in the 
sector, when analyzed carefully, one can detect striking differences among them and 
some wagerings and reservations in their narratives. 
Before I asked her about her experience of being a woman in the media, 
Göğüş, columnist in Cumhuriyet newspaper, began her narrative by talking about the 
difficulties for a woman journalist to write a column in a male-dominated newspaper. 
This shows that in her mindset, being a woman and being a journalist are not two 
seperate forms of experience; they are to a great extend intermeshed with one 
another. The fact that from the very beginning she prefers to tell her story in 
gendered terms indicates that she does not believe in non-gendered existence in 
professional life. This particular narration allows her to construct a gendered 
subjectivity and challenge the male-dominated character of the media sector.  
Göğüş recounted that her generation of women columnists and journalists had 
a pioneering role in the media sector because there were not any role models in front 
of them. According to Göğüş’s account, this pioneering role rendered their position 
even more vulnerable. Göğüş expressed her resentment towards male writers who 
tried to ignore or devalue her professional achievements by saying that she should be 
grateful to them because they made it possible for her to become a columnist.  
“A former columnist in Hürriyet and the editor-in-chief in Sabah newspaper 
made statements like ‘I made you a columnist’. It didn’t happen that way. 
Here I would like to stress that it is crucial for women to make demands in 
their profession.” (September 25, 2012) 
 
As a reaction to the paternalistic attitude of her male colleagues, Göğüş describes her 
journey in the media sector quite in detail, underlines her willingness and the efforts 
she made to achieve success in her profession and clearly refutes the attempts to 
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depreciate her qualifications. One can suggest that gendered subjectivity stands out 
as the heart of the matter in her narrative. At a later point, she also acknowledges that 
the gendered position and the discrimination she experienced is not peculiar to her 
case but many other women colleagues have lived through the same unequal gender 
relations. Thus, the meanings she attributes to her experiences as a woman in the 
media sector are based on a structural interpretation of the gendered norms and 
values in that she relates them to the patriarchal society.   
 According to Göğüş, the most challenging part of a woman columnist’s 
career is to prove her qualifications. She states that when she first started to write a 
column, male executives as well as the readers were at first suspicious of her abilities 
as a columnist:  
“It took some time to convince some readers that I am the one who writes my 
columns. It was as bad as this. ‘Who is behind her; who is actually writing 
this column’ were questions that I had to confront.” (Ibid)  
 
Moreover, she stated that to be approved, a woman journalist is forced to behave in a 
modest fashion and be obedient to the executives who try to limit her professional 
aspirations:  
 
“They expect you to be a ‘nice’ girl. They assign you to cover issues that will 
narrow your horizons or lead you to deal with gossip news.” (Ibid) 
 
Relying on such experiences, Göğüş declares that she has been definitely 
discriminated against in the media sector. She openly uses the term “discrimination” 
to describe her experiences as a woman in the media sector. This deliberate choice is 
in tune with her gendered approach to her position in the media.   
Mine Kırıkkanat, another columnist in Cumhuriyet newspaper, tells about her 
career as a columnist in detail but unlike Göğüş, she says that she has not 
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experienced any kind of discrimination because of the privileged position she had as 
a Paris correspondent. According to her account, the fact that she has worked as a 
foreign correspondent exempted her from sexual harrasment and all kinds of 
inequalities in the editorial office.  
“Having started journalism as a foreign correpondent, I visited Turkey for 
short periods of time since I lived abroad till 2005… I was protected against 
sexual exploitation, inequalities, the fights in the ‘kitchen’…  Thus, I have 
never experienced discrimination in the media, lived through sexual 
harrassment or come across unequal treatment because I am a woman.” 
(September 26, 2012) 
 
As seen from here, at one point, she touches upon the gendered inequalities that 
women journalists experience and displays an awareness of the systemic aspects of 
gendered inequalities. However, having outlined gendered inequalities as salary, 
promotion and misogynist discourses, Kırıkkanat underscores that she enjoyed a 
privileged position throughout her professional life which prevented her from gender 
discrimination in the media:  
“As far as I know from my friends, they get lesser salaries. Second, their 
number in executive positions is of course less. For example, even though 
Cumhuriyet is a newspaper which employs the greatest number of women 
both as columnists and executives, still less women work here in such 
positions when compared to men. I exclude myself, but when I look at my 
friends working in executive positions, I see that at times of clash, their 
woman identity may turn into a tool of assult.” [emphasis mine] (Ibid) 
 
Her narrative formulation as “my story versus others’ stories” blocks the possibility 
to reveal the commonalities that she may be sharing with “victims” of patriarchal 
norms. Hunter (2002: 115) notes that the act of priviliging one’s position vis-a-vis 
gendered inequalities may have both structural and individual reasons. First, 
according to her, male hegemonic values may not allow one to recognize the 
omnipotent character of gendered inequalities. Second, since it is widely believed 
that the acknowledgment of dicrimination fixes one’s position as a victim, the act of 
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priviliging one’s position may be geared towards stressing agency that is usually 
thought to be the positive counterpart of victimhood. Having noted this, Hunter 
claims that neither structural nor individual reasons are enough to explain the act of 
privileging. She interprets the act of privileging one’ position as “a discursive 
practice of gender politics and the constitution of the subject’s own gendered 
identity”. (Ibid, 116) This act may involve both structural and individual reasons but 
when read in more broader terms, it gives us clues about how the narrator negotiates 
her gendered subjectivity in a particular discursive regime and on which part of her 
identity she puts the stress on.  
Weir (2008) defines feminist struggles not only as acts to tell our stories or 
listen to and recognize others’ stories but also as an attempt to make others’ stories 
ours. In this sense, the distance that Kırıkkanat puts between her position and the 
position of others does not take into account the interrelational aspects of gendered 
identities and excludes the idea of permeabilities and commonalities that one may 
find in different gendered subject positions. Event though she acknowledges the 
embeddedness of gendered relations in professional life and regards gender bias as a 
systemic matter, the epistemic privilege that she reserves for herself tones down her 
mention of gendered subjectivity in her narrative.  
Mehveş Evin, columnist in Milliyet, also displays a certain gender awareness 
throughout the interview. As for the consequences of being a woman journalist in the 
male-dominated media, she first elaborates on the difficulties related to promotion 
and how difficult it is to balance the family life and the responsibilities at work. She 
also declares that sometimes women choose to remain in lower echelons of the 
hierarchy in order to have more time for their personal lives because having an 
executive role means taking a lot of responsibilities.   
243 
 
While talking about her own experiences, Evin outlines the stages of her 
career towards being a columnist. She mentions that it was not easy for her to get 
promoted and some of the positions she had in the past did not really give her critical 
roles in the editorial office:  
“They offered me the position of assistant editor-in-chief… Yet, I was not 
aware that this was sort of assuming the role of a nanny. You never have the 
right to have a say. Rather, you are supposed to manage your boss as well as 
those working under you. Only later I came to realize that the job definition 
of this position entailed nannying and motherhood…” (October 31, 2012) 
Yet, despite this statement, the tone of Evin’s narrative in general is not angry or 
resentful. She says that she is content with the path that her career has followed so 
far. On the other hand, this does not mean that she is not critical of the advantageous 
status that male journalists enjoy in the media sphere:  
“I have seen many male colleagues who performed quite poorly in terms of 
communication skills, lacked updated knowledge on global affairs and made 
me wonder how come they can sustain their positions in the media. A woman 
can never enjoy such advantages. It is very probable that she gets fired in the 
very instant when she makes a mistake.”  (Ibid) 
In addition, she underlines that she has learned to protect herself from sexual 
harrasment at an early age and that in general she has worked in friendly working 
atmospheres: 
“Sometimes very annoying things can happen but such things exist in many 
places where women and men work together. Some women get very angry 
about this but I don’t. It is possible to confront this in a certain civility. For 
example, swearwords… Generally, I have enjoyed a friendly working 
environment in the institutions where I have worked so far but I have learnt at 
the beginning of my career things like how to protect myself from sexual 
harrasment…”  (Ibid) 
 
Having said this, Evin takes a moment to think about the issue of discrimination 
further and mentions a case which, she thinks, could be an example of 
discrimination. She tells that before coming to Milliyet, she served as the editor-in-
chief in the weekly news magazine Aktüel; yet, despite this, Milliyet newspaper has 
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offered her a position in the gossip section and wanted her to prove her qualifications 
once again before being a columnist. Even though she thinks that this can be 
regarded as a case of discrimination, she does not outspokenly say that she was 
discriminated against.  
On the one hand, it is obvious that Evin makes a gendered analysis of her 
position in the media and acknowledges the systemic aspects of gendered inequalities 
that women journalists suffer from. On the other hand, her narration of cases where 
gender discrimination is visibly felt, does not overtly resort to the term 
“discrimination”. In this sense, she interprets “discrimination” as a categorical term 
signifiying victim feminism that should be reserved for cases of right violations 
blocking women’s way altogether throughout their career path. As a successful 
woman columnist today, Evin frames her narrative by prioritizing her efforts to find 
a way to perform her profession in a way that is most suitable to her qualifications 
and career targets. For her, to be located and singled out as discriminated against 
implies a less powerful position where one is prevented from using her abilities. 
Putting the stress on personal efforts, rather than on discrimination, makes it possible 
to avoid the victim’s discourse and build a narrative focused on intentionality and 
agency. Therefore, it is possible to say that in Evin’s narrative, there is an attempt not 
to reify gendered inequalities and instead focus on the possibilities of agency in the 
male dominated media sector.  
Müge İplikçi, who is a columnist in Vatan newspaper and also writes novels 
and short stories, begins her narrative by touching upon the differences that her 
womanhood makes in her career. We see that she has gained self-confidence about 
her writing at the time when she has started to articulate her ideas about gender roles. 
Specifically, she identifies her studies in women’s studies graduate program at 
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Istanbul University as a turning point in her life which allowed her to interact with 
like-minded women and gain confidence about her gender conscious approach to 
writing. Thus, it is possible to suggest that her inspiration to write comes to a great 
extend from her gender awareness.  
İplikçi states that from the very beginning in her career, she has always 
presented herself as a woman writer. Moreover, she declares that since writing has 
always been a realm where male norms and values dominate, at some point in her 
career, she has experienced discrimination and has had hard time to prove herself as 
a woman writer:    
“I am someone who set off facing critisims that accuse the language, the 
words I use for not being literature. This bothers me less now but when you 
are at the beginning of the road and believe that you are not prepared enough- 
girls in this geography always begin with a lack of self-confidence-, you feel 
devastated. You have to be strong and believe in yourself. You have to be 
very passionate to go on because everything is there to make you give up. 
Telling you ‘go home my girl’…”  (September 27, 2012)  
 
İplikçi interprets her position in media and literature always through her gendered 
subjectivity. Her gendered self constitutes the backbone of her “interpretive horizon” 
(Alcoff 2006), which helps her make sense of her experiences and become aware of 
the web of power affecting the positionings of gendered selves. In this sense, she 
thinks of her gendered identity not in terms of limitations or fixations but as an 
enabling perspective that cannot be detached from her subjectivity.    
Regarding the issue of being a woman in the media, Gila Benmayor, who has 
worked for 30 years for Hürriyet newspaper, first expressed her concern about the 
patriarchal character of the media sector. Benmayor criticized the misogynist 
coverage of news and the sexist language and told how she and her colleagues have 
always struggled against this mind-set. She further recounted that they formed a 
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small gender conscious group at Hürriyet to combat against the patriarchal 
tendencies in the news language. 
When I directly asked her whether she thinks that she has experienced any 
discrimination, she stated that Hürriyet was like a home for her and she cannot say 
that she has experienced unequal treatment. Moreover, she added that if you work 
very hard, nobody can discriminate against you. On the other hand, she stressed that 
she has heard from many colleagues that gender bias is highly prevalent in the media 
sector:  
“Of course there is discrimination. For example, it is discrimination if women 
cannot have a say in the editorial board… I have never attempted to be 
included in this board; if I did, maybe then would have experienced 
discrimination. Even though I have not experienced it personally, I have 
heard about it from other women colleagues. It is mostly women who lose 
their jobs. It is much easier for men to find a job… When women are 
detached from the profession, it is very difficult for them to come back.” 
(November 20, 2012)  
 
Having mentioned the gender bias and the discrimination against women, Benmayor 
frames women’s gendered subjectivity in the media in terms of their positive assets 
and the difference they make in their profession. She touches upon the differences 
between the work ethics of male and female journalists by stating that when 
compared to men, women journalists are always more disciplined and hard-working. 
For her, women are more compentent in dealing with crises and finding resolution 
for such situations. It is important to note that Benmayor does not limit her narrative 
to the acknowledgement of gender bias in the media; she also puts emphasis on 
women’s journalistic and other professional skills and in this way portrays women’s 
existence in the media as a success story.  
With regard to the consequences of being a woman in the media sector, 
Yazgülü Aldoğan, columnist in Posta, states that it is quite hard for women to climb 
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the ladder to the highest executive positions. For her, having a column instead of 
being the executive editor of the newspaper is a sign showing that women are not 
allowed to be at the highest echelon of the hierarchy: 
“I had some experience in executive positions but they never make you 
editor-in-chief. You always stay in a middle ground executive position and 
after a while you get bored. Therefore, being a columnist is like having a little 
squatter house in the newspaper.” (November 26, 2012) 
 
Aldoğan also touches upon the issue of unequal payment. Moreover, she declares 
that there is a tendency in the media to urge women writers to write on certain issues 
such as gossip. Aldoğan is quite critical of women columnists’ being gettoized to 
such issues, which, for her, depreciates their credibility and is an insult to their 
qualifications. She tells that as a journalist, who has a Ph.D in journalism and has 
worked for several years in leading newspapers as a columnist writing about the 
political agenda, during a period of unemployment she had been offered a position 
that underestimates her skills as an experienced journalist. For her, this example is 
clearly expressive of the devaluation of women journalists’ qualifications in the 
media: 
“I could not believe it when they offered me to lead the gossip supplement of 
a major newspaper. How could I do it, I did not even know the popular 
celebrities… They said your are a woman, you can do this. This is what is 
expected from you. Lead a gossip section and do not get interested in political 
matters…” (Ibid)  
 
When I ask her whether she thinks that she has been exposed to discrimination 
because of her womanhood, Aldoğan denotes that she has never experienced sexual 
assault because she has always enjoyed a powerful position and her male colleagues 
have always seen her as a “sister”. In addition, she states that her privileged position 
as a women with a Ph.D in journalism protected her from such vulnerabilities:  
“My generation did not experience discrimination that much. Since we as 
women journalists were very few in the media, they treated us like sisters to 
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protect and hold in high esteem... Maybe this was releted to my own position 
in the media… As a team who learned the profession outside the academy, 
they were not used to journalists who are university graduates. My position as 
a woman journalist with a Ph.D was even more difficult for them to 
comprehend.” (Ibid) 
 
It is striking that while talking about discrimination, she cites “sisterhood” as a 
protection mechanism against sexual assault: “They kept watch over us and treated 
us like a sister.” Kandiyoti (1997) and Durakbaşa (1998) point out that since the 
early Republican period women in Turkey could participate in the public sphere on 
the condition that they tame their sexualities. Aldoğan’s narrative shows us that the 
same condition may apply to the pioneering women columnists in the post-1990s 
period, i.e. a time period in which the media has been privatized and gone through an 
impressive transformation. It is clear that “sisterhood” as a tool to tone down their 
sexuality is a protective belt for them against sexual assault.   
In Aldoğan’s narrative, the statement regarding the protection against sexual 
harrasment is followed by a short statement about vulnerability to misogynist 
language and then, by an emphasis put on the difference that women make in the 
media. This is a complicated narrative with different themes and ideas. On the one 
hand, Aldoğan acknowledges women’s vulnerability to discrimination and gender 
bias; on the other hand, she prefers to put the emphasis on women’s skills and 
qualifications that give women a privileged position. This shift of focus in the 
sequence of narrative can be interpreted as an attempt to avoid the fixation women’s 
position as victim.     
Similar to other columnists, Ruhat Mengi, a columnist who makes TV 
programs and used to write for Vatan newspaper, touches upon the gendered power 
relations in the media and states that while writing for Sabah newspaper, she 
received the lowest salary when compared to male writers:   
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“In the end I was so frustrated that I told them: ‘You don’t give me the salary 
I deserve because my husband is a journalist and you think that I will not 
starve. But this is a matter of prestige for me. If I am a successful woman 
journalist, why should not I get the same salary with a male journalist?” (May 
16, 2013) 
 
Mengi criticizes that even though she had the highest ratings on TV, it is usually men 
who receive the TV awards. For her, male journalists take it as an insult if a woman 
journalist becomes more successful than themselves. Another discriminatory case 
that Mengi told during the interview is about male journalists’ attempts to degrade 
women columnists on the basis of their family lives and their sexuality. When she 
criticized Fatih Altaylı for the huge amount of transfer payment he received from a 
newspaper, Altaylı in return wrote a column implying that Mengi could become a 
columnist thanks to his husband who is the leading columnist in the same newspaper. 
Regarding this, Mengi states the following: 
“I have seen that men attempt to hurt me by using my private life, even my 
children and they think that they can do this easily because I am a woman.” 
(Ibid) 
 
As seen above, Mengi is aware of the fact that she is positioned in the midst of 
gendered power relations. Her narrative clearly reveals that one cannot exist in a 
non-gendered, generic way in the media sector. Yet, on the other hand, at a later 
point in the interview she states that she does not believe in differentiations in 
journalism on the basis of gender. The coexistence of the gendered perspective and 
the denial of articulating gendered subjectivity in self-presentation is in fact not 
unique to her narrative but also appear in other narratives in different ways. This 
complicated coexistence will be thoroughly discussed in the following parts. 
For Ferai Tınç, a columnist who worked for Hürriyet newspaper for 30 years, 
“being a woman journalist” is a prominent theme that helps her make sense of her 
career path in the media field. Tınç posits that from the very beginning of her career, 
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her professional goal has been to integrate women’s perspective into her journalism. 
She underscores that media is a male dominated institution where a sexist language 
dominates. Like Benmayor, Tınç recountes that together with other colleagues they 
have struggled against the sexist news language in Hürriyet. Moreover, to stress the 
absence of women in higer echolons of hierarchy, she explains that women are 
expected to behave like men in order to take an executive role. According to Tınç, 
not only the decision making mechanisms but also the general habitus of journalism 
built with male norms and values excludes women journalists: 
“Male journalists can go together to a kebab restaurant or to a bar… They 
build affinity through a male language but as a woman who lives in Turkey, 
you cannot do this… Moreover, you have responsibilities at home. For 
example, when my kids were small, I had to restrain my professional 
ambitions to have more time to spend with them…” (May 12, 2013) 
 
When I ask Tınç whether she has experienced any discrimination, she states that 
journalism has always been a very difficult profession for women since it is highly 
dominated by men and she has experienced a lot of difficulties. First, she states that 
women are frequently silenced in meetings: 
 
“When you are young, it is even worse… They treat you like a little girl. This 
sexist approach is always prevalent and you try to protect yourself from it…” 
(Ibid) 
 
Moreover, Tınç also touches upon the issue of sexual harrasment and how young 
women journalists in the past were highly sexualized and gettoized into ‘light’ 
subjects such as culture or environment. From here, it is clear that as an experienced 
journalist, Tınç has witnessed many gendered inequalities in the media. Are these 
experiences reflected in Tınç’s negotiation of her gendered identity in public? Being 
aware that women have gendered positionings in the media, does Tınç as well as 
other women columnists feel the need to stress their womanhood in their public self-
portraits? Or do they assume a generic, non-gendered existence in order to get away 
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from gendered inequalities that prevent them from climbing higher in the career 
ladder? Discussions in next parts will hep us tackle with such questions in greater 
detail.     
In sum, as seen from the statements above, all women columnists evaluate the 
current state of media and their position in it through critical gendered lenses. Some 
of them may refrain from directly talking about their own experience of 
discrimination; some others may reserve a priviliged position for themselves or 
frame cases of discrimination in reconciliatory terms. Some associate discrimination 
with other female colleagues or tell their story of discrimination without overtly 
naming it as discrimination. In this way, they avoid producing a victims’s discourse. 
It is obvious that these columnists are well-educated and professional women and 
enjoy a priviliged position. While talking about gendered inequalities, they also aim 
to stress agency, i.e, personal efforts and qualifications to make the narrative not 
sound merely as a victim’s discourse but also present it as a success story. 
 
7.1.2. About Being a Woman Writer 
The idea of gynocriticism in feminist literary theory puts forward that women have a 
literature of their own and when investigated, their works reveal particular 
specificities. (Showalter, 1979) This attempt to distinguish women’s writing and 
define a distinctive female tradition in literature is based on the assumption that 
patriarchal gender relations in society in one way or another affect women writer’s 
literary perception of the world and render it unique. From the mid-1970s to the mid-
1980s, women’s writing, gynocriticism and écriture féminine were quite popular 
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subjects in literature.
118
 However, with the rise of the postructuralist approaches, the 
interest in women’s writing has begun to disappear from the feminist theoretical 
agenda and the term “woman writer” and “women’s writing” have gradually lost 
credibility as analytical categories. Poststructuralist thoeries argued that in literary 
texts, meaning is constructed through the play of signifiers without any reference to a 
speaking subject. (Moi 2008) In line with this, feminist theorists began to question 
the studies focusing on the sex of the author. It has been argued that the term 
“woman writer” entails threats such as essentialism, uniformity and articulation of 
sexual difference in reifying and ahistorical terms. Moreover, stressing that the 
category of “woman” reifies the processes that construct woman as a subordinated 
subject position, it has been suggested that the term “woman writer” fixes women in 
a subordinated position and obscures the processes of subordination. (Kamuf 1980) 
In response to the decrease in the interest in women’s writing, Moi (2008) 
argues that the dismantling of the term “woman writer” results in generic, non-
gendered speaking positions which deprive women of a language that is expressive 
of their experiences as gendered subjects. In addition to the decreasing interest in 
women’s writing in feminist literary theory, in her seminal essay, Moi (Ibid) also 
focuses on women writers’ negotiation of the gendered speaking positions. She 
claims that women writers’ denial of gendered authorship should be read as a 
defensive speech act emloyed to protect themselves from streotyped fixations about 
how women’s writing should be. In this sense, Moi argues that the denial of 
gendered subjectivity and gendered authorship is regarded by women writers as a 
tool to eliminate their particularities to be able to speak from a universal position. 
                                                          
118
 Some of the examples from the books written in this era are as follows: A Literature of Their Own 
(Showalter, 1977), Women Writing and Writing about Women (Jacobus, 1979), The Poetics of 
Gender (Miller, 1986) 
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Moi reminds us of Beauvoir’s claim that man is associated with the universal while 
woman is prisoned into particularity. According to this logic, women can have 
authority to speak and write only if they suppress their gendered subjectivity and 
assume a generic existence; otherwise their authorship is pushed into the limits of a 
streotypically defined “feminine” realm. Regarding this point, Moi (2008: 266) 
argues the following: 
 
“In the USA, I have discovered, a man trained as a nurse is called a ‘male 
nurse’… Male nurses are quite easy about their access to the universal: they 
speak of themselves as nurses, male nurses, or as men in nursing, without any 
sense of strain, even when they complain that male nurses suffer 
discrimination from female nurses. There seems to be no situation in which a 
male nurse would feel compelled to say: ‘I am not a male nurse, but a nurse’. 
This goes to show that in a sexist society, one can’t belittle a man by 
reminding him of his gender. (This is a hypothesis, so far.) The male or the 
masculine is still the norm, the female or feminine remains the deviation.”  
 
Similar to Moi, Friedman (1998: 31) argues that in a social setting where patriarchal 
formations continue to have a material reality, one cannot dismiss gendered 
subjectivity from analysis. For her, the retreat of gynocriticism would only serve to 
the patriarchal tendencies that are indifferent to women’s textual agencies. Thus, she 
underscores that especially in settings where women’s writing is trivialized and 
marginalized, it is politically imperative to focus on women’s writing as a distinctive 
literary product. However, Friedman (Ibid, 26) also points out the importance of 
redefining the idea of gynocriticism and women’s writing in a historically situated 
way. She criticizes gynocriticism as a metanarrative which fails to account for 
shifting constituents and multiple facets of identity. For her, an adequate feminist 
criticism should go beyond conventional binaries such as man/woman, male/female 
that define fixed, foundational narrratives about the self and thus fail to capture the 
interplay between different constituents of identity such as gender, age, class or 
ethnicity. Accordingly, any attempt to discover the embodiment in writings of a 
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gendered subjectivity should encompass a fluid matrix of differences and take into 
account the interplay of multiple roles. In sum, in Friedman’s account one can find a 
stress on the importance of gynocritical study of the writer’s gender and also a 
warning against reifying binary categories such as man/woman. As a resolution, she 
argues for a new feminist literary criticism that takes into account multiple positions 
and fluid epistemological standpoints.  
Against this theoretical background, this study incorporates into the analysis 
the idea of women’s writing and the term “woman writer/ women columnist/ women 
journalist” as another indicator to measure the negotiation of sexual difference in 
women columnists’ narratives. How do the women columnists negotiate gendered 
authorship? Do they find it liberating or limiting? What are the reasons underpinning 
their negotiations? To be able to answer such questions, I have asked women 
columnists how they would receive it if someone would label them as a woman 
writer/ woman journalist/ woman columnist. This question can be thought of in line 
with the questions inquiring about columnists’ gender awareness. The main aim here 
is to understand to what extend they attribute priority to their womanhood and see 
the world through women’s point of view. Except for Müge İplikçi and Ferai Tınç, 
all women columnists denied the label “woman writer/ women columnist”. Some of 
them refused it by saying that it is a residual category which depreciates women 
writers’ qualifications and gettoizes them to certain issues. For them, the term 
“woman writer” implies the patriarchal character of the intellectual realm and 
presents the woman writer as a secondary figure.  
According to Göğüş, the term “woman writer” connotes that authorship is 
granted to women as a favour.  
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“They invite five men to a panel discussion and you feel like they have 
included you just because of the gender quota… In the media sector I have 
also heard statements such as ‘we have already one woman columnist, why 
would we need the second one’… Of course we are women writers and they 
are male writers but if women are specifically labelled as women writers 
while men are exempted from gendered authorship, then it is necessary to call 
men as male writers, too. I resort to this language as a reaction…”  
(September, 25, 2012)    
 
Upon my asking how she interprets the case of writers who define themselves as 
women writers, she states that she is quite critical of such women writers because 
they resort to this term in return of a patriarchal bargain. For her, in order to get the 
benefits they want, they have to write in line with the patriarchal expectations of the 
media sector.  
From above, it is clear that for Göğüş, the term “woman writer” is an external 
imposition that positions women writers in an inferior status and degrades their 
writing. In this understanding, labels regarding gendered authorship are nothing but 
the materialization of the patriarcal character of the intellectual realm. Adopting this 
view, Göğüş denies the term “woman writer” on the basis of a Beauvoirian critique. 
Like Beauvoir, she believes that man symbolizes the norm, the universal while 
woman in the intellectual field is always regarded as deviation, as particularity and 
thus is given a specific name, i.e. “woman writer”.  
In a similar vein, Kırıkkanat regards the term “woman writer” as an insult to 
her authorship. She declares that to differentiate writers according to their sex is a 
degrading treament:  
“Authorship cannot be defined according to gender, as if categorizing boxers 
as featherweight or heavyweight. Neither authorship nor intelligence is 
proportional to weight… Thus, for me, categorization of writers according to 
gender is an insult...” (September, 26, 2012) 
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Kırıkkanat tells that throughout her life, she has always witnessed women being 
more clever and successful in intellectual activities. Although Kırıkkanat 
differentiates between men and women on the basis of their intellectual talents and 
distinguishes women as superior, she opposes the gendered approach to authorship 
for two reasons. First of all, for her, the term “woman writer” is a product of the 
patriarchal mind-set and is a degrading term undermining women writers’ 
qualifications. Second, she thinks that those writers who use the term to stress gender 
consciousness and women’s point of view, believe in the superiority of women, 
which is unacceptable for social and political arrangements. According to her, writers 
who adapt the label “woman writer” are either “blond gossip writers” or those who 
are in favour of women’s supremacy over men.    
For Evin, to use the term woman writer is absurd because there is no such 
term as man writer. Evin thinks that this term is used as if the authorship and 
publicity are granted to women as a favour:  
“Women columnists consitute only 16 percent of all columnists in the media. 
Most of them write in supplements and their writings focus on topics such as 
beauty or soft expertise areas such as “economy”. They rarely write on sport; 
very few of them write on politics... Sometimes when I am invited to TV 
programmes, I can understand that I am invited as a vase, just to fulfill the 
quota reserved for women. The prevailing understanding grants women this 
quota symbolically, not because they love to see women there…” (October 
31, 2012)  
 
Evin also states that some women writers use this term as a marketing strategy. As 
Göğüş said before, she implies that these writers submit to the expectations of the 
patriarchal media sector and in return, hope to enjoy some benefits. Moreover, for 
her, if one is really a feminist, one should definitely avoid the term since it overlooks 
one’s professional qualifications and puts the emphasis on womanhood. Similar to 
Göğüş’s and Kırıkkanat’s narratives, in Evin’s account, the term “woman writer” is 
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detached from its connotations related to gender awareness and women’s perspective 
and is interpreted strictly within the limits of its patriarchal definition.  
Benmayor states that she wants her name mentioned in terms of her 
journalistic writings, not with a reference to her womanhood. In this sense, she 
declares that she is a journalist first: 
“I define myself as a journalist and prefer to be defined by others in this way. 
Not over my womanhood… I am a journalist by profession, not a woman 
journalist.” (November 20, 2012) 
 
When I ask her what she thinks about the employment of the term as a sign of 
women’s point of view and gender consicousness, she says that there is no need to 
overstress womanhood; the readers can already sense the writer’s gender awareness 
between the lines. Yet, she adds that she supports organizations that bring women 
journalists together to empower them:  
“The name of this profession is called journalism. So, I do not want to utilize 
my gender in presenting my professional identity. However, quite 
paradoxically, I joined a journalistic network organized by women on the 
status of women journalists in the Mediterrenean region… So, ‘woman 
journalist’ is a term that is in circulation. I can join an organization that 
prioritize women journalists’ concerns. The fact that I do not use my gender 
in my public self-presentation does not necessarily lead me not to support 
women journalists’ organizations. I support such organizations because it is a 
fact that women are subject to discrimination and they should be powerful in 
all areas.” (Ibid) 
 
From here, it is clear that for Benmayor, there is a gendered aspect to one’s identity 
but she prefers not to put it forward in her public self-identification. In her narrative, 
open articulation of gendered self is limited to particular contexts and issues. As for 
her professional identity, she regards womanhood as a particularity that may 
overshadow her competence as a successful journalist.     
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Aldoğan’s narrative about gendered authorship is also marked by fluid 
negotiations about gendered self. On the one hand, Aldoğan is against the 
employment of the term, denoting that labeling a writer as a woman writer is a sign 
of insolence. Like other writers covered so far, for her, the term “woman writer” 
degrades women’s qualifications. On the other hand, at some other point during the 
interview, Aldoğan clearly says that there is no other choice for a woman to write 
through a women’s point of view. She tells that at the beginning of her writing career 
she wanted to employ a genderless point of view but later when she become familiar 
with feminist ideas she realized that she has always employed a women’s point of 
view without intending to do so: 
“For example, while debating the news with male colleagues, I realized that 
they do not see the details that I see because I am much more sensitive about 
these issues. In this way, I realized how important it is to be a woman in the 
production of news. I began to employ a women’s point of view in my 
writing or rather, I should say that I have always been writing as a woman 
even though I didn’t know it until that day.” (November 26, 2012) 
 
As seen from above, Aldoğan believes that women incorporate their gendered 
positions into their writing, which allows them to see what male writers cannot easily 
see. In this sense, she defines “women’s writing” by leaving the patriarchal 
connotations out and associating it with profeminist ideas. Nonetheless, when asked 
to elaborate on the term “woman writer”, she regards the term as a patriarchal term 
and refuses to use it. It is clear that her denial of self-identification as a woman writer 
is a response to the possible public attempts to reduce her writing to certain issues 
and traits. In other words, it can be interpreted as a defensive speech strategy that 
does not capture her conception of women’s writing as a whole.  
Unlike the previous writers, İplikçi regards the term “woman writer” as a 
liberating term which has helped her to establish herself as an accomplished writer in 
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the male-dominated literary field. She declares that from the very beginning in her 
career, she has presented herself as a woman writer: 
“There is no use in rejecting the gendered self. The pen always writes in 
gendered terms; you cannot escape it. And you should not… Because 
women’s writing is a wonderful writing. It has its own music, its own poetics. 
Thus, I adore it…” (September 27, 212) 
 
İplikçi states that in the male dominated literary field, women’s perspective and their 
unique language is marginalized and trivialized as sentimental and peripheral. She 
tells about the difficulties that she had as a young woman writer who publicly 
anounced that she writes through a women’s point of view. However, she denotes 
that in the later stages of her career, she no longer felt the need to make this emphasis 
on her womanhood since she believed that she has verbalized her cause enough. 
When I asked her to elaborate further on her giving up to announce outspokenly that 
she is a woman writer, she says that she does not see this as a retreat since she hasn’t 
given up to write from a women’s point of view. She tells that presenting yourself as 
a woman writer is a very difficult choice because then, you are severely criticized for 
this and your writing is reduced to certain themes and traits. The fact that she no 
longer feels the need to present herself as a woman writer can be obviously read as a 
strategy to avoid criticisms. Having established herself as a well-known author, it 
may be more difficult for her to oppose the hegemonic ideas about the term “woman 
writer”. From here, one can suggest that İplikçi clearly differentiates between 
strategy and denial of gendered position. Accordingly, even though one cannot 
imagine a speaking position in isolation from one’s gendered being, one can choose 
not to prioritize the gendered aspects of the self as a strategy deployed to deal with 
the hegemonic discourses.      
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In Mengi’s narrative, the term “woman writer” is isolated from its feminist 
connotations and thought of as a patriarchal imposition from outside. 
“…I write the facts without fear. If I cannot write them, I should not do 
journalism. Thanks to this understanding I am always one of those who write 
facts first. Therefore, I don’t accept differentiations between men and women 
journalists. Nor do I accept it in TV. Therefore, I never put my womanhood 
forward in my TV programs. I always appear in classical clothing, put my 
womanhood in the background and prioritize the news.” (May 16, 2013) 
 
Here, it is obvious that in Mengi’s mindset, womanhood in professional life is an 
obstacle that devalues one’s professional qualifications. According to her, in order 
for women to make their professional competency acknowledged, the category 
“woman” has to be eliminated from the picture altogether. On the other hand, Mengi 
also states that sometimes it is necessary to point out the unique aspects of women’s 
perspective to stress the details that men may ignore. However, for her, this kind of 
public articulation of gendered position is a rare case; what is really needed is to 
stress that women can leave all particularities aside and act as “professional” as men 
do. 
Tınç’s views on gendered authorship shift between a defensive strategy and 
an emphasis put on the importance of assuming gendered positions. First, she states 
that there should not be any differentiation between men and women journalists since 
such a differentiation reproduces patriarchal discourses that attribute women 
inferiority. Yet, later she adopts a standpoint where she affirms the public 
articulation of gendered self.  
“If it is a fact, why do we hide it? There is a difference between a man and 
woman writer… This means that being a woman has further implications. 
This difference does not originate from my ignorance or incompetence but it 
is directly related to my womanhood. If this is so, I should be aware of the 
consequences of my womanhood and overcome them. Ignoring the gendered 
self means entering a war that the male dominated society wanted, without 
knowing that you are in a defeated position.” (May 12, 2013) 
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Here, Tınç makes use of the constitutive effect of narrative reflection to figure out 
her position vis-a-vis gendered authorship and revises her conception of the term 
“woman writer” during the act of narration. For her, in order to sharpen her gender 
consciousness and remind others about the unequal gender relations, it is important 
to stress that women have gendered positions in professional life:  
“We are women journalists. If we are discriminated against, it’s because of 
the approach of patriarchal sociey to women, not because of our 
incompetence. This is our identity… In order not to be caught in the traps of 
the statement that “there is no need to differentiate between men and women, 
we are all journalists”, I find it right to present myself as a woman journalist.” 
(Ibid) 
Tınç is aware of the dangers of assuming a generic, non-identity position. For her, 
since individuals are all positioned in the web of power depending on our gender, 
ethnicity or religion, they should be able to freely express where they stand. She 
states that failing to do so will result in suppression of their particularities. One can 
maintain that in her negotiation of gendered authorship, Tınç interprets the term 
“woman writer” through its feminist connotations, not as a label imposed from 
outside in the form of a patriacrhal stigmatization.     
To sum up, most of the women columnists strictly oppose the term “woman 
writer” since they interpret it as an insult to their authorship. Women columnists’ 
denial of gendered authorship tells a lot about how a woman public opinion leader 
establishes herself in the public sphere in Turkey. To prove that they are equal actors 
of the intellectual realm, women writers curb the difference of their writing. 
However, this does not mean that they ignore their gendered positioning altogether. 
Some suggest that women’s writing is unique in that women can see the details that 
men cannot see. Earlier, we have seen that they also acknowledge unequal power 
relations in professional life and the political implications of gendered identities. 
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Relying on this, it is possible to suggest that women columnists’ denial of public 
articulation of gendered authorship does not necessarily imply a denial of their 
gendered positioning. Rather, it is more likely that as public figures, they prefer to 
speak in non-gendered terms in order to protect themselves from the patriarchal 
implications of gendered positions. Yet, it is quite interesting to note that most of 
them interpret the term “woman writer” as an externally imposed patriarchal label 
that devalues their qualifications and do not attempt to define the term anew by 
employing women’s perspective. In this sense, one can suggest that most of the 
women columnists construct their narratives on gendered authorship in a defensive, 
protective narrative tone, not as an unrestrained reflection on their positionings.  
 
7.2.Meanings of Feminism for Columnists 
How do women columnists situate themselves vis-a-vis feminisms and feminist 
identity in a conservative political regime? To investigate this, I have asked women 
columnists how they define their relationship to feminism. My aim was to formulate 
this question as broadly as possible. Different strands of feminisms in Turkey are not 
openly mentioned in the question. Rather, I expected women columnists to touch 
upon the cleavages among feminisms in Turkey on their own initiative. The motive 
behind this was to see whether women columnists think of feminism in Turkey as a 
monolithic block or whether they incorporate the differences among feminisms into 
their analyses. Some of the women columnists mentioned three different strands of 
feminism as Republican, Islamic and Kurdish feminisms, while some others did not 
touch upon the cleavages at all. For the majority of women columnists, the most 
striking divide emerges between Republican and Islamic feminisms.  
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On the one hand, secular women columnists argue that different strands of 
feminisms in Turkey should work hand in hand and pious women should voice the 
idea of gender equality in their communities. On the other hand, some of them 
declare that they do not believe in the compatibility of Islam and feminism since 
Islamic doctrines do not provide a fertile ground for cultivating gender equality. As 
for Kurdish feminism, some writers touch upon the Peace and Democratic Party’s 
intra-party policies regarding gender equality and dynamic women’s activism taking 
place in provinces such as Diyarbakır and Van yet Kurdish feminism did not come 
forward as a major topic throughout the interviews.    
Secondly, when I asked women columnists to reflect on the most critical 
issues with respect to gender relations in Turkey, a great majority of them limited 
their answers to women and did not touch upon the issue of sexual orientation at all. 
Thus, it is important to note that even among a gender conscious sample, the issue of 
LGBT rights and sexual orientation is not regarded as a critical subject in 
contemporary Turkey. 
Thirdly, while explaining their relation to feminism, women columnists feel 
the need to differentiate betwen radical feminism and feminism as gender equality 
and women’s rights.  On the one hand, they criticize the strepotypical conceptions of 
feminism in the public mind such as “feminism as man-hating”. On the other hand, 
while explaining their position vis-a-vis feminism, they stress that they support 
feminism to the extend that feminism is not about women’s supremacy and man-
hating. This paradoxical stance is also witnessed in their approach towards the label 
“feminist”, which is explained in greater detail below.   
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7.2.1. Relationship to Feminism and Feminist Identity  
When I asked women columnists how they define their relationship to feminism, the 
following points have come forward in their statements. Göğüş states that she has 
been quite active in the flourishment of the second wave women’s movement in the 
1980s in Turkey. She denotes that having contributed to feminist organizations, 
publications and taken part in feminist protests, she has developed a firm 
commitment to the importance of adopting a feminist perspective: 
“I am one of the founding members of Ka-Der [Kadın Adayları Destekleme 
Derneği]. I have organized its mobilization in the media sphere… I have also 
edited a book titled “Never Without Women”. It was a very important book 
back then because it claimed that there can be no progress without women 
participating in the decision-making processes. Moreover, I have made 
considerable efforts to bolster women’s existence in politics. I was also 
present in the first, emblematic protest walk in 1986 organized against 
violence against women.” (September 25, 2012)     
 
Furthermore, Göğüş openly declares that having grown up in an egalitarian family 
environment, she is feminist by birth. She underlines that if one supports feminist 
ideals, one should call oneself feminist. Therefore, she criticizes those who refrain 
from calling themselves as feminist since they don’t want to assume any 
responsibility in accepting a particular identity. For Göğüş, the acknowledgement of 
gendered inequalities on the one hand and the refrainment from public declaration of 
feminist identity on the other is a hypocritical attitude:  
“Those who state that they support women’s rights but do not want to accept 
the feminist label, act strategically to avoid criticisms… I can be very 
reactional about this attitude, so much so that I see it as self-denial.” (Ibid) 
Yet, despite this strong declaration, Göğüş’s narrative is marked by some 
reservations in terms of displaying a feminist position. She first states that she has 
never censored her writings and her speech when it comes to expresing feminist 
ideas. Following this, she admits that in the past there were times when she could not 
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fully put forward her feminist identity in her career choices. She denotes that while 
writing a research book in the early stages of her career, she decided not to focus on 
gender issues because of the reactions from her colleagues.  
Earlier, we have seen that Göğüş denies the label “woman writer” on the 
basis that it is a patriarchal tool to label women’s writing as inferior. This indicates 
that in a male dominated society where feminist identities are streotypically defined, 
even those who are in favour of public declaration of feminist identity find 
themselves in a defensive position vis-a-vis hegemonic patriarchal discourses and 
tone down their feminist position. This position is based on a reactionary rhetorics 
that aims to avoid stigmatization by denying the partiarchal definitions of feminist 
identity but at the same time fails to define it anew through a feminist stress on 
gendered subjectivity. In this sense, one can safely suggest that patriarchal discourses 
set the limits within which one can negotiate feminist attitudes.  
In her conceptualization of feminist positionings, Göğüş espouses that there is 
not one feminism but many: 
“Feminism has greatly changed in time. It evolved into different camps and 
developed new discourses…” (Ibid) 
 
 As for the Turkish context, Göğüş differentiates between secular, Islamist and 
Kurdish feminisms and defines the cleavages between these feminisms as the most 
acute problem for the feminist mobilization in Turkey, noting that their strictly 
formed boundaries inhibit any possibility for forming coalitions. However, despite 
this stress on the importance of building coalitions, Göğüş does not engage in a self-
reflective analysis of her own positioning vis-a-vis different cleavages among 
feminists in Turkey. Defining herself as a secular feminist, she is suspicious of the 
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emancipatory potential of Islamic feminism. Both in the interview as well as in her 
columns, Göğüş interprets headscarf as submission to patriarchy. Opposing the claim 
that veiling may entail free will and agency, Göğüş puts forward that women resort 
to the veil only to be able to take part in public life.  
“Veiling is in no way liberatory… Many women who are not allowed to go to 
the grocery store in their neighborhood in Adapazarı, may come to Istanbul to 
visit a religious sect in Fatih just because they belong to that particular sect… 
This is of course important for them.” (Ibid)  
 
Göğüş argues that the religious framework inhibits the realization of feminist ideals 
but hopes that feminism will transform Islam into an egalitarian position. With 
respect to Islamic feminism, she states the following: 
“I cannot say that an Islamist woman cannot be feminist. She can be feminist, 
why can’t she? But they have some blockage points; they will proceed by 
overcoming them or creating a new track for themselves. So it can happen as 
long it is possible to agree on certain points.” (Ibid) 
For Göğüş, Islam and feminism can collaborate but their collaboration is bounded 
with the limitations of Islamic practices such as veiling. In this sense, the conception 
of collaborative feminist politics in Göğüş’s mind is in fact very fragile because it 
fails to engage in an authentic dialogue with Islamic feminists, their demands and 
conceptualizations of feminism and agency. Göğüş utters that despite all its defects, 
the Republican project of women’s emancipation is still a valid ideal to improve 
women’s access to education and public life.  
“If my grandmother who was a very religious person sent all of her three 
daughters to university, there is only the Republican project underneath 
this… Without the Republican ideology this could not have happened; we 
have to accept this.” (Ibid) 
 
Considering the urbanization and modernization of Islamist identities in recent 
decades, one can maintain that Göğüş’s analysis cannot capture the gist of gendered 
relations in Islamic communities in contemporary Turkey. Urban, well-educated 
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veiled women who participate in public life today conceptualize veiling by 
prioritizing agency. Thus, the association between veiling and suppression of agency 
is not an adequate frame of thought to explain the demands of veiled women in 
contemporary Turkey. In a nutshell, one can state that Göğüş is aware of the 
multiplicities in feminism but fails to critically reflect on the situatedness of her 
ideas. Relying on her epistemic privilege as a secular, well-educated, urban, middle 
class feminist, she provides a limited definition about how women’s liberation 
should be and blocks the possibility of dialogue and collaborative politics between 
different strands of feminisms in Turkey. 
With respect to her approach to feminist identity, Kırıkkanat first states that 
each and every woman should be feminist if they regard themselves as free 
individuals. Having normalized the feminist identity for women in general, she 
makes a strong declaration about her own feminist position:  
“All over the world, half of the population oppresses the other half. People 
like myself back up the opressed, right? So, what is more understandable than 
my being feminist? ... I was born as a feminist and will die as a feminist…” 
(September 26, 2012) 
 
However, following this expression, Kırıkkanat remarks that she is a feminist as long 
as feminism is about defending women’s equality with men. In this sense, she 
expresses her dissent from a feminism that argues for women’s superiority. For 
Kırıkkanat, feminism loses its legitimacy when it is understood as retaliation and 
leads to supremacy of women to men. She stresses that she diverges from a feminism 
in which some women deny their femininity by refusing to wash their hair or choose 
to wander around in ragged clothing. In Kırıkkanat’s understanding, this denial of 
femininity and claims for the supremacy of women are factors that lead to the failure 
of feminism: 
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“There has to be an egalitarian struggle and it has to be done without 
disclaiming womanhood. In the past, feminists refused to wash their hair for 
the sake of the feminist struggle… This kind of nonsense gave way to the 
decline of the feminist struggle.” (Ibid) 
Earlier, we have seen that Kırıkkanat is quite critical of the term “woman writer” 
since she interprets this term as a product of the patriarchal discourse that attempts to 
repudiate women’s qualifications. Kırıkkanat’s approach to gendered authorship 
indicates that she refrains from stressing gendered subjectivity in the public 
presentation of identities. A similar approach can be found in her interpretation of 
feminism. Defining feminism as the struggle for equal rights of women, Kırıkkanat 
adopts a liberal understanding that favours a generic existence. Limiting her focus to 
issues such as equal pay, merit based employment and legal rights, Kırıkkanat does 
not put any stress on gendered subjectivity. One can safely maintain that Kırıkkanat 
builds her narrative on the liberal understanding of neutral, abstract and disengaged 
individual, which claims that particularities should be left behind before entering the 
public sphere in order to ensure equality before the law.  
Hekman (2004: 40) points out that liberalism and feminism in this respect 
may be thought as oxymoron. Accordingly, the liberal discourse of abstraction and 
universality, which suggests that particularities belong to the private realm and 
individuals have no identity per se in the public, obscures power differentials 
originating from different positionings in the web of power. In this vein, Kırıkkanat’s 
position vis-a-vis feminism is characterized by the limitations of the liberal idea of 
abstract individual.  
On the other hand, despite her critique of feminism, Kırıkkanat wants to make 
sure that she has clearly expressed her alignment with feminist identity. Thus, 
following her critique of certain strands of feminism as supremacist, she mentions 
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her writings in a French feminist website in order to stress the feminist tone in her 
narrative. One can say that Kırıkkanat’s narrative goes back and forth between a 
strong declaration of feminist identity and a critique of certain strands of feminism. 
Another important point in Kırıkkanat’s narrative is her conceptualization of 
feminism as a monolithic block. This becomes visible when she elaborates on the 
compatibility of Islam and feminism. According to Kırıkkanat, Islam and feminism 
are mutually exclusive in that the Islamic framework inhibits any attempt to achieve 
gender equality. In this sense, she criticizes the idea of Islamic feminism and Islamic 
feminists by defining feminism as the antithesis of Islam:  
“It is not posssible for someone who accepts the religious rules as the 
backbone of her life to struggle for women’s rights… I know some 
conservative women in the media who call themselves as feminist. How can 
they justify this? ... When they define themselves as Muslim, they already 
submit to the position that they are ascribed to in Quran. However hard they 
struggle to oppose it, it will not be possible for them to change this order or it 
will take too long… Because their position contradicts their belief…” 
(September 26, 2012)   
 
The interpretation of feminism as antithetical to Islam is a main theme in 
Kırıkkanat’s narrative. Identifying the increasing conservatization in the country as 
the main obstacle in front of gender equality, Kırıkkanat argues that women’s 
liberation can be realized only when religion is criticized. In this sense, she 
repudiates the idea of Islamic feminism by labeling it as paradoxical and inherently 
misogynist. Like Göğüş, Kırıkkanat constructs a narrative that attempts to define the 
right way for the realization of gender equality. As such, she fails to take into 
account the multiplicity of women’s positions and demands.  
Stating that she is a feminist since her early twenties, İplikçi defines feminism 
as a worldview that enables one to reflect on the world critically, employ multiple 
perspectives and develop effective strategies to struggle against patriarchal norms 
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and values. Critizing the streotypical claim that “feminists are ugly and angry 
women”, İplikçi underlines the importance of articulating the feminist self-
identification in public. Regarding the denial of the label “feminist”, she states the 
following: 
“Feminism constitutes a dangerous territory. Since it is one of the most 
threatening counter ideologies, many attempts have been made to suppress it. 
Yet, it is brave, stubborn and never gives up… The rising neoliberal 
conservatism across the world today attempts to eliminate ideologies like 
feminism… ‘I believe in women’s rights but I’m not a feminist’… How 
come? This is imposed by the discursive formation that produces streotyped 
discourses such as ‘feminists are ugly’. In fact women have no fault in this. If 
you cover something up, it is difficult to reveal it.” (September 27, 2012)  
   
In this frame, for İplikçi, despite the widespread stigmatization of feminist identity in 
the patriarchal society, one should not refrain from maintaining one’s feminist 
position since it helps one make sense of one’s experiences, find ways to struggle 
against gendered inequalities and feel more powerful. It is clear that İplikçi defines 
feminism as a hermeneutic site where one can interpret and work through the social 
world. For her, it constitutes an interpretive horizon through which experiences are 
rendered meaningful. As Alcoff (2008) argues, this understanding of identity is not 
inhibiting, rather enabling in that it operates as a horizon through which certain 
phenomena can be rendered visible. In this vein, İplikçi identifies feminism as an 
empowering component in her life that helps her deal with the social world, engage 
in dialogue with others, question the social world and transform herself. 
Having defined her position vis-a-vis feminism as such, she further explains 
what she really means when she talks about feminism. Concepts such as 
intersectionality, dialogue and intersubjectivity are at the core of İplikçi’s 
conceptualization. She criticizes the exclusionary tendencies in feminism that have 
dominated feminist movements for a long time and resulted in the erasure of 
differences among women. Questioning the feminist movement in 1980s’ Turkey on 
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the basis of its exclusive focus on the demands of well-educated, middle class 
women, İplikçi touches upon the issue of class as a crucial factor that should be taken 
into account in the articulation of feminist demands: 
“When we look at the protest walks, we see women from middle or upper 
middle class… A few years ago, when we visited the Bakırköy Prison, 
women from poor backgrounds stated that they are there because they wanted 
to protect their honor. How can we reach them if we do not deal with the 
issue of honor? … Can we do something that can help them claim their 
bodies and remind them their bodies belong to themselves. For me, limiting 
the feminist struggle to certain classes is the major dilemma of feminism…” 
(September 27, 2012) 
 
This intersectional perspective allows her to state that “feminism is not luxury”. 
İplikçi also puts emphasis on dialogue and the interrelational aspects of ourselves. 
She clearly states that her feminist position provides a ground for her to relate to 
others and feel affection and empathy for them: 
 
“One of the important things that feminism has taught me is to see others’ 
pain, at least to try to see it and act conscientiously…” (Ibid) 
According to İplikçi, this intersectional, interrelational feminism not only struggles 
against the partiarchal web of power relations and unequal legal arrangements but 
also transforms the self: 
“I used to be a much more angry person. Having realized that anger does no 
good, I have learnt from feminism how stay to calm, find the courage to 
continue and say that we [as women] should continue [our struggle] because 
there is no other way…” (Ibid)  
 
From above, it is clear that İplikçi’s conception of feminism is enabling, inclusive 
and dynamic. To underline this dynamism and distance herself from fixed, rigid 
conceptions, İplikçi denotes that her understanding of feminism is quite smooth. 
When I ask her about her relationship to feminism, Evin tells that during 
university years she has always kept her distance with feminists since she regarded 
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feminism as an extreme ideology. However, following this statement, she adds that 
as she gained more experience in her career and became aware of the unequal 
gendered relations, gradually she has developed a profeminist consciousness:  
“As people learn from life, they come to realize that feminism is about basic 
human rights. As a young girl, I may have distanced myself from feminists 
and leftists because of fear but now I head towards the opposite direction. I 
think it is the same with many women… As women age, life reveals them the 
fact that it is necessary to be a feminist or at least to take feminist demands 
seriously.” (October 31, 2012)   
Accordingly, one can suggest that her subjective experiences as a woman journalist 
in the male dominated media sector have provided Evin a unique perspective through 
which she has come to discover and work through her gendered subjectivity. Alcoff’s 
concept of “interpretive framework” could be useful here to explain Evin’s 
relationship to feminism. One can suggest that Evin’s position as a woman journalist 
in the media sector leads her to construct meaning in relation to her lived 
experiences. This interpretive horizon formed both by subjective experiences and 
hegemonic discourses allows her to see what has remained invisible until then. This 
gradual formation of the profeminist position also involves a time dimension, which 
indicates that identity positions are not formed once and for all but are constantly 
worked through depending on subjective experiences and contextual factors.  
On the other hand, despite her declaration of a profeminist position, Evin 
states that she does not feel the need to articulate her feminist identity in public 
outspokenly:  
“If it’s necessary I would verbalize it but I don’t think there is a need to do 
that because I already make my position clear through my writings.” (Ibid) 
  
Having said this, Evin expresses her concerns about labels and categorizations 
accompanying certain identities. According to her, if a writer announces that she is a 
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leftist, environmentalist or a feminist, then she is reduced to that particular identity 
and is denied to employ any other perspective in her writings. Suggesting that 
identity categories cannot encompass multiplicities and thus reduce the self to a 
single dimension, Evin takes a cautious position vis-a-vis identity labels so as to 
protect herself from the reductionist tendencies in the hegemonic public discourse 
about identities. One can maintain that her disengament with feminist identity is 
more a strategic tactic rather than a disbelief in feminist ideals. Evin chooses not to 
mention her feminist identity outspokenly with the aim to have more discursive 
freedom in her writings. For her, women experience stigmatization and negative 
labeling even more deeply when they articulate identity claims because their position 
as a woman renders them more vulnerable in the public sphere. Evin further denotes 
that the articulation of an identity may change depending on the context:  
“When you talk about feminism during a visit in a village, you can face 
resistance from native women but talking about life in general will enable you 
to touch upon that topic.” (Ibid) 
 
Relying on this, one can safely argue that to understand one’s self-identification, one 
has to take into account the location in which the identity in question is negotiated. 
Depending on the character of this location, identity labels may be denied/ accepted 
or toned down/ toned up. In this frame, it is possible to state that unlike some other 
writers who criticized feminism more in terms of its extremity, Evin’s relationship to 
feminism is rather shaped by tactical concerns. The streotypical labeling of identity 
categories in hegemonic discourses prevents her from openly articulating her 
profeminist position in public.  
As for feminisms in Turkey, Evin elaborates on the differentiation between 
secular and Islamic feminisms. Regarding this, she defines the coexistence of Islam 
and feminism as paradoxical, stating that Islam is a male dominated religion. She 
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also criticizes Islamic feminism for its restricted conception of gender equality. 
However, Evin does not pose an essentialist criticism against Islamic feminism in 
which both Islam and feminism are categorically fixed. Rather, she states that she 
hopes for an Islamic feminism in which gender equality is more deeply integrated 
into the Islamic line of thinking. 
On the other hand, Gila Benmayor, a columnist who frequently writes about 
women enterpreneurs, women politicians and many other gender issues, states that 
she believes in gender equality but does not call herself a feminist. She clearly 
differentiates between women’s human rights and feminism in that for her, feminism 
is more about feminist movement and activism. She tells that she has never been as 
committed to the women’s movement as “real” feminists are and therefore cannot 
call herself feminist. According to her, feminism includes ideas defending women’s 
superiority over men and also a belief in the primacy of women’s perspective. In this 
respect, Benmayor sees feminism as a strict ideological position that dominates one’s 
point of view and requires one to speak always in gendered terms: 
“…I do not call myself blindly as feminist. I have always believed that in life 
men and women should walk side by side… For example, I may argue for 
positive discrimination if necessary. I also believe in quotas in politics as well 
as in professional life… But this is not a truly feminist point of view… Of 
course feminism deals with such issues but it’s more committed to gender. 
I’m not committed to feminism in such a way as to call my entire point of 
view as feminist but I support it. Maybe one can call this feminism too, I 
don’t know… I support it with respect to women’s human rights.” (November 
20, 2012) 
 
In Benmayor’s interpretation, feminism and feminist identity connote a position that 
is more radical and extreme than the support for women’s human rights. For her, this 
extremity orginates from the feminist attempts to dominate over men. Even though 
Benmayor states that she supports positive discrimination and even employs the 
principle of positive discrimination in her columns by giving priority to women’s 
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stories, she refrains from a self-identified feminist position in order to ensure gender 
equality without dominating men. In this respect, Benmayor’s narrative is quite 
complicated since it is difficult to relate her pro-feminist position in her columns to 
her disassociation from feminism and feminist identity. One can note that 
Benmayor’s conception of feminism is based on a streotypical understanding of 
feminim as rigid, extreme and anti-man. Moreover, Benmayor regards feminism as a 
dominant ideological position that reduces the self to a single dimension, excluding 
other aspects of identity. Since Benmayor’s narrative does not directly deal with the 
possible negative effects of feminist self-identification, one can suggest that her 
disassociation from the feminist label cannot be explained as a strategic tactic which 
she resorts to in order to avoid ostracization and/or negative labeling. Rather, despite 
her ardent support for feminism and feminist movements, she aligns with hegemonic 
discourses on feminism when it comes to identifiying herself as feminist. Her 
narrative in this regard is quite intricate and multi-layered as it oscillates between a 
profeminist position and a streotypical critique of feminism.     
Yazgülü Aldoğan defines feminism as a lifestyle that crystallizes in women’s 
economic independence, education, professional identity and autonomy. She further 
alleges that one does not have to be involved in feminist activism in order to be a 
feminist:  
“The woman has to have property, a job, a car. Those women who fulfil such 
requirements are all feminists. To be a feminist one does not have to 
participate in a Purple Roof protest.” (November 26, 2012) 
 
She further argues that a woman who can lead such an autonomous life does not need 
to announce aloud that she is a feminist. Quite paradoxically, Aldoğan also declares 
that she is critical of those women who lead feminist lives but say that they are not 
feminist. It is even more puzzling that upon my asking whether or not she puts her 
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feminist identity into words in the public sphere, she tells that she is tired of labels 
and there is absolutely no need for shouting feminist identity as a slogan:  
“In this country, for years they have called us as communists, leftists, then 
feminists and now laicists. No one knows what all these labels are all about... 
If they ask me, yes, I support women’s rights to the very end, I write for this 
and will do so but I won’t label myself as others do.” (Ibid) 
Referring to the criticisms she received upon publishing a novel in which she deals 
with women’s sexuality, Aldoğan states that labels discriminate against you. 
Aldoğan’s refrainment from verbalizing her feminist position aloud could be 
attributed to her concerns about being reduced to a label in the public mind. Thus, 
like most of the narratives in this study, her refrainment can be read more as a 
tactical strategy, rather than a disbelief in feminist identity. 
Stating that every woman should be a feminist since feminism is about 
women’s rights, Aldoğan deconstructs streotypical accounts on feminism and argues 
for a flexible conception of feminism. Yet, at a later point she criticizes feminism for 
being rigid and stable. Her denial of the feminist label relies on an attempt to avoid 
strictly defined set of ideals. 
“I have an approach of my own within the limits of my own lifestyle. 
Because I don’t really believe in labels. I don’t want to be included within 
stable lines. I should say, ‘I’m pink, not red. When I was in university, I 
wasn’t a leftist because I cannot stand discipline. These identities require a lot 
of discipline. You should go there, you should behave like this. This is not for 
me; that’s why I dont like labels.” (Ibid) 
 
In addition, Aldoğan states that she does not believe in the compatibility of Islam and 
feminism since religion suppresses women. In this sense, she belongs to the group of 
secular women columnists in the media who criticize the idea of Islamic feminism 
and reserve gender equality only for the secular line of thinking.  
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Mengi, a columnist who frequently writes about violence against women and 
urges the government to take action in this regard, clearly states that she is not a 
feminist. For her, feminism is extreme in that it associates women’s liberation with 
women’s sexual agency. She argues that since 1980s the feminist promotion of 
women’s sexual agency has resulted in the demise of family values in Turkey.  
“The social process started by feminism in Turkey has reached such a level 
that today even in England and the USA, family values and traditions are 
more deeply embedded in society than in Turkey… We have come to this 
point because of feminism. Thus, I have never called myself feminist.” (May 
16, 2013) 
Mengi argues that the excessive emphasis put on women’s sexual agency also 
contradicts with motherhood. Criticizing this, Mengi distances herself from feminism 
and underlines that she is a women’s rights advocate. Clearly differentiating 
women’s right advocacy from feminism, Mengi defines feminism as an attempt to 
treat men and women as the same. For her, women’s rights advocacy argues for 
equality between men and women both in the public and private sphere. The themes 
that come forward in her narrative are equal division of labour, equal legal rights and 
prevention of violence against women.     
In Tınç’s narrative, the stress on gendered subjectivity is a prominent theme 
in the narrative line. As seen in her views on gendered authorship, Tınç believes that 
it is vitally important to recognize the gendered concequences of one’s position in the 
professional arena. On the other hand, when it comes to the relation between 
gendered subjectivity and feminist self-identification, Tınç differentiates between the 
political necessity of acknowledging a gendered positionality and identification with 
a stable feminist identity: 
“Feminism is part of my life. But I don’t like labels, categorizations. I have 
always looked through feminist lenses… I see myself as a woman who tries 
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to be aware of women’s point of view. Since concepts change over time, 
feminism as a concept changes as well… It is not like being a fan of a 
football team. Even sports fans’ obsessions may become flexible depending 
on circumstances... Thus, what matters is to empower individuals with checks 
and balances... Feminism is included in this empowerment, so is leftism but 
not concervatism and dogmatism.”  (May 12, 2013) 
 
As seen from the quotation above, Tınç constructs a cautious narrative on the 
feminist label with the aim to avoid the essentializing aspects of identification. For 
her, feminist self-identification may connote a fixed set of values and demands that 
preclude change by stabilizing one’s position. Hence, even though she strongly 
affirms the mention of gender in the public presentation of her professional identity, 
she states that self-identification with feminism is not that vital for her. Rather than 
openly stating that she is a feminist, she prefers to define her position over feminist 
values and ideas. In this sense, Tınç replaces the term “identity” with “identification-
with”: 
“I am someone who believes in feminist ideas and principles. But there are 
many other components of my identity other than feminism… I am a 
feminist, an egalitarian, a socialist… Yet, if you say so [I am a feminist], it 
may connote a certain kind of determinism… On the other hand, I feel myself 
most comfortable with people who share feminist ideals. This means that I 
have built my whole life on feminist principles.” (Ibid) 
 
As discussed earlier,  the term “identification-with” provides a useful ground to cope 
with the essentialist connotations underlying the hegemonic conceptions of identities. 
Weir (2008: 116) suggests that it involves a shift from an essentialist model of 
identity to a political one. Putting the stress on one’s attachments, values and 
commitments, this approach redefines identity politics by replacing it with politics of 
identification that allows space for subjective, interest-driven, identification-based 
and relational identities. This non-categorical conception of identity makes it 
possible to present the self in public through identifications with what is significant 
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to us. In this frame, Tınç’s narrative on feminist identity can be regarded as a call for 
replacement of identity politics with politics of identification.  
To sum up, all columnists espouse a certain feminist position, though in 
differing degrees and perspectives. There are some critical points which come 
forward in columnists’ responses. First of all, in some accounts a particular 
conditionality accompanies the espousal of feminist identity. One can allege that in 
these narratives, the famous statement “I’m not a feminist but I’m in favour of 
gender equality” evolves into the following statement: “I’m a feminist but...” 
Kırıkkanat’s account is emblematic of this case. In her statements, we witness a 
strong alignment with feminist identity; yet, having declared that there is no question 
that she is a feminist, she feels the need to stress that she is feminist only to the 
extend that feminism is about gender equality. Through this statement, Kırıkkanat 
provides a response to a possible public streotyping that associates feminism with 
extremity, man-hating or women’s superiority. To avoid any such association with 
extremity, she also attempts to normalize feminist identity by saying that “each and 
every woman should be feminist”. A similar normalizing approach can also be 
detected in Aldoğan’s account: “In this patriarchal society, how can we call a woman 
smart if she is not feminist?” I think that this normalization effect functions as a 
protective shell for women columnists while making strong public statements about 
feminist identity.  
Moreover, the oscillations in their narratives are expressive of the challenges 
of feminist self-identification in the public sphere. It has become clear that the 
espousal of feminist identity in women columnists’ narratives is often accompanied 
by a critique of certain strands of feminism. However, having criticized certain 
feminisms as such, with the aim to assure the interviewer that there should be no 
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doubt that they are feminists, women columnists give examples proving their 
commitment to feminist identity. Secondly, even though women columnists may be 
quite willing to espouse feminist ideas and label themselves as feminist, to secure 
their public position as an acknowledged women columnist/journalist, they may 
prefer to disassociate themselves from the feminist label or tone down their 
commitment to feminism. These kind of tactical strategies permeate even into the 
accounts marked by strong declarations of feminist identity. For example, at some 
point during the interview, Göğüş states that she is a feminist by birth and she never 
makes a comprimise in this respect. However, at another point she admits that in the 
past there were times when she did not give voice to feminist ideas in her writings 
with the aim to secure her place in the media sector. Similar to this, thoughout the 
interview, İplikçi underlies that feminism has always been a source of inspiration for 
her writing. She further states that at the beginning of her writing career she has 
espoused not only the label “feminist” but also “woman writer”. However, she adds 
that in later stages of her career she became a deactivated feminist and has quit 
publicly announcing that she is a woman writer. She tells that when you call yourself 
a woman writer, critiques may attempt to reduce your work to certain categories such 
as sentimentality. It is plausible to suggest that İplikçi’s choice is another example of 
a tactical strategy employed in order to cope with the streotypical labeling in the 
public mindset. The same strategizing could be found in Aldoğan’s and Evin’s 
narratives as well. Despite her ardent commitment to feminist identity, Aldoğan 
states that since labels such as “feminist” serve as an assault to people in Turkey, she 
avoids to call herself feminist aloud and tells that one can already sense her feminist 
identity from her writings and her lifestyle. On the other hand, Evin directly admits 
that since identification with “-ism”s puts a burden on your shoulders, she refrains 
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from the feminist label and believes that in this way, she can have a greater 
discursive freedom in her writings.  
 
7.3. Narratives on AKP’s Gender Politics 
The antifeminist ethos of the AKP era has generated discursive opportunity 
structures that lead both antifeminist and feminist discourses to reinforce their 
publicist character, reach broader masses and develop their efficacy in public 
debates. In this sense, in order to explore the effects of the contemporary gender 
discourses in Turkey on women columnists’ positionality vis-a-vis feminist subaltern 
publics, it is important to put forward women columnists’ views on AKP’s gender 
politics. This analysis can shed light on how women columnists see the public 
standing of feminist subaltern discourses and their own positionality in the current 
antifeminist era.  
 One can safely suggest that all secular women columnists are highly critical 
of the patriarchal tones underlying AKP’s gender discourses. Yet, there are different 
narrative lines in this critique. First, identifying the conservative character of AKP’s 
gender politics as the main problem of the current gender regime in Turkey, women 
columnists stress that AKP’s gender politics reproduces traditional gender roles by 
confining women’s status to the familial realm.   
Regarding Erdoğan’s urge for families to have at least three children, 
Benmayor states the following: 
“We have a PM who urges couples to have at least three children… Yet, if 
you call for three children, this means that you confine women to the familial 
realm because you do not take the necessary actions to prepare the ground for 
women’s employment. There are no kindergardens, no elderly care centers; 
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all these responsibilities are on women’s shoulders… This approach that does 
not regard women as individuals but instead prioritizes the notion of family, 
harm women’s status in society. Of course this situation has to do with the 
current government…” (November 20, 2012) 
 
In a similar vein, Aldoğan touches upon the stress on women’s familial roles in AKP 
discourses as follows:  
“The role model that the AKP promotes is a woman who has many children, 
is well-educated but does not participate in the workforce… The rise in 
violence against women in society is also related to this secondary role 
attributed to women. In addition, there is a striking recess in women’s 
employment… Even when they seem to struggle for improving women’s 
employment, they urge women to work at home by giving microcredit for 
handicraft activities.” (November 26, 2012) 
 
As clearly seen from above, for some women columnists, the AKP’s attempts to 
define the “ideal woman” within the confines of the family is the distinguishing 
character of the contemporary gender regime. They suggest that contemporary forms 
of patriarchy is different from earlier forms in that they rely on prevailing public 
discourses constantly reproducing conservative gender roles. According to them, the 
ubiquitous character of conservative gender discourses and the prevalent stress on 
traditional gender roles are the main themes in the gender regime today that have to 
be challenged to reinforce gender equality.  
It is also useful to note that this narrative on the distinguishing aspects of 
AKP’s gender politics may adopt an essentialist tone in some of the interviews. For 
instance, in Kırıkkanat’s narrative, the AKP’s gender politics is defined as inherently 
misogynist due to its pro-Islamist motives and incapable of accomodating gender 
equality as a guiding principle. According to Kırıkkanat, the interweaving of 
increasing conservatization today and pro-Islamism exacerbate women’s status in 
society in an unprecedented way: 
“Those who accept religious rules as guideline in their lives, cannot struggle 
for women’s rights… It is very telling that violence against women has 
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dramatically increased under the AKP rule. It means that there is an organic 
link between conservatization and the increase in violence against women. 
Thus, as long as this conservatization relies on a religious basis, violence 
against women will continue rising…” (September 26, 2012) 
 
It is obvious that women columnists’ critique of AKP’s gender politics is crucial for 
the expansion of profeminist discourses in public sphere since it has the potential to 
collaborate with feminist struggles aiming to reinforce gender equality in 
contemporary Turkey. Yet, when this critique adopts an essentialist tone, its feminist 
potential is replaced with an anti-Islamist motive and its pro-feminist plot is 
degraded. Thus, one could suggest that women columnists’ critique of the AKP’s 
gender politics assumes a profeminist character only if it can incorporate a non-
essentialist tone into its analytical frame.  
Some women columnists touch upon the difference between the profeminist 
critique of AKP’s gender politics and the ultrasecularist critique that employs a 
profeminist discourse in a strategical way in order to challenge pro-Islamist politics. 
For instance, Evin states the following: 
“The RPP benefited a lot from the AKP’s approach to women. But I am not 
sure about whether they really believe in the [profeminist] critique they 
articulate. How many women politicians are there in RPP’s executive cadres? 
… Recently, identification with feminism has become easier for those who 
oppose the government… I don’t think it has anything to do with feminism. 
There is a strategic motive behind it.” (October 31, 2012) 
 
Evin’s remark is illustrative of the fact that different motivations and narrative lines 
underlie the critique of AKP’s gender politics in public debates. As seen above, this 
point also holds true for women columnists’ narratives. Yet, despite the 
ultrasecularist/ strategic motives underlying some of the profeminist critiques, it is 
possible to suggest that women columnists’ narratives acknowledge the discursive 
opportunity structures that have come into being as a result of the rise in 
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conservative, anti-feminist gender discourses. Earlier, I have noted that the 
antifeminist gender politics under the AKP era did not result in the hegemonic 
stabilization of meaning in the field of gender relations. Rather, it has given 
momentum to feminist discourses to challenge the rise of the patriarchal regime. 
Relying on this idea, women columnists refer to the expansion of the pro-feminist 
discursive frameworks and point out the need for further feminist activism both in 
their interviews and newspaper articles.   
 
7.4. Concluding Remarks  
The above analysis has disclosed that women columnists’ narratives studied 
in this chapter display highly intricate narrative lines in which profeminist motives 
come into focus at some points, while they fade away at others. This constant shift in 
narrative lines does not connote incoherence but rather points out the complexity of 
narratives on identity positions.  This complexity stems from both the intricate, 
multi-layered character of identity narratives and the contextual setting in which the 
feminist identity is negotiated.  
First, it is useful to note that identity narratives resist stabilization as they are 
always open to change. Narrative lines can change not only over the course of time 
but also within the same narrative. The shift in narrative lines in the same narrative 
may crystallize in the concerns about the public connotations of the identity in 
question, the urge to avoid negative labeling, resistance to fixation and strategic 
appropriation of identity claims in accordance with the character of the public 
context in question. 
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To stress the flexible character of identities, many scholars underline that 
identity claims are provisional since the contextual setting as well as the subject’s 
position in this setting change over time. (Lloyd 2005, Alcoff 2006) Moreover, they 
point out the possibility of redefining the meanings of identity categories beyond 
hegemonic fixations, in line with one’s needs and demands. (Hekman 2004, Alcoff 
2006, Weir 2008) They further elaborate on the nomadic aspects of identities, 
suggesting that some identities are constructed on borderlines and resist 
categorization in an attempt to explore how to live with multiple differences. 
(Braidotti 1994, Anzaldua 1987) 
One can suggest that the shifting narrative lines in women columnists’ 
narratives reflect their attempts to challenge the fixed character of identities through 
reconceptualizing identity positions along the lines that contemporary feminist 
scholars outline. Their assumption that identity categories are hegemonic discursive 
products imposed on subjects from outside make their narratives unstable. They 
resort to various narrative strategies to avoid from being confined to fixed identity 
categories. Some women columnists reserve a privileged epistemic position for 
themselves in order not to be confined to a victim’s position, while others put the 
stress on agency, intentionality and individual success to enhance the public 
recognition of their professional identities. 
Finally, the contemporary gender regime and the contextual circumstances of 
being a female public figure also affect women columnists’ narratives on gendered 
subjectivity and feminist identity. The male-dominated character of the media sphere 
lead women columnists to define professional expertise and rationality in generic 
and/or masculine terms and disassociate themselves from gendered subjectivity. On 
the other hand, the rise of patriarchal discourses in the contemporary gender regime 
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generate significant opportunities for women columnists to collaborate with subaltern 
feminist discourses, especially when certain issues are at stake. In a nutshell, such 
janus-faced qualities of secular women columnists’ narratives result in puzzling 
shifts in narrative lines, which have both profeminist, progressive motives and 
limiting, essentialist tones beneath them.      
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
ISLAMIC FEMINISM AND PIOUS WOMEN COLUMNISTS IN 
CONTEMPORARY TURKEY 
 
Along the course of Turkish modernization the deepest intellectual and emotional 
gaps between the modern West and Islam have come to the foreground most 
strikingly at the level of gender relations and definitions of the private and the public. 
(Göle, 1997: 86) In other words, women have been perceived and treated as markers 
of the frontiers between these two civilizations. Modern Kemalist women were 
defined by the Kemalist discourse as the ones who actively participate in public life 
and are liberated from the religious or cultural constraints of the intimate sphere. In 
this understanding, women had to make a radical choice about whether to be Western 
or a Muslim. (Ibid) 
Discussions about the status of women in society began to appear in the late 
nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. Main topics that were discussed were women’s 
attire, family, marriage, education, employment, rights and place in society. The 
Young Ottomans produced works criticizing arranged marriage, the subordinated 
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position of women in marriage, family life and society.
119
 Moreover, a quite fertile 
women’s movement led by women themselves came into existence in the late 
Ottoman society.
120
 The rise of nationalism in the post-1908 period established a new 
framework to discuss the status of women in society. Ziya Gökalp, the nationalist 
ideologue, pointed to the national-cultural rather than Islamic references for norms 
and morales. He traced the roots of Turkish feminism back to pre-Islamic origins and 
shamanistic rituals and justified the equality of men and women and monogamous 
marriage in this way.
121
 In the post-1923 period, the new Republic implemented 
national policies to foster women’s equality in the public sphere and granted many 
rights to women. Thanks to the Republican reforms, upper and middle class urban 
women found the opportunity to perform as professionals. However, veiled women 
who could not leave tradition in terms of dress were considered as uncompatible with 
the Republican ideal of modern, secular, professional and well-educated woman. 
Thus, a bifurcation among women emerged as a result of the highly exclusive 
Republican project of women’s emancipation. In this sense, it turns out that the 
Kemalist project of emancipation mainly targeted urban and middle class women, 
who comply with a certain code of attire and neglected veiled women. 
According to Çınar (2008), states try to set the norm about public attire in the 
public sphere; they constitute this sphere through regulating how people appear in 
public places. Displaying photographs of modern woman in bathsuits in beauty 
contests, in Western attire in ballrooms or in serious suits as lawyers, scholars, 
                                                          
119
 Şinasi’s Şair Evlemesi (1860) and Namık Kemal’s Intibah (1876) could be mentioned among the 
works problematizing family, marriage and woman’s status. For a comprehensive study accounting 
for the thought of the Young Ottomans, see Mardin (2000). 
120
 Women’s journals and associations provided a useful platform for the articulation of demands 
about enhancing women’s education, employment and place in the private sphere. For a detailed 
account see Çakır (1996: 43-78 ).  
121
For a detailed account, see Ziya Gökalp, 2001. Türkçülüğün Esasları, Istanbul: Inkılap, 139-149.  
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professionals, was a useful tool utilized by the Kemalist elite to encourage a 
particular dress code. (Graham-Brown, 1988) One can suggest that even though the 
state did not ban the headscarf while it introduced a Hat Law in 1925 for men, it 
openly promoted and encouraged a particular public image for women. The image of 
the modern woman was a strategic means to prove Turkey’s break with its past and 
its belonging to the Western civilization. On the other hand, veiled women were 
perceived as the epitomes of the Orient, the traditional, the backward and the “other” 
of the Kemalist modern women. Being veiled and being a modern woman were 
thought to be at odds with each other in the Republican modernization project.     
 
8.1.Political Meanings Attached To Veiling: The Post-1980 Period   
One has to acknowledge that the headscarf issue is quite contextual in 
Turkey, meaning that its meaning has changed from time to time. In the early years 
of the Republic, uncovering was seen as an indicator of the commitment to the 
Republican reforms. As mentioned earlier, though veiling was not prohibited, a 
particular dress code was encouraged for women by the Republican elite in line with 
the Western standards. Accordingly, a modern woman was expected not to veil. On 
the other hand, Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu (2008) state that in the 1940s and 50s 
headscarf was associated with rural Turkey and symbolized underdevelopment and 
poverty.  
It can be said that the real gist of today’s discussions about headscarf has 
emerged in the post-1980 period. In the 1980s veiling was redefined as part of the 
identity of educated, urban, Islamist women. In this period, university students 
emerged in the public sphere, giving headscarf a new meaning. The headscarf was no 
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more a matter of the poor, rural, uneducated women as it was during the 1950s and 
60s but it has acquired new connotations in the city. Islam that has been condemned 
to being the other of the urban, the rational, the modern, of what Kemalism praised, 
emerged in this decade in a quite different form that the secularists did not know 
before.  
During the 1980s the headscarf came to be seen as a political symbol rather 
than simply being a religious attire. Since the essence of the matter is directly about 
appearance, different connotations have been attached recently to different forms of 
veiling. Accordingly, today urban, veiled woman prefer türban, i.e., a particular kind 
of veiling which is different than the traditional headscarf and tightly covers the head 
and neck but is not necessarily accompanied by a long coat. One could say that it is 
türban that causes reactions from secular circles because it implies the demands of 
urban Islamist women.  
Especially in the post-1980s, when headscarf has gained political 
connotations beyond its religious meaning, the identity of veiled woman has become 
an arena in which the secularist and Islamist camps have confronted each other. The 
control on veiled women’s bodies has turned into a tool of the orthodox secularism to 
create a public sphere that would secure its own existence. (Çınar 2005) Yet, since it 
is not possible to associate headscarf with rural, uneducated and unliberated women 
anymore, headscarf debates have posed serious challenges to the existing Republican 
definitions of “modern woman” and pushed the boundaries of the Republican front, 
leaving it in a very confused mood.  
 In recent ethnographic studies on veiled women’s identity in Turkey, it is 
stressed that headscarf is not necessarily the symbol of submission to Islamist 
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patriarchy but rather a modern form of agency. (Saktanber 2002, Özdalga 1998) Göle 
(1991) alleges that in today’s Turkey, marginalization of veiling and the exclusion of 
covered women from public life would result in women’s subjection to Islamic 
patriarchal codes rather than emancipation from them. This perspective on veiling 
acknowledges that the act of veiling may in fact work towards empowerment of 
women in certain ways. In some contexts, the veil could serve as a guard against the 
patriarchal mind-set and open the way for women to be more active in the public 
sphere.  
 On the other hand, young, urban, well-educated veiled women with 
professional identities contribute to the redefinition of the meanings of veiling by 
displaying autonomous identities and asking for an all-inclusive public sphere. 
Presenting veiling as an act of free will and agency, they have discarded the 
essentializing Republican assumption that associates veiling with submission to 
patriarchy and revealed that old paradigms about veiling cannot explain the newly 
emerging dynamics of urban veiled women’s identities. Their demands for an 
inclusive public sphere that would allow them to perform their professional 
identities, point out their commitment to women’s participation into the workforce. 
Their objection to the binary opposition between modernity and veiling becomes also 
clear when their lifestyles are compared and contrasted with unveiled young urban 
women. Studies reveal that veiled and unveiled young urban women may share 
similar tastes and consumption patterns. (Genel and Karaosmanoğlu, 2006; White 
1999) For example, as Islamic lifestyles intermesh with urban experiences and 
become more and more visible in the urban landscape, the codes of veiling adopt 
urban trends and change in line with the modern fashion codes, which in return 
renders the dichotomy between the “covered” and “uncovered” obsolete. These 
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commonalities in terms of urban trends put forward that the discrepancy between 
Islamic and secular lifestyles as portrayed in the Republican imagination does not 
hold true.  
 Relying on veiled women’s demands and critiques in recent decades, one can 
safely argue that the rising public visibility of educated, urban, veiled women has led 
to the dismissal of the Republican definition of “modern woman”. Veiled women’s 
critique of secularism has expanded the parameters of democratic participation and 
helped change the political values that are not in line with the contemporary social, 
political and cultural dynamics. (Arat 1998)  
 
8.2. Veiled Women and Islamist Politics 
 
The demands of veiled women in the public sphere have not only challenged the 
orthodox secularist Republican front but also criticized the patriarchal dynamics of 
the rising Islamist politics in the country. As noted above, the orthodox Republican 
circles have regarded veiled women’s identities and bodies as a domain where the 
rise of the Islamist politics could be fought back. Yet, one should also note that the 
symbolization of veiled women’s identities in the Islamist political party experiences 
in the 1990s and 2000s has been as intense as it has been in the Republican front. 
Therefore, veiled women’s critique of the Republican interpretation of secularism 
and “modern woman” has also been accompanied by a critical stance towards male 
hegemony in Islamist politics.  
Beginning with the mid-1980s, women’s involvement in Islamist political 
activities has begun to play an important role in the political arena. Growing numbers 
of women have become active in the Welfare Party women’s commissions but they 
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were largely excluded from decision making mechanisms. (Narlı 2009: 168) The 
case of Sibel Eraslan, a prominent activist lawyer, clearly displays the party’s 
approach to women. Eraslan played a crucial role in the Welfare Party as the head of 
the women’s commission of Istanbul. Despite the fact that she has successfully 
mobilized women and worked very hard for the election of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as 
the mayor of Istanbul in 1994, she was excluded from the decision-making 
processes. In an interview that she gave to the feminist journal Pazartesi in 1995, 
Eraslan openly criticized the male hegemony in the Welfare Party. (Arat, 2004: 288.) 
This exclusion of women from decision making positions has been also witnessed in 
the successive Islamist political parties. In fact, the marginalization of women in 
party politics is not a phenomenon that is peculiar to Islamist party politics but rather, 
characterizes each and every political party on the political spectrum in Turkey. 
However, this marginalization have been much more acute in Islamist party 
experiences especially for veiled women since veiled women who have zealously 
worked for the mobilization of voters, could not be put on the candidate list because 
of the legal restrictions on veiling and thus have been condemned to serve in 
women’s commissions.  
The unrest among veiled women about the headscarf bans has risen 
particularly in the final years of the AKP government. Just before the 2011 elections, 
a group of veiled women activists from “Gathering Women Platform” initiated a 
campaign titled “no veiled deputy, no vote!”, which calls political parties to offer 
veiled women candidates in the upcoming elections. Women activists as well as 
veiled women columnists who supported the campaign stated that political actions 
necessary for granting veiled women the right to be elected, should not be delayed 
any more and all political parties, particularly the AKP, should take action against 
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the violation of this fundamental human right.
122
 The campaign attracted a wide 
range of support from the liberal segments of society but was severly criticized by 
the PM Erdoğan. Erdoğan stated that to say “no veiled deputy, no vote”, is 
undemocratic, improper and headscarf should not be turned into a tool of bargain to 
enter into parliament. This attitude has caused mistrust and disappointment for many 
veiled women. For instance, in her column in Habertürk newspaper, Nihal Bengisu 
Karaca heavily criticized Erdoğan’s interpretation of the campaign as a bargain and 
stated that veiled women’s demands to be elected as MP’s is a cry for a fundamental 
human right, not a bargain.
123
  
Moreover, Erdoğan’s comments on the bill brought forward by the Peace and 
Democratic Party (BDP), which proposes a change in the bylaws to allow women to 
wear trousers as well as headscarf in the parliament, has caused harsh criticisms 
among pious women writers. Erdoğan said that BDP’s attempt is not sincere and 
blamed the party for exploiting the headscarf issue for its own political gains.
124
 
Regarding this debate, Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal, columnist in Taraf, argued that for 
the last decade the AKP has ignored veiled women’s efforts contributing to the 
party’s electoral success and even prohibited the political attempts to grant veiled 
women the right to be elected.
125
 For Tuksal, this clearly shows that AKP’s approach 
to veiled women is no different from the orthodox Republican understanding. In a 
similar vein, another veiled woman columnist, Hilal Kaplan wrote that AKP’s 
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 See http://basortuluadayyoksaoydayok.wordpress.com/basintoplantisi/ 
123
 Nihal Bengisu Karaca, “Hak Talebi Ne Zamandan Beri Pazarlık Oldu” [Since When is A Rights Claim 
Considered As a Bargain], Habertürk, http://www.haberturk.com/yazarlar/nihal-bengisu-
karaca/621012-hak-talebi-ne-zamandan-beri-pazarlik-oldu. 
124
 “Dini Zerdüştlük Olanın Böyle bir Derdi Olabilir mi?”, Milliyet, 15 Ekim 2011, 
http://siyset.milliyet.com.tr/-dini-zerdustluk-olanın-boyle-bir-derdi-olabilir-mi-
/siayset/siyasetdetay/15.10.2011/145167/default.htm 
125
 Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal, “Keşke Siz de Zerdüşt Olsaydınız”, Amargi Feminist Quarterly, Winter 
2011. Here, Tuksal especially expresses her resentment to AKP’s rejection of the bill proposed by the 
Peace and Democracy Party, which was designed to allow women to wear trousers and headscarf in 
the parliament.  
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blaming of the BDP for utilizing headscarf for political gains is the same discourse 
that the orthodox Republican politicians have always used against Islamist politics.
126
 
For Kaplan, AKP delays political actions towards improving veiled women’s rights 
with the aim to rebuff the opposition through a moderate stance and achieve other 
goals with high priority such as winning elections or making a new constitution.  
The constitutional amendments initiated by the AKP in 2008, which made it 
possible for veiled women university students to enter universities with headscarf, 
had led to optimism and hope. However, today veiled women still do not feel secure 
and empowered since the recent enhancement of veiled women’s rights in 
universities is a de facto situation, not a legal acquisition guaranteed in law and thus 
can be easily taken back. In this sense, veiled women demand further legal 
enhancement with regard to the issue of veiling in universities.
127
 Furthermore, they 
find it quite difficult to explain AKP’s long-lasting reluctance to lift the headscarf 
ban in other public institutions and open the way for them to become MPs. In 2013, 
through a democratization package announced on September 30, the AKP lifted the 
ban on wearing headscarves in public offices. Accordingly, public servants except 
prosecutors, judges and military personel, acquired the right to wear headscarf in 
public offices. However, these recent improvements in the status of veiling could not 
eradicate mistrust and disappointment in veiled women’ state of mind arising from 
AKP’s longlasting reluctance to lift the bans. It is a commensical expectation that a 
political party, which has gained the majority of votes in three succesive elections, 
would empower veiled women in the public sphere by lifting all the hitherto existing 
headscarf bans without any further delay. AKP’s inability to do so implies that the 
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 Hilal Kaplan, “BDP’nin Başörtüsü Önergesi”, Yeni Şafak, 14 October, 2011, 
http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/HilalKaplan/bdpnin-basortusu-önergesi/29367. 
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 Hilal Kaplan, “Başörtüsü Yasağı Sadece Uygulamada Çözülemez”, Taraf, 13 October, 2010, 
www.taraf.com.tr/hilal-kaplan/makale_basortusu-yasagi-sadece-uygulamada-çozulemez-html. 
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party discourse about veiled women is to a great extend shaped by strategic concerns 
in the party’s contentions with the Republican front. In other words, the identities of 
veiled women are seen in the party mindset as a discursive space to be utilized in 
order to justify the Islamist project and its political goals.  
Sibel Eraslan, a prominent pious writer and activist, explains veiled women’s 
particular position in the Islamist community by referring to the term “bacı”, i.e., 
“sister”, which was mostly used among the leftist circles in the 1970s in Turkey with 
the aim to desexualize women “comrades”. For Eraslan (2011: 16), bacı in the 
Islamist community is a silent entity, that is genderless and works for the communal 
aims without complaining. Eraslan further notes that regardless of the political aims, 
all ideologies treat women as a symbol, flag or criterion rather than as a subject. For 
her, veiled women’s claims for autonomous subjectivity can only be achieved if the 
attempts to redefine the orthodox meanings attached to secularism and public sphere 
can be combined with a struggle against the discursive utilization of women’s 
identities in the Islamist community.  
In this frame, if one great obstacle to veiled women’s position in society is 
the prevailing orthodox Republican discourses and the constraining legal 
frameworks, the other one is the discursive utilization of their identities in Islamist 
politics. In an interview that she recently gave to a mainstream newpaper, Ayşe 
Çavdar, a journalist and academic, who had to decide to uncover because of the 
hardships to find a job as a covered woman in the job market, articulates her reaction 
to the discursive utilization of veiled women’s identities as follows:  
“...Tayyip Erdoğan cannot know as much as myself what it means to be 
covered. Even though I am not covered now, I feel hurt whenever he talks 
about headscarf. Tayyip Erdoğan does not know what it means to cover or 
uncover. I had to uncover because my headscarf was more visible then I 
was... Since I could not find work as a covered woman, I always had to work 
as cheap labour force. In order to appear “normal”, the Islamist capitalists still 
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try to keep the number of veiled women workers as low as possible. Quite a 
few well-educated veiled women had to give up working...”128 
 
As seen above, today veiled women’s resentment towards Islamist politicians mainly 
stem from these male politicians’ claiming the right to talk on behalf of veiled 
women. For Çavdar, it is the veiled women who should have a say prior to anyone 
one else when the headscarf issue is debated in public. Moreover, Çavdar’s statement 
clearly reveals that this dual nature of the discrimination against veiled women is not 
only specific to the political realm but is also severely felt both in secular and 
Islamist job market.
129
 In a nutshell, one can safely suggest that the common-sensical 
assumption that veiled women’s status in society would be irreversibly improved 
under a pro-Islamic party that is in power for over a decade, seems to be untrue 
because the age-old confrontation between the Islamist and Republican camps is still 
in force and continues to reproduce itself through the symbolization of veiled 
women’s identities for political purposes. 
 
8.3. Pious Women Writers As Influential Public Figures in Turkey  
Veiled women have come forward in the public sphere in Turkey in the post-
1980 period and helped change the status quo in Turkish politics. The political 
struggles fought at universities over headscarf in the 1980s was succeded by the 
emergence of veiled women as influential actors in the intellectual arena in the 
1990s. They began to publish books- novels, collections of story stories, research 
books, doctoral theses- and attained crucial roles in the media sector. This was an 
unprecedented phenomenon in the intellectual life of the country. It is possible to say 
                                                          
128 See “2002’de Tanıdığımız Erdoğan, O Kışlayı Yapmayıverelim Derdi”, Milliyet, June 24, 2013, 
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that Şule Yüksel Şenler, born in 1938, who was a precursor pious woman writer 
receiving wide public acclaim with her public speeches and books especially in the 
1960s and 70s, has been a role model for a very long time for younger veiled women 
having intellectual aspirations. Yet, in the post-1990s, a new model of pious 
intellectual woman has come to the foreground. These “new” pious intellectual 
women were modern, urban, highly educated women who write not only for the 
Islamist community but also for the general public. Their weekly columns have 
appeared in Islamist newspapers as well as in mass circulation secular newspapers. In 
addition to publishing books and writing regular articles for journals and newspapers, 
some of these pious women writers engaged in political activities to increase the 
electoral success of Islamist parties. Others have contributed to the foundation of 
civil society organizations that aim to enhance veiled women’s status in society. In 
sum, the 1990s and especially the 2000s have witnessed the emergence of pious 
women writers as influential public figures in different realms such as literature, 
journalism, politics and activism. 
The Republican definition of “ideal woman” establishing a binary opposition 
between women’s liberation and veiling is clearly challenged in the very persona of 
pious intellectual women in the last decades in Turkey. The fact that veiled women, 
the “other” of the modern, liberated woman in the Republican psyche, can leave their 
imprint on the intellectual field, a field that requires a great deal of symbolic and 
cultural capital in the Bourdieuan sense, is maybe the best proof of how orthodox 
Kemalist paradigms about veiling have eroded and veiled women have emerged as 
influential actors in the public sphere in Turkey. 
One should underline that the main difficulty that pious women writers have 
to confront in the intellectual field is not specifically their religiosity but their being a 
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religious woman. This means that the challenges of being a pious woman writer has a 
dual character: On the one hand, pious women writers have to struggle against the 
orthodox Republican reflexes of the intellectual field. Even though most of them 
write in pro-Islamist newspapers or magazines, as public intellectual figures 
appealing to wider audiences their competence is frequently questioned as there is no 
conception of “pious woman intellectual” in the Republican psyche. On the other 
hand, they also have to struggle against the patriarchal mind-set in the Islamist 
community. In this sense, being a well-educated woman writer writing for national 
newspapers is a great challenge to the patriarchal gender relations in orthodox 
Islamist communities, which attempt to confine women to their duties at home as 
mothers and wives.  
One of the most overt examples of orthodox Islamist male figures, who is 
highly criticized by pious women writers, is Ali Bulaç, a well-known author and 
columnist in Islamist circles. In his columns in Zaman newspaper, Bulaç deals with 
issues such as women’s employment and family unit through an archaic viewpoint 
and alleges that women’s contemporary claims for enhancement of their status in 
society damages the integrity of family and society. For Bulaç, women’s 
employment causes difficulties for men to find jobs and in return, leads to 
disintegration of domestic life. Therefore, Bulaç openly writes that the ideal place for 
women is home.
130
  
Pious women writers have written many columns that harshly challenge 
Bulaç’s views. For example, Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal sarcastically responded to 
Bulaç’s views on women’s employment by stating that not women’s employment but 
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Bulaç’s call for women to stay at home and wash their husbands’ sweet-smelling 
socks is a danger to the familial integrity.
131
 Tuksal also mentions that in her 
encounters with Bulaç in meetings and conferences, she has been accused by him of 
bringing gender issues to the agenda just to show off her feminist identity. Nihal 
Bengisu Karaca, on the other hand, argues that Bulaç’s approach to women’s 
employment is not specific to him but represents the views of many conservative 
men in the Islamist community.
132
 She further claims that there can be no difference 
between Republican and Islamist political fronts in terms of their approach to women 
if in the end they both try to confine women to the private realm.    
It is also significant to note that beginning with the 1990s the writings of 
pious women writers have begun to display a considerably individualistic tone when 
compared to the earlier examples. As Çayır (2007) argues, the novels written by 
pious women writers in the 1980s were more concerned about reaching salvation 
through defending Islam against the Westernized, secular lifestyles. The main idea in 
these novels was that Islamic way of life is superior than secular lifestyles.
133
 Yet, in 
the 1990s a new form of Islamic novel has risen, which deals with pratogonists’ 
questionings of religiosity, urban life, marriage and love, rather than presenting Islam 
as the perfect ideal.
134
 The fact that the focus in the Islamic literary realm has shifted 
from the presentation of Islam as the way to salvation towards a stress on women 
protaganists’ inner conflicts and questionings reveals that the new generation of 
pious women writers in the 1990s do not feel themselves as symbolic markers of the 
Islamist politics and thought but are rather interested in expressing their authentic 
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selves. In this frame, one can argue that the new generation of pious women writers 
display quite autonomous identities in the sense that they are highly critical of the 
ideological projects that attempt to utilize their identities for broader social and 
political goals. Opposing discursive utilization, they refuse to be symbolic pawns of 
Islamist politics and formulate a new way of reconciling Islam with a modern, urban 
and gender-conscious thinking. 
Confronting the discriminatory discourses articulated both by orthodox 
Republican and Islamist communities, pious women intellectuals deeply influence 
the intellectual field today, a field that has high walls and barriers for outsiders. Yet, 
they also state that being able to write and publish is not a free choice for them. 
Rather, writing is the last resort where they can go after having rejected many times 
elsewhere. The hardships of performing their professional identities as lawyers, 
chemists or sociologists render them obliged to write. For example, Hilal Kaplan, a 
young pious columnist in Yeni Şafak newspaper, declares that she would not need to 
write if she could freely enjoy her rights and liberties.
135
 Similarly, in the interview 
that I have conducted with her, Eraslan clearly states that today most of the pious 
women writers have taken refugee in writing because they cannot perform their 
professions freely:  
“Cihan Aktaş is an architect by profession, Yıldız Ramazanoğlu is a 
pharmacist and I am a lawyer. We all have different professions. But we write 
because there is no place to go other than writing. As a matter of fact, writing 
is very close to silence. It is too close to inertia... It is both a remedy and a 
sign of despair... Since we cannot work elsewhere, we take refugee in 
writing.” (interview, January, 28, 2013) 
 
Keeping this in mind, while analyzing their writings and interviews, one should treat 
pious women columnists’ statements as a manifestation of their discontents with the 
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social, political and cultural context and as a projection of their quest for an 
autonomous self. 
 
8.4. Core Debates on Islamic Feminism  
When asked about their approach to feminism, pious women writers’ first 
reaction is to differentiate between feminism as a Western ideology and a different 
understanding of feminism that allows to reinterpret gender equality through 
reconciling it with the Islamic faith. Therefore, to understand pious women writers’ 
conceptions of feminism, first, one should put forward the distinguishing traits of 
Islamic feminism.  
One of the main disputes in the literature on Islamic feminism is about the 
compatibility of Islam and feminism. Feminists are quite divided on this matter. 
Secular feminists such as Moghissi (2011) and Mojab (2001) oppose the idea that 
Islam and feminism could be reconciled since Islam contradicts women’s rights. 
Moghissi (1999) argues that none of the interpretations of Islam can be in line with 
the idea of gender equality. She maintains that Islamic feminism refers to the 
absorption of secular ideas of feminism into a religious framework, which works 
against women’s rights:  
“What we are witnessing [in Islamic feminism] is not the “multi-lingualism” 
of feminism but the transformation and absorption of its secular “language” 
into a religious one, which, through discriminatory practices, is sanitized 
and renamed as empowerment.” (1999: 140) 
 
Similarly, Mojad sees the formulation of Islamic feminism as a threat to the feminist 
project:  
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“In this theorization, the women of the world are fragmented into religions, 
ethnicities, tribes, cultures, nations and traditions, which determine the 
agenda of women’s and feminist movements. The political ramifications of 
this cultural relativism are clear…” (2001: 143) 
She stresses that since the ruling religious elite can easily dismiss the feminist 
reinterpretations in Muslim contexts, the real democratization can only be achieved 
outside of the religious framework.  
In opposition to this, pro-Islamic feminist stance is justified by such scholars 
as Badran, Najmabadi and Moghadam. Moghadam (2002) investigates the 
possibilities of framing feminism in Islamic terms. She refers to Najmabadi who 
points out how Islamic feminists in the Iranian context have come to argue that 
gender discrimination has a social rather than a divine basis and how this could 
facilitate the applicability of feminism to Muslim socities. (Ibid, 11) Following 
Najmabadi, Moghadam notes another reason for celebrating Islamic feminism. For 
her, through reconciling Islam and feminism, it is possible to open up a dialogue 
between Islamic women activists and secular feminists and eliminate the old hostility 
between the secular and religious thought. For Moghadam, what is crucial is to 
revisit feminism’s meanings and develop a new approach to feminist identity that 
prioritizes women’s praxis rather than their ideology. As Misciagno (1997: 31) 
argues, sometimes women may engage in activities that struggle against the ideology 
of patriarchy without directly addressing the issue of patriarchy as an ideology. 
Keeping this in mind, Moghaham calls for understading feminim on the basis of 
actions rather than solely concentrating on ideas. Moreover, for her, it is equally 
important to evaluate feminist ideals through the lenses provided by the historical 
context. 
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For Islamic feminists such as Asma Barlas, Leila Ahmed and Fatima 
Mernissi, who believe in the possibility of equality, equity and empowerment within 
an Islamic context, the most crucial task of Islamic feminism is to struggle against 
the misogynst interpretations of Qur’an. They allege that discrimination against 
women in Islam does not stem from the teachings of the Qur’an but from the 
secondary religious texts, i.e., the patriarchal reinterepretations of the holy text. 
(Saadallah, 2004: 221) In this vein, Badran (2009) points out how Iranian scholars 
Afsaneh Najmabadeh and Ziba Mir-Hosseini have challenged the misogynist 
constructions of Islam by stressing the Islamic feminist rereadings of the Qur’an 
since the early 1990s. She also notes the writings of Moroccan feminist sociologist 
Fatima Mernissi and the ideas of Sibel Eraslan, a pious Turkish writer and activist, as 
contemporary Islamic feminist endeavours to deconstruct patriarchal interpretations 
of Islam.  
As Cooke (2000: 58) suggests, while investigating the compatibility of Islam 
and feminism, one of the key points is to differentiate between Islam and Islamism. 
This differentiation between Islamic/Muslim and Islamist discourses suggests that 
while the conservative approach to the status of women in Islamist dicourses 
precludes a genuine critique of patriarchal structures, Islamic feminism tries to 
reconcile Islamic faith with the principles of gender equality, dismantling the male-
dominated religious discourses. Accordingly, Islamist feminism argues that women’s 
quest for being equal with men leads to their oppression because in this quest their 
integrity and dignity as women is disintegrated. (Saadallah 2004: 218) By suggesting 
that not the international human rights discourse but only Islamism gives women 
dignity and integrity, the Islamist argument openly reproduces patriarchal values. 
Muslim/Islamic feminism, on the other hand, allocates space for an emancipated 
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female subjectivity within Islam. Relying on this differentiation, Saadallah argues 
that “Islam and feminism are compatible, while Islamism and feminism are not.” 
(Ibid 220)  
 
This differentiation between Islamic and Islamist feminisms could be quite 
useful in understanding pious women writers’ approach to feminism in Turkey. It is 
quite clear that they present an Islamic feminist discourse that engages with Islamic 
sources while reconciling the Islamic faith with international human rights discourse. 
Yet, when conflicts emerge while tyring to reconcile Islam and feminism, how is the 
resolution achieved? What are their red lines? Is it possible to argue that the rights 
discourse of Islamic feminism may evolve into an orthodox Islamist position when 
certain issues are at stake? These questions will be kept in mind while analyzing 
pious women writers’ discourse on feminism in Turkey.   
 
8.4.1.Accomodation of Islamic Feminism in the Third Wave Feminism 
 
Islamic feminists on the one hand struggle against the patriarchal 
interpretations of Qur’an and the patriarchal gender codes in their own communities; 
on the other hand, they try to defend their particular position vis a vis secular circles. 
If one resolution of the binary opposition between Islam and feminism is the 
differentiation between Islam and Islamism, the other one could be the pluralistic 
approach provided by third wave feminism. As Saadallah (2004: 225) puts forward, 
third wave feminism attempts to find a way out of the rigidity of the universalizing 
premises of the second wave feminism by relying on multiplicity. It encapsulates the 
demands, needs and discursive strategies of non-Western feminisms, including 
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Islamic feminism. Secular feminism faces resistance in Muslim societies because it 
has been regarded as a signifier of Western culture and thus as a threat to 
authenticity. Since third wave feminism encourages multiplicities in feminist 
approaches, it tries to overcome the divergence of Western and Eastern feminisms 
and provides a space where Islamic feminism can claim its authenticity without 
having to abondon Islam or feminism. 
The confrontation between secular and Islamic feminists on the basis of 
claims about the superiority of one form of feminism over the other is quite 
problematic in the sense that this kind of logic presupposes a true “ownership” of 
feminism which authorizes the speaker to identify what is good for all women. Third 
wave feminism opposes this claim for ownership, suggesting that feminisms should 
adopt an elasticity that would facilitate to respond to emerging necessities. Saadallah 
(Ibid, 219) notes that this new wave of feminism embraces diversity and works 
towards constructive solutions to enhance women’s status in society. In this frame, 
she identifies Muslim/Islamic feminism as a tactical change in the feminist 
movement rather than as a non-feminist project. 
 
8.5. Pious Women Columnists’ Narratives on Feminism, Islamic Feminism and 
Feminist Identity  
8.5.1. Attempts to Disclose Women’s History/Memory and Rewrite Official 
History from the Viewpoint of Pious Women in Turkey  
Pious women columnists, who have played crucial roles in the media field as pioneer 
women, deeply question official narratives of women’s history and attempt to rewrite 
it with a special focus on pious women’s role. They declare that writing is of central 
importance for them in defining their position in society as veiled women since it 
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allows a space where they can articulate their identity positions and revise women’s 
history and memory from the viewpoint of veiled women in Turkey.  
Sibel Eraslan, columnist in Star newspaper and novelist, states that the main 
goal of her writing is to diclose women’s history and memory. Committed to this 
ideal, she rewrites the history of Islam by prioritizing influential female figures who 
had been ignored in the canonical historical narratives for a very long time. This 
attempt to bring women’s history to the foreground constitutes the core pillar of her 
work. She explains her gender-conscious approach to writing as follows:  
“... The faces of women are always flu. They are always in the background, 
either in the attic or in the basement. One cannot find reliable information in 
the archives. Thus, you have to search the private drawers of history. You 
have to listen to your grandmothers and talk to elderly women. One needs to 
struggle a lot to transcribe this information from oral memory into a written 
narrative...”  (January 28, 2013) 
 
Eraslan claims that women’s consciousness provides possibilities to listen to the 
margins. Without a female voice, one surrenders to blindness and deafness. As 
though being a woman writer who is interested in awakening women’s consciousness 
and disclosing women’s history was not a difficult position on its own, the 
discriminatory policies and discourses regarding veiling has made Eraslan’s 
professional life even more difficult. She declares that she has always been exposed 
to inequalities and confined to the margins, which in return obliged her to a relentless 
struggle to disassociate veiling from the margins and place it at the “center”. 
In this frame, writing, for her, has a dual function: On the one hand, she 
writes in order to read history through gender-conscious lenses and learn from the 
past memories and stories of women who have been rendered invisible in history. On 
the other hand, writing helps her struggle against the discriminations regarding 
veiling in the present time. In short, writing is a truly empowering act for Eraslan, 
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which enables her to position herself in time and place and provides her a space to 
articulate her identity as a veiled woman. 
On the other hand, for Yıldız Ramazanoğlu, novelist and contributor to 
Zaman newspaper, writing from the very beginning means resistance and protest. It 
is the most elaborate means to comprehend the world and make sense of one’s 
experiences. Since writing for her is first and foremost an attempt to understand the 
world, Ramazanoğlu states that she has never approached to it as a way leading to 
visibility and fame and has written under different pseudonyms for a while. The idea 
of dialogue appears to be at the very center of her writing. She states that the visit 
that she has made to Germany many years ago as a guest speaker invited by a 
women’s organization has been a turning point for her writing career. Ramazanoğlu 
notes that the dialogue that took place between herself as an Islamic feminist from 
the Middle East and the Western feminists from the hosting organization in Germany 
has provided herself the opportunity to speak about the reconciliation of Islam and 
feminism and explain how she experiences emancipation through the Islamic 
framework: 
“They told me that they are interested in learning how a woman who claims 
that liberation through Islam is possible, expresses herself in this century. 
This has been a turning point in my life… The women there have written 
many articles on this topic… This meeting has been very productive not only 
for me but also for them because they met women with a tottaly different 
background that they did not know before…” (June 4, 2013) 
 
Later, we will see that this emphasis on dialogue is a building block in 
Ramazanoğlu’s conception of identities in general and her relationship with secular 
feminist women in particular.  
To point out the possibility of writing women’s history in Turkey anew by 
enhancing veiled women’s visibility, Ramazanoğlu cites Serpil Çakır’s seminal work 
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Ottoman Women’s Movement as a major step among attempts to revise the 
Republican accounts of women’s liberation. She states that dating the history of 
women’s movement back to the Ottoman times, this work has exposed the first 
attempts of religious women to enhance women’s status in society. To contribute to 
the rewriting of women’s history, Ramazanoğlu herself has edited a volume titled 
The Transformation of Women’s History From the Ottoman Times to the Republic. It 
is obvious that such attempts are crucial for pious women writers in order to position 
themselves in history and identify their precursors.    
It is also significant to note here that writing is not a privileged, protected 
realm for pious women writers where they can write without being subject to 
disciplinary norms and exclusionary power mechanisms in society. They clearly 
point out that writing is the very realm where power relations marginalizing veiling 
and veiled women crystallize. The exclusionary logic of the literary and media field 
and pious women columnists’ experiences in this respect will be discussed in greater 
detail below.  
 
8.5.2. Media, Gender and Being a Pious Woman Professional in Media: An 
Intersectionalist Approach  
Intersectionality exposes that different axes of identity interact on multiple 
levels and systematically contribute to experiences of domination and exclusion. 
According to this, different axes of identity can only be comprehended in the light of 
each other.  In line with the intersectionalist argument, pious women columnists 
denote that womanhood experiences in the Islamist community are not constituted on 
a single axis, i.e, gender but come into being as a result of the multi-layered 
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interactions of gender and religion. Accordingly, since gender is just an abstract 
category on its own, it can only acquire further meaning when its close relation to 
religion is taken into account. Thus, for them, womanhood and veiling are 
inseparable components of a veiled woman’s subjectivity that cannot be grasped 
wholly without one another. Moreover, it is important to note that while explaining 
different layers of their gendered subjectivities, pious women writers also cite 
women’s consciousness as a crucial component. They refuse to speak from within a 
generic category of gender but always position themselves as pious women writers 
who frequently deal with matters relating to women’s consciousness. Below is a 
summary of their intersectionalist approach to womanhood experiences in the media 
sector and the literary field.    
I have asked Eraslan to describe her professional experiences as a woman 
who has spent long years in the media sector. Her response to my question about 
being a woman in the media was thoroughly informed by intersectionality. She does 
not imagine her position as a woman in isolation from other components constituting 
her identity. In this sense, she refers to different subject positions stemming from 
different components of her identity and states that each subject position imposes 
different barriers and difficulties on her. She identifies two dominant subject 
positions to define her subjectivity: Being a religious woman and being a woman 
who writes her books and articles with the aim to contribute to women’s memory and 
history. For her, each of these identity positions leads to different consequences for a 
woman writer. 
“Things are difficult, if your are a woman; it is more difficult if you are a 
pious woman. It gets even worse if you struggle for women’s history and 
memory…”  
(January 28, 2013) 
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It is obvious that Eraslan does not treat experiences of womanhood as a monolithic 
category. Rather, she acknowledges that female subject position may change 
depending on multiple facets of identities. In line with the intersectionalist argument, 
Eraslan stresses that other axes of oppression intersect with being a woman and result 
in quite diverse experiences of womanhood. Therefore, while talking about her 
experiences as a professional woman in the media sector, she feels the need to touch 
upon the complex ways in which different components of her identity crosscut each 
other. For her, it is not possible to think of a womanhood position in which she can 
articulate her experiences as a woman in isolation from her veiling. Neither can she 
isolate her religiousity from her womanhood. In this regard, she states the following: 
“Once I was invited to a panel discussion at TRT but later, when I was about 
to board on the plane, they told me that I cannot participate in the program 
because of my veil. I have struggled against this censorship a lot… If I were a 
man with the same religious conviction, I could have easily overcome many 
of these difficulties…” (Ibid) 
 
Moreover, as noted above, Eraslan frequently refers to the consequences of being a 
woman writer who is committed to exposing women’s history. These different yet 
intersected layers, i.e., being a veiled woman and being committed to women’s 
history and memory, generate multiple positions, which point out the multiple layers 
underlying Eraslan’s experiences of womanhood. In this vein, Eraslan’s 
conceptualization of identity clearly displays an intersectionalist character. 
In a similar vein, while elaborating on gender identities in the media sector, 
Nihal Bengisu Karaca underlines that not only gender but intersections of gender and 
other axes of identity should be taken into consideration to fully grasp womanhood 
experiences: 
“Being a woman makes you confront gender inequalities in the media sector 
but being a veiled woman imposes on you an additional burden as veiling is a 
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signifier that brings to mind both your womanhood and the political meanings 
attached to the veil… Every second you have to struggle against the 
pejorative connotations ascribed to womanhood; what is more, you are 
subject to explicit forms of otherization and discrimination because of your 
veiling. You experience these two levels of discrimination simultaneously.” 
(June 27, 2013) 
 
Echoing the intersectionalist argument that the experience of womanhood varies 
depending on different components of identity, Ramazanoğlu’s narrative on being a 
woman writer in the literary and media field is also composed of different aspects of 
her womanhood experiences. Upon my asking about her experiences as a woman 
during her writing career, she first refers to the difficulties of reconciling writing 
with the duties assigned women at home:  
“Life does not provide women the time to write... It tells you things like this: 
you are a woman, you can only write after you have looked after the kids and 
made your husband and relatives happy. This means that you can only write 
after everyone has gone to sleep... This is like turning into a wolf woman, i.e, 
a woman writer, when the full moon rises...” (June 4, 2013) 
Ramazanoğlu further declares that in addition to this burden at home, pious women 
writers confront double discrimination both from their own communities and from 
the secular circles. On the one hand, they are exposed to the patriarchal discourses of 
Islamist men, who tend to overlook and even restrain women’s authorship. On the 
other hand, they also face discriminatory discourses of secular circles, which deny 
pious women writers legitimacy in the intellectual field.  
Intersectionality and the double discrimination that pious women writers face 
appear as a constitutive theme in Tuksal’s narrative as well. She clearly points out 
how womanhood experiences originate from the intersection points of various axes 
of identity, which result in different types of exlusions in different contexts and 
communities.  
313 
 
“Women’s experiences depend on many factors such as gender, veiling and 
religiosity… For the conservative community, I am supposed to represent 
conservative values and viewpoints and thus they do not approve of any other 
representation my speeches may lead to… As for the leftist circles… I may 
defend the same idea with them but I articulate it in my own words without 
using their jargon… Thus, they may choose to ignore what I say. Therefore, 
the marginalization and exclusions you experience vary depending on what 
kind of a woman you are…” (April 15, 2013) 
 
Tuksal’s remark is crucial as it reveals that multiple identity levels that a pious 
woman writer experiences lead to different interpretations in different communities 
and thus further complicate the marginalization processes. According to Tuksal, a 
pious woman writer’s interactions with different communities bring to light the 
vulnerability of her multiple identity positions. She elaborates on this vulnerability in 
detail throughout the interview.  
From above, it is plausible to conclude that when building a narrative about 
womanhood experiences and women’s gendered subjectivities, pious women writers 
refrain from thinking of identity as a monolithic block and always refer to the 
complexities arising from multiple identity positions.   
 
8.5.3. Pious Women Writers, Intellectual Legitimacy and the Literary Field 
As noted earlier, pious women writers state that writing is an empowering act 
as it enables them to elaborate on the marginalized aspects of their identities. Yet, 
one should also keep in mind that writing at the same time connotes an area for them, 
where exclusionary norms of the literary field become highly visible. Questioning 
the norms regulating intellectual legitimacy in the secular intellectual field, pious 
women writers point out the need to demolish the high barriers that cast veiling and 
intellectual legitimacy as binary opposites. 
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In this frame, Eraslan declares that the exclusionary character of the cultural 
space exacerbates the degree of the hardships that a pious woman writer experiences. 
She puts forward that the discriminatory policies that she has confronted in the 
literary space are more severe when compared to the media sector. Even though she 
identifies censorship as one of the main problems that she has encountered in the 
media, especially in secular TV channels and newspapers, she states that she could 
always find other newspapers or TV channels, where she could express her opinions. 
However, she denotes that the secular literary field is a space strictly reserved for 
those who could get authorization from the influential figures in the field:  
“The censorship in literature is much more repressive than the one in media… 
The literary field has its own ‘guru’s, who enjoy a much more privileged 
status than a king or a prophet. You need to get their permission first to be 
able to enter into this field.” (January 28, 2013) 
Eraslan strongly stresses that to enter into this particular public is already difficult for 
women writers but it is even more difficult for pious women writers and for women 
writers who write in order to contribute to women’s history and memory because the 
“guru”s or “prophets” of the literary field do not allow them to enter into this field. 
Eraslan’s account clearly exposes the reflections of the age-old secular-
Islamic divide upon the cultural field. The sui-generis secularization experience in 
the modernization process in modern Turkey, which defined Islam as backward and 
archaic, not only produced a particular definition of “ideal citizen” and shaped mores 
and manners accordingly but also affected the cultural realm. The concept of “high 
culture” in the light of a Bourdieuan reading can be utilized here to explain the 
reflections of the secular-Islamic divide on the cultural field in Turkey. In Bourdieu’s 
(1984) analysis, the consumption of art works is closely related to the social codes 
that people from different socio-economic status adopt. Economic, cultural and 
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symbolic capital that people acquire in life in return are matched with certain kind of 
dispositions, tastes and values, creating a particular habitus. In this line of thought, 
the secular literary canon and the rising Islamic literature in Turkey refer to different 
sets of aesthetic values and expectations and thus signify two different habitus. It can 
be argued that the elitist character of the secular literary public overlooks the rise of 
pious women writers’ literature with a historical reflex derived from the cultural 
hegemony established by the modernization experience. Relying on Eraslan’account, 
it is possible to say that pious women writers find it difficult to find a place in the 
secular literary field as the gates of the subject field are closed to them. 
On the other hand, Ramazanoğlu points out that the double discrimination 
that pious women writers face both from secular and Islamist circles also holds true 
when it comes to the literary field and intellectual legitimacy in this field. She states 
that when she published her first collection of stories, a leading Islamist male figure 
advised her not to enter into the literary realm because otherwise she could lose her 
way and get out of hand: 
“Why did you choose this way? You were writing beautiful articles; your 
writing style is strong but literature is a waste of time… You may get out of 
control here and get lost…” (June 4, 2013) 
 
While such an advise from the Islamist community attempts to restrain veiled 
women’s authorship, the discriminatory discourses of secular circles deny pious 
women writers the symbolic and cultural capital necessary for entering the literary 
field. As seen in Eraslan’s narrative, the power configuration embedded in the 
secular literary field is composed of certain dispositions, tastes and values that do not 
provide enough opportunities for pious women writers to acquire intellectual 
legitimacy and visibility. Ramazanoğlu alleges that pious women writers’ credentials 
are most of the time undermined through such statements:  
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“You cannot write about sex or you cannot tell about women’s experiences in 
the field of sexuality. Because you are conservative people...” (Ibid) 
 
Ramazanoğlu challenges such statements by saying that narrating a certain human 
condition does not mean telling each and every detail about it; thus pious women 
writers may choose to be selective in their narratives and this should not undermine 
their authorial credentials. To disassociate her writing from the streotypical 
connotations of veiling, she states the following: 
“What I only want from the reader is not to perceive me. Forget about me, 
forget what you see. Please only deal with my text or try to comprehend what 
I say…” (Ibid) 
 
Ramazanoğlu also heavily criticizes the tendency to isolate the secular and Islamic 
literary fields from each other. For her, limiting writers to their own communities is 
an act that suffocates them by prisoning them to certain identities. What she suggests 
instead is a new understanding that affirms differences and facilitates the foundation 
of literary platforms where both Islamist and secular writers can find a place and 
share their writings. She argues that the literary field should serve as a catalyst that 
would help writers and readers discover the commonalities between the Islamist and 
secular circles and discard the essential, fixed categorizations imposed on subjects: 
“Everybody defines a peculiar literary public for his/her own commmunity. 
Every community has its own literary supplements and your name cannot be 
mentioned there unless you belong to that particular community… You are 
given a name: veiled, Islamist woman writer. This label goes on and on like 
the tail of a kite.  However, you are just a writer after all… We prefer lives 
that resemble what we live and resonate our experiences… In the end, the 
possibility for a different life, different point of view and a different image of 
women gets erased altogether… But if we care to listen to each other, we can 
figure out how our differences can crosscut each other. Otherwise we become 
ghettoized to particular communities… We should not suffocate one another 
like this, condemning different ones to certain identity categories.” (Ibid) 
 
Ramazanoğlu identifies the attempts to fix subjects’ positions through identity 
categories as the foremost threat to dialogue and communication. Her position vis-a-
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vis identity categories primarily stems from her critique of fixed essences attributed 
to certain identity positions. For instance, the following categorization that 
Ramazanoğlu heard from a well-known secular professor during a conference 
organized by Istanbul University is quite telling in this respect. According to 
Ramazanoğlu’s account, the professor’s statement that targets Ramazanoğlu’s 
persona is as follows: 
“...It is not very proper for you to speak here because here we speak about 
women’s rights but you are a woman who wants to be one of four wives of a 
man and who listens to Ferdi Tayfur...”  (Ibid) 
Ramazanoğlu alleges that in this prototype of the orthodox Republican psyche each 
and every detail about a veiled woman’s identity, even the kind of music she listens 
to, is defined in such a way that in the end she comes to represent what the 
Republican subject regards as “inferior”. For her, such a binary opposition in return 
excludes any possibility for finding a common ground to share experiences and 
prohibits transitivity between different subject positions. Looking through the lenses 
provided by the Bourdieuan analysis of power relations, one can suggest that 
regardless of the cultural capital that pious women writers have, their veiling and 
religiosity is the most decisive factor in the determination of their relative positioning 
in the intellectual field. Veiling is evaluated as the “other” of the dispositions 
constituting the secular literary field in the orthodox Republican mind-set. This 
configuration of power makes Ramazanoğlu quite suspicious about labels 
denominating identity positions. Her concerns in this regard are clearly reflected in 
her approach to the labels “woman writer” and “feminist” as well, which we will 
discuss later. 
Tuksal’s narrative is another emblematic example of the regulatory norms in 
the intellectual field. Tuksal tells about two particular incidents which expose the 
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silencing of veiled women in both secular and Islamist intellectual fields. First, she 
tells about her experiences regarding the 2013 Hrant Dink memorial meeting, where 
she was a keynote speaker. She states that even though every year the speakers’ 
speeches are broadcasted on TV channels, her speech was ignored. She also declares 
that not only the secular channels but also the conservative ones censored her speech. 
Relying on this statement, one can clearly see that as an intellectual persona Tuksal is 
neither welcomed in Islamic, nor in secular publics.  
As noted above, in the Bourdieusian framework, one’s position within the 
power configuration in a certain field is related to one’s habitus and the capital 
accummulation. With respect to pious women writers in the intellectual field, one 
can suggest that their belonging to multiple communities blurs their position in the 
power configuration. On the one hand, they represent Islamic values and lifestyles; 
on the other hand, their views and ideological positions are different from those of 
many other conservative writers in the Islamic community who submit to the 
patriarchal codes in the orthodox readings of Islam. Therefore, since they display a 
complex disposition that brings together pieces from both the Islamist and 
secular/profeminist habitus, they do not easily fit into prevailing categorizations, 
which incites hegemonic forces to ignore their intellectual persona or position them 
into pre-set, fixed categories.  
Another example in Tuksal’s narrative that evidently shows how her veiling 
is essentially coded as “anti-intellectual” is as follows: While she was writing for the 
daily Taraf, one day she went to see the editor-in-chief Yasemin Çongar. But the 
security guard at the door of the newspaper building did not want to let her in. Tuksal 
says that the guard had no conception of a “veiled woman writer” and thus thought 
that he should not let her in. 
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According to Bourdieu (1984), a field connotes a social setting organized 
around specific types of capital, i.e., resources of power determining the relative 
positioning of the subject, and in return, generates and generated by a certain system 
of certain dispositions, namely, habitus. In this framework, a particular set of rules 
govern the strategies and practices in the field. Moi (1991: 1024) maintains that “any 
field is necessarily structured by a series of unspoken and unspeakable rules for what 
can legitimately be said or perceived within the field.” Thus, any field functions 
through certain forms of censorship. As Moi (Ibid) says, the field grants the right to 
speak or act to those individuals who possess the neccesary capital and display 
dispositions adjusted to the field. In this frame, the practice of veiling is seen by the 
powerful agents in the secular literary field as part of a certain habitus that does not 
belong to the literary public. Pious women writers declare that this exclusion takes 
place on the basis of symbolic capital and legitimacy that is denied to pious women 
writers, rather than cultural capital denoting literary competence.  
As noted earlier, the existence of pious women writers in the public sphere in 
the post-1980 period have resulted in crucial repercussions both for the public sphere 
in general and for the literary field in contemporary Turkey. Pious women writers 
deny the argument that the act of veiling and religiosity are not in line with the set of 
dispositions required by the field in question. They reconstruct the boundaries of the 
secular and Islamist habitus and challenge the requirements placed on them by the 
prevailing power configurations in the field. Their reconciliation of religiosity with 
the claims for intellectual legitimacy in the field point out that a new conception of 
habitus and field comes into being along with the new set of dispositions displayed 
by pious women writers. 
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8.5.4. The Term “Woman Writer” 
Pious women writers are very cautious about identity labels as they do not 
want to be defined through pre-defined, fixed identity categories that contribute to 
their marginalized position in society. This cautious approach is also valid with 
respect to their conception of the term “woman writer”. 
When I ask her how she interprets the term “woman writer”, Eraslan first 
states the following: 
“Of course I am a woman. They use the term ‘woman writer’. Why is it 
woman writer, but not just ‘writer’? Probably because authorship is seen 
peculiar to men...” (January 28, 2013) 
 
For Eraslan, there is no need to use the prefix “woman” to describe someone’s 
authorship since the sex of the author can be clearly seen. She points out that in her 
case the term “woman writer” turns into “veiled writer” or “headscarved writer”, 
signifying another form of discrimination. In Eraslan’s mind-set, such 
discriminations based on gender and religiosity are already outdated in 2000s.  
Eraslan’s belief in the relevance of gender as a social and analytical category 
can be clearly felt throughout the interview; yet, when it comes to the term “woman 
writer”, she sees this reference to gender as an overt cyristalization of discrimination 
against women and describes it as outdated. She interprets the term “woman writer” 
along the same lines with the label “veiled writer”. Such categorizations, for her, 
place subjects into fixed, essential positions and operate as discriminatory discourses.  
Her analysis of the term “woman writer” is quite brief and to the point. 
Having criticized it as discriminatory and essentializing, Eraslan continues her 
response with an analysis of the dramatic change in the approach to identity politics 
across the globe. She notes that the image of Muslim woman as a victim who is 
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repressed by Eastern patriarchal traditions and needs to be saved, has begun to 
change in line with the disssolution of the discriminatory labels and essential 
categorizations of identities in 2000s as more and more feminists support the choice 
to veil and protest against the bans on veiling in Europe. Similarly, the 
transformation of feminisms in Turkey from an elitist position in the 1980s that 
excluded veiled women towards a more accomodating and all-inclusive position 
makes Eraslan think about the effects of postmodernity on identities. She asks the 
following question: 
“Is this postmodernity? Could be... However, I don’t think that there are huge 
rifts between the traditional and the modern on the one hand and between the 
modern and the postmodern on the other. There is no gigantic holes. And I 
think that in time the possibility to establish connection between them will 
emerge out of women’s language.” (Ibid) 
 
Eraslan’s above statement is quite revealing in terms of her approach to identities. As 
a reaction to essentializing conceptualizations of veiled women’s identities, she 
points out new trends in identity politics, which dismiss old essentialist 
understandings and acknowledge differences and multiplicities in the construction of 
subject positions. Stating that there should not be an absolute cleavage between the 
new and old forms of subject positions, she suggests to find a midway through 
women’s language, which could serve as a mirror to uncover commonalities between 
different subject positions.  
On the other hand, when asked to explain her conception of the term “woman 
writer”, Ramazanoğlu elaborates on the disciplinary mechanisms inherently 
embedded in identity categories. She declares that the act of labeling women writers 
on the basis of their sex is a form of violence:   
“It is a form of violence... I feel as if I were exposed to physical violence. I 
told you earlier that someone accused me of wanting to be one of the four 
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wives of a man... This is a categorization. Just like I cannot find an answer to 
give to such a categorization, I cannot accept the term ‘woman writer’ either.” 
(June 4, 2013) 
For Ramazanoğlu, identity categorizations and labels can only be used if subjects 
themselves define their meaning. All other definitions imposed from outside are 
attempts to fix the subject’s position in the existing power configuration. Thus, she 
states that she could use the label “woman writer” if she herself defines what it really 
signifies. In this sense, she states that she accepts the usage of the label “woman 
writer” only if it aims to stress gender consciousness and women’s peculiar 
experiences. Her approach to the label “veiled woman writer” also displays similar 
features. She states that the subject position defined through the label “Islamist 
woman writer” is an uncanny realm because she cannot really know how those who 
use this phrase define it. It is an uncanny realm for her in the sense that it is used as a 
discursive tool to silence the very subject it attempts to define.  
“If someone uses the term ‘woman writer’ to stress women’s consioussness 
and women’s differential traits, I can accept that. But if she/he also adds the 
term ‘Islamist’ as a prefix in front of this label, then I would say this would 
be totally unnecessary. After all, I don’t define myself as ‘Islamist’. If I were 
to use this label, I would explain in detail what Islamism really is… However, 
if someone else categorizes me through this term, I don’t know what it 
includes. Since it is a very suspicious and uncanny realm for me, I cannot 
accept it…”  (Ibid) 
 
For Ramazanoğlu, the label “Islamist” or veiled woman writer” is a discursive tool 
that positions its user hierarchically vis-a-vis Islamist women since the user claims 
that s/he knows everything about Islamist women and thus leaves no room for 
Islamist women to speak in their own name. In short, Ramazanoğlu states that she 
would use the label “Islamist women writer” only if she herself defines what 
“Islamist” and being an “Islamist women writer” means. 
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Relying on the statements above, one can suggest that for Ramazanoğlu the 
critical question is for what purpose the label in question is utilized. She denies all 
the labels and identity categories if they are utilized with the aim to attribute an 
essence to subjects and fix their position in society. In this sense, it is possible to 
claim that for Ramazanoğlu, defining one’s identity through a label does not 
inevitably lead to essentialism. In her account, if the subjects themselves define what 
the identity labels correspond to, then it signifies an expression of an identity 
position which is not necessarily fixed or essential. However, if the label is defined 
from outside and imposed on subjects, then it should be evaluated as a form of sheer 
violence.   
Adopting a critical approach to identity labels, Karaca claims that the labels 
“Islamist woman writer” or “veiled writer” are discursive tools utilized by the secular 
front to resist against the enhancement of veiled women’s status in society and to 
imply that they don’t want to live together with veiled women. For her, the aim in 
using such labels is to present pious women writers as marginal subjects.  
In Karaca’s mind-set, the label “woman writer” is already outdated; nobody 
can dare to use it because it openly corresponds to a sexist terminology.  
“There is nothing to praise in the term “woman writer”... Considering that no 
one ever uses the term “male writer”, I believe that the stress on womanhood 
in addressing a woman writer cannot be well-intentioned.” (June 27, 2013)  
 
Having said this, Karaca states that unlike the term “woman writer”, the label “veiled 
writer” and “Islamist woman writer” are still in force and are boldly used to 
stigmatize veiled women’s writing. According to Karaca, these labels directly target 
the potential readers who may read pious women writers’ columns and aim to warn 
them about the “marginal” stance that they may encounter in such columns. Karaca 
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claims that labels are mostly used to point out what deviates from the established set 
of norms in society. In a sarcastic tone, she states that we never use labels such as 
“writer who wears glasses” or “writer whose hair has gone grey” since we accept 
them as “normal”. In this sense, for her, individuals resort to labels only if they want 
to underline the “marginality” of certain identity positions.  
Tuksal agrees with other columnists on the idea that the term “woman writer” 
is a patriarchal term locating women writers in an inferior position vis-a-vis male 
writers.  
“As if women represent a species that is unable to write and there are those 
other women who surprisingly write… This kind of a stress expressed 
through the term ‘woman writer’ is really absurd and weird.”  (April 15, 
2013) 
 
Tuksal also elaborates on different ways in which the term woman writer is utilized. 
She differentiates between a sexist usage of the term and other discursive attempts 
that resort to this term to stress women’s consciousness. Yet, it is interesting to note 
that rather than acknowledging the possibility of redefining the content of the term in 
an affirmative, positive way, she focuses more on the essentialist public usage and 
thus denounces the term. 
“In public discourse this term is used mostly with the aim to differentiate 
women on the basis of gender, not to refer to women writers with gender 
consciousness. Even women who write like men, are called women writers. 
That is, one is not called a woman writer because of the content of the 
writing, but just because of one’s gender.” (Ibid) 
 
As seen above, pious women writers are quite critical of essentializing attempts that 
position them into fixed identity categories through certain identity labels. While 
some writers conclude their critique with a denial of all identity labels, others 
differentiate between essentialist use of labels and subject’s own definition of that 
particular identity label.  
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8.5.5. Islam, Feminism and Islamic Feminism 
As seen so far, pious women columnists harshly criticize essentialist conceptions of 
identity labels that in return serve to marginalize veiling and veiled women’s subject 
positions in society. One can argue that this anti-essentialist critique promises a 
significant potential to deconstruct the orthodox arguments defining Islam and 
feminism in binary opposition. In this sense, pious women columnists’ narratives on 
Islam, feminism and Islamic feminism expose novel ways in which the relationship 
between Islam and femnism can be redefined through a dialectical approach. Yet, 
despite this transformative, regenerative potential, their narratives also have serious 
limitations in reconsidering the coexistence of Islam and feminism. Below is a 
summary of the striking points in pious women columnists’ narratives on Islam, 
feminism and Islamic feminism.    
Eraslan (2011: 13) investigates the applicability of the term “Islamic 
feminism” to the Turkish context. To this end, she poses the following questions:  
“Is there an Islamic feminist movement in Turkey?”, Is it proper to identify 
women’s sensitivities, reflexes and activities about certain subjects as a 
movement?, Can we evaluate women’s activities and protests which are 
incorporated into other ideological projects as an independent women’s 
movement?”  
 
Keeping such questions in mind, Eraslan alleges that it is not possible to identify 
current activities of religious women in Turkey as a women’s movement that treats 
women as individual subjects and aims to make structural transformations for 
enhancing gender equality. Rather, for Eraslan (Ibid) these activities can be seen as 
reactive, political, gradual responses to certain discriminatory practices and legal 
frameworks. Thus, Eraslan prefers the term “Islamic women’s activity” (İslami kadın 
hareketliliği) over “Islamic women’s movement”.  
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Having made this differentiation, Eraslan points out the importance of 
intellectual attempts to write women’s history136 and the mobilization of broader 
masses in the formation of a women’s movement and alleges that the formation of 
Islamic women’s movement in Turkey is not completed in terms of these 
components.  
“There is a certain activity but it has to go through certain processes and have 
ahistory. This means that it is neccesary to make an analytical study into its 
historical roots… There are certain historical studies such as Yıldız 
Ramazanoğlu’s Kadın Tarihinin Dönüşümü or my article titled 
‘Uğultular, Silüetler…’ But these works talk about Islamic women’s activity, 
not a women’s movement.” (interview, January 28, 2013) 
 
On the other hand, in her introduction to the collection of essays of Şule Yüksel, a 
precursor pious woman writer in the 1970s, she identifies the symbolization of veiled 
women’s identities in the Islamist movement as the major reason to account for the 
lack of an Islamic women’s movement in Turkey. As noted earlier, she uses the term 
“bacı” (sister) to express the genderless and silenced existence of women in Islamist 
politics. In her mind-set, bacı refers to a selfless entity which gives up on her needs 
and demands and devotes herself to the broader social and political goals defined by 
the ideological project in question. To explain this genderless position further, she 
notes that when Islamist men wanted to praise Şule Yüksel, they used such terms as 
“our brother Şule Yüksel” or “hoca efendi”, which aim to obliterate her womanhood 
and even turn her into a man. (2011: 16) 
In this frame, Eraslan asserts that the erosion of gender differences in the 
Islamist movement endangers the possibility of organizing a women’s movement 
based on gender consciousness. She further declares that there is always another 
                                                          
136
 See Eraslan (2002), Ramazanoğlu (2000). Eraslan cites these works as crucial attempts to 
reconceptualize women’s history in modern Turkey.  
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component in Islamist women’s activities such as family, environment, children or 
health; thus, these activities fail to focus primarily on gender consciousness and 
women’s autonomous identities. On the other hand, Eraslan also adds that Islamist 
women’s activities have come to embrace a wider array of differences and display a 
higher representativeness in the first decade of 2000s, which increases their chance to 
gradually evolve into a women’s movement. (Ibid, 17) 
One can argue that Eraslan’s analysis about the lack of an Islamist women’s 
movement in Turkey has also to do with her own journey into the feminist thought 
and activism. As a pious woman writer, who cannot accomodate herself in the 
existing publics respresented by the orthodox Islamist thought on the one hand and 
the secular feminist movement on the other, she expresses the need for an Islamic 
feminist platform through which the feminist ideals and Islamic faith could be 
reconciled. Given that one can hardly find such platforms in pious women’s civil 
society activities, Eraslan had to find her way on her own by appropriating feminist 
ideals in line with her religiosity. Thus, it can be claimed that by stressing the lack of 
an Islamic women’s movement in Turkey, Eraslan implies the uniqueness of her 
position marked by efforts to reconcile her religiosity with feminist ideals and the 
difficulty of positioning her authentic experiences in the public sphere. 
She also touches upon the idea of empathy and self-reflexivity as connection 
points between the secular feminist ideas on the one hand and the religious 
commitments on the other. In this sense, regarding her experiences about the secular 
feminist movement in Turkey, Eraslan stresses the unique importance of individual 
stories as principal elements of the relationship in-between:  
 
“When you unearth the uniqueness of individual stories, you see that there is 
a whole different world beyond the categories such as women, men or 
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Islamists. The studies I have done on women’s history have opened this door 
for me. I have learnt that thinking through categories and masses makes one 
lazy. Having acquired this knowledge, I have come to know myself better... 
Given the religious conviction that you have, how can you make room for 
yourself in the Western understanding of freedom? Asking such questions, I 
have come to figure out the meanings of freedom thanks to the women’s 
movement.” (January 28, 2013) 
 
One can suggest that this stress on relationality, self-reflexivity and affection is 
another building block in Eraslan’s critique of the polarizing character of fixed 
identity categorizations and labels. By pointing out the importance of dialogue, 
Eraslan appreciates the possibility of recognizing commonalities between Islamic 
feminist and secular feminist positions. In this sense, what is most important in her 
narrative on the relationship between Islam and feminism is mutual understanding 
and affinity established by close human relations transcending essentialist fixations 
of identity positions.      
In her narrative on Islamic feminism, Ramazanoğlu first deals with the 
compatibility of Islam and feminism. She opposes the argument that Islam is a 
mysogynist religion and Islamic practices are against women’s rights. Rather, she 
argues that not Islam and Qur’an per se, but the patriarchal interpretations of Islamic 
verses contradict women’s human rights. In this sense, her narrative echoes the 
arguments trying to justify the compatibility of Islam and feminism in the feminist 
literature and is formulated as a defense against possible counter-arguments. To 
justify her position, Ramazanoğlu gives examples from the history of Islam, showing 
the dignity and respect women enjoyed in the Islamic tradition:  
“Ontologically Islam is not a religion that suppresses women; rather, the 
opposite is true. There was this past tradition in Islam that urged fathers to 
raise out of respect when their daughters enter the room. Each time when 
Fatima entered the room, our prophet raised because of his affection and 
respect for her.” (June 4, 2013) 
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It is important to note that Ramazanoğlu’s narrative begins with a defensive 
discourse. One can say that defensive discourse strategies underlying veiled women’s 
public visibilities echoe in their public declarations about their Islamic feminist 
stance as well. They produce a defensive and cautious narrative that takes into 
account possible counter-arguments.  
Having justified the compatibility of Islam and feminism, Ramazanoğlu states 
that reading feminism through Islamic lenses enhances her conception of feminism 
and vice versa. Ramazanoğlu maintains that feminism gains a new perspective 
through a reading that is informed by Islam, more specifically by the Islamic 
conception of equity (hakkaniyet). For Ramazanoğlu, Islamic equity is a concept that 
is superior than the feminist ideal of equality. It is based on the compatibility of men 
and women and forms expectations, allocates tasks and responsibilities according to 
the ontological capacities of both genders:  
“I always give this example… The artwork of an Iranian miniaturist. This 
picture of Ferhat and Şirin depicts a story in which Şirin gets tired and her 
horse gets tired, too. Upon this, Ferhat shoulders Şirin together with her 
horse. When I first saw this, I thought that this should be what goes beyond 
feminism. A man who can shoulder the woman together with her tired 
horse…” (Ibid) 
 
Ramazanoğlu also argues that when read in the light of the feminist framework, 
Islamic verses acquire new meanings beyond the patriarchal interpretations and 
Qur’an is reconciled with contemporary feminist ideals. Therefore, she stresses that it 
is not possible to grasp Qur’an fully without acknowledging the usefulness of 
feminist scholarship first.  
Ramazanoğlu’s narrative oscillates between an Islamic and a feminist 
framework. At one point, Ramazanoğlu celebrates the feminist line of thinking on 
the basis that it has transformed the patriarchal approach to women in Islam; yet at 
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another point, she prefers the Islamic framework over the feminist framework. For 
example, while discussing the idea of gender, she prioritizes the Islamic concept of 
equity, rather than equality. She differentiates between the Islamic concept of equity 
and equality by referring to the idea of compatibility between sexes. In this sense, 
she maintains that it is better for men and women to realize their ontological 
disposition rather than to adopt to a legal understanding of equality. For her, the legal 
conception of equality may not take into account the potentialities and capacities of 
sexes and thus may lead to a relentless conflict between sexes.  
Ramazanoğlu’s views on equity/equality debate becomes more clear when 
her views on motherhood and construction of gender identities are taken into 
account. Ramazanoğlu argues that motherhood is a unique experience that women 
should not suppress or deny because it is an expression of women’s invaluable 
ontological capacity to create life. Here, she articulates an objection to the radical 
feminist argument, which claims that motherhood and maternal thinking may hamper 
women’s autonomy. 137  Moreover, with respect to the construction of gender 
identities, she thinks that gender is not socially constructed altogether but also 
corresponds to an essential core in both sexes:  
“The concept of gender leads us to the point where we find ourselves defining 
womanhood and manhood culturally… Yet, having raised children, I can see 
that there is a certain masculinity/femininity that humans are endowed with 
by birth… My grandson, whose mother tried to make her play with dolls to 
arouse affection in him, automatically gets interested in cars, trucks, etc… 
How are we going to explain this? One of the thinkers who profoundly affect 
me is Kristeva… She opposes the cultural definition of motherhood. For her, 
if we define motherhood as such, we become impoverished because it is an 
existential and ontologial part of our existence, not something that we should 
suppress… I agree with her…” (Ibid)   
 
                                                          
137
 For a detailed account, see Ruddick (1980).  
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Here, Ramazanoğlu explicitly refuses the idea that gender identities are completely 
social constructs. For her, social constructivism in this regard may lead to the idea of 
sexual orientation and legitimize homosexual relationships, which is quite 
problematic in Ramazanoğlu’s thinking. She states that she would defend the LGBT 
rights to the end yet she would not display a special effort to promote homosexual 
relationships through gay prides or other mechanisms because of the difficulties that 
she experiences in reconciling her Islamic faith and the issue of sexual orientation.   
In addition to the equity/equality debate, Ramazanoğlu opposes the attempts 
to excessively demarcate gender identities. She refers to the Islamic idea that gender 
identities are ephemeral images and thus should not be that decisive in the expression 
of identity: 
“In fact souls are genderless... while descending to earth, we appear as man or 
woman. This is created by God as a richness. One should not produce a 
language from here to stigmatize people with gender identities...” (Ibid) 
For Ramazanoğlu, instead of generating a conflict based on gender identities, 
individuals should try to negotiate on the basis of what is right or wrong.  
In sum, while reconciling her Islamic faith and her feminist stance, 
Ramazanoğlu utilizes the conceptual tools of the Islamic framework at some point 
and those of the feminist thought at some other, which makes her narrative quite 
unstable and flexible. Therefore, one can argue that her conception of Islamic 
feminism corresponds to a very peculiar standpoint that makes it impossible to 
identify a stable, core ideological framework that Ramazanoğlu primarily relies on. 
Since her interpretive framework constantly shifts between Islamic and feminist 
standpoints, neither Islam nor feminism constitutes the permanent linchpin of 
Ramazanoğlu’s conception of Islamic feminism. Rather, it is the dialectical 
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relationship between Islam and feminism that gives its peculiar tones to her 
conception of Islamic feminism. The quotation below is quite useful in this respect:       
 
“My position vis-a-vis feminism acknowledges feminism’s weaknesses and 
poses criticisms against it. Yet, despite this, it appreciates the usefulness of 
feminist literature, makes use of it and even gains a deeper insight of Islam in 
the mirror of feminism. Because you cannot understand Qur’an without this 
knowledge. If my understanding of Qur’an does not include all women and 
cannot address their problems, then it is not meaningful enough. It is crucial 
to interpret it by reconciling different layers of experiences.”  (Ibid) 
 
Similar to Ramazanoğlu, Tuksal constantly revises and renegotiates the meanings of 
Islamic feminism by engaging in a critical reading of both Islam and feminism. Her 
critique against the patriarchal tones in the commentaries on the Qur’an dates back to 
her doctoral dissertation where she meticulously identifies the miosgynist points in 
the Islamic tradition and points out the possibility of reading Islam’s holy text 
through gender conscious lenses. On the other hand, the challenges she poses against 
secular feminisms cover a broad array of subjects ranging from the elitist character of 
feminist movements in Turkey to the essentialist tendencies of feminisms in the 
West. Drawing on these two lines of criticisms, Tuksal denotes that Islam and 
feminism can be read in the light of each other in such a way that in the end they 
come to embrace multiplicities and different subject positions. Her criticisms of 
secular feminisms and the peculiarities of her Islamic feminist standpoint will be 
much more clear when her approach to feminist self-identification and identity labels 
are discussed in greater detail.  
What is also interesting in her narrative is the generational reading that she 
resorts to in evaluating gender consciousness among Islamist women in Turkey. As a 
pioneer woman in the public sphere who has challenged the misogynist discourses in 
the Islamist community and the exclusionary character of the secular camp, she states 
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that in the contemporary era it is easier for veiled women to adopt a gender conscious 
standpoint as they have more access to intellectual resources.
138
 For her, this makes it 
more likely that Islamic feminism in contemporary Turkey can flourish on a larger 
scale than before:  
“In the past everyone had to believe what the local religious leader said... But 
in time we as women theologians formed our own interpretations of the 
Qur’an and escaped the tyranny of misogynist interpretations… I see these 
deep questionings flourishing among women in the conservative circles… 
They have role models now, these were very few of them in the past but now 
there are plenty… I hope this will have a positive impact on conservative 
women’s questionings…” (April 15, 2013)  
  
Like Ramazanoğlu’s narrative, Tuksal’s narrative is marked by a pendulum 
movement oscillating between feminist and Islamic frameworks. At certain points, 
she puts the emphasis on the feminist rereading of Islam; at other points she shifts to 
a mainly Islamic position and elaborates on aspects of feminism which contradicts 
her religious conviction. This dynamism and hybridity in her conception of Islamic 
feminism makes it difficult to locate it into a fixed framework.    
 This constant movement in Ramazanoğlu’s and Tuksal’s narratives turns into 
a stable account in Karaca’s narrative. Even though Karaca acknowledges that Islam 
and feminism can transform each other, she clearly puts the emphasis on the Islamic 
framework when reflecting on the coexistence of Islam and feminism: 
“The category of Islamic feminism includes every individual who on the one 
hand appreciates the Islamic framework and wants to live according to it and 
on the other hand, is aware of gender inequality in society and is convinced 
that since God cannot approve of it, this inequality should be overcome 
altogether. However, what is important here is to disclose the ties that Islamic 
                                                          
138
 Indeed, this generational reading is not peculiar to Tuksal’s narrative but can also be detected in 
many other narratives in this study. As most of the women writers in this study are pioneer women 
in their fields, they tend to adopt a generational approach and make comparisons between their 
time and the contemporary time period. This point makes it necessary to take into account this 
generational aspect as an analytical category. Thus, in the upcoming chapters, I will try to 
understand how the issue of being a pioneer woman in the intellectual field in Turkey affects women 
writers’ approach to identities.   
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feminism has with the secular form of feminism in the West... If it is going to 
be called Islamic feminism, then the Islamic framework should be maintained 
as its reference point… If secular feminism constitutes the center of gravity in 
our conceptions of Islamic feminism, then you cannot call it Islamic…” (June 
27, 2013) 
 
In her statement above, Karaca clearly distinguishes the Islamic framework as the 
decisive component in the conceptions of Islamic feminism. For her, feminism can 
be reconciled with Islam as long as the Islamic framework permits for this 
interaction. This clear-cut emphasis on the Islamic framework stems from Karaca’s 
criticisms’ against secular feminisms in Turkey and in the West, which we will touch 
upon later in this chapter. 
To conclude, veiled women columnists acknowledge the coexistence of Islam 
and feminism and the transformative effects of the relationship inbetween, though in 
differing degrees. Despite certain reservations in their line of thinking, Tuksal and 
Ramazanoğlu tend to adopt an Islamic feminist position; Eraslan stresses the 
hybridity and peculiarity of her standpoint, while Karaca clearly distances herself 
from any identity position. As a result, their narratives on Islamic feminism display a 
heterogenous character. Some of these narratives have the potential of coming up a 
dynamic, flexible understanding of Islamic feminism. They can also be considered as 
striking examples pointing out the limitations deeply embedded in the relationship 
between Islam and feminism. 
  
8.5.6. Critique of Western Secular Feminisms 
It is possible to suggest that pious women columnists’ approach to feminist 
self-identification and their conception of the coexistence of Islam and feminism is to 
a great extend shaped by their critique of Western secular feminisms. They state that 
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essentialist and elitist categories that Western feminisms have produced over years 
have rendered many of the feminist ideas alien to Muslim women.  
For example, to challenge the prevalent definition of “liberated woman” in 
the Western discourse, Ramazanoğlu touches upon the recent war in Iraq and 
Afghanistan which has had a great impact on her writing. For her, while devastating 
an Eastern country in the name of freedom and democracy, the Western powers also 
claimed that they liberated the indigenous women, unveiled them and saved them 
from the patriarchal indigenous men.  
“Afghanistan has become devastated during the war; but the news in the 
United States announce this as the following: ‘Women are very happy. They 
got rid of their burqas and found themselves in hairdressing salons…’ How 
are we going to make sense of this?” (June 4, 2013) 
  
In her critique of the Western discourse about women’s liberation in the East, 
Ramazanoğlu echoes the postcolonial feminist arguments. Referring to Spivak, a 
well-known postcolonial feminist theorist, she elaborates on the limitations of the 
colonial feminist arguments and alleges that the West discursively utilizes the image 
of Muslim women to promote its actions in those regions. In this sense, she reacts 
both to the Western conception of Muslim women as victims to be saved from the 
patriarchal Eastern men and the so-called women’s emancipation in Iraq and 
Afghanistan which she sees as limited to the allocation of a few symbolic seats in the 
parliament to women. She has published her views in two collections of essays titled 
“Baghdad Fragments” and  “Women During Occupation”.  
In addition, in her critique of elitism in Western feminisms, she also aligns 
with the black feminist struggle:  
“For example, let’s look at the feminist movement in England… I may be a 
black woman or an hispanic, Indian or Pakistani woman. If I am humiliated 
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here mainly because of my color…, can the feminist movement raise its voice 
against this discrimination? … Women of color criticize the feminist 
movement, saying that ‘we cannot cooperate because you form hierarchical, 
elitit relationships.’ These are quite rightful criticisms…” (Ibid)   
 
On the other hand, Tuksal denotes that one of the most acute problems of feminism 
in general is to impose on women certain role models and career paths. She argues 
that the feminist conception of professional woman who is assertive, ambitious and 
aspires to climb higher in the organizational hierarchy, may not respond to all 
women’s needs and desires. According to her, if a woman chooses to stay at home 
and have more than two kids, or prefers to work part-time in order to spend more 
time with her family, this should not be named as a retreat from feminist ideals:  
“For example, let’s take the issue of flexible working hours. Our feminist 
friends always oppose this… But, some women prefer part-time jobs… If a 
woman is a teacher, feminists want to see her as the director of her school. I 
was a teacher but I never wanted to be a director. Maybe I do not want to 
spend the whole day at school, maybe I want to stay at home and meet my 
friends. Thus, we are not supposed to impose on everybody the image of 
“ideal” woman who competes with men on every occasion.” (April 15, 2013) 
For Tuksal, perception of sexuality as a sign for women’s liberation is also quite 
problematic. She claims that some women in feminist movements resort to sexuality 
in order to feel themselves liberated. Tuksal’s critique regarding this approach to 
sexuality stems from her belief in rendering feminist struggles local. In this sense, 
she states that instead of imitating the Western lifestyles, norms and values, non-
western feminists should attempt to reconcile Western feminist ideas in line with the 
local practices.  
“Living a certain kind of [sexually permissive] lifestyle is regarded as an 
indicator of being a courageous and liberated women. I think this is an 
imposition. The definition of ideal woman changes accordingly. They define 
this kind of lifestyle as the norm so much so that for them, we lead banal, 
wasted lives. As long as they follow this line of thinking, it is not possible to 
build a common struggle… Thus, for me, the most acute problem of the 
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feminist movement in Turkey is not to be able to localize its struggle…” 
(Ibid)   
 
According to Tuksal, the emphasis on sexual freedom in feminist movements 
alienate a great segment of women, which in return results in failure in mass-
mobilization. Therefore, for her, what is really needed is not to adapt the Western 
theoretical framework as it is but to appropriate it according to the local context. This 
idea of “localization” of the feminist movements lies at the very center of Tuksal’s 
understanding of feminism. Since her thoughts are deeply informed by a critique of 
essentialism, she incorporates the intersectionalist argument into her narrative and 
clearly argues against any abstract conception of “woman”. In this sense, it is very 
critical for Tuksal that feminisms acknowledge women’s needs and demands in 
different contexts or identity positions. 
In Eraslan’s narrative, one can see a similar concern to localize the feminist 
thinking in line with indigenous demands and needs. For example, she criticizes 
feminism by stating that it is based on an anti-family stance and argues that this anti-
family ideology is a cleavage ideologically seperating feminist and Islamist women: 
“I believe that family is the place where a child can be raised best... I have 
raised three kids so far… Based on my experiences, I can tell that it should be 
the parents who protect the children and take care after them… Therefore, we 
clash with feminist friends most when it comes to the issue of family…” 
(January 28, 2013)  
 
As pointed out in earlier parts, Eraslan’s approach to women’s history, feminism and 
Islamic feminism involves hybrid, dynamic elements and tends to promote dialogue 
and communication between differences and multiplicities in subject positions. Yet, 
as far as her statement above is concerned, one can suggest that at certain points, her 
narrative may shift towards an essentialist conception of Western secular feminism, 
coding it categorically as anti-family.  
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Similar to other women columnists’ stress on motherhood, in her critique of 
Western feminisms Karaca also maintains that motherhood is a unique ontological 
capacity that women should cherish. In this regard, she underlines that a feminist 
position may be rightful only if it does not see women’s reproductive capacities as a 
burden:  
“I have never struggled against the ontological state of being a woman but 
always criticized the norms and limitations put on my womanhood… And I 
have never denied the fact that a woman is first and foremost a mother… A 
woman’s life is not limited to motherhood but ontologically she is created 
with a potential to be a mother... She may have other talents in life but this 
does not annul her potential to be a mother.” (June 27, 2013)  
 
Moreover, like other women columnists, Karaca identifies hierarchical social 
relationships among women as a crucial theme that feminism should deal with. She 
denotes that feminism cannot ignore the relationship between powerful women and 
women from lower strata in society. In this frame, through her critique of essentialist, 
categorical feminist ideas, she attempts to come up with a new definition of 
feminism that would be in line with her pious standpoint. In fact, all women 
columnists in this chapter negotiate feminist ideas, criticize essentialist conceptions 
of feminism and point out the possibility of redefining feminist approaches in a way 
that is inclusive of one’s needs and demands. On the other hand, at certain points in 
their critique of Western feminisms, they tend to limit Western feminisms’ meanings 
to essentialist conceptions. This paradoxical discourse that includes both 
deconstructive and essentialist components will be touched upon at length in the 
analysis part.   
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8.5.7. Critique of the Secular Feminist Narratives and Feminist Movements in 
Contemporary Turkey 
To understand pious women writers’ relationship to feminism, one also has to 
analyze their critique of the secular feminist movement in Turkey. The autonomus 
feminist movement when first emerged in the post-1980 era, failed to incorporate the 
demands of veiled women into its discourse. Organized by middle class, well-
educated, secular women, the post-1980 feminist movement in Turkey as a 
counterpart of the the second wave feminism in the West mainly focused on issues 
such as the elimination of violence against women and suppression of women’s 
sexuality. (Sirman 1989) In this context, feminist women developed a new language 
prioritizing autonomy and individualism. They utilized this new language to redefine 
their relationship to state and challenged the Kemalist Republican framework for 
women’s emancipation. Heavily criticizing the orthodox Republican mindset, they 
argued that the Republican modernization project confined women’s emancipation to 
legal equality and relied on an ideal public image of professional women as the 
marker of modern Republic while ignoring repressive gender relations in the private 
domain. (Arat, 2000: 10) Yet, as noted above, this feminist critique mainly focused 
on the rights and liberties of middle class, secular women and could not integrate the 
demands of veiled women into its discourse.  
The divide between secular and religious women has come to be challenged 
only in the 1990s with the emergence of cleavages and multiplicities in feminist 
demands. Islamist and Kurdish women as well as the lesbian–gay-bisexual–
transsexual (LGBT) movements have led to the disintegration of the monolithic 
conceptions of gender relations in Turkey and helped bring about a dramatic change 
in the history of feminist movements. (Diner & Toktaş 2010) The rise of differences 
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on the stage of feminisms in return has led to self-reflexive questioning of secular 
feminisms and pointed out the necessity of a stance accomodating pluralities. For 
example, the feminist monthly Pazartesi: Hanımlara Mahsus Gazete [Monday: 
Newspaper for Women] published between 1995 and 2003 is emblematic in this 
respect. In various issues of the journal, it has been stated that the headscarf bans 
marginalized veiled women, resulted in their isolation from public life and confined 
them to the private realm. (Arat, 2004: 288) Arguing against state authoritarianism 
that prohibits headscarf, the journal conducted interviews with veiled women 
activists, published passages from pious women intellectuals’ narratives and in this 
way provided a space for them to voice their opinions. (Ibid, 289) Such platforms 
facilitating dialogue between secular and religious women can be clearly noted as 
invaluable accomplishments of women’s movements in the 1990s. As discussed in 
Chapter V, the political urgency of hot gender debates in the 2000’s resulted in the 
flourishing of these collaborative platforms. However, during the interviews I have 
observed that veiled women today are still cautious while talking about the dialogue 
with the secular feminist movement. They expect more empathy and a genuine 
interest in their demands to further enhance this dialogue. 
As noted before, Eraslan’s motivation for writing stems from a commitment 
to expose the neglected parts of women’s history. In this sense, she puts great 
emphasis on historical accounts providing new readings of women’s emancipation in 
Turkey. Confronting the canonical Republican narrative, which limits the history of 
women’s emancipation to the time period following the foundation of Republic, 
Eraslan cites influential female figures from the late Ottoman period as important 
reference points in her line of thinking: 
“Fatma Aliye, Emine Semiha, Halide Edip, Halide Nusret Zorlutuna, Safiye 
Erol, Semiha Ayverdi…  I regard these figures as my precursor. There is also 
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another cohort of women writers who did not personally experience the 
Ottoman modernization period, were raised in the Republican period but 
define themselves through Islamic values. Şule Yüksel was the precursor in 
this new generation of women writers who adopt an Islamist standpoint.” 
(January 28, 2013) 
The intellectual figures cited above from the late Ottoman period are crucial for 
Eraslan since they reconciled the Islamic faith with claims for gender equality. In a 
similar way, the generation of pious women writers in the 1970s and 80s, among 
which Şule Yüksel is a precursor figure, are significant role models for Eraslan. 
Reference to such influential female figures in history clearly reveals the motives 
underlying Eraslan’s writing: First, she aims to write women’s history in Turkey 
anew by rendering pious women visible. Second, in an attempt to define her peculiar 
place in the public sphere in Turkey today, she attempts to position herself on the 
stage of history by establishing intellectual ties with like-minded historical female 
figures.  
For Eraslan, there are different turning points in the trajectory of historical 
accounts on women’s liberation in Turkey. The revelation of the late Ottoman 
women’s movement is quite significant for Eraslan in the sense that as a result of this 
discovery, the historical experience of interpreting gender equality through the lenses 
provided by the Islamic framework have been brought to light. In addition to this, 
Eraslan cites the rising visibility of pious women in the public sphere in the post-
1970 period as another turning point in this respect. Thirdly, with regard to the 
dialogue between the secular feminists and pious women, she regards the 1990s as 
another turning point in women’s history.  
As Eraslan explains, the language of state feminism, which established a 
binary opposition between the religious and the secular, has become obsolete in the 
1990s and 2000s as a result of women’s discovery of areas of common struggle: 
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“Struggling against headscarf bans, in union activism or following a rape 
case, we learned from each others’ sensitivities. These experiences have 
brought us closer…” (Ibid) 
Eraslan underlines how cooperation and dialogue helped erode the distance between 
secular and religious women. It is important to note that for Eraslan, this dialogue 
has not only changed the dynamics of secular feminist movement but also pointed 
out the potential in Islamic women’s activities towards developing a movement 
based on women’s consciousness.  
As alleged above, Eraslan’s views on the lack of an Islamic feminist 
movement in Turkey mark the uniqueness of her positionality in the public sphere as 
a pious woman writer who argues for reconciliation of Islamic faith and feminist 
ideals. Thus, her remarks stressing the commonalities between the demands of 
secular feminists and religious women could be read as a projection of her authentic 
relationship with feminism. With an attempt to figure out her position vis-a-vis the 
secular feminist movements, she stresses the existence of pluralities in feminism and 
criticizes the tendency to place subjects into categories or groups. She calls for an 
understanding to evaluate each and every case with its authenticities and differences. 
It is obvious that this criticism stems from a reaction to categorical attempts to label 
religiosity and veiling as traditional, backward and as the marker of submission to 
patriarchy. In this regard, Eraslan’s conception of feminism is motivated by a 
critique of essential categories and generalizations and is highly informed by 
concepts such as positionality, context and difference. 
The key terms for Eraslan are “solidarity, cooperation and sisterhood”. She 
uses these terms frequently while explaining her conception of Islamic feminism and 
her position vis-a-vis feminism in general:  
“Cooperation, love, friendship... I take these concepts quite seriously. It is 
important that we can transact information via women’s experiences and acts. 
343 
 
Despite all the disagreements between us, whenever we, women in the media 
and literature, come together, we have always learned something from each 
other...” (Ibid) 
 
This particular discourse stressing cooperation and solidarity represent an 
intersection point where Islamic references meet secular feminist ideals, generating a 
new position inbetween. The recurrence of themes such as cooperation and 
friendship implies that for Eraslan the meaning of feminist ideals can only be 
discovered in dialogue with other women. This bold emphasis on dialogue could be 
read as an expression of hybridity, dynamism and change, which prepares the ground 
for a constant learning process from others’ experiences and repositioning of the self 
in line with this process.  
On the one hand, it is obvious that this stress on dialogue implies close ties 
with the secular feminist movement. Eraslan tells that she has very close feminist 
friends whom she can trust by all means:  
“...I have come across good feminist women who make me feel secure, 
encourage me and make me laugh. I was lucky, I guess. Feminism means 
friendships and solidarity to me...” (Ibid) 
 
On the other hand, this call for dialogue inevitably corresponds to a particular 
distance between different subject positions. Especially when it comes to labels or 
naming identity positions, Eraslan prefers to stress the distance inbetween.  
As for Ramazanoğlu and her views on the relation between the secular 
feminist movement and veiled women, it is possible to say that she is both optimistic 
and cautious. She first states that much has been accomplished to establish a dialogue 
between secular feminists and veiled women. Having said this, she adds that it took 
too much time to reach the current state of affairs and this is a major drawback in the 
dialogue inbetween, which makes it difficult to keep up with constantly changing 
social and political realities of veiled women. Ramazanoğlu further elaborates on 
344 
 
veiled women’s first attempts to contact with feminist women writing in feminist 
journals: 
“For example, journals such as Feminist and Kaktüs excited us. We wanted to 
get in touch with them in order to figure out whether we could collaborate. 
There are letters that they have written us. They said: ‘How could we 
collaborate if you have certain ideas in your mind.’ But they had certain 
ideas, too... Intentionally or unintentionally, they treated us with a statist 
understanding.” (June 4, 2013) 
 
Ramazanoğlu clearly puts forward that in these first attempts to build a dialogue, the 
discourse of secular feminist women was mainly shaped by a statist understanding 
that regards headscarf as a barrier to women’s liberation. To point out the difficulty 
of establishing a dialogue inbetween, she quotes a friend commenting on secular 
feminists’ attitude vis-a-vis veiled women:  
“When a veiled woman speaks, they get surprised as if a jug or a vase 
suddenly came to speak.” (Ibid) 
 
For Ramazanoğlu, this elitist attitude in the secular feminist movement in Turkey, 
which limits feminist projects to urban, middle-class, unveiled women, reminds one 
of the exclusion of black or working class women from the second wave feminism in 
the West.  
Ramazanoğlu expresses that the encounters between secular feminists and 
veiled women have increased in the aftermath of the foundation of the Başkent Kadın 
Platformu (Capital Women’s Platform), a non-governmental women’s organization 
initiated by Islamist women. She also refers to Amargi Women’s Solidarity 
Cooperative [Amargi Kadın Dayanışma Kooperatifi], a women’s NGO based in 
Istanbul, as a significant platform contributing to the burgeoning of dialogue between 
two parties. She puts great emphasis on the collective works that provide a ground 
for secular feminists and veiled women to come together for common goals. In this 
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sense, she cites the Platform “We Stand By One Another”139, (Birbirimize Sahip 
Çıkıyoruz Platformu) as a turning point in the history of women’s movement in 
Turkey. Ramazanoğlu narrates one of the protests of the platform as below:  
“Nükhet Sirman (a feminist activist and sociology professor in Bosphorus 
University) took the flag and said: ‘I am there just to share my knowledge 
with my students. How could you attempt to use me as a police force to throw 
veiled students out. I object to this...’ Many feminist women have taken part 
in our protests. All women from the Amargi circle... This was an invaluable 
experience for us...” (Ibid) 
 
Taking into account all the way that veiled women’s activism and secular women’s 
movement has gone through, Ramazanoğlu argues that the integration of veiled 
women’s demands into secular feminist movements has extended the scope of 
feminist projects in Turkey and revealed how much women need to cooperate and 
live together side by side.  
“…We do not have the luxury to live in our ghettos and produce constant 
opposition against each other. Everyone has a lot to share with each other... If 
so many well educated young women today declare that they veil on their 
own will and experience liberation through their veiling, one has to take them 
seriously. Finally, they [secular feminists] have started to take them 
seriously.”  (Ibid) 
 
In this frame, similar to Eraslan, she identifies cooperation, dialogue and mutual 
understanding as key terms in feminist movements. It is also worth noting that for 
Ramazanoğlu, this dialogue should embrace all different segments of society. Here, 
she refers to another platform called Women’s Initiative for Peace, which brings 
women together to collaborate on the Kurdish question and the recent attempts to 
maintain peace. In this sense, one can suggest that feminist politics for Ramazanoğlu 
does not only concern women’s rights and demands but should have a say about 
                                                          
139
This was a women’s platform founded in 2008 with the aim to bring together both veiled and 
unveiled women around the common cause of protesting against headscarf bans.  
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other policy realms as well, especially other right claims. Accordingly, in 
Ramazanoğlu’s mind-set, feminist politics crosscuts all political debates with regard 
to identity politics and displays an intersectionalist character.   
As clearly seen above, for Ramazanoğlu, the dialogue recently established 
between secular and veiled women is quite promising in the sense that it has 
demolished the elitist, hierarchical relationships in the feminist movements in 
Turkey. In this regard, Ramazanoğlu’s narrative is marked by optimism, not 
resentment. On the other hand, this optimistic narrative is followed by a cautious 
narrative that points out the orthodox tendencies in the secular feminist movement. 
Ramazanoğlu identifies the Merve Kavakçı case as the marker of the distance 
between veiled women’s demands and secular women’s conception of women’s 
rights and liberties.  
In 1999 elections, Merve Kavakçı has been elected as an MP from the 
Felicity Party. Yet, when she entered the parliament, she was precluded to take the 
parliamentary oath due to her headscarf. Ramazanoğlu reminds us that on the very 
same day, a group of secular women, who define themselves as feminist, protested 
against Kavakçı and called her to leave the parliament:  
“…Rather than arguing for a pluralist understanding of women’s 
representation in the parliament, they defended a monolithic, Republican 
approach that condemns individuals to labels… How can you come together 
and cooperate with such a movement?” (Ibid) 
 
For Ramazanoğlu, this orthodox attitude towards veiling in the secular feminist 
movement confines veiled women to a fixed, inferior position and eradicates their 
claims for fundamental rights, resulting in frustration and disppoinment for many 
veiled women. Ramazanoğlu also cites KA-DER (Kadın Adayları Destekleme 
Derneği), a women’s organization that aims to provide training for women aspiring 
347 
 
to take a role in politics, as another platform that had reproduced the orthodox 
Republican conception of veiling and refused to collaborate with veiled women for 
some time.  
Im sum, Ramazanoğlu’s narrative on the secular feminist movement in 
Turkey clearly reflects the historical stages that the feminist movements in Turkey 
have gone through since the post-1980 era. Stressing both the promising 
developments and the pervasive exclusionary tendencies, it displays an optimistic as 
well as a cautious character. Taking her account into consideration, one can suggest 
that the current era of dialogue and cooperation in the feminist movements has not 
totally erased veiled women’s worries about exclusion and their resentment dating 
back to the initial stages of the movement. While talking about their experiences with 
the secular feminist movement, veiled women still resort to a discourse that is alert 
about an elitist, exclusionary stance of the orthodox Republican understanding. 
Tuksal’s narrative on the initial stages of the women’s movement in Turkey 
echoes the narrative lines in Eraslan’s and Ramazanoğlu’s accounts. For Tuksal, the 
most acute effects of the Republican conception of “ideal citizen” throughout the 
modernization processes in the country were observed in dispositions, mores and 
manners, codes of outfit and in status symbols. As a result of the promotion of the 
“ideal” model, a bifurcation has emerged in the psyche of citizens, leaving them 
trapped between their authentic selves and the ideal self. This ideal self, which is 
based on a Westernist understanding in each and every aspect of life, ranging from 
appearance to taste and consumption patterns, excluded the Islamic selves and 
confined them to an “inferior” set of dispositions and a different habitus. In this line 
of thought, Tuksal argues that the initial stages of the feminist movement has 
reproduced the Republican conception of “ideal” citizen and categorized veiled 
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women as victims of patriarchy. According to this, pious women, who fail to comply 
with the Republican image of “ideal” woman, are automatically associated with 
certain dispositions, life styles and tastes. For instance, Tuksal tells that in an article, 
a feminist academic whom she is acquainted with, wrote about Capital Women’s 
Platform by a particular reference to women’s habits in the Platform to take off shoes 
in front of the door: 
“She felt the need to write about the shoes in front of the door because this is 
a cultural categorization… It’s another way of saying that they are from a 
certain class. It takes too much time for people to get rid of this kind of a 
perspective…” (April 15, 2013) 
 
For Tuksal, this reference clearly implies the automatic association of veiled women 
with provincial identities. She maintains that while the “ideal” Republican woman 
represents an urban, liberated, high status position, veiling and veiled women’s 
habitus are associated with an “inferior” set of values, tastes and lifestyles in the 
prevailing power configuration in the women’s movement in Turkey.  
On the other hand, to stress the democratic advencements in the secular 
feminist public, Tuksal also points out the recent attempts to collaborate with veiled 
women. She stresses the significance of collaborating together against headscarf 
bans:   
“Recently we have organized a petition campaign against headscarf bans and 
many secular friends who haven’t supported us before have agreed to sign... 
This points out a positive turning point for us.”  (Ibid) 
Yet, Tuksal is not altogether content with the current state of the secular women’s 
movement. She states that there is still a long way to go with regard to enhancing the 
cooperation between secular and veiled women. Like other pious women writers 
interviewed in this study, she is quite cautious while talking about the recent 
advancements in the women’s movement: 
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“What I expect (from secular feminists) is more emphathy... For God’s sake, 
just be curious about Islamist women. Ask whether they really generate threat 
for you... I expect them to ask what kind of peculiarities veiled women have, 
instead of saying that veiled women are obedient and submissive... We have 
still a long way to go...” (Ibid)  
In a similar vein, Karaca also produces an optimistic yet at the same time cautious 
narrative like other writers do. First, she outlines the trajectory of secular feminist 
movement in Turkey from the exclusionary approaches in the 1980s that condemned 
veiled women to an inferior status to its shift towards a more inclusive stance 
beginning with the 1990s. Karaca denotes that as secular feminists came to 
acknowledge that veiled women can experience empowerment in society through 
religion, they revised their conception of veiling and religion:  
“It has come into the open that religion may help women become more 
powerful actors in their struggle against the patriarchal system in society… 
Along with this change in perspective, feminists came to acknowledge that 
women who are refused to enter schools because of their headscarf, 
experience discrimination on the basis of their womanhood situation. Men 
with the same religious conviction never suffered in the same way that veiled 
women did... Therefore, in this power configuration, not aligning with veiled 
women would be equivalent to supporting the patriarchal system. Feminists 
have questioned this and adopted a more dialogic approach…” (June 27, 
2013) 
 
Yet, Karaca’s narrative adopts a pessimistic tone when it shifts towards the recent 
political climate in the country. Referring to the rise of criticisms against the current 
pro-Islamist government, Islamist identity and veiled women in the aftermath of Gezi 
protests, Karaca states that cooperation between veiled women and secular feminists 
cannot be as strong in the future as it used to be: 
“Lately, we managed to communicate with feminists better than it used to be 
in the past but the recent political incidents distanced us again…The political 
incidents in the last month [the Gezi Park protests] revealed that the reaction 
towards pious people has only receded temporarily in recent years but never 
faded away altogether. This showed me that the will to live together is still 
missing in this country… Interestingly or maybe not so interestingly, the 
350 
 
target during the riots [the Gezi Park protests] were again veiled women...” 
(Ibid)   
As Karaca’s remark above clearly exposes, her relationship with the secular feminist 
public is to large extend shaped by her concerns/ optimism about the status of veiled 
women in society. The fact that the increasing polarization between secular and pious 
selves in contemporary Turkey casts a shadow on the enhancement of veiled 
women’s status in society, makes Karaca adopt a cautious stance vis-à-vis the secular 
feminist public.  
To sum, it is clear that veiled women’s perception about their status in society 
is still to a great extend characterized by feelings of resentment and disappointment. 
Even though they have experienced relative empowerment in recent years with the 
rise in their public visibility, when the overall picture is taken into account, their 
position in the public sphere today is still marked by a struggle against 
marginalization, feelings of resentment and a highly cautious stance vis-a-vis the 
secular women’s movement. 
 
8.5.8. The Label “Feminist” 
The question as to how women columnists define their relationship to 
feminism constitutes a main pillar in this study. A detailed analysis of the narrative 
strategies that women writers adopt while reflecting on their relationship to 
feminism, can allow us to comprehend how women columnists perceive identity 
categories as well as the position they take vis-a-vis hegemonic public discourses on 
feminism and feminist self-identification. The interviews revealed that while some 
pious women columnists refuse the feminist self-identification because of ideological 
or strategic reasons, others may adopt this label by redefining its scope and meaning.     
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In this frame, Eraslan states that she does not prefer to call herself openly as 
“feminist”. On the one hand, she identifies the notion of family as the primary 
dispute among veiled women and secular feminists; on the other, she stresses that 
differences do not endanger the possibility of dialogue. Her narrative shifts between 
a stress on commonalities emerging out of women’s friendships and a counter-
narrrative pointing out differences inbetween. Thus, one can safely suggest that her 
denial of the label “feminist” does not connote an absolute distance between her 
position and the feminist thinking. Rather, it should be interpreted as the denial of the 
baggage that is associated with the label feminist in the public imagination. Eraslan 
explain her strategic concerns as below:  
“I do not openly say that I am a feminist. But they always call me Islamist 
feminist. If I have to say something, I use the term ‘women’s 
consciousness’... I prefer this shelter against all those traditional views 
criticizing feminism... Together with some friends, we use this phrase to 
explain our sensitivity without using the word ‘feminist’. It protects me...” 
(January 28, 2013) 
From here, it is clear that Eraslan’s refrainment from outspoken feminist-self-
identification is a protective mechanism that she resorts to against stigmatization in 
public discourse. This protective shelter allows her to speak in a much more secure 
and self-confident manner in the public sphere.   
When I ask her to define her relationship to feminism, Ramazanoğlu states 
that she is a “fragile feminist”. For her, a fragile feminist is someone who criticizes 
feminism in terms of many aspects but at the same time takes the feminist 
acquisitions seriously and interprets the world through the feminist framework: 
“I can define myself as a fragile feminist but this has nothing to do with being 
defined as feminist from outside… A fragile feminist position criticizes 
feminism, acknowledges its weaknesses but at the same time makes use of its 
accomplishments. It even includes a better understanding of Qur’an in the 
mirror of feminism…” (June 4, 2013)    
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Ramazanoğlu stresses that she would accept to be called “feminist” only if she 
herself defines what “feminist” means. Her stance vis-a-vis feminism is composed of 
a sui generis combination of a particular critique of feminist ideas and a 
reinterpretation of them through Islamic lenses. In this sense, the label “fragile 
feminist” used by Ramazanoğlu refers to a very peculiar position in which Islam and 
feminism get mixed in the same pot and gain further horizons. Furthermore, this is a 
cautious identity position that involves certain reservations, concerns and flexible 
self-positionings. Ramazanoğlu elaborates on two reasons explaining this cautious 
stance. First, since she poses major criticisms against the secular feminist framework, 
her “fragile feminist” position also involves a certain distance with feminism. 
Second, Ramazanoğlu points out the risks involved in being defined as “feminist” by 
orthodox Islamists. She states that since her conception of Islamic feminism requires 
the patriarchal interpretations of Islamic verses to be revised, she has faced reactions, 
even threats in the past from orthodox Islamist figures who regard her call for 
revision as deviation from Islam: 
“Religious scholars’ commentary on the Qur’an with regard to the issue of 
women is regarded so holy that people ask: ‘How can you know better, he is a 
great religious scholar after all’. He may be a great religious scholar but every 
scholar speaks from within a particular time and place. His words are not holy 
since they are not holy text or divine testimony… But when you say that new 
commentary is needed, you confront reactionary questions such as ‘are you 
talking about a new religion?’. Once, I gave a talk somewhere and a 
youngster from that meeting sent me a message full of threats: ‘You are a 
horrible woman... You talk about a new religion… This means you are 
talking about a new prophet. You make such a claim that it makes you very 
dangerous.’ What does this mean? He calls other believers to act... This is 
really frightening. We are expected to submit to certain patriarchal 
interpretations of Qur’an as if they were holy text. But we cannot accept 
this… At this point it is really dangerous to be labeled as feminist from 
outside, by orthodox Muslims.” (Ibid)          
 
Similar to Ramazanoğlu, Tuksal also uses a peculiar terminology when asked to 
define her relationship with feminism ad feminist identity. She defines her stance as 
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a “sui generis feminist” position and calls herself as “thinking feminist”. She states 
that the term “sui generis feminism” can actually be utilized by everyone because 
everyone appropriates feminism according to her needs and demands. Thus, Tuksal 
does not regard the “feminist” label as compliance to a set of fixed premises. Rather, 
in Tuksal’s mind-set, feminism assumes a flexible character that enables one to 
adjust feminist ideals to different subject positions: 
“I do not like the idea that I should accept feminism as it is…  It is very 
constraining to say that ‘Okey, I belong here, I will not search any more.’ 
Therefore, I keep thinking, exploring and looking over the barriers… I got to 
know feminism through the readings I have done in 1997... Now I know a lot 
more and have experienced more. But this did not prevent me from further 
reflecting on how I relate to feminism.” (April 15, 2013)     
 
Before explaining what the label “feminist” means for her, Tuksal problematizes the 
usage of the label in the public sphere. According to Tuksal, the primary aim in the 
public usage of this label is to categorize subjects. In this sense, for Tuksal, the 
discursive connotations of the label “feminist” depend on the intentions of the user. It 
is very likely that this label is utilized with the aim to confine subjects to certain pre-
set categories and subject positions that in return serve to the fixation of their 
identities. Tuksal is especially cautious about the usage of the label “feminist” in 
conservative circles. In an interview given to Birikim, a quarterly journal in Turkey, 
she refers to the assasination of Gonca Kuriş as the emblematic incident revealing the 
orthodox Islamist tendency towards feminists.
140
 Kuriş, an Islamic feminist in radical 
Islamist circles, was kidnapped and murdered in 1998 by the Turkish Hizboullah 
because of her remarks about the need to reinterpret the Qur’an through women’s 
point of view. This brutal silencing of an Islamic feminist voice had generated 
certain consequences for the articulation of Islamic feminist identities in public. 
Tuksal states that before the assasination she refrained from appearing on TV 
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 See http://www.birikimdergisi.com/sayi/137/kadin-bakis-acisina-sahip-olmaliyiz. 
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together with Kuriş because of this violent attitude towards Islamic feminists. (Ibid) 
Even though the violent attitude towards Islamic feminists is by no means 
representative of the whole Islamic community, it resulted in discursive barriers 
regarding the open declaration of Islamic feminist positions. 
On the other hand, despite this negative attitude, Tuksal expresses that since 
she has become familiar with the feminist thought and activism, she has never 
attempted to distance herself from feminism:  
“I have benefited from feminist literature and feminist research methods a lot. 
In addition, I believe that the rights that women enjoy today have been 
achieved mainly thanks to the feminist struggles. Therefore, if someone asks 
me whether I call myself feminist, I do not want to say ‘No, I am not a 
feminist’. Because I find the feminist struggle significant…” (Ibid)  
 
Tuksal states that the open articulation of feminist identity depends on the character 
of the public from which Islamist women speak. She indicates that in a public 
environment where the label “feminist” is used as a swearword, she calls herself 
feminist without further explanation or any reservation, which, for her, is an 
emblematic struggle against the patriarchal mind-set. Moreover, she declares that she 
feels comfortable to call herself feminist when she is among feminist friends. Yet, 
she notes that in big conferences or meetings, before calling herself a feminist, she 
feels the need to explain what kind of feminism she has in mind. Similarly, in 
occasions where the compatibility of Islam and feminism is questioned, she mentions 
that the audience expects her to further explain and justify her position vis-a-vis 
feminism. In this regard, Tuksal’s narrative reveals the fact that the declaration of an 
identity position cannot be limited to a fixed, stable statement but deeply varies 
depending on the character of the public in which this statement is made. In other 
words, articulation of an identity position does not simply encapsulate the 
negotiation of certain identity claims but also entails a positioning vis-a-vis the 
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public reception of the identity in question. As Tuksal states, articulation of identity 
positions may get stronger or weaker, as one enters into different publics with 
different attitudes towards the identity in question. Tuksal’s following statement is 
quite meaningful in this regard:  
“Your feminist identity is welcomed in feminist circles while it is seen as a 
flaw in the Islamist community. The vice versa applies to your Islamist 
identity. You always have to face this dilemma...” (Ibid) 
 
From here, it is obvious that presence in multiple and even allegedly contradictory 
publics destabilizes articulations of identity positions. Tuksal’s multiple belongings 
to Islamist and feminist communities and the discursive lines that accompany each 
identity position, make it difficult for her to use stable identity labels. Given the 
claim that Islamic feminists distort the Islamic tradition or that Islam and feminism 
are irreconcilable, Tuksal feels the necessity to adjust her discourse so as to defend 
her Islamic feminist position or protect herself from being labeled with negative 
connotations imposed on her feminist identity.  
In this context, her defining of her relationship to feminism as a sui generis 
stance stems from her multiple belongings and the flexibility of her position. For 
Tuksal, this flexible character of identities does not damage the integrity of identity 
positions since identities are not fully harmonious constructs; rather, they may also 
involve contradictions and conflicting parts. To explain this point, she refers to an 
interview that she gave to a German journal related to the Green Party. She tells 
about this particular interview as follows: 
“They cannot relate veiled women with feminism. Therefore, you have to 
explain them. The interviewer asked me whether this is a contradiction. I said 
‘yes, it is a contradiction. He said ‘how come’. And I responded: ‘For 
God’sake, does everything in our lives have to be consistent? We experience 
some issues in a contradictory way.’ In the end, he was not convinced...” 
(Ibid)  
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Tuksal does not claim that she has perfectly reconciled Islam and feminism. For her, 
it is a relentless endeavour marked by shifts, instabilities and questionings. 
Therefore, she defines herself as a “thinking feminist” who constantly deliberates 
feminist ideas.  
“I think about feminist ideas a lot… Therefore, I am probably a thinking 
feminist. Always questioning, always in search… Since the time when I first 
came across feminist literature, I have always adopted this critical stance… I 
still try to negotiate feminist ideas and understand what good they do to me.” 
(Ibid) 
 
As seen above, while explaining her relationship to feminism, Tuksal uses different 
terms and labels such as “sui generis feminist” or “thinking feminist”. She also 
denotes that depending on the character of the public she may prefer to utilize 
stonger or weaker articulation of her feminist position. Yet, Tuksal never refrains 
from revealing her profeminist position:  
“I resort to various usages of the term but I have never said ‘I am not a 
feminist’. (Ibid)  
It is obvious that Tuksal puts great emphasis on public declaration of identity 
positions. Unlike most of the women columnists interviewed in this study, Tuksal 
does not find identity labels inherently restrictive. She clearly differentiates between 
the discursive baggage imposed on identity positions from outside and the sui generis 
position that subjects themselves take by appropriating identity claims in accordance 
with their own needs and demands. For Tuksal, if identity labels are not used for the 
purpose of categorization and fixation of identities through negative connotations, 
they may be utilized as discursive tools to put forward our sui generis interpretation 
of identity claims. Having such a pro-identity stance, Tuksal is quite critical of those 
who strictly refrain from feminist self-identification even tough thay may support 
feminist goals. In this frame, Tuksal thinks that if one supports feminist struggles in 
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one way or another, one should not deny the feminist label because it is a useful tool 
to express awareness about feminist goals and methods.  
It is quite critical that for Tuksal, commitment to an identity position does not 
preclude criticism of that particular identity. Her approach to feminist self-
identification clearly reveals this point. On the one hand, she openly calls herself 
feminist since she believes that the feminist label is a useful discursive tool to 
articulate support for feminist struggles. However, this self-identification in her 
mind-set does not correspond to an absolute commitment to feminism since there are 
many aspects of secular feminism that she is highly critical of. The issue of family, 
sexuality and the elitist character of the secular feminist publics come forward as 
prominent themes in her critique.  
Finally, unlike writers who attempt to reconfigure the hegemonic meanings 
underlying identity labels, Karaca strictly refuses to define her identity position 
through labels. She thinks that identity labels are quite restrictive in the sense that 
they confine the self to a particular position while ignoring other aspects of life. 
Upon my asking where she locates herself within the Islamic feminist framework, 
Karaca states the following: 
“I am not a person who confines herself to a single identity position. Neither 
do I define myself only as a mother, nor as a veiled woman and Muslim... 
Therefore I would not define myself only as feminist or Islamic feminist 
either.” (June 27, 2013) 
This stance shows us that for Karaca, self-identification with a particular identity 
position precludes belonging to other idenity positions and thus cannot be reconciled 
with multiple belonging. Therefore, even though Karaca may espouse certain identity 
claims, she refrains from openly identifying herself with certain identity labels.  
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Another reason for Karaca to distance herself from Islamic feminist self-
identification could be related to her critique of secular feminisms. Like other veiled 
writers, Karaca is quite critical of the secular feminist movements’ approach to 
veiled women particularly in the 1980s and 90s. In her mind-set, feminism’s secular 
character is so dominant that it leaves little room to re-interpret feminist premises 
through the Islamic framework. Therefore, for her, Islamic feminism is still an ideal 
that is not fully realized yet. Her remark below is clearly expressive of this approach: 
“How can we deconstruct the pre-defined secular codes of feminism? That’s 
the question… There is already a particular conception of Islamic feminism 
but its content has not been finalized yet… As a Muslim, I should try to 
figure out how I can appropriate feminism into my own belief system. Which 
feminist ideas can I incorporate into the framework that I define as just and 
good? I should try to find that out… There are some differences in 
between…. [In Islamic feminism] you do not react to the ontological 
consequences of being a woman, but to the negative meanings ascribed to 
your ontology…” (Ibid)       
According to Karaca, feminist self-identification does not allow enough room to 
renegotiate feminist identity and appropriate it in accordance with one’s values and 
priorities. For example, she regards secular feminism as antithetical to the 
understanding of disposition in Islam that defines motherhood as the distinguishing 
trait of women. Coding feminism as anti-motherhood, Karaca states that her alliance 
with feminist ideas is valid only to the extend that feminism does not attempt to 
disassociate motherhood from womanhood:   
“I have never denied the fact that a woman is first and foremost a mother… A 
woman’s life is not limited to motherhood but ontologically she is created 
with a potential to be a mother...” (Ibid) 
 
In this sense, it is possible to argue that despite her call for revision of essentialist, 
exclusionary aspects of secular feminism, Karaca reproduces the very fixed identity 
categories she herself criticizes. Fixing feminist self-identification as monolithic and 
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exclusionary, she discards the possibility of coming up with hybrid, dynamic and 
multiple identity positions in the realm of feminist politics. Yet, this does not 
necessarily mean that Karaca’s narrative can be stabilized as totally devoid of a 
potentiality to reconfigure a dialogic conception of feminism. One can suggest that 
her multi-layered, complex narrative encompasses essentialist and anti-essentialist 
tones side by side. In this sense, her remark below clearly points out the existence of 
anti-essentialist tones in her narrative that confront stretypical conceptions of 
feminism: 
“I think feminism is not anti-man. It is a reflexive approach that opposes the 
attempts defining societal relations over concepts like power, supremacy and 
hierarchy. Feminism derives its momentum from such a reflex… Feminism is 
supposed to say something on the relationship between powerful women and 
women who cannot get access to each and every sphere of life. It is already 
raising its voice in this regard and should continue to do so…” (Ibid)    
 
8.5.9. Narratives on the AKP’s Gender Policies and Veiled Women’s Status in 
Contemporary Turkey 
As noted earlier, veiled women columnists remind us that the improvement of 
veiled women’s legal rights in recent years has not necessarily led to the elimination 
of discriminatory discourses altogether. They point out that veiled women still 
constitute a marginalized group under the pro-Islamist AKP administration.   
Challenging the commonsensical claim that veiled women are better off 
under the AKP government, Tuksal underlines that only in the third period of the 
AKP administration (2011-present), it became possible to enter universities with 
headscarf. For Tuksal, until the third era, it has been understandable that the AKP did 
not take action with regard to headscarf bans in order not to clash with secular 
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sensitivities; but the refrainment from taking action in the third era, i.e, the era of 
consolidation, implies something else.  
In an interview she gave to the press, Tuksal argues that the AKP 
administration is aware of the fact that they are the only alternative for veiled women 
and they can take their votes in any case: 
“Unless the issue of headscarf is resolved, veiled women would not vote for 
another party. But when the problem is resolved, votes may disperse and the 
AKP may cease to be the only option.”141 (April 15, 2013) 
As this remark reveals, in addition to the orthodox Republican understandings deeply 
embedded in Turkish politics and the elitist character of the feminist movements, 
Tuksal identifies the intertia of the AKP government regarding the headscarf 
problem as another serious barrier in front of veiled women’s rights and liberties. In 
this frame, for her, even if veiled women today have a greater say in the public 
sphere today, they still feel confined and unliberated. To stress this point, she uses 
the following allegory:    
“A flea that is kept in a bottle can jump only as much as the bottle’s height. It 
can jump only this much even after it is released.” (Ibid) 
On the other hand, despite her harsh criticisms against the AKP regarding the 
patriarchal party politics and the secondary status ascribed to veiled women’s rights 
and liberties in the party mind-set, Tuksal does not categorically oppose all AKP 
policies in the realm of gender politics. For example, unlike many secular feminist 
groups, she states that PM Erdogan’s pronatalist call for three children in every 
family should not be read as an imposition on women: 
“…why do we always imagine the ideal family with a single child or two 
children? … I don’t find it right to define this family ideal as normal and 
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 See “Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal: Ak Parti’de Etkili Üç Cemaat Var”, 2012, Taraf,  September 29, 
http://arsiv.taraf.com.tr/yazilar/nese-duzel/hidayet-sefkatli-tuksal-ak-parti-de-etkili-uc/23749/ 
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labeling everything outside it as abnormal… If I can choose to give birth as 
many children as I want, then I don’t see a problem here… We don’t have to 
impose on women a competitive model where she constantly competes with 
men… I believe that the AKP tries to produce pragmatist, capitalist policies 
that also take into account women’s motherhood conditions and I don’t 
regard it odd.” (Ibid)    
Here, Tuksal clearly declares her support for some of the conservative policies of the 
AKP which prioritize motherhood and family values. Before, we have seen that 
despite the criticisms she posed against the AKP’s anti-abortion initiative in 2013, 
she distanced herself from the secular feminist movement in opposing this initiative. 
Although she is critical of any ban imposed on women’s reproductive capacities, she 
states that she does not approve of the idea of abortion. Thus, she does not agree with 
the secular feminists defending the right to abortion through slogans such as “my 
body, my decision”. In this frame, it is possible to suggest that her peculiar Islamic 
feminist perspective positions Tuksal in-between the conservative AKP gender 
politics and the secular feminist camp. As a result, Tuksal’s Islamic feminist position 
make her appreciate some of AKP’s conservative gender policies, while criticizing 
others.  
It is obvious that recent abortion debates represent a critical juncture that 
mobilized both secular and Islamic feminists against AKP’s anti-abortion initiative. 
Like most of other women writers in this study, Ramazanoğlu clearly expresses her 
criticisms against the anti-abortion initiative. Yet, similar to Tuksal, she does not 
approve of the idea of abortion and criticizes AKP’s conservative gender politics 
from a pro-feminist Islamic position that does not necessarily oppose AKP’s policies 
in a categorical way. On the other hand, one should also keep in mind that this 
peculiar position does not alleviate her critical stance vis-a-vis the patriarchal tones 
in AKP’s gender politics. She openly states that AKP’s conservative policies should 
not limit women’s status in society to familial and maternal roles: 
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“…AKP’s discourse has always been a very male discourse. Even at times 
when it seems to be protecting women, it deals with women within the 
confines of family. Yet, it is not necessary to define women within family. 
First and foremost, women have an individual existence; they don’t have to 
get married or form families. One should first acknowledge woman as a free 
individual with rights and liberties...” (Ibid)        
In discussions so far, it has become clear that pious women writers acknowledge the 
democractic advancements in the women’s movement in Turkey in recent years. 
Moreover, they state that veiled women’s status in society has improved in the last 
decades and veiled women have become much more visible when compared to the 
past. However, in their narratives they also feel the need to emphasize that despite a 
pro-Islamist government’s being in power for the last decade, veiled women’s 
position in the public sphere is still a marginal position. Pointing out the ongoing 
marginalization of veiled women’s status in society, Karaca expresses her concerns 
as the following:  
“Veiled women still have not acquired their fundamental rights and 
liberties… Legally it is possible that a veiled lawyer can enter the 
courtroom... But still some judges do not let in the women who want to 
perform their profession as lawyers with their headscarves. Interestingly, this 
happens under the AKP administration that has allegedly got too strong... 
Givent that veiled women lawyers cannot perform their profession despite the 
fact that there is no legal barrier in this regard, I cannot ignore this 
discrimination and use a softer, unifying discourse…” (June 27, 2013) 
Karaca states that it is even more necessary today to articulate the marginalization 
that veiled women face. I have talked to Karaca after the Gezi protests have broken 
out. Therefore, her narrative is much more directed against the orthodox Republican 
reflexes regarding veiled women, rather than being a critique of the AKP 
government’s gender politics or its inertia with regard to veiled women’s rights and 
liberties.
142
 Even though my questions did not specifically refer to Gezi incidents, 
Karaca frequently told about the implications of these protests. Her narrative 
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Karaca reads Gezi Park protests as an orthodox Republican attempt directly targeting at Islamic 
selves, especially veiled women and aiming to overthrow the pro-Islamic AKP government. 
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includes references to the recent physical and discursive attacks to veiled women that 
were reported to have taken place during the protests. In this sense, the overall tone 
of Karaca’s narrative discourse is resentful.  
When compared to Tuksal’s or Razamanoğlu’s narrative and their stance 
during the Gezi protests, Karaca is more pessimistic about veiled women’s status in 
society and the secular front’s approach to veiled women.143 Her concerns about the 
Republican orthodoxy and veiled women’s status in society can clearly be seen in the 
following statement: 
“The lives of people who have a religious lifestyles are shadowed again by 
the question as to whether we are going back to the times of 28 February. 
These kind of problems never end in this country. The struggle between the 
ones who claim that they are the constitutive block in this country and others 
who say that they respresent the people’s will never ends. Veiled woman as a 
symbol because of her outfit is placed at the very center of this struggle...” 
(Ibid) 
From here, it is clear that Karaca interprets the recent Gezi park protests as a new 
attempt of the Republican orthodoxy to suppress the Islamist rise in Turkish politics. 
Her concerns mainly focus on the status of veiled women because she thinks that 
veiled women are utilized by political actors as symbols of Islamist politics and thus 
are treated as scapegoats. In this vein, Karaca’s priority is to draw attention to the 
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While Karaca chooses to utilize a much more resentful narrative tone to combat against the 
ongoing marginalization of veiled women, Ramazanoğlu and Tuksal imply that it is neccesary not to 
further agitate the clash in society between veiled women and the secular front. Ramazanoğlu states 
that instead of relentlessly underlining the discriminations and the victim position that veiled women 
have experienced so far, she prefers to use unifying statements and stress possibilities for 
collaboration and common experiences. Similarly, Tuksal points out the barriers that she has come 
across as a veiled women writer throughout her career but at the end of her narrative, she says the 
following: “Anyway, these are small things...” This statement could be seen as a discursive tool to 
refrain from perpetuating the victim position, to open a space to foster dialogue and find a 
resolution. In this frame, veiled women writers utilize different discursive schemas to struggle 
against the ongoing violations of veiled women’s rights and liberties. While some prefer to put the 
stress exclusively on veiled women’s victim position, others resort to more reconciliatory and 
accomodating discourses.  
 
364 
 
danger of stigmatization of veiled women as scapegoats in the dispute between the 
Islamist and secularist camps.  
For Karaca, the ongoing conflicts between the secular and Islamist camps 
disadvantages veiled women the most because the reallocation of public roles along 
with the rising visibility of veiled women generates a feeling of victimization and 
unjust treatment in secular camps and turns veiled women into targets of secularists’ 
anger. To oppose this, Karaca constructs her narrative discourse with a particular 
emphasis on the critique of the Republican front and does not allocate much space 
for the critique of the AKP’s gender discourses. Yet, from her articles in Habertürk 
newspaper, we know that she is in fact quite critical of the AKP government’s 
ignorance towards veiled women.  
   With regard to the AKP’s pro-natalist policies and attempts to restrict 
abortion, Karaca reminds us that the AKP has neither abolished the right to abortion 
nor enforced policies enforcing pro-natalism and thus it is not possible to call the 
AKP authoritarian in this regard: 
“Since the regime in Turkey relies on Islamophobia and generates a particular 
type of intellectual whose line of thinking is orientalized, the discourse 
encouraging families to have three children is presented as a massive 
initiative… As if there is an order for three children and abortion is 
forbidden... While women protested AKP’s abortion discourse, arguing that 
their private lives are under surveillance, we said ‘one minute… the PM only 
wants to put the issue of abortion into debate…”  (Ibid) 
Referring to the recent feminist critiques posed against the anti-abortion initiative 
and Erdoğan’s recommendations to have at least three children, Karaca further 
declares that the political agenda should not be dominated by feminist concerns since 
gender mainstreaming or feminist consciousness may turn into obstacles hindering 
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the democratic public debate. Her following remark is quite explanatory of her 
position: 
“Women’s consciousness should not block reasonable thinking. Gender may 
be a useful concept but we see that looking at social and political events only 
through gendered lenses could be extremely blinding… Unfortunately some 
women intellectuals have gone blind today. They label everything they see as 
sexist… Justice is to pay the attention that you show to a particular subject to 
other phenomena as well... I would not let my feminist identity to absorb the 
economic and political aspects of events... I cannot agree with the fact that 
feminist politics may abolish other rights and freedoms…” (Ibid) 
Stressing that feminism should not mean superiority of women, Karaca opposes the 
current feminist critique against the AKP government in many respects. One can 
suggest that Karaca’s critique of feminist consciousness is closely related to the 
contemporary social and political context. In a political environment in the aftermath 
of Gezi protests, in which veiled women have been turned into political symbols of 
Islamist politics at some occasions, Karaca feels the need to emphasize her critique 
of feminisms vis-à-vis her critique of Islamist community and the AKP government. 
In this sense, the point of emphasis in her narrative varies considerably depending on 
the context, feminisms’ approach to veiled women and Islam. Thus, it is possible to 
claim that when the threat perception against the Islamic selves and veiled women’s 
position in society rises, then a pious woman writer may curb her critique of the 
Islamist community and politics.  
 
8.5.10. Concluding Remarks 
Every subject in the public sphere speaks from a particular location, experience and 
context. (Alcoff 2006) In return, the frame of reference in which the subject is 
embedded influences how she sees and interprets the social facts around her. Thus, 
the situatedness of a subject position makes it necessary to unfold the complexities of 
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public discourses operating on this particular position and how the subject in 
question negotiates her position vis-a-vis the existing discursive framework. In this 
sense, as seen in the discussions so far, the study of pious women columnists’ 
negotiation of feminism, Islamic feminism and feminist identity first requires one to 
map out the contours of their position in the public sphere.  
Pious women columnists’ narratives revealed that they are pioneer women in 
the social and political life in Turkey. In their narratives they frequently make 
generational analysis, positioning themselves as the first generation of pious women 
intellectuals in the public sphere in Turkey who have publicly articulated the 
discriminations against veiling and veiled women in the post-1980 period. This 
pioneer role renders their position in the public sphere extremely significant yet at 
the same time quite vulnerable. One can suggest that their vulnerability stems from 
their critical standpoint with a dual focus. Since they criticize both the secular front 
for its exclusionary discourses and the Islamist community for its patriarchal 
viewpoints, pious women columnists’ position in society constantly shifts between 
different critical standpoints and is hard to pin down. While their veiling is seen as a 
threat in the secular front, their critical, pro-feminist stance is harshly criticized in the 
patriarchal Islamist community. This dynamic, hybrid critical position subjects pious 
women writers to different vulnerabilities in different contexts.    
As pioneer women in the public sphere who have struggled against the 
discriminatory state policies since the 1980s, pious women columnists produce quite 
cautious narratives that remind us that the marginalization of veiling and violation of 
their rights is an ongoing phenomenon in contemporary Turkey. Although they 
acknowledge that many promising legal steps have been taken recently to improve 
veiled women’s status in society, they underline that these legal achievements do not 
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guarantee the elimination of discriminatory discourses from society altogether. Their 
narratives point out the fact that the coding of veiling as inferior is deeply embedded 
in the public imagination. Thus, one can safely argue that this cautious tone in pious 
women columnists’ narratives obviously has an impact on their approach to identity 
labels and negotiation of identity positions.    
 Moreover, their pioneer roles as pious women writers in the 
cultural/intellectual field in the post-1980 period further reinforces the cautious 
narrative tone in their accounts. As discussed earlier, the entrenched secular-Islamic 
divide in Turkey positions pious women writers hierarchically vis-a-vis the norms 
and values of the secular cultural/intellectual field. Pointing out the binary opposition 
established between Islamic norms and lifestyles and the secular literary public, 
pious women writers declare that powerful agents in the secular literary field do not 
grant them intellectual legitimacy and thus their voice is usually omitted from secular 
literary platforms. However, as their accounts disclose, not only the secular literary 
public but also the Islamic public may regard their writing as the violation of the 
norm.  
Taking into account these myriad axes of vulnerability, one can argue that 
when speaking in public, veiled women columnists develop certain discursive 
strategies to avoid pejorative meanings ascribed to their vulnerable position. In 
addition, beyond strategical tactics, this state of vulnerability provides veiled women 
columnists a frame of reference within which they negotiate their position in society 
and the identity categories associated with it. In this sense, their negotiation of 
identities does not merely consists of tactical strategies but also encapsulates a 
particular commitment to certain identities as well a disavowal of others, which can 
be interpreted as a repercussion of their situatedness.  
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As seen throughout this chapter, veiled women columnists’ approach to 
identity positions is quite dynamic, hybrid and exceeds any fixed categorization. This 
dynamic approach is quite visible in their ideas on the coexistence of Islam and 
feminism. When asked about their approach to feminism, pious women writers’ first 
reaction is to differentiate between feminism as a Western ideology and feminism 
that is motivated by a critique of essential categories and highly informed by 
concepts such as positionality, context and difference. For them, the latter conception 
of feminism can open a space to reinterpret gender equality through the Islamic 
framework.  
It is quite clear that pious women columnists engage in a challenging attempt 
to figure out their position vis-a-vis the Islamic feminist discourse and reconcile the 
Islamic faith with feminist thinking. The reconciliation between Islam and feminism 
in their mindset is constantly reconstructed, depending on the issues at stake. For 
example, while criticizing the patriarchal thinking of some leading intellectual 
figures in the Islamist community, the feminist framework overweighs in their 
narratives. On the other hand, when political debates about family, sexuality or 
abortion are at stake, they may prioritize certain Islamic concepts over the feminist 
line of thinking. In short, one can safely conclude that pious women columnists’ 
conception of Islamic feminism is never a static intersection point but is highly 
contingent and contextual.    
Pious women columnists’ narratives about Islamic feminism is promising and 
refreshing in the sense that they point out novel ways as to how to reconfigure the 
official narratives about women’s history, challenge the essentialist categories in 
feminist thinking and acknowledge dynamism, hybridity and multiplicity in identity 
categories. However, it is interesting to note that despite their deconstructive 
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approach to essentialist categories, their narratives may reproduce streotypical 
assumptions labeling secular feminist discourses as extremist, anti-family and anti-
motherhood. In this respect, at certain points they fall short in providing a truly 
deconstructionist approach to essentialist catgeories.  
With respect to feminist self-identification, their approaches constitute a 
wide, heterogenous array of identity positions, ranging from disavowal of identity 
categories to strategical tactics, from differentiation between being defined from 
outside and self-definition to acknowledgment of contradictions embedded in 
mutliple belonging. In this frame, it is possible to claim that different concerns and 
frames of reference influence pious women columnists’ negotiation of feminist self-
identification. All pious women columnists resort to various strategical tactics in 
their narratives to avoid stigmatization and negative labeling. Yet, while some openly 
declare themselves as Islamic feminist, others rigidly deny any such labeling.  
As seen in the analysis of their weekly newspaper columns, pious women 
columnists cooperate with the feminist subaltern public on certain issues. While 
criticizing the exclusionary tendencies of secular feminisms on the one hand; on the 
other, they call for dialogue and cooperation. Yet, the idea of cooperation as a main 
narrative theme does not display a linear, steady trajectory in their accounts. At some 
points, pious women columnists may choose to distance themselves from any 
association with the secular feminist public. In a nutshell, their highly contingent and 
contextual narratives evidently indicate that negotiation of identity categories and 
collaborative politics of identity always take place within a specific frame of 
reference, the contours of which is mapped out by subjects’ position in the power 
configuration in society.  
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CHAPTER IX 
 
INTRICATE IDENTITIES/ VULNERABLE POSITIONALITIES: FINAL 
ANALYSIS ON WOMEN COLUMNISTS’ NEGOTIATION OF FEMINIST 
SELF-IDENTIFICATION 
 
 
9.1. Feminist Scholarship and Puzzling Identity Narratives 
As women columnists’ negotiations of feminist identity exemplified throughout this 
study, identities involve multiplicities, contradictions, strategic elements, constantly 
shifting belongings and contextual positionings. When asked to elaborate on their 
relationship with feminism, women columnists construct intricate narratives which 
do not necessarily entail a fixed position that can be clearly pinned down. Therefore, 
the unstable, always in process, contingent character of identity positions in women 
columnists’ narratives requires a dynamic approach to politics of identity that delves 
into identity formations and identification processes without surrendering to 
essentialism.  
As discussed previously at length, “identity” has turned out to be a thorny 
issue in feminist scholarship and activism in recent decades. The poststructural 
critiques of identity suggesting that any claim to a unified and coherent self signifies 
violence to the possibilities of self (Butler, 1990, 1997), dismantled the essentialist 
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conception of identity as a fixed, stable and monolithic entity. Yet, on the other hand, 
feminist scholars draw attention to the fact that the absolute dismantling of the 
concept of identity may result in the impossibility of feminist politics since it would 
annul feminist demands arising from womanhood experiences. (Hekman 2004, 
Alcoff 2006) They have attempted to develop new accounts that acknowledge the 
poststructural critique of essentialist notions of identities without abondoning the 
concept of “identity” altogether. According to this new cohort of theories seeking a 
third way between essentialism and poststructuralism, the politics of identity should 
be reconfigured by keeping in mind that there is no identity prior to politics and that 
each and every identity claim is produced within a particular power configuration. 
These theories stress that the acknowledgement of power dimension should not 
necessarily lead to the absolute dismantling of “identity” as an analytical concept. In 
this regard, at certain moments identity positions may be stabilized to make political 
demands and articulate certain identity claims, which should not mean that identity is 
stabilized once and for all. Gillis, Howie and Munford (2004: 69) explains this point 
quite well: 
“It is that we do always speak from some identifiable position, albeit 
provisional and contingent, and more importantly that that position is both 
undecidable and subject to the governmentality of iteration, which at the same 
time is endlessly transformative. In short, to repeat ‘I am x’ is always to 
subtly change the nature of the claim, as though in a game of Chinese 
whispers… Rather than providing a foundational position, identity is always 
at stake but not, thereby, without valency. The point is to contest the 
givenness and persistence of any identity claim – including those that are 
transgressive – without denying its substantive import.” 
 
The interpretation of identity as a dynamic source of meaning is quite crucial in 
grasping the gist of the shifts in the narrative line, the coexistence of belonging and 
disarticulation of identity, the resistance towards fixation and the pendulum-like 
character of identity negotiations in women columnists’ narratives in this study. 
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Henceforth, the new cohort of feminist theories mitigating between essentialism and 
poststructuralism have been quite helpful in exploring the complexities of these 
narratives. Throughout the interviews women columnists have produced intricate 
narratives wherein they fiercely contest the essentialist fixations of identity positions 
and deny to be positioned under stable identity categories. On the other hand, one 
can detect other moments in these interviews where women columnists feel the need 
to articulate certain identity claims and openly allign with the feminist subaltern 
public.  
In these janus-faced narratives, women columnists’ critiques of essentialist 
approaches to identity entail a cautious stance vis-a-vis stable identity labels imposed 
from outside. Yet, one should also bear in mind that this cannot be viewed as an 
identical replica of the poststructuralist dismissal of identity. Unlike the 
poststructuralist accounts that regard identities as a form of subjectification to 
existing power structures in a particular field of discursivity that name the subject 
and in doing so categorize her once and for all, women columnists’ narratives rely on 
concepts such as agency, choice and intentionality. In this sense, they do not regard 
subjectivity as merely subjectification but read it through an explicit stress on 
agency. Many times during the interviews they elaborate on their professional 
careers with a particular reference to their gendered agencies marked by a complex 
web of subjective choices and intentions. In this sense, one can suggest that women 
columnists’ narratives entail the possibility of reconfiguring identity as an 
interpretive horizon that operates as a source of meaning.  
Alcoff (2006: 42) argues that “identity is the product of a complex mediation 
involving individual agency in which its meaning is produced rather than merely 
perceived or experienced”. Accordingly, identity is not a pregiven essential construct 
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but it is worked through a particular social location. This perspective challenges the 
poststructural view that identity is inherently repressive and constraining as it is 
always imposed from outside. Opposing this argument, Alcoff (Ibid) stresses agency 
in identity positions by defining identity as articulation of knowledge derived from 
the material conditions, lived experience and social location of participants. 
Accordingly, both subjective experiences and meaning making processes as well as 
the contextual framework in which these experiences are interpreted have an effect 
upon the subject’s narrative on her subjectivity. Adopting this dynamic approach, 
Alcoff (Ibid) defines identities as “positioned or located lived experiences in which 
both individuals and groups work to construct meaning in relation to historical 
experience and historical narratives”.  
This understanding of identity as a source of individual and collective 
meaning renders the self intelligible through dynamic processes of interpretation and 
negotiation, which take place as a result of participation in communities, institutions, 
systems of meanings and intersubjective interactions. From here, it is clear that one’s 
identity is constituted through taking up communicative positions and negotiating 
claims in the public sphere. (Alcoff, 2006: 19) By taking into account both subjective 
and contextual aspects of identity positions, Alcoff’s approach provides us a complex 
account that makes it possible to explore the effects of hegemonic discourses on 
identity formation without abondoning the idea of agency and subjective meaning 
making processes.  
In this frame, this conception of identity and identification draws on the 
premise that identity positions go beyond any pregiven checklist of identity claims; 
rather they are constantly reconfigured along with one’s needs and commitments. 
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Taylor’s following quote clearly explains the gist of the idea of identity and 
identification in Alcoff’s account:  
“The question ‘who am I?’ can’t necessarily be answered by giving name and 
genealogy. What does answer this question for us is an understanding of what 
is of crucial importance to us. My identity is defined by the commitments and 
identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to 
determine from case to case what is good or valuable, or what ought to be 
done.” (Taylor, 1989: 27) 
This stress on the importance of subjective commitments also plays a key role in 
theories that replace the concept of identity with the idea of “identification”. Hall 
utilizes the term “identification” to avoid the reifying connotations of identity, 
arguing that identities are points of temporary attachment to subject positions 
constructed by discursive practices. In a similar vein, Weir (2008: 115) points out the 
subjective character of identifications by employing the idea of “identification-with”: 
“identification with others, identification with values and ideals, identification with 
ourselves”. This vision implies a shift from identity politics to politics of 
identification or from a static to a relational model of identity that takes into account 
subjects’ attachments and commitments.  
A similar stress on subjective aspects of identity positions stands out in some 
of the narratives in this study. Some women columnists clearly engage in an attempt 
to reconstruct the meanings of identity labels and redefine them in accordance with 
their attachments and commitments. In this sense, they challenge the streotypical 
conceptions pertaining to identity by employing the idea of identification. For 
instance, Aldoğan states that identity categories do not perfectly fit into stable 
identity claims but rather take new forms in accordance with one’s worldview: 
“I have an approach of my own within the limits of my own lifestyle... I don’t 
want to be included within stable lines. I should say, ‘I’m pink, not red.” 
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In a similar vein, Tuksal denotes that she constantly negotiates feminist ideas and 
appropriates her position vis-a-vis feminism accordingly: 
“Since the time when I first came across feminist literature, I have always 
adopted a critical stance… I still try to negotiate feminist ideas and 
understand what good they do to me.” 
 
In addition to the idea of identification, Hekman’s understanding of identity as 
“ungrounded ground” could be regarded as another prominent contribution to the 
revision of politics of identity. Differentiating between private and public aspects of 
self, Hekman puts forward that selves are not totally subsumed under public identity 
categories since the complex character of personal identities far exceeds the scope of 
public categories and public identity categories are reinterpreted through unique 
aspects of personal identity. In this way, she argues that public identity categories do 
not constitute an obstacle to the multiple aspects of the self. Hekman’s argument 
about the reinterpretation of public identity categories in line with personal aspects of 
identity positions is in tune with the reformulation of identity politics as politics of 
identification and can be utilized to examine the anti-essentialist call in women 
columnists’ approach to identity labels. Yet, her reconciliation of multiplicity of self 
with belonging and identification cannot really find place in most of the narratives in 
this study because they regard open articulation of identities as an obtacle to multiple 
aspects of being. This point will be elaborated on further in next parts.  
In addition to the reformulation of identity as “interpretive horizon”, 
“ungrounded ground” and “identification”, there are other “third way” theories in 
feminist scholarship that attempt to capture the dynamic character of contemporary 
identities and thus are quite useful in analyzing women columnists’ intricate 
narratives. For example, Andalzua’s concept of “mestiza” provides a helpful 
analytical framework to examine the narratives on identity that resist fixation. 
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“Mestiza” emblematizes the contradictions, the ambivalent character and plurality in 
marginal identities. It refers to a subject position beyond borders and signifies being 
at the crossroads of multiple differences. As such, mestiza identity clearly discloses 
how intersections of different aspects of identity render it futile to fix subject 
positions.  
The resistance to fixation and self-positioning on borderlands are prominent 
themes in women columnists’ narratives. For instance, to oppose marginalization of 
their identities, pious women writers refuse to stabilize their position through identity 
labels that pin down their identities through hegemonic codes of what is “normal” 
and “marginal”. With the aim to underscore the impossibility of containing identity 
positions within static borders, they position themselves on the borderland through 
flexible, intricate labels such as “fragile feminist” or “thinking feminist”. Such terms 
help them move across borders by opposing the binary between Islam and feminism 
and challenge the essentialist categorizations imposed on them from outside.  
Braidotti’s idea of nomadic subjectivity also provides a useful insight to grasp 
the deterritorialization of self in some of the narratives in this study. Allowing for 
interactions of various axes of differentiation such as class, race, ethnicity, gender or 
age, this concept endorses entangled relationships in the foundation of the self, 
signifies constant movement and a detachment from fixed identity categories. 
(Benhabib, 1999: 25) Considering this, one may suggest that pious women 
columnists’ narratives with constantly shifting belongings between Islam and 
feminism, rely on a nomadic understanding of self that is tolerant of ambiguities, 
multiplicities and hybridity. 
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In a similar vein, some secular writers also build their narratives on the idea 
of borderland and nomadism, shifting between different standpoints and refusing to 
be contained in a stable identity position. Their narratives on feminist self-
identification fits into the mestiza way of thinking in the sense that in settling 
accounts with different meanings of feminism, they acknowledge the interlockings of 
different aspects of their identity positions. In this regard, Tınç states the following:  
 
“I am someone who believes in feminist ideas and principles. But there are 
many other components of my identity other than feminism… I am a 
feminist, an egalitarian, a socialist…” 
 
Tınç’s remark implies a particular identity position in which different axes of identity 
intersect, moving the subject position beyond borders. A similar tone can be also 
found in İplikçi’s narrative where she points out the dialogic character of the feminist 
position, defines feminism as a junction point with a possibility to acknowledge the 
multiplicity of subject positions and the dialogue between them. For instance, she 
refers to class as one of the major components in capturing the multiplicity of 
womahood experiences: 
 
“You tell women to go out at night and wander the streets. But which class 
perspective are you relying on while saying this? Women can maybe go out at 
night in Beyoğlu but what about Sultanbeyli?” 
This dialogic approach entails the potential to recognize intersections of different 
aspects of selves, entangled belongings and how they transform each other as well as 
other subject positions as they interact with them. In this sense, this potentiality to 
appreciate intersections of different aspects of identity in the foundation of the self 
render some narratives lines in women columnists’ narratives suitable for cultivating 
mestiza way of thinking and the nomadic approach to identities. However, one 
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should also note that some of these narratives are marked by serious limitations in 
this regard as they cannot appreciate the multitude of identity positions, their 
intertwinings and the transformative effects of this multitude detaching the subject 
from the rigidity of borders. For example, the failure to endorse the interaction 
between Islam and feminism in veiled women’s negotiation of feminism and its 
dynamic, constantly changing character, make some secular narratives move away 
from a nomadic and mestiza approach.   
To sum up, during the interviews both secular and pious women columnists 
clearly state that they are critical of any attempt that categorizes themselves under 
fixed labels. Some secular columnists challenge fixed conceptions of feminism and 
ask for a flexible understanding of feminism that takes into account one’s needs and 
demands. In a similar vein, pious women columnists challenge identity labels in 
public discourses utilized to discriminate against themselves. They criticize the 
binary opposition between Islam and feminism and stress the dialectical 
transformation of both Islam and feminism through dialogue and mutual empathy. 
One can claim that the critique of essential identity categories imposed from outside 
constitutes the linchpin of women columnists’ narratives on feminist self-
identification. It is also important that women columnists do not dismiss agency and 
intentionality altogether while calling for an anti-essentialist reconfiguration of 
identity labels. This renders their narratives in tune with third way theories in 
feminist scholarship mitigating between essentialism and poststructuralism.  
Nonetheless, while women columnists’ narratives encompass many 
possibilities to come up with a new understanding of identity as a dynamic entity 
formed within a particular social location as a result of subjective negotiations and 
interpretations, they also include serious limitations in this regard. At certain points 
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they are highly prone to essentialist fixation of feminism and feminist identity. Two 
concluding remarks are noteworthy in this regard:  
1. Women columnists may articulate certain identity claims without 
neccessarily endorsing identity labels accompanying these claims. 
2. To distance themselves from identity labels, they may resort to 
essentialist accounts, interpreting identity positions in question through 
streotypical readings.  
From above, one can conclude that identities are never monolithic entities in black 
and white but entail grey shadows. As such, they encompass quite intricate processes 
of interpretation and negotiation marked by a myriad of ambiguities. Below, I will 
elaborate on the ambiguities and limitations of women columnists’ narratives in 
detail. Yet, before going into this, first I would like to dwell on the idea of narrative 
as another useful theoretical tool to capture the dynamic aspects of women 
columnists’ narratives. 
 
9.2. The Idea of Narrative and Narrative Tools for Exploring Feminist Self-
Identification 
Narrative analysis allows one to move away from the search for essential 
identities and puts the stress on the creative processes of identity construction. 
(Byrne, 2003) In this sense, it can serve as a useful analytical framework to capture 
the complexities of narratives with shifting narratives lines. As women columnists’ 
narratives have demonstrated, it is through narration that different axes of identity 
and subjectivity become explicit. Therefore, a careful analysis of the idea of narrative 
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can shed light on how women columnists negotiate identity positions and narrate 
their approach to identity labels. 
Narratives require a constant work on narration of identities; they involve 
uncertainties of representation and may never reach closure. They are fertile sites for 
subjects to discover, throughly reflect on and work through their subjective 
experiences, intersubjective relations and positionings in the public sphere. In this 
sense, they provide a space for subjects to go beyond the limitations of the statements 
such as “Yes, I am a feminist” or “No, I am not a feminist” and put forward the 
complexities of their shifting belongings. 
Narratives stress the uniqueness of individual positions and avoid the 
poststructural denial of agency. Yet, this does not mean that they are produced solely 
as a result of subjective meaning making processes that take place in isolation. 
Rather, the construction of narratives always take place in a particular contextual 
setting. In this regard, Sommers (1994: 606) alleges that we come to know who we 
are by locating ourselves within wider social narratives. The concept of “public 
narrative” as a mirror of the existing social and political order enables Sommers to 
locate individual stories within a larger repertoire of already emplotted meta-
narratives available in a particular context. In a similar vein, Benhabib (1999) points 
out the contextual and also dialogic character of identity narratives. Revising the 
Habermasian concept of the public sphere through the idea of narrative identity, she 
states that we construct identity positions by taking part in public, social and intimate 
conversations. According to her, one adopts an identity position by telling one’s 
stories and learning to become a conversation partner. In line with this, Weir (1995: 
263-283) argues that the capacity for interaction with others invests the self with 
meaning. According to Weir, identities become subject to constant change as others’ 
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existence prevent their closure. This relational model of identity formed through 
engagement in relations with others is political in that it takes into account the power 
dimensions underlying the negotiations of meanings and values. 
In this frame, this emphasis on narratives and interrelational dialogue can 
never be detached from a thorough analysis of power relations. Interrelational and 
narrative accounts involve the capacity to introduce an analysis of power relations 
into the picture as both the interrelational dialogues and acts of narration take place 
within the limits of public narratives. Accordingly, the construction of identity 
narratives always signify an act that is subject to the webs of power embedded in 
interrelations taking place in the public sphere.  
In this frame, the study of women columnists’ narratives on feminist identity 
reveals that negotiations of identity positions should be read as acts of narration that 
insert the self into the web of public narratives in the social imagination. Especially 
when it comes to marginalized identities, the relative positioning vis-a-vis public 
narratives may involve strategic action, self-censorship and subjectification through 
hegemonic discourses.  
Another important point to consider here is that women columnists’ 
narratives on feminist identity display unstable, always in process, contingent 
identity positions. Narrative as a way to weave disperate facts together provides a 
fertile site for unstable identities to come into the open. Making it possible for 
subjects to work through their subjective experiences, intersubjective relations and 
positionings in the public sphere, narratives provide a space to go beyond the 
limitations of fixed identity claims.  
The constructive effect of narratives is quite visible in Tınç’s narrative. 
During the interview, she first denied the label “woman columnist” because of its 
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patriarchal connotations but later when she had enough time to reflect on it 
thoroughly, she revised her position and declared that she would rather espouse the 
label in order to point out the gendered inequalities in the media sector. This 
constructive character of narrative can also be detected in Aldoğan’s shifting 
narrative lines. The shift in her narrative from affirmation of the feminist label to 
disassociation from it clearly reveals how different, even contradictory narrative lines 
may come out at different moments in a narrative, preventing narrative lines from 
closure.  
Another important narrative element that plays a key role in the articulation 
of unstable identity narratives is time. The time factor in narrative clearly reveals that 
identities are not fixed positions that are prior to action but rather are constituted over 
time in response to the changing contextual conditions. Mishler (1999: 5) states that 
one continually recasts the past, weaves events together in different ways, discovers 
connections that have been invisible before and as a result, positions the self 
differently. The time factor may allow the narrator to discover connections that she 
had previously been unaware of. As a result of the reconfiguration of the past and 
present, the narrator repositions herself and others in her network of relationships. 
The constitutive effect of time in narrative is clearly visible in women 
columnists’ narratives. For example, Aldoğan recounts that as she has become more 
conscious about feminist thinking, she came to realize that she has written her 
articles always through women’s point of view. Similarly, Evin states that as she 
gained more experience in the media sector and witnessed discrimination against 
women, she revised her streotypical conception of feminism that she had during her 
university years and began to see the position of women in the media through 
gendered lenses. In a similar vein, Tuksal denotes that she had reconsidered her 
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prejudiced conception of feminism after she had thoroughly read the feminist 
literature in the late 1990s and shifted towards a pro-feminist position. In this frame, 
one can safely maintain that women coloumnists’ narratives on feminist identity 
positions depict how identity positions come into being as dynamic positionings that 
are adopted in line with lived experiences. 
Narratives help individuals make sense of the social world through different 
narrative tools and a particular narrative logic. Sommers (1994) indicates that in 
narrative certain events/parts in social reality are selectively appropriated and the 
relations among these parts are rendered clear. Moreover, the causality keeping the 
parts intact is clearly established and as a result the plot explaining why the parts are 
brought together in this particular way is constructed.  
Using these narrative devices, women columnists construct narratives that in 
the end signify a profeminist position. At certain points in their narrative, they deny 
the feminist label or reproduce hegemonic narratives on feminisms and feminist 
identities. Yet, it is important that when it comes to issues such as women’s 
participation in politics, women’s employment or struggle against violence against 
women, they all collaborate with the feminist subaltern public and display a 
profeminist position. They bring the parts in their narratives together in such a way 
as not to overshadow this issue-based, contextual profeminist tone. This profeminist 
position allows them to make sense of their experiences and become aware of the 
web of power affecting the positioning of gendered selves. However, we should also 
keep in mind that this is a conditional, contextual and issue-based profeminist 
position that is not always accompanied by an explicit feminist self-identification. 
Thus, it is possible to read it as a strategic alliance with the feminist subaltern publics 
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that comes into being when certain issues such as violence against women or 
women’s participation in politics are at stake.  
As noted earlier, narratives on subject positions are formed through 
participation into systems of meaning and engagement in interrelations with others in 
a public setting. One may suggest that narration of a subject position in a public 
setting is a reciprocal event between a teller and an audience. (Riessman, 2001: 12) 
Thus, the focus point in the analysis of narrations on subject positions should be the 
interactions and the public setting in which the act of narration occurs. Plummer 
(1995: 26) argues that certain power structures may lead the way for certain stories to 
be told while silencing others. Considering the modalities of power structures, the 
narrator may also act as an editor who constantly monitors, manages, modifies, and 
revises her narrative. Gubrium (1993) notes that through narrative editing, narrators 
attend to the ways they will be heard in a public setting.  
She believes that this provides her a protective shelter where she can perform 
freely without being marginalized by th“Narrative editing” is a major narrative tool 
that women columnists frequently resort to during the interviews. Keeping the 
audience in mind, they edit their narratives on feminist identity with the aim to avoid 
stigmatization and negative labeling. For example, pointing out that feminist identity 
is associated with extremism in hegemonic public discourses, Eraslan utters that she 
avoids explicit identification with feminism and instead prefers terms such as 
“women’s consciousness” while explaining her position on gendered issues in a 
public context. e audience.  
Moreover, some women columnists present a more nuanced understanding of 
audience by pointing out that their narratives vary depending on the character of the 
public context. For instance, Evin states the following: 
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“When you talk about feminism during a visit in a village, you can face 
resistance from native women but talking about life in general will enable you 
to touch upon that topic.”  
 
Similarly, Tuksal denotes that she may revise or edit her narratives on feminist 
identity as she enters into different public contexts with different conceptions of 
feminist identity. In this sense, she states that she may tone down or bolden her 
narrative on feminism depending on the character of the public context in question.  
 As seen from the discussion so far, the idea of narrative proves to be a useful 
analytical tool to explore the dynamic character of women columnists’ narratives on 
feminist identity. It sheds light on the meaning making processes in these narratives 
marked by shifts, ambiguities and pendulum-like movements. During the interviews, 
women columnists weave the parts into a whole in such a way that in the end they 
want to make sure to display a profeminist position about certain public debates on 
gender regime in Turkey. Yet, as noted above, most of the time this does not appear 
as a position that is related to feminist identity politics but rather takes the form of a 
contingent strategic alliance with the feminist subaltern public. Last but not least, the 
narrative analysis in this study also revealed that women columnists as vulnerable 
actors in the patriarchal media sector take into account the reactions of the audience 
when they construct their narratives on feminist identity and arrange their narratives 
accordingly. This narrative editing in return results in the deployment of many 
tactical strategies and multiplicity of meanings in women columnists’ narratives.   
 
9.3. Profeminist Tones in Women Columnists’ Narratives 
The profeminist position in women columnists’ narratives is worth elaborating on 
further. As noted above, this contingent, contextual alliance with the feminist 
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subaltern public comes into being in response to the rise of patriarchal discourses or 
an urgent need for feminist mobilization regarding a hot public debate on gender 
issues. When women columnists’ articles in newspapers are analyzed, one can detect 
that they choose to cooperate with the feminist subaltern public particularly on the 
following topics: violence against women, women’s participation into politics and 
misogynist statements of male politicians.  
The post-Habermasian feminist conception of public sphere has put forward 
that the public sphere is not a monolithic block where power flows in a unidirectional 
way; rather, heterogeneity is constitutive of each and every public sphere, including 
the counter publics. Relying on this, one can suggest that the feminist subaltern 
counter public in contemporary Turkey is composed of various discourses, each of 
which draws attention to a different point in their critique of the discursively created 
gender regime. Given different political agendas of secular and Islamic feminists, it 
would be reductionist to assume that the “counter” in the feminist subaltern counter 
public in contemporary Turkey corresponds to a monolithic set of universal validity 
claims. Along this line, it is important to note that women columnists’ collaboration 
with the feminist counter public on certain issues entails a variety of different 
profeminist tones. It does not designate a monolithic pattern, unifying women 
columnists’ narratives under the same rubric. In this sense, the label “profeminist” 
here does not connote a unified political stance but entails quite varied commitments, 
priorities and concerns with regard to gender politics in contemporary Turkey. As 
discussed at length, the Islamist/ secularist divide as well as the differences between 
orthodox and reformist writers both from the Islamist and secularist camps appear as 
the main line of fraction in this profeminist alliance. 
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It is obvious that women columnists’ collaboration with the feminist counter 
public is of tantamount importance for the articulation of feminist demands in the 
public sphere. Ferree et al. (2002: 16) argue that in the contemporary world, mass 
media has a pervasive influence over the trajectory of public debates since social 
actors evaluate the effectiveness of their own dicourses by looking at the coverage in 
mass media. Given that coverage in the mass media is key for public discourses to 
display efficacy in public deliberation, one can safely suggest that women 
columnists’ profeminist coverage of gender debates in their articles enhances the 
standing of feminist discourses in hot public debates on the gender regime. 
  Women columnists’ collaboration with the feminist subaltern public becomes 
explicit when the rise of patriarchal discourses in public debates generates a 
considerable threat perception. The recent expansion and wide circulation of 
patriarchal discourses under the AKP rule has surely provided an incentive for 
women columnists to openly declare a profeminist position in their newspaper 
articles. The contingent profeminist alliance that they form in response to the 
patriarchal features of public debate indicates that their positionality evolves as they 
enter into public deliberation. In this sense, they don’t have a profeminist identity 
ready at hand; neither of their positions, i.e, profeminist and non-feminist, are 
permanent. Calling for policies to end violence against women, supporting women’s 
participation into politics or challenging politicians’ or other public figures’ 
misogynist statements, they take a profeminist position that is triggered by the 
acknowledgement of the need for a counter discourse challenging the patriarchal 
gender regime.  
On the other hand, one should denote that this contingent profeminist alliance 
also has serious limitations that hinder the promising features in women columnists’ 
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narratives. At certain points, women columnists’ contingent profeminist positions 
may be prone to essentialism, which in return leads to a highly static and 
exclusionary gender discourse. For instance, when some secular women columnists 
argue for the enhancement of women’s participation into politics, their call addresses 
a limited target group that does not include veiled women. The conception of veiling 
in this ultrasecularist, essentialist approach further reproduces the binary opposition 
between secular and Islamist women, confining veiling to submission to patriarchy 
and fixing it as essentially misogynist. One can suggest that this essentialist approach 
vis-a-vis veiling prevent them from adopting an all inclusive profeminist position.  
In a similar vein, pious women columnists’ narratives also display limitations 
in certain aspects. As discussed before, the dialectical character of their approach to 
the relationship between feminism and Islam renders their narratives quite dynamic 
and open to change as this dialectical interaction transforms both Islam and feminism 
in their mindsets. However, when certain issues are at stake, their narratives cease to 
employ this dialectical perspective and shift towards an Islamist frame of reference 
that does not allow space for some key feminist ideas. The recent abortion debates in 
Turkey proved to be a good example to demonstrate this shift of reference. Some of 
the pious women columnists explicitly opposed politicians’ attempts to intervene in 
women’s reproductive rights yet the motives of their opposition against the anti-
abortion initiative did not stem from the feminist idea of women’s autonomy on their 
bodies. Since bodily autonomy is not in line with the Islamic thought, they opposed 
the anti-abortion initiative by referring to imperatives that make abortion necessary 
such as rape, poverty or health risks. In other words, their Islamic position in this 
regard does not incorporate the secular feminist idea of women’s choice into the 
analysis. This disassociation of the right to abortion from women’s bodily autonomy 
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is difficult to reconcile with the secular feminist approach to abortion. Yet, the main 
obstacle hindering transitivity and dialogue between these two positions stems from 
the disinclination to engage in transformative communicative action geared towards 
collective action without ignoring differences in between. 
The confrontation between Islam and feminism in pious women columnists’ 
mindset also comes to the foreground with regard to the issue of violence against 
women. For example, in a newspaper article where she criticizes the partiarchal 
gender regime resulting in violence against women, Eraslan feels the need to make 
clear that her profeminist critique does not connote an opposition against family 
unity.
144
 This need to stress the differentiation between the opposition against male 
violence and the anti-family stance is quite telling with respect to the limits of 
Islamic feminism in pious women columnists’ mindset. One can argue that this note 
is reflective of an essentialist approach fixing feminism and the feminist critique as 
anti-family.  
From the limitations portrayed above, it becomes clear that at some points, 
the profeminist narrative line in women columnists’ narratives is enmeshed with 
hegemonic discourses. Thus, it is possible to suggest that women columnists take an 
“in-between” position in the public sphere, oscillating between the hegemonic public 
discourses and the feminist subaltern counter public. At times, the feminist counter 
publicity in their narratives shifts towards the hegemonic public, reproducing 
essentialist or exclusionary discourses. Fraser (1990), Felski (1989) and Fenton and 
Downey (2003) note that counter publics are not enclaved clusters but may display a 
publicist orientation in order to appeal to wider audiences. One may maintain that 
                                                          
144  “Fatma Şahin BM’de: İstanbul Sözleşmesi”, Star, 6 Mart 2013, 
http://haber.stargazete.com/yazar/fatma-sahin-birlesmis-milletlerde/yazi-733308. 
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women columnists’ profeminist narratives come into being at a liminal point where 
counter publics engage in dialogue with wider publics. As a result of being 
positioned at an intersection point, women columnists’ narratives encompass 
elements both from hegemonic and counter hegemonic discourses. Their unique 
positionality displays a nuanced, multi-layered understanding of public sphere, 
complicating the two-polar structure constituted by hegemonic and counter 
hegemonic publics. It also offers space for comprehending the internal variations and 
multiplicities of counter publics. To avoid homogenizing, inattentive accounts, 
Squires (2002) underscores that the use of vocabulary is a key tool in capturing the 
multiplicity of counter publics. In this vein, women columnists’ in between 
positionality as a new terminology can contribute to scholarly attempts aiming to 
grasp the complexity of the relationship between hegemonic and counter hegemonic 
publics and shed light on the ways in which the publicist character of counter publics 
engage in dialogic activities.  
Discerning the multiplicity of public sphere has been a key move in critical 
public sphere theory after Habermas. A crucial part of this move was the recognition 
that “counter” in counterpublics is multi-layered and complex. It does not have to be 
necessarily located in the identity of persons who articulate oppositional discourses; 
it may also have a topical orientation, circulating neglected social and political 
concerns into wider publics. (Asen and Brouwer 2001, Fraser 1990) In this sense, 
one can argue that the counter underlying the in between positionality that women 
columnists take, cannot be explicated only by seeking the meanings of counter in the 
identity markers of the social group in question. It would be more appropriate to 
suggest that the counter here has a topical orientation crystallizing around certain 
themes such as violence against women or women’s participation in politics. In this 
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sense, as a thematic counter discourse, its major contribution to the public sphere 
theory lies in its deconstruction of the fixed seperation between the hegemonic and 
counter publics. This key move designates the permeability of borders in the public 
sphere and further sophisticates the theories elucidating the composition of counter 
publics. 
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that despite its limitations, women 
columnists’ unique in between positionality is of crucial importance in the current era 
in Turkey marked by increasing visibility and efficacy of patriarchal discourses in 
the public sphere. It does not only enhance the efficacy of profeminist discourses in 
public deliberation but also contributes to women’s media activism, opening up an 
alternative discursive space in media where counter hegemonic attempts can be 
recognized. Women’s media activism can be considered as a key tool that helps 
feminist activists reinforce the feminist component in the hegemonic public sphere. 
(Byerly and Ross, 2006: 100) Speaking from within/ through established media 
enterprises, women’s media activism aims to expand the boundaries of the 
profeminist discursive space in the dominant public sphere, thereby transforming 
both the hegemonic gender discourses and the patriarchal media language itself. This 
form of activism may take different forms such as pressuring the media to stop sexist 
coverage of women in their content; demanding gender equality for female media 
professionals; and collaborating with journalists in campaigning for feminist causes. 
(Minic, 2014: 134) In this frame, although most of the women columnists do not 
declare active participation into the women’s movement, their unique positionality 
has an activist component as their profeminist writings provide a useful venue for 
disseminating feminist activist attempts.  
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This alliance with the women’s movement points out that the alternative 
media domain composed of profeminist women columnists in contemporary Turkey 
offers a space for women’s movement to pursue publicist goals and engage in a more 
relational approach to media. This possibility for active engagement with the media 
domain does not preclude employment of a critical approach disclosing the 
limitations and problematic aspects of the profeminist media domain in question. 
While acknowledging the limitations of women columnists’ position on the one 
hand, on the other, the publicist impetus in the feminist counter public may incite 
active dialogue and engagement with this alternative media domain. This alliance in 
return may provide the feminist counter public useful tools to bolster its media 
activism and circulate feminist goals and ideas into wider publics. It is significant to 
be aware of these useful tools and possibilities geared towards enhancing feminist 
media strategies, since in this way one can get a more complete picture of the 
contemporary feminist discursive space in Turkey.   
 
9.4. Generic Existence: Profession Instead of Identity  
When asked about their public self-identification, most of the women columnists 
aspire for gender neutrality by avoiding being treated as a gendered subject. In some 
of the accounts, gendered subjectivity is associated with patriarchal bargain that 
provides women certain benefits in return of their collaboration with the patriarchal 
gender regime. In this sense, stress on gendered aspects of identity in public self-
presentation is regarded in contradiction with a profeminist position. Evin states that 
a real feminist should avoid gendered identity labels such as the term “woman 
writer” since such terms are highly loaded with hegemonic discourses.  
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In the patriarchal intellectual field, the woman intellectual/writer has always 
been a marginal actor. (Moi 1994) Even though she gets access to the intellectual 
arena, she is always in a vulnerable position and lacks a secure platform from which 
to speak. (Eagleton 2005) As for the social and political context in Turkey, the 
intellectual field in general and the media sector in particular constantly reproduce 
patriarchal discourses that position women hierarchically vis-a-vis male actors. In 
this frame, it is not suprising that in most of the interviews women columnists’ 
profeminist and gender conscious position is not accompanied by a stress on their 
gendered subjectivity. Hegemonic discourses that fix women’s gendered existence as 
inferior lead both secular and pious women columnists to speak in the public sphere 
as generic beings.  
To analyze the negotiation of gendered subjectivity, it is useful to take into 
account the working mechanisms of the power structures in which subjects in 
question try to achieve legitimacy and recognition in the public sphere. As discussed 
earlier with regard to pious women writers’ marginalized positionality in the secular 
literary field, Bourdieusean concepts of field and capital can be of use to unmask the 
terms in which power, legitimacy and capital are granted to subjects. In the 
Bourdieusean thinking, agents in a particular field who are motivated to seek 
maximum power and dominance, resort to various strategies to achieve legitimacy. 
Given that the field grants legitimacy only to those who conform by the rules of the 
field, subjects choose to act in accordance with the immanent laws of the field in 
question. Bourdieu suggests that “for a field to work, there must be stakes, and 
people ready to play the game, equipped with the habitus which enables them to 
know and recognize the immanent laws of the game, the stakes and so on.” (cited in 
Moi, 1991: 1021)  In this sense, women columnists’ generic self-presentation in the 
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media sphere should be interpreted by bearing in mind the terms in which intellectual 
legitimacy is granted to women professionals in the media field in Turkey. 
According to the Bourdieusian framework, if actors do not enact the rules of the 
field, they may risk exlusion or experience the field as a form of censorship. As Moi 
(1991) argues, actors in the field are endowed with the right to speak only if they are 
acknowledged as powerful possesssors of capital. In this frame, women columnists’ 
generic self-presentation in this study points out that avoidance from gendered 
subjectivity is among the consitutive components of the media field that are widely 
internalized by pioneer women columnists in the field.         
One can argue that women columnists’ aspiration for gender neutrality is 
closely related to the trajectory of hegemonic discourses on gendered subject 
positions in Turkey. Since the modernization period at the beginning of the 20th 
century, the category of woman has always been incorporated into broader 
ideological projects as a discursive tool to be utilized for political purposes. This 
discursive utilization in the social and cultural imagination has precluded women’s 
autonomous gendered subjectivities, defining ideal womanhood with a stress on 
women’s modesty and asexual existence in the public sphere. (Durakbaşa 1998, 
Kadıoğlu 1998) The narratives of the first generation Republican women reveal that 
their identities in the public sphere rely on a particular logic composed of a strong 
commitment both to the Kemalist revolution and their occupational identity. (Toktaş 
and Cindoğlu 2006, Özyürek 2006) Despite the emphasis on their symbolic role as 
the first generation professional women of the new Republic who represent the 
country’s belonging to the West, their public self is refined from gendered identity 
positions. Since a gendered public self and professional identity are seen at odds with 
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each other, the first generation Kemalist women declare that they have performed 
their profession as a generic being, not as a woman.  
The repercussions of this age-old notion that ascribes gender neutrality to 
successful professional women in the public sphere in modern Turkey, can be still 
strongly felt in professional women’s narratives today. Women columnists’s 
narratives in this study provide a useful ground to examine the contemporary 
modalities of the discourse on gender neutrality in women’s professional lives in 
Turkey. During the interviews women columnists construct narratives that remind 
one of the Republican modernization discourse that stresses women’s 
professionalism but refrains from acknowledging their gendered public self. At 
certain points, women columnists stress women’s positive qualities in professional 
career by underscoring the importance of their existence in the media sector. 
Benmayor praises women journalists’ diligent work ethics, while Kırıkkanat refers to 
their excellent educational and professional qualifications. However, this 
appreciation of gender difference in the working environment is not accompanied by 
an espousal of gendered professional identity. Benmayor’s statement clearly puts 
forward the gist of the puzzle here: 
 “I am a journalist first, not a woman journalist…” 
The ideological component in women’s professional identities in the early 
Republican period has long left its place to commitment to occupation. Especially in 
the post-1980’s period, the image of the ideal Republican woman who is expected to 
devote herself to the advancement of the nation, has been already replaced with 
individualistic values such as self-interest, personal success and advancement. 
(Kabasakal 1998; Kabasakal et al, 2011) Yet, the genderless presentation of the 
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professional self in public still remains intact. I will try to explore this generic notion 
of public self in women columnists’ narratives along two lines: 1. Neoliberal 
individualistic logic 2. Being a pioneer woman in the media sector. 
 
9.4.1. Neoliberal Individualistic Logic and Women Columnists’ Narratives 
When reflecting on women journalists’ positionality in professional life, 
women columnists employ a gender conscious approach that allows them to reflect 
on unequal gender relations in the male dominated media sector. In most of the 
narratives, one can find examples about different forms of gender discrimination in 
the media. On the other hand, in some narratives this critique is immediately 
followed by an emphasis on success stories. Hard work and strong personal 
qualifications are presented as a safety belt against discrimination based on gender. 
This shift of focus allows women columnists to avoid victim’s discourse and 
underscore women’s agency, success and powerful position in the media. The 
downplaying of systemic factors and the stress put on personal efforts is a key 
neoliberal narrative line that make it possible for women columnists to establish 
“empowerment” as a main theme in their narratives.  
The liberal understanding of neutral, abstract and disengaged individual rests 
on the premise that particularities should be left behind before entering the public 
sphere in order to ensure equality before the law. Alcoff (2006: 38) points out that in 
the Western thought identities as the most overt expression of particularities have 
always been seen as an obstacle that blocks the way for rational reasoning. This 
notion that the substantive content of identities constitutes a counterweight to 
rationality, precludes reasoning through the interpretive framework provided by 
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one’s particularities. As a result, the public and the private are defined in binary 
oppositional terms and the public sphere is associated with a certain kind of 
discourse that is distinctive to that sphere: A discourse of abstraction, rationality, and 
universality. Depite the paradigm shift in the 20th century from generic existence to 
the plethora of identities, the liberal polity still defines rationality as a disengaged 
endeavour detached from one’s particularities. (Ibid) As a result, it is concluded that 
womanhood as a prefix in the public self-presentation hampers objective reasoning. 
This logic becomes cyristal clear when women columnists covered in this study state 
that downplaying their identity as women and acting as “individuals” will ensure 
their fair treatment. 
In the contemporary neoliberal era, the liberal differentiation between 
reasoning and particularities is further accompanied by a strong stress on self-
enterpreneurship, success, choice and empowerment. As a form of governmentality, 
the neoliberal logic produces self-interested subjects who are expected to act as 
individual entrepreneurs in every aspect of life. (McRobbie 2010, McNay 2010) This 
notion of subject who makes free choices based on rational economic calculation, 
eradicates the border between the social and the economic along with the fact that 
market rationality is extended to all social practices. (Oksana 2013) Accordingly, this 
overarching character of the neoliberal logic eliminates structural social forces from 
the picture, replacing them with an individualistic approach to self through a strong 
stress on economic-calculation, self-interest and choice. 
In recent years, many emprical studies have been conducted, disclosing the 
organic link between women’s downplaying the effects of structural constraints of 
the patriarchal regime and their orientation towards values such as choice and 
freedom. (Budgeon 2001, Scharff 2013) Relying on this, one can safely suggest that 
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the neoliberal rhetorics of choice and individual agency is a powerful discursive tool 
in the contemporary gender regime that is utilized to shift the narrative line from a 
victim’s discourse towards individual achievement. This neoliberal rhetorics marked 
by an individualistic approach also characterizes some of the narratives in this study. 
The individualistic motifs in these narratives connote a strong motivation for power 
and success in the media sector. The stress on success and empowerment is further 
accompanied by a disarticulation of gendered subjectivity and underestimation of the 
effects of sytemic gender inequalities. This neoliberal individualistic logic regards 
identification with gendered subjectivity as a fixed position that suppresses one’s 
personal qualifications and condemns one to the unifying force of the category of 
woman. As such, it closely collaborates with the anti-identity trend that perceives 
identities as fixed, unifying entities.  
In this frame, the following anti-identity assumptions accompany the 
individualistic logic in question here: 
1.The assumption that the public reasoning requires a transcendence of particularities 
2. Interpretation of identity labels as inherently repressive and stigmatizing  
This line of reasoning coupled with the neoliberal stress on the individualistic 
notions of self constitutes the ground upon which the generic thinking comes into 
being. In a nutshell, the generic thinking contends that unless one gives up gendered 
existence, one is doomed to be fixed into a streotypically defined feminine realm. 
Pointing out the perils of generic thinking for feminist politics, Friedman (1998: 32) 
warns that the displacement of gender identity in the public sphere only serves to the 
reproduction of patriarchal discourses that blur gendered inequalities by representing 
them as natural. In a similar vein, noting that the generic, universal human individual 
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is a patriarchal category, Hekman (2004: 37-81) asserts that in order to escape this 
imposition, women should enter into the public sphere as embodied beings.  
The antithesis between public reasoning and one’s particularities, which is a 
prevailing rule governing the intellectual field, particularly the media sphere, is 
clearly felt in women columnists’ narratives. Bearing the perils of generic thinking in 
mind, one should note that the disarticulation of gendered subjectivity and 
professional identity deprives women columnists of the means to articulate their 
situatedness and lived experiences as a woman.  
On the other hand, it is important to acknowledge that neoliberalism as a 
universally applicable term cannot account for the specificities of women’s 
professionalism arising from the symbolic gender codes in the local context. In this 
sense, the fact that women’s professionalism in the post-1980 Turkey has been 
greatly shaped by neoliberal discourses, requires a further analysis explaining the 
peculiarities underlying the neoliberal logic that applies to women’s employment. 
Cindoğlu’s study on headscarved women’s employment is a good example in this 
respect that sheds light on how the terms of women’s employment and 
professionalism is negotiated within the confines of the prevailing gender codes. In 
her study on the employment of headscarved women, Cindoğlu (2011) puts forward 
that headscarf bans in the public sector in Turkey generate “spillover effects” on 
headscarved women’s employment in the private sector, causing discrimination in 
terms of recruitment, wage policies and promotions. Given the marginalized position 
of veiling in the public sphere, headscarved women are less likely to succeed in the 
secular job market and may be subject to discriminatory policies irregardless of the 
neoliberal logic that operates on values such as efficiency, merit, profitability, rather 
than on ideology. In this vein, one should note that women columnists’ 
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professionalism in the post-1980 period is shaped not by a universally applicable, 
generic conception of neoliberalism. Rather, it is defined over a particular neoliberal 
discourse that is informed by gender neutrality, symbolic value attributed to 
women’s professionalism, male dominated work ethics and women’s social roles 
primarily defined within the familial realm. This form of neoliberal logic arises from 
the hegemonic codes defining gender relations in the Turkish context. Henceforth, 
one should bear in mind that the post-1980 rise of the neoliberal logic in Turkey is to 
a large extend situated within the particularities of the Turkish context. In this sense, 
women columnists’ professionalism displaying highly individulistic tones is a 
product and a constitutive part of this peculiar neoliberal order that is marked by a 
patriarchal gender regime. Neither neoliberal individualistic positions nor the 
conceptions of professionalism connote a readily defined set of values. Women 
columnists as professionals in the media sphere appropriate the meanings of 
professionalism in line with their situatedness and the symbolic codes applying to it.  
 
9.4.2. Women Columnists as Pioneer Women in the Public Sphere  
As noted earlier, hegemonic gender discourses in modern Turkey has conventionally 
ascribed gender neutrality to women’s professionalism. The trajectory of Turkey’s 
modernization processes at the beginning of the 20th century has been 
overwhelmingly characterized by the silencing of gendered aspects of women’s 
professional selves. In the new Republican regime, women could gain access to 
social, civil and political rights and were highly encouraged to excel in education and 
various professions such as science, law and medicine. (Arat 1998) However, while 
encouraging the active participation of professional women into the public sphere, 
the Republican project relied on an ideology of “sameness” that erased all 
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particularities and differences including gender. (Acar and Altunok 2012: 35) 
Promoting a notion of dutiful citizenship and strong commitment to the ideals of the 
new Republic, the Republican gender equality project disassociated women 
professionals’ symbolic role in the public sphere from gendered public self-
presentation. As a result, first generation Republican women’s professional 
achievements in the public sphere were not accompanied by an acknowledgement of 
gendered subjectivity. Rather, their narratives clearly assume a generic existence and 
prioritize their occupational and ideological commitments that are thought to be in 
contradiction with gendered public self-presentation.  
Looking at the narratives of women columnists under consideration in this 
study, one may argue that women’s genderless presentation of their professional self 
still remains intact today especially in the accounts where women appear as pioneer 
figures in their fields. Most of the women columnists that I interviewed are pioneer 
women journalists who declare that they had no role models when they started the 
profession. Having started their journalistic careers in the 1980s, on the one hand, 
they benefited from the liberalization of the era and gained access to the male 
dominated media sphere; on the other, they had to confront the male dominance and 
the patriarchal elements of the journalistic profession.  
In the aftermath of the 1980 military coup, globalism and neoliberal 
discourses have had a considerable effect on economy, politics and society in 
Turkey, permeating into each and every sphere of life and radically transforming 
social and cultural codes. Along with Turkey’s increasing integration into the world 
economy, the media sphere witnessed a striking proliferation as well as privatization 
of communication channels in the 1980s. (Algan 2003) The economic liberalization 
in Turkey has dissolved the state monopoly over the media, leading to the flourishing 
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of autonomous media networks. This, in return, has generated new “opportunity 
spaces” for meaning construction. Opportunity spaces can be regarded as new social 
sites where cultural codes can be revisited through the emergence of new social 
actors and their value systems. (Yavuz 2004) Since these spaces can generate 
transformation by rendering previously inaccesible arenas open for transmission of 
values, they may operate as sites of empowerment for social actors who benefit from 
the ongoing transformation. On the other hand, these opportunity spaces may also 
connote restraintment as they do not always operate in an ideal way. It is likely that 
these spaces may favor certain subject positions, while excluding others.  
In this frame, as a result of the privatization of media in Turkey, new media 
platforms have appeared on the media scene and allowed new actors to intervene into 
the meaning making processes in the media. Women journalists/ columnists were 
among these actors who gained access into the media scene and took part in the 
transformation wave in the media sphere. On the one hand, the fact that they could 
enter the male-dominated media sphere, may be read as an empowerment story. 
However, considering that women journalists’ position in the male dominated media 
field was restricted to the lower echelons of the professional hierarchy, one can 
suggest that the proliferation of media platforms in the post-1990 period also 
exposed their vulnerability and marginalization in the media.   
Pointing out the uniqueness of their position, most of the women columnists 
in this study state that they have struggled a lot to prove their qualifications as a 
columnist in the male dominated mass media. One strategy that they employ to cope 
with the gender discrimination in the media is to disarticulate the gendered aspects of 
their professional identities. The binary opposition between womanhood and 
professional merit, which is deeply embedded in the operating mechanisms of the 
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media sphere, leads women columnists to assume a generic existence when they talk 
about their professional identity in public.  
One could suggest that women’s disarticulation of the gendered aspects of 
their professsional identities in the early Republican era and pioneer women 
columnists’ generic self-presentation in the contemporary media display striking 
similarities. Women columnists declare that the media field in the 1980s appreciated 
their professional contribution due to their symbolic existence in the field. Yet, this 
encouragement, similar to the support for women’s professionalism in the Kemalist 
era, was conditional in the sense that the male supporters expected women to assume 
a generic existence. This conditionality, in return, has generated a discursive terrain 
that results in women columnists’ employment of generic thinking as a strategical 
and/or ideological position. In this way, professional success and gendered 
subjectivity are clearly disassociated from each other. 
Being a pioneer woman in a male dominated professional field means that the 
woman professional engages in a struggle to push the discursive boundaries further 
or forms a subjectivity in line with the expectations and conditionalities of the 
discursive terrain from which she speaks. This struggle takes a different form in the 
case of pious women columnists. Similar to secular women columnists’ narratives, 
pious columnists’ narratives operationalize a generational thinking in which they 
situate themselves as the first generation pious women in the post-1980 period, who 
pioneered in the struggle to enhance the social, cultural and political status of veiling 
in the Turkish context. Not surprisingly, the main narrative line in their accounts is 
based on the struggles fought against the secular exclusionary discourses with regard 
to veiling. Yet, the gendered struggles that they have fought within the Islamist 
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intellectual sphere or the media sphere as pioneer women columnists/writers is not so 
comprehensively narrated.  
To sum up, in addition to the neoliberal logic that characterizes the processes 
of subject formation in the contemporary era, another factor that can explain women 
columnists’ disarticulation of gendered professional identity could be the 
peculiarities of their positionality as professional pioneer women in the male 
dominated public sphere.   
 
9.5. Women Columnists’ Reflections on their Relationship with Feminism  
The fixation of identity as obstructive, which is one of the main themes in women 
columnists’ disarticulation of gendered self-presentation, recurs in their accounts on 
feminism and feminist identity. Most of the narratives that women columnists 
construct on feminist identity rely on the assumption that identities and identity 
labels may operate as sites for hegemonic articulation of subject positions. In this 
sense, the act of “naming” in general and the discursive terrain in which naming 
takes place come forward as critical elements in women columnists’ reflection on 
their public self-presentation.  
When women columnists’ approach to labels, self-labeling and being labeled 
from outside are carefully analyzed, the following themes map out the contours of 
their narratives on feminist identity:   
1.) Strategic diasarticulation of the feminist label 
2.) Streotypical/essentialist fixation of feminism and feminist identity as a 
discursive move to disarticulate close association with feminism 
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3.) Lack of differentiation between labeling oneself and being labeled from 
outside   
4.) Contingent alliance with the feminist subaltern public on certain gender 
issues 
5.) Janus-faced, intricate narratives on the feminist label both affirming and 
denying feminist self-identification 
First, it is worth further elaborating on women columnists’ accounts on the 
act of “naming” and subject formation through labels. Butler (1997: 31-38) 
explicates that subjectivity is first constructed in language. For her, individuals come 
to occupy the site of the subject through the constitutive possibility of addressing 
others and being addressed by others. Therefore, subjects always have this linguistic 
vulnerability since they are constantly addressed by one another. (Cavarero, 2000: 
xviii) In this regard, Butler (1997: 28) states the following: 
“Vulnerable to terms that one never made, one continues as a subject through 
categories, names, terms, and classiﬁcations that mark a primary alienation in 
sociality.’’  
 
This understanding sees categories and identity labels as imposed from outside to 
render the self intelligible. Accordingly, it is through this linguistic vulnerability that 
one is subjected to hegemonic discourses. In this line of thinking, identity categories 
and labels constitute a form of regulation; both the act of naming others and any 
activism in the name of identity politics reify hegemonic discourses. Along similar 
lines, most of the women columnists in this study interpret identity labels as 
imposition from outside. Thus, they response to the acts of labeling by employing a 
defensive strategy vis-a-vis the hegemonic discourses underlying the labels in 
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question. In this sense, they detach identity labels from subjective meaning making 
processes and limit their meaning to hegemonic articulation.  
As discussed earlier, Alcoff (2006) argues that both subjective experiences 
and meaning making processes and the contextual framework in which these 
experiences are interpreted, have an effect upon the subject’s narrative on her 
subjectivity. She defines identities as “as positioned or located lived experiences in 
which both individuals and groups work to construct meaning in relation to historical 
experience and historical narratives”. (2006: 42) In this sense, identities are neither 
solely imposed from outside, nor do they have a pre-given, essential character. 
Alcoff’s account clearly puts forward that public self-presentation may involve a 
space for subjective interpretation and meaning making. Henceforth, there is a 
difference between being labelled from outside and one’s own attempts to define the 
self through self-identification. While the former may reproduce hegemonic 
discourses, the latter enables one to reflect on identity categories and redefine them 
in the light of one’s interpretive horizon. In this frame, one can suggest that women 
columnists’ failure to differentiate between self-labeling and being labeled from 
outside overlooks the possibility of redefining identity labels through subjective 
reflection.  
Women columnists’ narratives on the label “woman writer” clearly displays a 
defensive strategy adopted as a protective shelter against streotypical labeling from 
outside. Except for a few writers who point out the need to differentiate between self-
labeling and being labeled from outside (Müge İplikçi, Ferai Tınç, Yıldız 
Ramazanoğlu), most of the women columnists interpret the label “women writer” as 
a discriminatory term that is imposed on them from outside to degrade their writing. 
They prefer to present themselves in non-gendered terms in order to avoid being 
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stigmatized by hegemonic discourses. This denial of gendered authorship can be read 
as a defensive speech act employed to avoid the fixation into the limits of a 
streotypically defined “feminine” realm.  
Women columnists resort to the same defensive strategy when they explain 
their approach to the label “feminist”. Most of them state that the hegemonic 
articulation of subject positions through labels such as “feminist” renders them 
highly vulnerable to stigmatization. Thus, in some narratives one can clearly detect 
that statements such as “all women need feminism” are followed by a denial of the 
label “feminist”. In this sense, concerns about the streotypical labeling from outside 
and disarticulation of the feminist label may be accompanied by affirmation of a 
feminist standpoint and vice versa. This multiplicity of meanings complicates the 
plot of women columnists’ narratives in a puzzling way.  
Considering this multi-layered character of women columnists’ negotiations 
of feminist identity, one can safely note that identity narratives, particularly 
narratives on feminist identity do not necessarily entail a fixed position that can be 
clearly pinned down. They are dynamic and flexible; they resist fixation and shift in 
line with needs, expectations, demands and strategic concerns. Such narratives 
connote ambigious, messy “mobile selves” that do not stick consistently to one stable 
identity claim. (Braidotti 1994, Ferguson 1993) The shift in narrative lines 
demonstrates that various axes embedded in the construction of identities and the 
continual state of flux in positionality prevent subjects from constructing stable 
narratives on their subject positions. While at one point subjects may affirm a 
particular identity to express certain needs and demands, they may disclaim the 
identity in question at another point to strategically avoid stigmatization or fit into 
the discursive regime in a particular context.  
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It is also not surprising to discover that progressive identity narratives with an 
anti-essentialist approach to identity claims may be intertwined with essentialist 
discourses that situate identity labels into a fixed, streotypically defined terrain. The 
discussion so far has clearly put forward that the call for dynamic, flexible 
conception of feminist identity in women columnists’ narratives may be coupled with 
an essentialist fixation of feminism. In this respect, one could safely argue that shifts 
in identity narratives may connote both a progressive, anti-essentialist critique of the 
fixation of the meanings of identities and a puzzling essentialist tone that falls short 
in providing a dynamic approach to identification. As women columnists’ narratives 
have exposed, this puzzling coexistence may have to do with the following factors: 
1) hegemonic discourses reproducing negative labeling and stigmatization, 2) 
vulnerabilities underlying subjects’ positionalities in the public sphere, 3) subjects’ 
failure to differentiate between streotypical labeling from outside and redefinition of 
identities in line with one’s needs and demands.  
The anti-essentialist, interpretive approach to the feminist label in women 
columnists’ narratives challenges hegemonic discourses and practices as it draws on 
a resistance to fixation of boundaries and being included in the pre-set, fixed identity 
categories. Throughout the interviews, some women columnists frequently point out 
the potential for flexibility in feminist identity that allows one to adjust feminist 
claims in line with one’s needs and demands. It is important to note here that this 
resistance to hegemonic categories and social structures in women columnists’ 
narratives does not preclude the articulation of concrete identity claims, which 
clearly differentiates it from the poststructural abondonment of identity. As 
previously discussed, women columnists’ articulation of certain feminist identity 
claims provides the ground for forming a profeminist alliance with the feminist 
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subaltern public. The contingent and highly contextual character of this alliance in 
women columnists’ narratives replaces the conventional identity politics with a 
coalitional politics marked by networks and coalitions that are organized around 
specific issues, struggles and goals. In this sense, women columnists’ narratives can 
be seen as a testament to a strategic, highly volatile alliance that avoids stable 
identity claims for various reasons and sides with the feminist subaltern public on a 
contingent, contextual basis.  
 
9.5.1. Islamic Feminism in Women Columnists’ Narratives 
The promising openings of the antiessentialist strand in women columnists’ 
narratives come to the forefront most visibly in pious women columnists’ 
reconfiguration of feminism through a reading of Islam and feminism in the light of 
each other. Pious women columnists’ dialectical reading of Islamic feminism puts 
forward an overt form of mobile selves engaging in resistance against fixed 
boundaries and stable, predefined categories in identity narratives. The dialectical 
conception of Islamic feminism in women columnists’ accounts relies on a constant 
attempt to revise both Islam and feminism through continually working on their 
meanings. The terms that pious women columnists use to denote their feminist self-
identification clearly reveal the flexibility of this position. For example, while 
Ramazanoğlu call herself a “fragile feminist”, Tuksal states that she is a “thinking 
feminist”.  
Destabilizing both Islam and feminism, pious women columnists point out 
that when formed as a result of subjective meaning making processes, identity 
positions do not impose on subjects a predetermined, fixed set of values. In this 
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sense, their conception of Islamic feminist position is based on a process of 
negotiating and interpreting socially given meanings. In line with Alcoff’s claim that 
identity positions are articulations of knowledge derived from the material 
conditions, lived experience and social location of participants, pious women 
columnists interpret the feminist identity position in line with their needs and 
experiences based in their embeddedness in a particular social location. 
Furthermore, the intersectional thinking characterizing pious women 
columnists’ narratives, contributes to their resistance to fixed, monolithic identity 
categories. This intersectionalist tone points out different aspects of the self and 
multiple axes of belonging, thereby opposing that identity positions are monolithic 
and reduce the self to a single dimension. As Anzaldua (1987) and Lloyd (2005: 49) 
suggest, the idea of borderland is pivotal to the intersectionalist thinking. Refusing 
fixed boundaries, intersectional thinking replaces fixity with permeability in 
borderlines that allows subjects to freely move between different positions and 
articulate multiple and intricate identity positions. Pious women columnists talk 
about their social location and self identification always by incorporating the 
intersection points of their womanhood and veiling into their narrative, which in 
return reinforces their critique of essentialist, frozen categories and displays a 
potential for transformation through dialogue and intersubjective exchange. Dialogue 
and empathy are among the key themes in pious women columnists’ narratives. The 
call for dialogue and cooperation represents an intersection point where Islamic 
references can intermesh with secular feminist ideals.  
Pious women columnists also reveal that the intersectionalist thinking 
operates in tune with the idea of situatedness. Although the idea of crossroads in 
intersectional thinking signifies a constant movement and transformation, it also 
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entails the idea of embeddedness. Opposing generalizations and fixed 
categorizations, pious women columnists’ narratives acknowledge differences 
resulting from the positionality of subjects and their peculiar narratives. In this vein, 
the idea of localization of feminist movements lies at the very center of pious women 
columnists’ understanding of feminism. In sum, intersectional thinking, 
acknowledgement of situatedness and positionality and narrative approach enable 
pious women columnists to produce identity narratives that incorporate 
multiplicities, dynamism and hybridity into the analysis. 
Nonetheless, despite these promising features, pious women columnists’ 
narratives are also prone to reproducing streotypical approaches to feminism. 
Especially when it comes to the critique of secular feminisms, their approach may 
shift towards a position that replicates hegemonic discourses on feminism. This 
essentialist approach leads pious women columnists to interpret secular feminism as 
inherently anti-family or extremist with regard to sexuality,  which clearly 
contradicts with their attempts to deconstruct fixed categories and impermeable 
boundaries. Fixing secular feminisms’ meanings into streotyped conceptions, pious 
women columnists aim to stress the uniqueness of their position vis-a-vis secular 
feminists. Ironically, it is this very fixing and unifying discourse that they attempt to 
oppose in their narratives. In this sense, their project of deconstructing secular 
feminisms and constructing an Islamic feminist position that challenges fixed 
categories, falls prey to hegemonic discourses at certain points.  
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9.6. The Implications of the Public Context  
As noted earlier, the anti-essentialist, interpretive approach to identities puts 
forward that both the subjective meaning making processes and the public context in 
which the subject makes sense of her experiences and the social world, map out the 
contours of identity narratives. (Alcoff 2006, Lloyd 2005, Hekman 2004) Having 
elaborated on the promising openings underlying subjective interpretive processes, it 
is also necessary to delve into the repercussions of the public context on the 
construction of identity narratives.    
Sommers (2002, 2004) stresses that subjects construct narratives in line with 
how they read their positionality, i.e. their unique place in public narratives. In a 
similar vein, Benhabib (1999: 344) suggests that “we become who we are by 
learning to be a conversation partner in public narratives”. This understanding of 
identity narratives relies on the assumption that the self weaves an identity narrative 
within the limits of public narratives available to her at a particular time and place. 
Acordingly, subjects constantly monitor and revise their identity narratives to make 
them in tune with the changing conditions of their positionality and the public 
narratives.  
In this frame, since identity narratives in the public sphere are always 
constructed by bearing in mind who the audience is, they signify a reciprocal event 
between the teller and the audience. Each public context with its peculiar audience 
may lead to a different configuration of narrative lines. As a result, depending on the 
character of the public context, the audience and the dialogue that she expects to 
emerge out of her interrelations with the audience, the subject may perform the self 
in different ways.  
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One can suggest that the shifts and revisions in women columnists’ narratives 
on feminist identity is closely related to the patriarchal public discourses in 
circulation and their linguistic vulnerability in the public sphere. As seen so far, both 
secular and veiled women columnists strategically revise their identity narratives in 
order to avoid stigmatization of identity labels such as “feminist”. They denote that 
they feel the need to modify the tone of their narratives depending on the character of 
the public context in which they produce these narratives. Accordingly, while in a 
feminist meeting they may be more willing to affirm their feminist self-
identification, they may refrain from doing so when they address a general public.  
One can find a striking example of this strategic modification of narratives 
when one compares some of the pious women columnists’ newspaper articles before 
and after the Gezi Park protests. For example, Karaca has alligned with the secular 
feminist movement in her critique of the AKP’s patriarchal discourses before the 
Gezi protests broke out; yet, she toned down this critique in the aftermath of the 
protests. Since the AKP, the main guarantor of veiled women’s rights in the political 
realm in Turkey, faced a serious political challenge, she felt the need to curb her 
critique against it.  
In addition, while reflecting on women columnists’ positionality and 
engagement in interactions with a public audience, it is important to keep in mind the 
repercussions of being a pioneer woman in the media sector. As noted earlier, most 
of the women columnists have had a pioneering role in the media, which subjects 
them to patriarchal bargains, generic thinking and denial of gendered subjectivity. In 
this sense, vulnerabilities related to their pioneering role further bolster their 
motivation to strategically disclaim the feminist identity or fix its meanings in a 
conventional way. As a result, one can safely argue that despite the rise in their 
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visibility since the 1990s, both secular and pious women columnists in contemporary 
Turkey have experienced a certain linguistic vulnerability, especially when they 
attempt to display a profeminist position and speak as a gendered subject in the 
public sphere.  
This linguistic vulnerability renders women columnists’ narratives quite 
intricate not only because women columnists adopt strategic thinking to secure a 
platform from which to speak. Given this vulnerability, some of the women 
columnists also allign with hegemonic discourses on feminism, contradicting their 
profeminist and gender conscious perspective. At this point, one can note two 
important conclusions from the discussion so far. First, the hegemonic discourses on 
feminism and feminist identity that stigmatize profeminist positions lead to 
strategical manouvering in women columnists’ narratives on feminist self-
identification. Second, since subject positions are never isolated from the contextual 
setting in which they are formed, there is no modality of subjectivity that is totally 
immune to the hegemonic public discourses that are dominant in that contextual 
setting. (Foucault 1980, Oksana 2013) Thus, at certain moments women columnists’ 
narratives may intertwine with hegemonic discourses, adopting an essentialist, 
streotypical approach to feminism.      
 
9.6.1. AKP’s Patriarchal Gender Politics and Its Implications for Feminist 
Identity  
Ferree et. al (2002) state that a change in the discursive regime may lead to a 
new discursive terrain where certain ideas can be articulated more overtly. According 
to them, the governing rules underlying a particular discursive regime provide 
speakers with certain opportunity structures that enhance or diminish political 
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acceptibility of certain ideas and demands. In this regard, Ferree et. al (2002) 
underline that there is an interactive relationship between the discursive context and 
the speaker’s strategic choice to formulate certain discourses.  
The idea of discursive opportunity structures may connote a tactical strategy 
to adopt certain rhetorical tools that would render a public claim in tune with 
hegemonic discursive codes. In opposition to this, it may also connote a critical 
stance adopted to render subjugated identities and demands more visible. In this case, 
the hegemonic codes of the discursive regime marginalize certain identity positions 
to such an extent that the adoption of a critical stance vis-a-vis the escalating 
marginalization goes beyond the subaltern publics and acquires a broad appeal in the 
public.  
The conservative AKP rule since 2002 has resulted in the proliferation of the 
patriarchal gender regime and unequal gender relations in contemporary Turkey. In 
the AKP's conservative politics, being a woman is first and foremost defined within 
the familial sphere through traditional gender codes. (Çitak and Tür 2008, Coşar and 
Yeğenoğlu 2011, Unal and Cindoğlu 2013) Pronatalist policies constitute a main 
pillar of AKP’s pro-family politics. Through regulating women’s reproductive 
capacities and their rights on their bodies, pronatalist discourses and policy initiatives 
see women’s womb as a policy area that can be easily utilized for political purposes. 
Another major component of this patriarchal regime under the current AKP rule is 
the articulation of distaste of feminist ideas. (Coşar and Yeğenoğlu 2011) Feminism 
is defined as the other of the pro-Islamist stance in AKP’s gender politics. This 
patriarchal discursive framework under the AKP rule provides discursive opportunity 
structures for certain speakers to articulate patriarchal ideas more effectively. 
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Nonetheless, the proliferation of the patriarchal gender regime and the rise of 
antifeminist politics under the AKP rule does not mean that profeminist discourses 
and struggles are all silenced by the hegemonic rules of the current discursive 
regime. On the contrary, since the discursive terrain is characterized by constant 
social struggles (Laclau and Mouffe 1985), profeminist discourses function as a 
counterweight vis-a-vis the rise of conservative gender regime and effectively 
respond to the wide circulation of patriarchal statements in public debates. Against 
this background, it is significant to investigate how women columnists engage with 
this discursive struggle over the governing rules of the gender regime.   
In previous parts, it has come into the open that women columnists form 
contingent, contextual alliances with the feminist subaltern public in response to the 
rise of patriarchal discourses. The recent expansion and wide circulation of 
patriarchal discourses under the AKP rule has surely provided an incentive for 
women columnists to articulate profeminist demands more frequently in their 
newspaper articles. In this respect, one can safely argue that the contemporary 
contextual setting plays a key role in women columnists’ cooperation with the 
feminist subaltern public. Acknowledging the need for a counter discourse to 
challenge the patriarchal gender regime, they form a profeminist stance on issues 
such as violence against women, women’s participation into politics, pronatalist 
policies and politicians’ or other public figures’ misogynist statements. This 
contingent profeminist stance triggered by threat perceptions indicates that when 
certain gender debates are at stake, women columnists greatly contribute to the 
publicist face of feminist demands and needs. In this frame, one can argue that the 
current rise in patriarchal discourses and policies constitute a useful ground for 
feminist coalition politics to emerge “as a way of forming political alliances around 
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specific issues, struggles and goals”. (Ferguson, 1993: 186) As this study has shown, 
profeminist women columnists are influencial public figures in the contemporary 
gender regime since their contingent collaboration with the feminist subaltern publics 
has the potential to enhance the efficacy of coalitional feminist politics in public 
debates.  
On the other hand, one should not take the promising potentialities women 
columnists’ peculiar positionality for granted. The failure to be inclusive and the 
contingent shift towards essentialism are major limitations in women columnists’ 
narratives that imperil the prospects of forming an effective coalition on 
contemporary gender debates in Turkey. For example, the fixation of Islam and 
veiling as antithetical to gender equality is one of the essentialist narrative lines in 
secular women columnists’ accounts that precludes the incorporation of 
intersectionality and multiple aspects of selves into gender analyses. Considering this 
essentialist approach to Islamist women’s selves, one can argue that some of the 
critiques articulated by secular women coloumnists regarding the proliferation of the 
patriarchal gender regime under the AKP rule does not stem from an all-inclusive 
profeminist standpoint. Rather than profeminist sensibilities, ultrasecularist 
tendencies may overweigh in the formulation of these critiques. Kırıkkanat’s account 
on the escalating violence against women in contemporary Turkey is a good example 
of this ultrasecularist tendency. Associating violence against women with Islam, she 
establishes a cause-effect relationship between the recent rise in male violence and 
the proliferation of conservative values and norms in society. Such essentialist 
associations, when coupled with an ultrasecularist line of thinking, falls short in 
acknowledging the broader picture about structural gender inequalities and the 
functioning mechanisms of patriarchal discourses.   
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In a similar vein, the promising aspects in pious women columnists’ 
narratives on feminism and feminist identity become ineffective when the Islamic 
feminist framework in these narratives is replaced by an overweighing stress on the 
Islamic frame. Redefining the meanings of Islam and feminism through a dialectical 
reading, pious women columnists pose significant criticisms to the misogynist 
discourses in public debates and challenge some of the patriarchal policies of the 
AKP rule. Yet, when it comes to certain issues such as protection of family unity, 
motherhood or flexible employment for women, they may side with the conservative 
politics of the AKP rule and replace the feminist tones in their narratives with a 
dominant Islamist standpoint. At certain points, this shift in their narratives may be 
accompanied by an essentialist fixation of feminism.  
The fixation of feminism as anti-family and regarding it obsessed with 
women’s professional success at the expense of familial life, blocks the flourishing 
of the dialogue between the secular and Islamic feminist positions. This essentialist 
fixation also prevents pious women columnists from acknowledging the perils of 
conservative policies about family unity or women’s flexible employment. As a 
result, gender policies and discourses that are highly criticized by secular feminist 
publics such as women’s flexible employment or AKP’s call for three children may 
find resonance in pious women columnists’ narratives without any critical 
questioning. 
For instance, Tuksal underlines that feminists overstress women’s leadership 
position at the workplace and ignore the fact that some women may prefer to spend 
more time at home to care for the family and children. This fixed reading of 
feminism as anti-family and obsessed with women’s leadership puts a distance 
between Tuksal’s conservative gender views and secular feminist activism. On the 
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other hand, Karaca declares that the AKP’s call for three children is a natural 
outcome of the conservative politics that the party adopts. For her, since the party’s 
conservative political stance by its very nature encompass pronatalist and profamily 
policies, such discourses should not be seen as an imposition on women’s 
reproductive freedoms as there is no regulation on this matter that can hamper 
women’s free choices. Here, Karaca obviously overlooks the fact that the regulatory 
character of patriarchal discourses do not need to rely on legal arrangements.  
As seen in these statements, pious women columnists’ support for some 
conservative policies regarding family life and women’s reproductive rights does not 
entail an acknowledgment of the perils that such policies may lead to with regard to 
gender relations. One can suggest that pious women columnists’ stress on Islamic 
norms and values curbs the promising aspects of their dialectical understanding of 
Islamic feminism when it is not accompanied by a critical stance that the coexistence 
of Islam and feminism can provide. 
In this frame, it is obvious that the gender regime under the AKP rule 
generates certain opportunity structures for both secular and pious women columnists 
to articulate a profeminist stance in public debates. Despite the limitations and 
essentialist tendencies involved, the profeminist tones in women columnists’ 
narratives constitute a discursive terrain where cooperation with the feminist 
subaltern public can be enhanced and coalitional feminist politics can flourish. Thus, 
women columnists’ approach to the issue of feminist self-identification is of 
tantamount importance to the contemporary feminist struggle in Turkey. The 
affirmation of feminist identity and feminist goals by an influential public figure 
such as a well-known woman columnist can greatly contribute to the standing of 
feminist discourses in public debates. Yet, as the analysis so far has clearly shown, 
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not only the affirmation of a profeminist stance, but also the anti-essentialist 
character of this affirmation and inclusivity of differences and multiples aspects of 
selves are critical for an effective feminist coalition politics in the current 
antifeminist, neoliberal and neoconservative era. 
An all-inclusive, nuanced conception of coalitional politics recognizes 
differences among women, while it also ensures a ground where it is possible to rely 
on the rhetorics of a feminist “we” to articulate political demands. (Lyshaug, 2006) 
In this way, it enables women to act in concert without suppressing their differences. 
This conception of coalition politics argues that to go beyond strategic, issue-based 
collaboration, it is neccesary to cultivate sympathy and develop inclusive political 
ties that can be formed as a result of affective encounters with others. Since 
differences present themselves only in the context of communicative engagement 
(Dean, 1997:4), transformative coalition politics characterized by flexibility with 
respect to one’s values and receptivity to others’ experiences and demands, can only 
be achieved as a result of self-reflexivity, dialogue, mutual respect and sympathy. 
(Elomaki 2012) In this regard, one should acknowledge that women columnists’ 
strategic, contingent cooperation with the feminist subaltern public can be regarded 
as an initial step towards a feminist coalitional politics. Nonetheless, in order for this 
issue-based cooperation with the feminist subaltern public to turn into an all-
inclusive, transformative, sustained profeminist coalitional politics, further 
communicative engagement informed by self-reflexivity, receptivity to others’ 
demands and openness to self-transformation is needed. 
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CHAPTER X 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
In seeking to analyze the intricacies of feminist self-identification in the 
contemporary Turkish context, this dissertation has set out to disentangle the 
puzzling ways in which feminist identity is narrated and negotiated by influential 
female public figures, i.e., women columnists, against the complex background of 
pro-Islamism, neoliberalism, conservatism and authoritarianism. In recent years, the 
issue of feminist self-identification has come to the forefront of the feminist agenda 
as a major line of fraction. As Banet-Weiser (2007: 210)  points out, “feminism 
exists in the present context as the politics of contradiction and ambivalence.” The 
perplexing multiplicity of differences underlying feminisms today makes the current 
political moment quite challenging with respect to feminist principles and feminist 
self-identification. The self-reflexive reinvigoration of feminism inspired by 
postmodern and poststructural critiques has led to the dismantling of fixed 
conceptions of identity and introduced a number of working definitions of feminism 
that always change, depending on particular concepts, specific issues and personal 
practices. As a result, this plethora of differences has put forward that “there are as 
many ways of becoming a feminist as there are of becoming a woman.” (Budgeon, 
2001: 23)  
422 
 
While the self-reflexive moment of feminism has inspired new theoretical 
attempts to reconcile subjects’ situatedness with fragmentation, multiplicity, 
contingency and flexibility
145
, the anti-identity trend in feminist scholarship, together 
with postmodern discourses and the postfeminist backlash fed by conservative 
discourses poses a serious challenge for this reconciliation. The fact that identity is 
cast into doubt in feminist theory and practice has led to widespread concerns among 
theorists about the future of feminist activism. Bordo (1990: 142) defines the 
postmodern replacement of identity with plurality and fragmentation as an escape 
from our situatedness. According to her, given that the idea of consensus around 
feminist concepts such as patriarchy, sex, experience is already outdated, it is hard to 
find a common ground to articulate political demands in order to achieve feminist 
goals. In a similar vein, Benhabib (1992: 230) notes that being alert to the traps of 
foundational thinking should not lead to a retreat from utopia. This line of thought 
suggests that in an age in which gender inequalities persist, the poststructuralist 
positioning of subject in a decentered realm of detachment makes it difficult to take a 
position and acknowledge the situated character of subjectivity. Regarding this, 
Friedman (1998: 31) reminds us that the concept of “post-identity” does not imply a 
new historical stage with greater sophistication; but rather, a dangerous flirtation 
with a regressive discourse of postfeminism. Accordingly, to avoid displacement of 
gender as old-fashioned and take note of the enduring character of gender 
inequalities, it is politically imperative to maintain identity as an analytical concept.  
In this frame, as it has been argued throughout this dissertation, the issue of 
feminist self-identification is one of the most pressing issues in feminist thinking and 
practice in the contemporary social and political context. The contemporary 
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postfeminist moment relies on both progressive and regressive discourses, which, in 
return, points at the complexity of the current state of feminism. While a particular 
strand of postfeminism inspired by the postmodern ideas of flexibility and difference 
contributes to the self-reflexive moment of feminism, another strand connotes “the 
time after feminism” and “rejection of feminism”, implicating that feminism is passé 
or is a dangerous ideology hampering “core” values of society such as family or 
motherhood. (Genz & Brabon, 2009) The regressive connotations of the 
contemporary postfeminist/anti-feminist moment further crystallize when read 
together with patriarchal conservative discourses. The antifeminist tones in the 
current postfeminist moment encourage conservative discursive regimes stressing 
traditional gender roles by providing them a suitable milieu to promote the claim that 
feminism is passé/unnecessary/dangerous.  
This study has revealed that the collaboration between conservative 
discourses and the contemporary postfeminist moment fed by antifeminism becomes 
quite explicit in the Turkish context, when read against the complex patchwork of 
conservatism, pro-Islamism and anti-feminism. It has been pointed out that gender 
politics under the contemporary AKP rule relies on a conservative understanding of 
family and anti-feminism that replaces gender equality with the idea of 
complementarity between genders, claiming that feminist ideas cannot respond to 
contemporary challenges. As this conservative gender politics with pro-Islamist 
tones is promoted through policy initiatives, legislations, discursive interventions, 
conservative gender discourses gain further efficacy in public deliberation. 
Consequently, feminism gets increasingly eliminated from the social and political 
lexicon through various rhetorical strategies such as promotion of antifeminism from 
within a pro-Islamist framework and/or reference to the postfeminist moment in the 
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contemporary world. In this frame, the thorough study of the gender regime under 
the AKP rule has disclosed that postfeminist arguments calling for revision of 
established feminist ideas may be easily appropriated by conservative social forces 
for rendering antifeminist gender discourses entrenched.  
The following conclusions follow this line of analysis. First, attempts to 
destabilize the meanings underlying feminism and feminist identity through 
postmodern concepts such as flexibility, multiplicity, difference and fragmentation 
can contribute to an anti-essentialist, dynamic conception of feminism. Yet, when 
appropriated by the anti-identity trend in scholarship and the conservative patriarchal 
discourses, this destabilization may easily evolve into elimination of gender as an 
analytical category and redefinition of feminism as passé, redundant and/or 
dangeorus. 
Thus, one should be alert to the fact that in order to enhance the public 
standing of antifeminism, conservative discourses may rely on certain strands of 
postfeminism deeming feminism as old-fashioned, static and exclusionary. 
Moreover, they may appropriate contemporary feminist debates in such a way as to 
generate a progress narrative in which basic feminist acquisitions such as the idea of 
gender equality are rendered obsolete. Thus, it is of critical importance to take notice 
of the implications of the contemporary feminist doubts cast on concepts such as 
equality and commonality as they may turn into rhetorical tools to legitimize the 
conservative rejection of feminism. On the other hand, this vigilance should not 
dissuade us from employing a dynamic, anti-essentialist approach to revisit core 
feminist ideas and conceptions that are incapable of dealing with today’s challenges.   
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Keeping in mind the points outlined above, this study has scrutinized the 
issue of feminist identification without a categorical fixation of identity positions as 
progressive or regressive. It has demonstrated that the call for revision of entrenched 
feminist ideas may connote both a progressive, antiessentialist move and a 
conservative deviation from the feminist line of thinking. This complexity points out 
that discourses on feminism may be highly transitional, commuting between 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic publics. This acknowledgement has made it 
possible to study the issue of feminist self-identification in its complexity and 
beyond the categorical answers of “Yes, I am a feminist” or “No, I am not a 
feminist”.  
In this frame, this study has demonstrated that when read through the lenses 
of anti-essentialist, pro-identity feminist theories, feminist self-identification can 
operate as an interpretive horizon, enabling subjects to make sense of their 
experiences as well as the social and political context surrounding them. As such, it 
can serve as a useful tool to denote the situatedness arising from gendered 
subjectivity and the claims, demands and needs associated with it. In addition to 
implying acknowledgment of gendered subjectivity and identification with feminist 
collective identity, this interpretive, dynamic usage of the term can also function as a 
rhetorical strategy to promote counter-hegemonic feminist discourses vis-a-vis 
conservative antifeminism. Hence, one should acknowledge that negotiation of 
feminist identity can gain additional meanings beyond belonging and identification. 
It can assume a role in enhancing the efficacy of feminism in the discursive gender 
regime where hegemonic conservative discourses and counter hegemonic feminist 
discourses constantly struggle for meaning.      
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As discussed throughout this study, feminist self-identification functions as a 
multi-faceted form of public statement denoting the complex engagement with 
gendered subjectivity, lived experience and the social and political context. It reflects 
the peculiarity of subject positions in the public sphere and the ways in which 
subjects make sense of the social and political world around them in line with their 
gendered experiences. When read in such terms, it turns out to be a hermeneutic site 
where one engages in multi-layered meaning making processes. (Alcoff 2006) This 
reading of feminist self-identification as an “interpretive horizon” deeply grounded 
in subjects’ social locations is based on the idea that identifications are perspectival, 
context-specific and thus open to change. (Hekman, 1997) They derive their 
peculiarity from the “materiality of lived experience” that the subject experiences in 
a particular context. In this regard, one can safely argue that the topic of identity is 
best approached in context-based analyses. This locality can reveal how 
identification as a way of interpreting and working through, operates in a specific 
social and political context.  
In this sense, the study of feminist self-identification in the contemporary 
Turkish context has disclosed many significant points regarding the discursive 
construction of feminism and feminist identity in the contemporary gender regime in 
Turkey. First, it has revealed that in a social and political context where antifeminist 
discourses are a constitutive part of the gender regime, the negotiation of feminist 
identity assumes multiple meanings. Accordingly, feminist identity may connote a 
strategic positioning that aims to avoid negative labeling and ostracization. It may 
also hint at a counter-hegemonic attempt to challenge the rise of patriarchal gender 
discourses. Its multifarious connotations point out the heterogenity of the discursive 
realm in which meanings of feminism and feminist identity are debated. This 
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discursive realm is quite volatile and heavily-loaded in that the struggles between 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic gender discourses are overarching to the extend 
that they permeate into the most intimate spheres of life including reproduction, 
abortion, c-section, sexuality, marriage and crosscut across class, ethnicity and 
religion.  
Relying on the analysis put forward in this study, one can suggest that the 
narration of feminist identity always encapsulates quite complex qualities that resist 
fixed categorizations and demand a nuanced, interpretive approach acknowledging 
different tones embedded in identification. The contextual implications of the 
negotiation of feminist identity in contemporary Turkey render this need for a 
nuanced approach even more acute. As noted above, beyond being a categorical 
statement of belonging, feminist self-identification in contemporary Turkey is a form 
of public statement that reflects the overarching struggles for meaning in the gender 
agenda and is capable of contributing to the publicist aims of the feminist counter 
public.  
The multifaceted character of feminist self-identification indicates that 
feminist identity in the contemporary Turkish context corresponds to a very intricate 
positionality that has both “selective” and “enforced” qualities. (Franks, 2002) When 
it connotes an “enforced positionality”, it usually involves streotypical labeling and 
ostracization. On the other hand, feminist identity as a “selective positionality” 
designates a multifaceted engagement that displays quite dynamic, flexible 
properties. In women columnists’ mindset, the selective and enforced qualities of 
feminist self-identification blend together in such a way as to generate an 
amalgamous identity position that bears the marks of the contextual setting, women 
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columnists’ situational meaning making processes and the interrelational dialogue 
that they engage with in the public sphere.  
In this frame, this dissertation has contributed to the attempts to study the 
issue of feminist identity through a dynamic, anti-essentialist approach that can 
capture its multifariousness. Through a detailed survey on recent feminist theories on 
identity, it has disclosed main analytical tools of “mid-way” theories that mitigate 
between poststructuralist accounts of identity and the political need for stable identity 
claims. This perspective has proved to be quite fruitful for the purposes of this study 
especially in making sense of the coexistence of the denial of fixed identity labels 
and the stress on agency in women columnists’ narratives. In this sense, one can 
suggest that “mid-way” theories provide useful tools to comprehend the shifting 
narrative lines, hybrid meanings as well as the multi-faceted, equivocal conceptions 
of belonging in women columnists’ approach to feminist self-identification. This 
alternative perspective going beyond the binary opposition between the arguments 
for stable and flexible self reveals the complex web of meanings embedded in the 
espousal and/or denial of the feminist label and puts forward that politics of identity 
is not always entirely constraining.  
To explore the cognitive building blocks involved in the narration of an 
identity position, this study also attempted to shed light on the close relationship 
between identity and the idea of narrative. Pointing out that the idea of narrative can 
capture the complexities and dynamic aspects of identity positions, it has 
underscored that identity narratives are formed within the limits of prevailing public 
narratives and in accordance with the interpretive horizon set forth by subjective 
experiences. In this sense, one of the major conclusions of this study has been the 
relevance of the idea of narrative in dealing with multi-layered identity narratives.  
429 
 
The idea of narrative can also provide a suitable ground to revisit the concept 
of public sphere in a more nuanced way. This study has put forward that subjects’ 
particularities, which are brought into the open through narratives, map out the 
contours of their position in public deliberation. In this sense, idealistic accounts of 
the public sphere that ignore subjects’ particularities with the aim to ensure 
inclusivity of all, prove to be futile in dealing with the power dimension involved in 
public deliberation. Following the feminist critique of the Habermasian conception of 
the public sphere, this study has explored the promising aspects and the limits of the 
idea of subaltern publics where marginalized identities can articulate their demands 
and needs. Since contestation over meaning always takes place through agonistic 
relationships in the public sphere (Laclau and Mouffe 1985), any study into the 
constitution and the operating logic of marginalized identities should take into 
account the relationship between hegemonic and subaltern publics. Thus, one of the 
main aims of this study has been to reflect on the relative positioning of hegemonic 
and counter hegemonic discourses vis-a-vis each other and the transitivity between 
them. Rather than limiting the focus to the contestation between hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic publics as binary opposites, this study engaged in an attempt to 
explore domains where hybrid discourses come into being, going back and forth 
between hegemonic and subaltern discursive fields. These elusive, mobile, 
borderland discourses are constantly in shift in accordance with the changing 
contextual setting, subjective experiences and/or strategic concerns. As such, they 
exceed the limits of the discursive field characterizing the public in question and 
point out the permeability of borders. Henceforth, two-pillar conceptions of the 
public sphere that confine their focus to the contestation between hegemonic and 
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counter-hegemonic publics, may not suffice to account for the operating mechanisms 
of borderland discourses.  
Through an elaborate analysis of women columnists’ narratives, this study 
has disclosed that borderland discourses come into being at a location marked by 
pure potentiality where subaltern discourses engage in dialogue with the hegemonic 
public. Since women columnists’ unique positionality between the hegemonic and 
the feminist subaltern publics demands a new terminology, it would not be far-
fetched to suggest that the shifting lines in their narratives connote a positionality 
that can be named as “public-in-between”. This liminal space destabilizes the 
components of both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic publics, generating 
transformative effects on public discourses. It provides us a venue where the 
publicist character of counter publics can be further explored. Underlining the 
political necessity of forming conjunctural alliances, the study of borderland 
discourses hints at the existence of alternative public domains where the multiple, 
dialectical and always in process character of the “counter” in counter publics can be 
acknowledged. This dialogic reading of the relationship between hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic publics can highly contribute to the formation of coalitional 
politics, deconstruction of the so-called representative unity of hegemonic and 
counter hegemonic publics and the enhancement of the efficacy of counter 
discourses. In addition to its possibilities, the idea of borderland marked by in-
between positionalities may also display certain perils. At some points, borderland 
discourses may be prone to reproducing hegemonic norms and values, which 
destabilizes the meanings of the “counter” in their constitution.  
Pointing out the sui-generis implications of the combination of pro-Islamism, 
neoliberalism, neoconservatism and antifeminism in AKP’s gender politics, this 
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study has also touched upon the need in feminist activism to enhance the efficacy of 
profeminist ideas vis-a-vis the rise of patriarchal discourses in contemporary Turkey. 
AKP’s conservative, anti-feminist gender discourse does not exhaust all possibilities 
of meaning making about gender issues in the contemporary public debates in 
Turkey. On the contrary, with each conservative, anti-feminist attempt to reinforce 
meaning in the discursive field, other possibilities for meaning strive to be more 
visible and influential. Given the antifeminist ethos of the current social and political 
moment, attempts to explore the possibility of bolstering coalitional feminist politics 
is of tantamount importance in the Turkish context today.  
Keeping this in mind, one can suggest that the fields of struggle in the 
feminist subaltern public in contemporary Turkey has expanded considerably in 
order to counterweigh the rise of antifeminist gender discourses. Moreover, it has 
come into the open that feminist activism needs to ensure the broadest collaboration 
possible in order to contest the hegemonic attempts to stabilize meaning in the field 
of gender relations. Although the political urgency of feminist activism generates a 
promising potential for collaboration, the feminist subaltern public needs to develop 
a relational, transformative conception of coalition that will ensure a broader alliance 
between different voices of profeminist social forces. This relational conception of 
coalitional politics can greatly contribute to profeminist attempts by bridging 
differences without eradicating subjects’ individuality. (Weir 2008, Anzaldua 2002) 
In this frame, this study has set forth that the need for feminist collaboration in 
contemporary Turkey does not only require collaborative initiatives in the 
profeminist counter public, but also demands extensive publicity to keep feminist 
ideas on the agenda. From here, it is possible to reach the conclusion that unearthing 
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the potential in the media for enhancing the publicist goals of collaborative feminist 
politics is key for women’s activism today.  
In this frame, this study has indicated that women columnists as prominent 
public intellectuals engage in a contingent, contextual alliance with the feminist 
subaltern public, when certain issues are at stake. It has put forward that the rise of 
the patriarchal gender regime under the AKP rule has generated an incentive for 
women columnists to allign with the feminist subaltern public. This profeminist 
alliance takes place at a liminal point characterized by a complex amalgam of 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses.  
In addition to its contribution to the enhancement of the efficacy of 
profeminist discourses in public deliberation, women columnists’ contingent 
profeminist positionality can also bolster women’s media activism, transforming the 
patriarchal language in media enterprises. At a time when major political 
contestations take place in the media sphere, women’s media activism has the 
potential to counterweigh the rise of conservative patriarcal discourses. However, as 
it is shown in the study, in order for this profeminist alliance to turn into a sustained, 
all-inclusive and transformative coalitional politics, women columnists need to 
engage in further communicative engagement informed by self-reflexivity and 
receptivity to others’ demands. Collaboration with the feminist subaltern public per 
se does not ensure transformative coalitional politics. Neither the feminist counter 
public nor profeminist women columnists have fully adopted the relational, anti-
essentialist qualities of transformative coalition politics. To make sense of the 
complexity of the profeminist collaboration between different actors in the public 
sphere and uncover the gist of the profeminist ideas at stake, one should 
acknowledge the multiplicities underlying actors’ positions. Thus, before presenting 
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women columnists’ categorically as a major coalition partner for the feminist 
subaltern public, one should investigate the reciprocity between the profeminist 
components of women columnists’ writings and the potential for an all-inclusive, 
anti-essentialist feminist coalitional politics in the feminist subaltern public. 
Having said this, it is worthwhile to stress that women columnists’ narratives 
display multiplicity, rendering fixed categorizations and labelings impossible. They 
are divided into reformist and orthodox sub-clusters, depending on their receptivity 
to others’ differences and openness to change through dialogue. This in-between 
positionality in the public sphere and the contingent alliance with the feminist 
subaltern public sphere are indicative of the sui generis aspects of their situatedness 
in the Turkish context. As pioneer women in the media field, most of the women 
columnists assume a generic existence when they talk about their professional 
identity in public. This generic self-presentation originates from the fact that the 
operating mechanisms of the media sphere rely on a binary opposition between 
womanhood and professional merit. As most of the interviews in this study point out, 
the male dominance and the patriarchal elements of the journalistic profession result 
in women columnists’ negation of gendered subjectivity. This generic thinking 
underlying women columnists’ pioneer role in the journalistic sphere results from 
their aspiration to avoid victim’s position, prove their professional merit and ensure 
fair treatment. In this sense, one can suggest that vulnerabilities underlying women 
columnists’ positionalities in the public sphere is one of the main factors explaining 
the puzzling, janus-faced shifts in their narratives. 
Another significant point underscored in this study is the secular/Islamist 
divide as one of the major fault lines with regard to women columnists’ approach to 
contemporary gender debates. In this sense, the comparative study of women 
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columnists’ narratives has proved to be quite useful in mapping out the contours of 
their position in the public sphere. One should note that differences in secular and 
pious women columnists’ narratives do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that 
they constitute two isolated groups with impermeable boundaries. In collaborating 
with the feminist subaltern public, these two groups may display many 
commonalities in their approach to gender debates. The call for flexible, multiple 
identities, the critique of fixed identity labels, the stress on an all-inclusive, 
profeminist coalitional politics and opposition to patriarchal statements, violence 
against women and underrepresentation of women in parliament can be outlined as 
major themes that provide an incentive for secular and pious women columnists to 
take collaborative action. Yet, what is crucial here is to acknowledge that this 
potential for bridging differences does not reduce different positionalities into 
unified, categorical agreements. 
Hegemonic discourses reproducing negative labeling and subjects’ failure to 
differentiate between streotypical labeling from outside and redefinition of identities 
in line with one’s needs and demands, have also appeared as major forces shaping 
women columnists’ approach to gender, gendered subjectivity, feminism and 
feminist identity. Both the contextual setting and women columnists’ peculiar 
positionality in the public sphere play a key role in their construction of intricate 
narratives on feminism and feminist identity. In this sense, identity positions in 
women columnists’ narratives are adopted as a result of both processes of making 
sense of subjective experiences and the discursive effects of hegemonic public 
narratives. They are neither solely imposed from outside, nor do they have a pre-
given, essential character. 
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Shifting narrative lines and strategies that women columnists employ in their 
narratives clearly exemplify that identity narratives resist closure and are hard to pin 
down because they encompass multiple layers of meaning in line with subjects’ 
positionality and their making sense of the contextual setting. They involve 
multiplicities, contradictions, strategic elements, constantly shifting belongings and 
contextual positionings. Prominent narrative lines and strategies that stand out in 
women columnists’ narratives on feminist identity and feminist self-identification 
can be outlined as follows: 1.) Avoidance from being confined to fixed identity 
categories, 2.) Critique of fixed identity labels, 3.) Reservation of a privileged 
epistemic position for themselves in order not to be confined to a victim’s position, 
4.) Stress on agency, intentionality and individual success to enhance the public 
recognition of their professional identities, 5.) Coexistence of denial and affirmation 
of feminist identity in the same narrative, 6.) Coexistence of anti-essentialist and 
essentialist approaches to feminism and feminist identity, 7.) Appropriation of 
belonging in line with the public context in question. 
Along these lines, one can conclude that identity narratives in the public 
sphere are always constructed by bearing in mind who the audience is. Since identity 
narratives signify a reciprocal event between the teller and the audience, we always 
address a particular audience while we perform our identities. Thus, each time we 
perform our identities, we may put the stress on different aspects of the self or 
perform the self in different ways, depending on the dialogue that we expect to 
emerge out of our interrelations with the audience. One can suggest that women 
columnists’ “narrative editing” is closely related to their linguistic vulnerability in 
the public sphere, their unique positionality and the discursive limits as well as the 
discursive opportunity structures embedded in the contextual setting. 
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